

THE SÂMKHYA-PRAVACHANA-SÛTRAM

WITH

THE VRITTI OF ANIRUDDHIA, AND THE BHÂṢYA OF
VIJNÂNA-BHİKṢU

AND

EXTRACTS FROM THE VRITTI-SÂRA OF MAHÂDEVA VEDÂNTIN.

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सत्यमेव जयते

FOREWORD.

We have adopted for our text of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy, the celebrated *Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram* with the *Vṛtti* of Aniruddha and the *Bhāṣya* of Vijñāna-Bhikṣu thereon. The *Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram* is divided into six books, and is, on this account, sometimes alluded to as the *Saṭ-Adhyāyî*, Sāstra of Six Books. These books have been significantly described as *Viśaya-Adhyāya*, the Book of Topics, *Pradhāna-Kārya-Adhyāya*, the Book of Evolutions of *Pradhāna* or the Prime Cause, *Vairāgya-Adhyāya*, the Book of Dispassion, *Ākhyāyikā-Adhyāya*, the Book of Fables, *Para-Pakṣa-Nirjaya-Adhyāya*, the Book of Demolition of Counter-Theories, and *Vīpśā-or Tantra-Adhyāya*, the Book of Recapitulation of Teachings, respectively.

By the help of the *Vṛtti* readers will be able to form a fair and accurate general acquaintance with the principal doctrines of Kapila, the Founder of the School, and the *Bhāṣya* will enable them to traverse the whole field of Hindu philosophical speculation, and thereby to acquire a deeper and wider knowledge of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy in itself and in its relation to all other systems of thought. Referring to the *Bhāṣya* of Vijñāna-Bhikṣu, Dr. Garbe observes that "the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Bhāṣya is after all the one and only work which instructs us concerning many particulars of the doctrines of what is in my estimation the most significant system of philosophy that India has produced."

The Sāṃkhya holds a unique place in the history of Hindu thought, and is in many ways remarkable for the depth and subtlety of its criticism of human experience, besides possessing a peculiar terminology of its own. For these reasons it is desirable to start with an outline knowledge of the scheme of the work and a thorough understanding of its nomenclature. We have, therefore, thought it proper to preface the *Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram* with the very short treatise differently known as

Kâpila-Sûtram and *Tattva-Samâsa* or Compendium of Principles, to serve the aforesaid purpose.

The Sâmkhya has been very widely read and discussed all over the civilised world, and most divergent views have been propounded with regard to some of its cardinal doctrines. We propose to consider them and all other important matters in this connection in our Introduction. May success attend our enterprise.

BIHAR, DISTRICT PATNA:

The 22nd May, 1912.

TRANSLATOR.





KĀPILA-SÛTRAM

(TATVA-SAMĀSA)

WITH

NARENDRA'S COMMENTARY.

COMMENTATOR'S INTRODUCTION.

Aum

SALUTATION TO THE SUPREME SELF.

I compose this Commentary on the Aphorisms of Kapila, after making obeisance to Him, the Lord of infinite bliss, Whom the mind of thoughtful men reaches by thinking in deep meditation, as well as to Kapila, that Seer of ancient fame.

Now, verily, in this world, all beings, endowed with life, desire, "May there be no pain, may there be pleasure for me," and, thus, production of pleasure and avoidance of pain are the two things always desired by them. For there can be no feeling of pleasure without the disappearance of pain, inasmuch as, possessing contradictory properties as they do, they, like darkness and light, cannot exist at one and the same time. If pain had no existence in the Samsāra, stream of transmigration,—the world-process—then nobody would care to find out the means of its removal. But if it does exist there, care must be taken in respect of the remedy of the threefold afflictions; for, it is the cessation of the threefold afflictions that is the supreme object of desire.

Knowledge derived from the Śāstra is the only means for that, and there is no other such means, because knowledge imparted in the Śāstra desired to be composed, *i.e.*, Kapila-Sûtram, is the cause of discrimination,—so concluded in his mind Âchârya Pañchaśikha of great powers. He went through the vast field of Vedic literature according to the rules of study, such as "The Vedas should be studied," etc., and gathered that the Self had to be discriminated from Prakṛiti or the First Cause, such discrimination being capable of yielding the final result, (*i.e.*, Release). Accordingly he approached the great Seer Kapila who, in his intrinsic form, was Nārāyaṇa Himself.

Thereupon Kapila, whose mind has been purified by the consideration of the Real and the Unreal, with a view to demonstrate the Avoidable, (i. e., pain), through the removal of false knowledge, by means of this collection of twenty-two aphorisms, briefly proposes the beginning of the Śāstra, for the illumination of the disciple.

The Sāṃkhya (-Pravachana-Sūtram), consisting of six books, of which the first aphorism is, Final cessation of the threefold pain is the supreme object of desire, appears, it is said, to be a repetition or reproduction of what is taught in this Śāstra, inasmuch as brevity in speech should be the characteristic of Kapila who is spoken of in the Veda and who was master of meditation. Thus there is the Śruti :

ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्विभर्ति जायमानञ्च पश्येत् ।

(Who at first nourishes the Seer Kapila, when brought forth, with knowledge, and also looks upon him as he is brought forth.)

This is true ; for, their subject-matter being the same, the present one was taught as an elementary course, while the object of both the Śāstras is the ascertainment of the Principle of the Self.

Kapila's system is called the Sāṃkhya, because the word Sāṃkhya conveys a technical or singular sense derived from its etymology. Thus there is the authority of the Mahābhārata (Śānti Parvan) :

सांख्यां प्रकुर्वते चैव प्रकृतिं च प्रचक्षते ।

तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशत् तेन सांख्याः प्रकीर्तिताः ॥

[They are called Sāṃkhyas, because they cause illumination (of the nature of the Self), and declare Prakṛiti or the First Cause and the twenty-four Principles].

What, then, is that Śāstra ?

अथातस्तत्त्वे समासः ॥ १ ॥

अथ Atha, now, denotes undertaking and refers to the subject-matter. अतः Atah, therefore, gives the reason why cultivation of knowledge is required. तत्त्वे Tattve, of truths, principles. समासः Samāsaḥ, collection, compendium.

1. Now, therefore, a Compendium of Principles (is wanted).—1.

“Atha signifies a good omen, enquiry, inception of an act, sequence, undertaking, promise, substitution, etc.” Although so many different meanings of the word, Atha, are observed, yet it is here taken in the sense of an undertaking, the other senses being inappropriate. It may be rightly urged that, at the commencement of a book, the

observance of a good omen is indispensable, as, without the observance of a good omen, the completion of the book cannot be expected. But we believe that the sense of a good omen is obtained here from the mere recital of the word, *Atha*, which drives away all possible hindrances. Hence there is no violation of the practice of the polite. *Atha*, therefore, denotes undertaking. The word, *Ataḥ*, conveys the sense of cause or reason. The meaning is, because the fruit of action does not endure, as declared by the following and other Śrutis :

यथेह कर्मजितो लोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यजितो लोकः क्षीयते ।

(As here the world conquered by action wears away, so there also the world conquered by virtue wears away.)

The word, *tattva*, bears the sense of reality as demonstrated in the *Veda*. *Samāsaḥ* means throwing in together or collection, i.e., compendium or abridgment. *Tattve* (locative) *samāsaḥ* has been used for *tattvāsyā* (genitive) *saṁīsaḥ*, a short account of the Principles. The expression, "should be understood," is the complement of the aphorism.—1.

In order to throw light on those Principles, the author lays down the aphorism :

कथयामि अष्टौ प्रकृतयः ॥ २ ॥

कथयामि Kathayāmi, declare, describe. *अष्टौ* Aṣṭau, eight. *प्रकृतयः* Prakṛitayaḥ, Prakṛitis, natures, roots, radicals, originals, evolvents, first causes.

2. (I) describe or declare (the *Prakṛitis*). (There are) eight *Prakṛitis*.—2.

There is a stop after *Kathayāmi*. The meaning is that the author is declaring the *Prakṛitis* one by one. What is the designate of the word, *Prakṛiti*? What, again, are the kinds of *Prakṛiti*? And how many (are the *Prakṛitis*)? *Prakṛiti* (derived from *pra-kṛi-kti*, in the sense that) it multiplies, modifies, procreates, means procreatrix, that which brings forth. It is two-fold : pure and mixed. Pure *Prakṛiti* is one, being the state of equilibrium, or neutral state, of *Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*, the sentient, mutative, and conservative Principles, or the Principles of Illumination, Evolution, and Involution; it is Unmanifest, Principal, Insentient, and the Cause of the World. By means of their unequilibrated, disengaged, or perturbed states (arise) the Principles of *Mahat*, *Ahaṁkāra*, and the five *Tan-mātras*, (collectively) called *Prakṛiti-vikṛiti* or mother-principles as well as products or transformations. The mixed *Prakṛitis*, therefore, are seven. These are the eight *Prakṛitis*. Cf.

प्रकृतेर्महान्, महतोऽहंकारः, अहंकारात् पञ्च तन्मात्राणि ॥

(Mahat springs from Prakṛiti ; from Mahat, Ahaṁkāra ; from Ahaṁkāra, the five Tan-mâtras.)—(Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram I. 61).

What is the nature of Mahat ? It is a species of Buddhi or Understanding. Ahaṁkāra, on the other hand, is the Principle underlying such conduct as " I do." The five Tan-mâtras also are the five species of sound, touch, form or colour, taste or flavour, and smell.

But how can there be production from an insentient cause ? For no production can take place in the absence of a sentient agent, as, for example, the water-pot will not be produced where there is no sentient agent at work. This may be rightly contended, except that productive power is observed in insentient things also, as, *e. g.*, even insentient milk causes the growth of the baby. In like manner, insentient cow-dung, etc., give birth to insects. Similarly. If it is rejoined that, in the case of milk and cow-dung, the power of production comes from the sentient principle presiding over the bodies of the mother and the cow, we reply that this is not well said. How can the perception of sentiency in the bodies of the cow and the mother be continued as the perception of sentiency in the milk and cow-dung expurgated by them ? At no time is sentiency perceived in them as they are being ejected. Or, it may be understood in this way that as the loadstone, which is unconnected with sentiency, is found to possess the power of causing vibration of particles in other bodies by means of its mere proximity to them, so do sentient effects everywhere follow from insentient causes.—2.

After declaring Prakṛiti, the author lays down the following aphorism, with the object of reciting the Transformations :

षोडशकस्तु विकारः ॥ ३ ॥

षोडशकः Śoḍaśakaḥ, sixteenfold. तु Tu, only. विकारः Vikāraḥ, transformation, modification, evolute, product.

3. Transformation is numerically sixteen only.—3.

Transformation is sixteen in number. The word, tu, is used to show that the enumeration is exhaustive. Now, what are the sixteen Transformations ? The sixteen Transformations are the five elements, *viz.*, Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ether ; the five Energies of Action, locally named as the voice, hand, leg, anus, and organ of generation ; the five Energies or Faculties of Perception, located in the ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose ; and Manas, Intellect. But why should Earth, etc., which enter into the production of the water-pot, and the like, as material causes, be characterised as Transformations only, when, like the five Tan-mâtras,

they embrace the nature of both Prakṛiti and Vikâra? This objection cannot be allowed, as, in that case, the result would be infinite regression in this way that curd is the transformation of milk, cream is the transformation of curd, bad smell is the transformation of cream, and so on. Moreover, the objects, water-pot, cloth, etc., are not different from Earth, etc., as is found in the Śruti :

वाचारम्भणं विकारः नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ॥

(Transformation, such as a pot, a plate, a cup, etc., is a name, the creation of speech, while, in reality, it is nothing but clay).—Chh. Up., VI. i. 4. Hereby it is understood that water-pot, milk, sprout, etc., are not different objects from earth, animal, seed, etc., since perceptual cognition arises in the same form in both the cases.—3.

Motion in a chariot and the like, which are insentient, arises from their conjunction with horses. In like manner, the perception of sentiency in objects is everywhere due to their relation to a sentient object. Intending to teach this, the author says :

पुरुषः ॥ ४ ॥

पुरुषः Puruṣaḥ, Person, Spirit, Self, In-dweller.

4. (There is one) in-dwelling Self (in every object appearing as sentient).—4.

He who lies (śete) within the body, like one within a room (puri), is Puruṣa, by conjunction with whom everything appears to possess sentiency. He is the Enjoyer, stainless, eternal, and unproductive. So say the Śrutis, *e. g.* :—

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो ज्योतिरिवाधूमकः ।

ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य स एवाद्य स उ इव एतद् वै तत् ॥

(The Puruṣa, of the measure of the thumb, 'smokeless' like light, the Lord of the past and the future; He is the very same to-day and will remain so the next day; this is that)—Kāṭha Upaniṣat, II. iv. 13.

अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम् ।

[(He) produces no sound, gives no touch, possesses no form, and is immutable.]

Now, here the question may be raised whether there is only one Puruṣa, or whether there are many Puruṣas. Let us see how the two theories stand,

Objection to the first theory :—It is not tenable, as, there being unity of the Puruṣa, on the death of one, all would die, and so on, and that thereby creation would suddenly vanish out of existence.

Answer :—Still there may be unity of the Puruṣa since he is capable of manifold divisions, according to variety of upâdhis or external limitations, like (portions of) space confined within a water-pot and a temple and known as Ghaṭa (water-pot)-Âkāśa (space) and Maṭha (temple)-Âkāśa.

Objection :—Even if the accidental manifoldness of the Puruṣa be conceded, it would still entail the disappearance of the world (Samsâra) in course of time, as, the Śruti teaches, Release is attained on the destruction of the upâdhi by knowledge of truth. For, a thing which is not capable of growth, cannot be lasting, in the same way, for example, as immeasurable masses of wealth, belonging to a charitable person, will be spent up in no time, if there be no fresh source of income.

Answer :—This is not a sound objection. The body of the son, produced from the mother and the father, being made up of parts of their bodies, what is there to prevent, in the son, etc., the inflow of the parts of the Puruṣas seated within the parental bodies as well as of the part of their Vâsanâ or the tendency of their nature? For, living beings do not spring into existence as not embodying parts of the bodies of their parents. Consequently, sentiency of the same kind as exists in the causes, is perceived in the effects, as, for example, pieces of cloth are perceived to be red or yellow, because the threads which are their material causes, have conjunction with red or yellow colour. In the Mahâbhârata we find :—

कलेशश्च संजज्ञे भुवि दुर्योधनो नृप ।

(And a part of Kali, O king, was born on earth as Duryodhana.)—Also in the Veda :

आत्मा वै जायते पुत्रः

(Verily the Self is born as the son).

Thus the one unborn Puruṣa becomes multiplied to infinity as emanations from successive parents. Amongst them, some undergo transmigration, and some are released.

Objection :—Such a view cannot find favour with those who know the traditions of the School, as it is in contradiction with the Sâṃkhya conception of the Puruṣa as undergoing no transformation at all.

Hence the second theory should be accepted, namely, that there are many Puruṣas, there being diversity of pleasures, pains, births, deaths, etc., as well as variety of virtuous lives such as Varna, castes, Âśrama, stages of life, etc. It cannot be said that in this theory also there will be an

end of the world, since such a conclusion is contravened by the infinity and eternality of the Puruṣa.

These are the twenty-five principles maintained by the Sāṃkhya teachers.

Now, why should not the Puruṣa, it may be asked, have a beginning or birth? We reply that the Puruṣa is unborn, because, there being the Vâsanâ or tendency towards transmigration, the beginning of which is not known, the Vedas had no occasion to believe in repeated births and deaths of the Puruṣa, as repeated windings and turnings are required in the case of the clock and the potter's wheel. For, there is the Śruti :

संवत्सरो वै प्रजापतिस्तस्यायने दक्षिणञ्चात्तरञ्च तत् वेह वै तदिष्टपूर्वं कृत
इत्युपासते ते चान्द्रमसमेव लोकमभिनयन्ते त एव पुनरावर्तन्ते तस्मादेत ऋषयः प्रजा-
कामाः दक्षिणं प्रतिपाद्यन्ते एष भूर्वै रयि पितृयान अथोत्तरेण तपसा ब्रह्मचर्येण श्रद्धया
विद्यया ज्ञानमन्विष्यादित्यभिजायन्ते ॥

(The whole year is verily the Lord of Beings. It consists of two Paths, the southern and the northern. Those who worship by means of sacrifices and benevolent deeds, surely ascend to the World of the Moon. It is they that return into transmigratory existence. So the Ṛṣis, desirous of progeny, take to the Southern Path. This is Bhuh, this is Rayi, this is the Path of the Pitris. Again, by the Northern Path, by penance, by continence, by faith, by reason, one should search for knowledge. For these they are born.)—4.

After declaring the twenty-five Principles, the author now analyses the subsidiary states :

त्रैगुण्यम् ॥ ५ ॥

त्रैगुण्यम् Traiguṇyam, tri-qualified-ness.

5. Prakṛiti has three modes, manifestations, or states.
—5.

Traiguṇyam means the essential form, essence, or (unmanifested) existence, of the three Guṇas, modes or states, namely, Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. Herefrom it is learnt that Traiguṇyam or Prakṛiti is Pradhânam, i. e., the Principal or Primary (as distinguished from the Guṇas which are, as their name probably implies, Secondary or Subsidiary), and is the existence of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas in their intrinsic or essential form and in equilibrium, apart from the state of their predominance over one

another. If it be asked, what the reason for this interpretation is, we reply that it is so taught in the Veda. Thus :

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां स्वरूपाः ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥

[The One Unborn (Puruṣa), for enjoyment, consorts with the One Unborn (Prakṛiti), having the colours of red, white, and black, the procreatrix of manifold progeny, like unto herself. The other Unborn deserts her, after she is enjoyed.]—Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 5.

There is connection of the unattached, sentient Puruṣa with these modes, or subsidiary states, inherent in their material cause (Prakṛiti), and this connection takes place through mere proximity, as in the case of a lamp and darkness.

Objection :—But how can connection of states or modes, be possible in the case of the material cause of the world, which contains no parts? In the world, blue and other attributes are observed in the lotus and the like, which are made up of parts. But nowhere is found connection of attributes in things which contain no parts.

Answer :—This is true. But we may point out that super-ordinary things, made known by the Vedas, do not possess merely the same power as do ordinary things, since objects, proved in the Vedas, are capable of everything. Or, we may say, if white and other attributes may be admitted in the case of part-less, popular entities, namely, ultimate atoms, then the anomaly in the case of the all-powerful (material) cause of the world is really an adornment—5.

After stating Sattva, and the other modes or states, of Prakṛiti, the author lays down the following aphorism, with the desire of declaring their properties also :

सञ्चरः प्रतिसञ्चरः ॥ ६ ॥

सञ्चरः Sañcharaḥ, production, appearance. प्रतिसञ्चरः Prati-sañcharaḥ, destruction, disappearance.

6. Entities spring from the eight Prakṛitis, and disappear into them.—6.

The meaning of the word, Sañchara, is production, and of the word, Prati-sañchara, dissolution. It is learnt from the Vedas that production is from the eight Prakṛitis, and that dissolution is into them. How? Because, as, in the Veda itself :—

प्रकृतेर्महान्, महतोऽहंकारः, अहंकारात् पञ्च तन्मात्राण्यभिजायन्ते ।

from Prakṛiti, Mahat; from Mahat, Ahaṁkāra; and from Ahaṁkāra, the five Tan-mātras are produced, so the five Tan-mātras are dissolved into Ahaṁkāra, Ahaṁkāra into Mahat, and Mahat into Prakṛiti. As a tortoise sometimes extends and sometimes withdraws its limbs, and, similarly, as a spider itself spins out and withdraws its thread, in like manner the Prakṛitis also work in the order of evolution and involution.—6.

Since these Predicables of the Sāṃkhya System possess the characteristics of pleasure and pain, the author now describes the nature of Pleasure and Pain :

अध्यात्ममधिभूतमधिदैवञ्च ॥ ७ ॥

अध्यात्मन् Adhi-âtman, adhyâtma, springing from the embodiment of the self. अधिभूतन् Adhi-bhûtam, adhibhûta, caused by elemental creation. अधिदैवन् Adhi-daivam, adhidaiva, caused by celestial beings, super-human agencies

7. Pain is threefold: adhyâtma, adhibhûta, and adhidaiva.—7.

In the world of living entities, none is known to be free from the three-fold suffering. Why? Because they are subject to three kinds of pain. What, then, are those three kinds of pain? To this it is replied. अध्यात्ममधिभूतमधिदैवञ्च Adhyâtman means that (pain) which is *adhi*, relative, *âtmani*, to (the embodied state of) the self. It is twofold: bodily and mental. Bodily (pain) is occasioned by disorders of wind, bile, and phlegm within the physical organism. Mental (pain) is occasioned by desire, anger, lust, bewilderment, fear, sadness, envy, and non-attainment of the object of desire. All this should be regarded as adhyâtma pain, because they are produced from within, (that is, from the person himself). Adhibhûtam is that (pain) which is *adhi*, relative, *bhûtam*, to the elements, that is, occasioned by men, beasts, birds, reptiles, and immovable things. Adhidaivam is that (pain) which is *adhi*, relative, *daivam*, to celestial agencies, that is, occasioned by the influence of planetary powers, Vinâyaka, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa, and the like.

The import of the aphorism is that Prakṛiti, the Prakṛiti-and-Vikâras, and the Vikâras (mentioned above) have identity of nature with these threefold pains.

There are many easy means of exterminating them. Thus, for the cure of bodily pain, such an easy means as arborial elixir has been proscribed by the physicians. To counteract the torments of the mind, there are such pleasant and easily applicable remedies as a splendid

palace, woman, excellent dishes, ornaments, and so forth. In like manner, for the prevention of elemental pain, thorough mastery of polity or the science and art of civic life, is the means. Similarly, again, for the removal of adhidaiva pain, use of jewels and incantations is the means.

(*Objection* :—When pain is remediable by these quite ordinary means, where, then, is the necessity for this Śāstra which purports to teach discrimination of the Puruṣa from Prakṛiti as the means for the termination of pain?)

Answer :—There are no doubt all these means, but still, it should be observed, absolute or permanent cessation of pains is not possible by them, there still remaining the possibility of the re-appearance of those pains, time after time.—7.

Being desirous of pointing out the general characteristic of Buddhi or understanding, the author frames the aphorism :

पञ्चाभिबुद्धयः ॥ ८ ॥

पञ्च Pañcha, five. अभिबुद्धयः Abhi-buddhayah, cognitive faculties or powers.

8. The Cognitive Powers are five—8.

Abhibuddhayah means that by which objects are known. How many are they? Five. Which, again, are they? The three inner senses, the power of perception, and the power of action. Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra, and Manas are the inner senses. Adhyavasāya, certainty, is the characteristic of Buddhi, Understanding (another word for Mahat); Abhimāna, undue application of the Self (*e. g.*, to think that the Self is the agent in all acts, which, however, is not a fact), or Self-assumption, is of Ahaṁkāra, Egoity; and Saṁkalpa, ideation (or conception), and Vikalpa, imagination, are of Manas, Intellect. The Powers of Perception are, according to the differences of the acts of seeing, etc., respectively (localised in) the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin. Their sub-divisions are five. The Powers of Action, again, are, as, according to the differences of the acts of speaking, etc., respectively (localised in) the vocal organ, hand, leg, anus, and the organ of generation, five in number. Taking them all together, with their sub-divisions, we find, Karaṇa, sense or the instrument of knowledge, is of thirteen kinds. Hence, in this world, consisting of births and deaths in continuous succession the beginning of which is enveloped in darkness, every object being knowable, these Powers of Knowledge are maintainable.

Some are, however, of opinion that, amongst the inner senses, Manas is not a sense or power or faculty of knowing. But this is not a sound

opinion, because, as in the case of a ball of iron, the (external) senses are found to have, with regard to their respective objects, identity of nature with Manas, the ruler of all the senses. The sense-ness of *Buddhi* and *Ahaṁkāra* is hereby explained, inasmuch as there is such perceptual knowledge as "I shall go," "I am happy," etc. For, there could not be such perceptual knowledge, did not *Buddhi*, etc., possess the characteristic of senses.

Objection :—But, in your theory, even when you admit the (co-) extensiveness of all the predicables, diversity of *Buddhi*, etc., according to diversity of *Puruṣa*, is not justified. Why? Because there is certainty of their (ultimate) unity or homogeneity.

Answer :—True, but your objection is futile. For, we admit (diverse) *Buddhi*, etc., as undergoing change or transformation (at every moment), and taking their origin and form from the (peculiar) *Vāsanā* or tendency (of each individual embodied Self). By reason of this *Vāsanā* or tendency the senses attend to, or turn away from, particular objects.—8.

(An objection is apprehended :) This may be the case. But whence is this invention of *Vāsanā*? With this apprehension, the author says :

पञ्च कर्मयोनयः ॥ ६ ॥

पञ्च *Pañcha*, five. कर्मयोनयः *Karma-yonayaḥ*, action-borns, the products of action, the functions of *Buddhi*, Understanding or Consciousness.

9. The products of action are five—9.

Karmayonayaḥ means things of which *karma*, action, alone is *yonī*, the source or origin, that is, modifications of the understanding or states of consciousness. Thus, the products of action which, distinguished as painful and non-painful, are responsible for the experience (*bhoga*) of pleasure and pain by living beings, are used as being five in number. Thus, in consequence of the painful modification, the living being suffers pain, being scorched with the fire of *Samsāra* or transmigration, and, similarly, by means of the non-painful modification, enjoys pleasure, possessing developed discriminative knowledge, and being desirous of Release and filled with the greatest bliss. What are those functions? It is said, (they are) *Pramāṇa*, Proof, *Viparyaya*, Fallacy, *Vikalpa*, Fancy, *Nidrā*, Sleep, and *Smṛiti*, Recollection. *Vijñāna-Bhikṣu* has elaborately explained this point in his Commentary on the *Sāṃkhya Aphorisms* in Six Chapters. We refrain from doing the same here for the sake of brevity.—9.

Now the author shows the formal differences of one of the elements :

पञ्च वायवः ॥ १० ॥

पञ्च Pañcha, five. वायवः Vāyavaḥ, airs.

10. The Airs are five—10.

These Airs should be known to be five, seeing that living beings, undergoing production and destruction, possess a variety of (physiological) functions of Air, namely Prāṇa, Apāna, Samāna, Udāna, and Vyāna. Where are these different functions of Air located? The function operating in the mouth, nose, etc., belongs to Prāṇa; the function operating in the back, anus, the organ of generation, etc., belongs to Apāna; the function operating in the heart, navel, and all the joints, belong to Udāna: the function operating in the skin, etc., belongs to Vyāna.

Objection :—But Vāyu, Air, also may be regarded as causing all living beings to move or to shine, being itself sentient, moving, and the performer of vital activities in all bodies. Why, then, do you imagine a sentient Puruṣa different from it?

Answer :—Quite so, but there is nothing to be disputed here, because we learn from the Veda that there is a Puruṣa different from Prāṇa, etc. Thus there is the Śruti :

असङ्गोऽयं पुरुष इत्यादि

(This Puruṣa is unattached, and so forth.)

Or, were Prāṇa itself the sentient Principle, then, in the case of a person in dreamless sleep, whose Prāṇa does not at that time leave him, water-pot, cloth, and other objects would be perceived by him, in that state, in the same way as perceptual knowledge arises in him in the waking state, because in dreamless sleep Prāṇa exists all the same. But no such cognition takes place in dreamless sleep, as the senses then cease to be active. The matter should be regarded in this light that, as the owner of a house goes out, with his whole family, employing a gate-man to guard the door, so does the Puruṣa, (in dreamless sleep), rest in bliss, employing Prāṇa alone to protect the body.—10.

After stating Sattva and the other Guṇas of Prakṛiti, the author now ascertains the essences of action :

पञ्च कर्मात्मानः ॥ ११ ॥

पञ्च Pañcha, five. कर्मात्मानः Karma-âtmānaḥ, essences of action.

11. The essences of action are five.—11.

Karmâtmâ means âtmâ, the discriminator, that is, determinant, karmanâm, of actions. Herefrom it should be learnt that the determinants or essences of actions are five, of which the causes are Yama, Abhyâsa, Vairâgya, Samâdhi, and Prajñâ. These, being developed, enable all acts to be performed. The proof, on this point, is furnished by :

न चास्य कर्म इत्यादि

[Action does not belong to him (Puruṣa), etc.]

They are described, one by one : Yama, Restraint, is the designation of harmless-ness, truthfulness, non-stealing, continence, not to enter into family life or unworldliness, etc. Abhyâsa, Habituation, denotes attention to pure thoughts, deeds, and objects, for a long time, without intermission. Vairâgya, Dispassion, is absence of desire for enjoyment here and hereafter. Samâdhi, Concentration or Meditation, consists in one-pointed-ness of Manas. Prajñâ, True Knowledge, means knowledge of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa as different things. This has been explained by Vyâsa Deva in the Aphorisms of Patañjali.—11.

Now, in the next aphorism, the author teaches the mutual distinctions of the five kinds of A-vidyâ or False Knowledge :

पञ्चपर्या अविद्याः ॥ १२ ॥

पञ्चपर्या : Pañcha-parvâh, five-knotted. अविद्या : A-vidyâh, false knowledges.

12. False Knowledge has five knots.—12.

Here parva means a knot. Kinds of False Knowledge which is knotty, are five. As, in consequence of the hardness of the knot in a string, a man cannot easily free himself from it, so also in consequence of the surpassing hardness of the knot of Samsâra or transmigration.

How many are they? A-vidyâ, ignorance, Asmitâ, the sense of "I am," i.e., egoity, Râga, attraction, Dveṣa, aversion, and Abhiniveśa, clinging-to, idle terror, or love of life, respectively called Tamas, obscurity, Moha, infatuation, Mahâmoha, great infatuation, Tâmiśra, darkness, Andha-tâmiśra, blinding darkness, will be five in number. It is A-vidyâ to call things eternal, pure, and pleasant, which are, in reality, perishable, impure, and painful. Its form or function is as, e.g., "I am surely a Brâhmaṇa," the conceit being due to the identification of the Self with the Not-Self (or cognition of the Not-Self as the Self). Asmitâ is of the form of Abhimâna (q.v.). "Wealth is dearer to me"—such a state of mind is of the form of Râga. "It is not desirable, being perishable"—

such a state of mind is of the form of Dveṣa. Abhiniveśa is the state of mind having the form of, that is, leading into, births and deaths.

There are eight varieties of Tamas and Moha; ten varieties of Mahā-moha; and thirty-six varieties of the other two. The same has been declared in the Kārikā (Verse 48):

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च दशविधो महामोहः ।

तामिस्रोऽष्टादशश्च तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥

(The division of Tamas is eightfold; so it is also of Moha; Mahā-moha is tenfold; Tāmīśra is eighteenfold; the same is Andha-Tāmīśra.)
—12.

Thus declaring the five divisions of the opposite of True Knowledge, the author describes the twenty-eight varieties (of Incapacity):

अष्टाविंशतिधाऽशक्तिः ॥१३॥

अष्टाविंशतिधा Aṣṭāvimśati-dhā, twenty-eightfold. अशक्तिः Aśaktiḥ, feebleness, incapacity, disability.

13. Incapacity is twenty-eightfold.---13.

Here the suffix. dhā, is employed in the sense of variety. Hence it should be known that incapacity has twenty-eight varieties, inasmuch as it is diversified in form on account of A-vidyā. What are those varieties? It is said: Owing to the dead-ness or depravity of the senses or powers of perception and action, there exist eleven varieties of incapacity belonging to the eleven senses, namely, deafness, paralysis, blindness, loss of taste, loss of smell, dumbness, inactivity of the hand, lameness, constipation, impotence, and insanity, respectively belonging to the ear, skin, eye, tongue, nose, voice, hand, leg, anus, organ of generation, and Manas. Similarly, there are seventeen more varieties constituted by the opposites of Tuṣṭis and Siddhis. By their addition, these are the twenty-eight A-siddhis or imperfections (or inversions of Siddhis). Although the senses are the seats of those imperfections, still Vṛitti or state of consciousness is included in Buddhi, Understanding or Consciousness and nowhere else, since there is no room for a state of consciousness in any other place except where Buddhi is the material cause.—13.

The author now enumerates Tuṣṭis:

नवधा तुष्टिः ॥ १४ ॥

नवधा Navadhā, ninefold. तुष्टिः Tuṣṭiḥ, acquiescence, complacency.

14. Complacency is ninefold.—14.

It, *Tuṣṭi*, is (primarily) twofold: *Ādhyātmika*, internal, and *Bāhya*, external. The internal divisions are four, designated by reference to *Prakṛiti*, *Upādāna*, means or materials, *Kāla*, time, and *Bhāgya*, luck. Immediate intuition of the difference of *Puruṣa* from *Prakṛiti* is really a species of Transformation, and is the work of *Prakṛiti* itself, while I (*Puruṣa*) am perfect; what is the use of contemplation, and the like?—the *Tuṣṭi* which the disciple derives from so thinking, (is of the first kind). It is called *Ambhas*. For, *Viveka*, discriminative knowledge, does not result from *Prakṛiti* alone. The same *Tuṣṭi* is found in retirement; there is no use of contemplation, and the like,—the *Tuṣṭi* which lies in such instructions, is designated by *Upādāna*. It is called *Salila*. Retirement will take place, by means of meditation, after waiting for a long time,—the *Tuṣṭi* which lies in such instructions, is designated by Time. It is called *Megha*. *Nirvikalpa Samādhi*, meditation without discreet consciousness, will result by the force of luck alone,—the *Tuṣṭi* which lies in this, is designated by Luck. It is called *Vṛiṣṭi*.

Five external complacencies are produced or arise for him who unduly applies the characteristic of the Self to *Prakṛiti*, *Mahat*, *Ahaṃkāra*, *Tan-mātras*, and the gross Elements. These complacencies, consequent on the disappearance, dissolution, or dispersal of objects which entail acquisition, preservation, waste, enjoyment, and injuriousness, are respectively known by the names of *Pāra*, *Supāra*, *Pāra-pāra*, *An-uttama-ambhas*, and *Uttama-ambhas*. Whatever people will become delighted by obtaining external complacency, would not be knowers of Principles; for, e.g., acquisition of wealth can be effected only with the greatest trouble, and also there is no knowledge of Principles in it. So it has been said:

अर्थानामर्जने क्लेशस्तथैव परिरक्षणे ।

रागे दुःखं व्यये दुःखं हिंसायां तुल्यमेव वा ॥

(There is trouble in the acquisition of wealth, and the same also in its preservation. There is pain in attachment to it, and also in its expenditure. Similarly, again, in the case of injuriousness or killing.)—*Mahābhārata*.

By the aggregation of these, complacency is said to be ninefold—14.

The author now lays down an aphorism, enumerating the minor divisions of the uninverted *Siddhis* alluded to above (*vide* Aphorism 13):

अष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ १५ ॥

अष्टधा *Aṣṭa-dhā*, eightfold. सिद्धिः *Siddhiḥ*, perfection.

15. Perfection is eightfold.—15.

What, again, are those eight sorts of perfection ? Accordingly they are being specifically ascertained :

It is divided into two sorts : three primary ones and five secondary ones. The three primary ones are those named Pramodâ, hilarious ; Muditâ, delighted ; and Modamânâ, joyful. Study, oral knowledge, reasoning, intercourse of friends, and charity are the secondary perfections. Thus, knowledge that is produced, after causing the disappearance of Adhidaiva pain, is Pramodâ Siddhi ; knowledge that is produced, after causing the removal of Adhibhûta pain, by means of service, etc., is Muditâ Siddhi ; knowledge that is born, immediately after the prevention of Adhyâtma pain, is Modamânâ Siddhi.

To receive instruction regarding knowledge of the Self, from a competent teacher, with due rites and ceremonies, constitutes *study*. That which is established by study, is *oral* or *verbal knowledge*. *Reasoning* is that perfection which consists in reasoning about the Principles, under the influence of previous practice, instinct, without instruction from a teacher. *Intercourse of friends* is where pleasure is obtained by the mere company of near and dear ones. The perfection in *charity* consists in donation, according to ordinances, by one whose mind is absolutely free from all sorts of impurity.—15.

Now the author distributes properties or characteristics amongst the twenty-five Principles.

दशमूलिकार्था ॥ १६ ॥

दश Daśa, ten. मूलिकार्थाः Mûlika-arthâh, radical or root objects.

16. The root objects are ten.—16.

Herefrom these, mûlikâh, root, arthâh, objects (of perception), should be known to be ten. (Why are they called root objects ?) Because objects reside, so far as may be, in one or other predicable amongst these twenty-five Principles. What are they ? Where do they reside ? All this will be stated. Unity, productiveness, and existence for the sake of another *i. e.*, (Puruṣa), have been declared with regard to Prakṛiti ; other-ness, non-agent-ship, and diversity, with regard to Puruṣas ; and is-ness, union, and separation, with regard to both. Occupation of space or existence in time (has been declared) with reference to gross and subtle bodies. Thus, in the Bhoja-Vârtika :

प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।

पाराध्यञ्च तथानैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ।

शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ॥

(Principal existence, unity, productiveness, other-ness, existence for another, plurality, separation, union, finite existence, and non-agent-ship are remembered to be the ten root objects or primary qualities).—16.

After declaring the properties of the twenty-five Principles, the author now describes the manner of Creation.

अनुग्रहः सर्गः ॥ १७ ॥

अनुग्रहः : Anu-grahah, taking or putting together, composition accumulation, aggregation. **सर्गः** : Sargah, emanation, evolution, production, creation.

17. Emanation is accumulation.—17.

Here the word, anu, has the sense of 'together with.' Anugrahaḥ means that which takes together. It is springing into existence. And it has two varieties : one, of the form of Vāsanā or tendency or disposition, and the other, of the form of the subtile body. Both these forms are capable of being known, as they do not appear one without the other. For, there can be no subtile body in the absence of Vāsanā, nor does Vāsanā exist in the absence of subtile body, as is the case with seed and shoot.

Objection :—But, since, in your theory, Buddhi, and the other predicables are beginningless, how can you hold the theory of emanation with a beginning?

Answer :—Quite so, but, in spite that they are beginningless, yet perforce, by the maxim of ripples and waves, it is hinted that emanation appears in the form of development and envelopment.—17.

Evolution of species is next elaborately ascertained :

चतुर्दशविधो भूतसर्गः ॥ १८ ॥

चतुर्दशविधः : Chaturdaśa-vidhaḥ, of fourteen sorts. **भूतसर्गः** : Bhûta-sargah, elemental creation, evolution of beings.

18. Evolution of beings is of fourteen sorts.—18.

Herefrom the evolution of all entities should be known to be chaturdaśa-vidha, of fourteen specific kinds. For, all living beings come into existence, under the influence of Vāsanā or tendency, by the form of Svedaja, sweat-born ; Anḍa-ja, egg-born ; Udbhid-ja, shoot-born ; and Jarāyu-ja, uterus-born, during the disengaged state of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. And this evolution has three minor divisions : celestial or superhuman, human, and the grovelling. The first has eight varieties, the second, one, and the third, five. These varieties are declared : Brâhma,

Prājāpatya, Aindra, Gāndharva, Yakṣa, Rākṣasa and Paisācha, these are the eight varieties of superhuman evolution. Human evolution has one variety only. Beasts, domestic animals, birds, reptiles, and immoveables are the grovelling kinds.

Objection :—But why is evolution of entities limited to fourteen kinds only, when we observe evolution of such entities as a water-pot, etc. ?

Answer :—The objection cannot be allowed, because we do not know of any producible thing, like a water-pot, etc., which is different from the five gross elements. Similarly, it should be understood in all other cases.—18.

It is so ; for, without the knowledge of the predicables already mentioned, cessation of bondage cannot take place, since bondage has no beginning. Intending, therefore, to declare the nature of bondage, the author introduces the next aphorism :

त्रिविधो बन्धः ॥ १९ ॥

त्रिविधः Tri-vidhaḥ, threefold. बन्धः Bandhaḥ bondage.

19. Bondage is threefold.—19.

Here, what is precisely the nature of bondage? Bondage is the fabrication of false knowledge, occasioned by upādhi or external condition or adjunct, and is by no means real. Of how many kinds is it? (They are) Prakṛitika, Vaikārikā, and Dākṣiṇaka. This threefold bondage should be known. They are, therefore, successively recited. Thus, the absorption into the Prakṛitis, of those, who devote themselves to Prakṛiti by meditation, wrongly believing that the eight Prakṛitis are the ultimate or transcendental realities, constitutes Prakṛitika bondage. The absorption into the Vikāras or Transformations, of those who devote themselves to them, wrongly believing that sentiency exists in the Vikāras, e.g., the powers of perception and action, etc., constitute Vaikārika bondage. Those whose mind has been misled by transmigration, and who, knowing only the sacred performances intended for the Southern Path (*vide* Aphorism 4), think that the performance of Aśva-medha and other sacrifices is the supreme object of life, and thereby experience the fruits of action,—theirs is Dākṣiṇaka bondage, for they uniformly follow the revolutions of births and deaths, like a wheel. So says the Śruti :

येनिमन्ये प्रपद्यन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिनः ।

आशुमन्येऽनुसंयान्ति यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतम् ॥

(According to their action and enlightenment, migratory Selves, for the sake of embodiment, resort, some to wombs, and others to immoveable entities).—Kāṭha Upaniṣat, II. V. 7.—19.

Notwithstanding, therefore, that bondage has no beginning, exertion must still be made for its dissolution. So thinking, the author reads the aphorism:

त्रिविधो मोक्षः ॥ २० ॥

त्रिविधः Tri-vidhaḥ, threefold. मोक्षः Mokṣaḥ, release, liberation.

20. Release is threefold.—20.

Now, threefold release of living beings results by the exhaustion of virtue and vice. What, then, are these three kinds of release? So it is said Krama-mokṣa, gradual release; Vi-deha-kaivalya, dis-embodied singleness; and Svarûpa-pratiṣṭhâ, rest in one's self. Where a man who is attached to the objects of the world, pursues also the investigation of the Principles, for him release will result in another birth. This is Krama-mokṣa. For, we may recall:

बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवान् मां प्रपद्यते ।

(The wise come unto Me at the end of many births).—Gitâ, VII, 19.

Dis-embodied singleness implies the enjoyment of that bliss which is attained by a man who is dispassionate towards the objects of the world and who "regards pleasure and pain in the same light," as the Śruti says:

अपाम सोमममृता अभूम्

[We drank the Soma (acid asolepias) juice, and we became immortal.]

Rest in one's self means existence of one by one's pure essential form, continued through the endless future time. For according to the Śruti:

न ह वै स शरीरस्य प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति*

connection with the essence of Buddhi may again take place.—20.

The author now fully defines the characteristic of Pramāṇa or Proof:

त्रिविधं प्रमाणम् ॥ २१ ॥

त्रिविधं Tri-vidham, threefold. प्रमाणम् Pramāṇam, proof.

21. Proof is threefold.—21.

* I. e., (Verily there can be no extinction of the pleasant and the non-pleasant so long as there remains the body).—Chh. Uṇ. VIII. xii. I.

Here Pramāṇam means that by which something is proved, that is to say, the instrument of Pramā or certain knowledge. Proof is threefold, *viz.*, Dṛiṣṭa, Anumāna, and Āpta-vachana. Whatever entities Buddhi makes its objects, in the form of their identity with Chitta or Manas, by the gateways of the senses or powers of perception, the same are objects perceived. This is Dṛiṣṭa, visible or immediate, proof, *e. g.*, "I see the Deva," "I am happy," etc. Anumāna, inference, is threefold: (successional, from the observed to the unobserved), Pūrva-vat, from cause to effect, Śeṣa-vat, from effect to cause, and (co-existential, from two equally observed marks:) Sāmānyato-dṛiṣṭa, equally observed. Pūrva-vat inference is where the effect is inferred from the cause; as, *e. g.*, a shower by the ascent of clouds. Śeṣa-vat inference is where the cause is inferred by means of the effect; as, *e. g.*, ultimate atoms, etc., by the observation of a water pot. Sāmānyato-dṛiṣṭa inference is where, after leaving a place for a time, something, previously observed in one place, is next observed in another place; as, *e. g.*, going is inferred by the observation that Devadatta who was previously observed inside his house, is now outside it. The Veda which is the repository of all knowledge and the cause of the divisions of Devas, Yakṣas, birds, men, castes, stages of life, etc., not being the work of a personal author (and being accordingly free from the defects of personal equation), its declarations are Āpta-vachana, trustworthy sayings, upon which proceeds the conduct of the elders that this is real, that this is unreal, that this is a water-pot, etc.

Discriminative knowledge of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa by means of this threefold proof, is the source of the supreme object of desire with Puruṣa—21.

Therefore, after declaring these predicables, and desiring to briefly recapitulate them, for showing that release is attainable through knowledge of them, the author lays down the aphorism:

**एतत् सम्यक् ज्ञात्वा कृतकृत्यः स्यात्
न पुनस्त्रिविधेन दुःखेनानुभूयते ॥ २२ ॥**

एतत् Etat, this. सम्यक् Samyak, thoroughly. ज्ञात्वा Jñātvā, knowing. कृतकृत्यः Kṛita-kṛityaḥ, fulfilled, successful. स्यात् Syāt, will be. न Na, not. पुनः Punah, again. त्रिविधेन Tri-vidhena, by threefold. दुःखेन Duḥkhena, by pain. अनुभूयते Anubhūyate, made to feel, joined.

22. By thoroughly knowing this, man will be fulfilled, and will not have to suffer again from the threefold pain.—22.

Etat is easily understood. Here 'man' is the complement of the sentence : Samyak jñātvā kṛita-kṛityah syāt. Tri-vidhena, with pains Adhy-ātina, etc. Na anubhūyate, is not conjoined; for, on account of their absolute extinction, it is impossible for them to come to appear again.—22.

This Commentary on the Sāṃkhya was composed, with great delight, by Śrī Narendra, a terrestrial divinity (*i. e.*, a Brāhmaṇa), in the Śaka era 1793.



through intimate connection with the body. It has not been found that an embodied self has been happy. Hence this Puruṣa-artha or object of desire should be forsaken by reasonable men, and that which is learnt from the Śāstra should be adopted.—4.

Bhāṣya.—He states that the above-mentioned Puruṣa-artha, object of volition of a lower kind, should be rejected by men of wisdom :

And the above-mentioned remedy of pain, producible by visible means, 'heyah,' should be thrown into the side of pain, 'Pramāṇa-kuśalaiḥ,' by those who are well versed in the Śāstra, learning, of discrimination between pain and not-pain. Why? 'Sarva-asambhavât': Because remedy by visible means is not possible in all cases of pain. He further observes that even where there is such possibility, there still pain arising from sins of acceptance of gifts, etc., is inevitable: 'Sambhave api,' that is, even in case of such possibility, there must necessarily exist connection with pain not preventible by visible means. Compare Yoga Sūtra, *एतन्निमित्तं दुःखं विवेकिनः*—To the discriminative, all, without exception, is pain, inasmuch as (enjoyment of pleasure is accompanied) with affliction, (in the shape of aversion to all that interferes with the enjoyment of pleasure), and is followed by resultant pain and by pain due to the recollection that the enjoyment of pleasure has passed away, and also on account of active opposition among the functions (*e. g.*, pleasure, pain, etc.) of the Guṇas or principles, (namely, of illumination, Sattva, evolution, Rajas, and involution, Tamas, which are constantly struggling to overpower one another).—(Yoga Sūtram, II. 15, S. B. H., Vol. iv., p. 114).—4.

Because Mokṣa or Release is the good PAR EXCELLENCE.

उत्कर्षादपि मोक्षस्य सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेः ॥ १ । ५ ॥

उत्कर्षात् Utkarṣāt, on account of excellence or superiority. *अपि* Api, also; or. *मोक्षस्य* Mokṣasya, of Mokṣa or Release. *सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेः* Sarva-utkarṣa-Śruteḥ, from the texts of the Veda, which declare excellence over all else.

5. (Cessation of pain by visible means should be rejected), because it varies in degrees of excellence, (according as different means are applied), whereas Mokṣa is, as is evident from the Veda, absolutely the most excellent. (Aniruddha); or, (Existence of pain in objects of desire attainable by visible means is inferred) from the superiority of Mokṣa to those objects, and the superiority of Mokṣa to all else is proved by the Veda. (Vijñāna-Bhikṣu.)—5.

Vṛitti—The author advances another argument :

Again, comparative excellence (in different acts) of cessation of pain (by visible means) is an observed fact. Mokṣa, on the other hand, is the most excellent of all, being permanent and uniform and possessing the form of eradication of all pain.—5.

Bhāṣya.—An objector may urge : Intermixture with pain is not applicable to one and all cases of relief of pain producible by visible means. Hence it is also reallied :

यन्न दुःखेन समिश्रं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम् ।

अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत् सुखं खःपदास्पदम् ॥

That which is not intermixed with pain, nor is afterwards eclipsed or swallowed up in pain, and which comes to one as soon as it is desired, the same is pleasure or happiness fit to be called heavenly enjoyment. (*Saṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī, introduction to Saṃkhya-Kārikā 2*.)

In view of this argument the author states :

Existence of pain in them is ascertained from the superiority of Mokṣa, which is not realisable by visible means, to kingdom and other objects of desire, attainable by visible means. From the word, Api, also it follows that there are also such other reasons as that those objects are, in essence, modifications of the three Guṇas or creative principles (*vide post*), etc. If it be asked, what evidence there is as regards the superiority of Mokṣa, so he says, Sarva-utkarṣa-śruteḥ, which means that the superiority of Videha-kaivalya, disembodied isolation or singleness, is proved by such texts of the Veda as—

न च वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति

Verily obliteration of the distinction of the agreeable and the disagreeable cannot take place in the state of embodied existence—(*Chh. Upa. VIII. xii. 1*).

अशरीरं वाच सन्तं प्रियाप्रिये न स्पृशतः

The agreeable and the disagreeable cannot touch him who exists in a disembodied form (*ibid.*)—5.

Scriptural remedies are equally inadequate.

अविशेषश्चोभयोः ॥ १ । ६ ॥

अविशेषः Aviśeṣaḥ, non-distinction. च Cha, and. उभयोः Ubhayoḥ, between the two.

6. (As regards the temporary character of the result contemplated by them), there is no distinction between the two theories.—(Aniruddha). Or, (as regards the temporary character of their effect, *i.e.*, cessation of pain), there is no distinction between the two (*i.e.*, visible means, on the one

hand, and religious performances, prescribed in the Veda, on the other).—(Vijñāna-Bhikṣu.)—6.

Vṛitti:—An objector may say: "Well, but there is not a Darśana or System of Thought in which Mokṣa has not been held up as the Puruṣa-*artha* or supreme object of life. Nor does Mokṣa consist in the mere cessation of pain by means of medicine and the like. Hence that which is your conclusion, will also be ours." To this the author replies:

An opponent's theory can be condemned by proof of one's own theory, but not otherwise. It has been also said:

यत्रोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि वा समः ।

नैकः पर्यनुयोज्यः स्यात्तादृगर्थविचारणे ॥

Where the same defect exists in both, or where the rejection of both is equally immaterial, there one of them cannot be selected for censure, as regards the consideration of the particular subject in question,—6.

Bhāṣya:—An objector may say: "Let it be so that permanent cessation of pain cannot result from visible means. But it may result from invisible means, namely, religious performances, prescribed in the Veda, there being such texts of the Veda as अपानं सोमममृतं अभूय—We drank the Soma juice and we became immortal (Atharvaśiraṣ Upaniṣat, 3)." In that case, the author says:

The meaning is that 'Ā-viśeṣaḥ,' non-difference, only should be regarded to exist, 'ubhayoḥ,' in the case of both of them, that is, visible and invisible means, in respect of their not being the means of permanent cessation of pain, and in respect of their being the causes of what has been already stated, (i.e., temporary effects). The very same thing has been observed in the Kārikā: दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः सदाविशुद्धिचयातिशययुक्तः

The means or practices taught in the Veda are similar to the visible ones; for, they are attended with impurity, waste, and excess.—(Sāmkhya-kārikā, Verse 2).

'Ānuśravika,' Anuśrava means that which is heard from the Guru or preceptor, after recital by him, that is, the Veda; Ānuśravika means sacrifices and so forth enjoined in it. The meaning is that these scriptural means are, like the visible ones, admixed with impurity, i. e., sins due to killing, etc., and possess the characteristic of producing perishable as well as superfluous results.

As objector may argue:—(Killing in a sacrifice is lawful, being enjoined in the Veda, and) the significance of an injunction consists in the form of (conduct in accordance to it) being the means of realization of a good which is not followed by a greater evil. If, therefore, lawful killing be productive of sin, the significance of the injunction would be difficult to maintain.

But we say that such is not the case. For, that part of the injunction, *viz.*, that conduct in accordance to it is not followed by a greater evil, is of this form that it is not productive of pain in addition to the pain *immediately* following the production of the good. Inasmuch as, therefore, the evil producible by lawful killing, *immediately* follows the production of the good, the above significance of the injunction remains unimpaired. Some, however, think that only killing other than lawful killing, is productive of sin. But the explanation is not correct, there being no reason for so curtailing the meaning (of the texts on the sinfulness of killing). It is also heard that Yudhiṣṭhira and others had to perform penances in order to avert the evil consequences of having killed their kinsmen and of other acts of cruelty towards them, on the field of battle and elsewhere, even though, by their *Sradharma*, or dictates of their personal morality (as Kṣatriyas or deliverers from oppression), they were required, nay, compelled, to do so. There is, moreover, the observation of Mārkaṇḍeya :

तस्माद् यास्याम्यहं तात दृष्ट्वेमं दुःखसन्निधिम् ।

त्रयीधर्ममधर्माद्यं किम्पाकफलसन्निभम् ॥

I shall, therefore, go away, my son (or sire), seeing that it is the receptacle of pain—that merits springing from Vedic performances are rich in demerits, hence resembling a fruit hard to digest.—Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, X. 31.

There is, of course, the text of the Veda : अहिंसा सर्वभूतान्यन्यत्र तीर्थेभ्यः—Not killing any creature elsewhere than in sacred places (Chh. Upa., VIII. LXV. 1, S. B. II., Vol. III, Pt. II. p. 587). But it declares only that forbearance from killing besides that which is lawful, is the means to the attainment of some good, but not also that in lawful killing there is absence of casuality towards the production of evil. More on this point may be looked for in the Yoga-Vārtika.

There are, again, texts of the Veda such as :

न कर्मणा न प्रजया न धनेन त्यागेनैकेऽमृतत्वमानुशुः

Some attained immortality, not by action, nor by progeny, nor by wealth, but by renunciation.—(Kaivalya Upaniṣat, I. 2) ;

तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय

Only by knowing Him, one can pass beyond Death ; there exists no other path for travelling—(Śvetāśvatara Upa., III. 8).

(On the other hand, it is also revealed in the Veda, that immortality can be attained by means of drinking the Soma juice, etc.) By reason of this obvious contradiction, which, otherwise, must necessarily appear in the Veda, immortality, attainable by means of drinking the Soma juice

etc., should be understood in a relative or secondary sense, on the authority, for example, of the Viṣṇu-Purâṇa, which declares :

आभूतसंलुप्तं स्थानममृतत्वं हि भाष्यते

Existence till the dissolution (Pralaya) of the Cosmic System, is called immortality. (Viṣṇu-Purâṇa, II. viii. 90).—6.

Bondage is not natural to Puruṣa.

न स्वभावतो बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः ॥ १ । ७ ॥

न Na, No. स्वभावतः Svabhâvataḥ, by nature. बद्धस्य Baddhasya, of (one who is) in bondage, or confined. मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः Mokṣa-sâdhana-upadeśa-vidhiḥ, observance of instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa or Release.

7. Observance of instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa (can-) not (be enjoined) in the case of one who is confined by nature.—7.

Vṛitti :—It may be asked whether instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa refer to one who is confined by nature, or otherwise. So the author says :

(Observance of instructions regarding the means for the attainment of Mokṣa does not refer to one who is confined by nature), because destruction of natural condition will entail destruction of Svarûpa, i.e., the thing in itself. (*vide* Bhâṣya below). It has been also said :

वस्तुस्थित्या न बन्धोऽस्ति तदभावाच्च मुक्तता ।

विकल्पघटितावेतावुभावपि न किञ्चन ॥

There is no confinement or bondage by the nature of things, nor does the state of release follow from its non-existence. Both of these, (Confinement and Release), being constituted by error, have no real existence.—7.

Bhâṣya :—It has been thus established that ‘visible’ (popular) and ‘invisible’ (scriptural) means are not directly the means for the realisation of Puruṣa-ârtha or the (highest) object of desire. What then is the means for its realisation? The author will say that the means (required) is the knowledge of the Viveka or distinction (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti). Now, it is only by way of rooting out the cause of pain, known as A-viveka or non-differentiation between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, that knowledge of Viveka or their distinction becomes the means of the avoidance (of pain). With this in view, by a minor section at the very beginning, the author shows, by the method of exhaustion, by the exclusion of all others, that A-viveka itself is the cause of the avoidable (i.e., pain):

Permanent cessation of pain having been already declared to possess the characteristic of Mokṣa, Bandha here means nothing but connection or association with pain.

It, Bondage, does not possess the characteristic of being natural, as described below, to the Puruṣa, inasmuch as 'Vidhiḥ,' observance or performance, 'Sādhana-upadeśasya,' that is, of Vedic precepts regarding the means to be employed, Mokṣāya, for the purpose of release, of one who is confined by nature, is not possible for those who are enjoined in this behalf. For, the release, i.e., separation, of fire from its natural hotness is not possible, because that which is natural to a thing, is co-existent with the thing itself. Such is the meaning.

Accordingly it has been declared in the Īśvara-Gītā:

यद्यात्मा मलिनोऽस्वच्छो विकारी स्यात् स्वभावतः ।

न हि तस्य भवेन्मुक्तिर्जन्मान्तरादितैरपि ॥

Were the Self, by nature, impure, untransparent, mutable, verily Release would not accrue to it even by hundreds of re-births.—Kūrma-Purāṇa, II, ii, 12.

One thing is said to be *natural* to another, when, the former existing, no delay occurs in the production of the latter, from delay (in the appearance) of the cause. Such is the definition of the characteristic of being natural.

An objector may interpose that there can be no doubt at all that pain is natural, as there is the incidence or possibility of constant experience of it. But this is not so. For, although pain is inborn to, or of the very nature of, the Chitta or the mind, for the reason that the latter is essentially constituted by the threefold Guṇas or elements of Prakṛiti, yet, as there is not constant experience of pain in consequence of the overwhelming preponderance of Sattva or the element of stability in the Prakṛiti, so the non-experience of it is possible for the Self also. Furthermore, the Bauddhas who maintain that pain is inborn to the Chitta or mind, make a concession to the popular view that the Chitta or mind itself is the Self.

Our opponent may urge: Now, that being so, (i.e., if Bondage does not by nature belong to the Self), let Mokṣa or Release result only from the annihilation of the Self.

But we do not grant this. For, 'I am in bondage, I will be completely released'—such states of mind clearly prove that Mokṣa or Release is the highest object of volition only in so far as it is co-extensive with Bondage.—7.

Bondage is not natural to Puruṣa.—(contd).

स्वभावस्यानपायित्वादननुष्ठानलक्षणमप्रामाण्यम् ॥ १ । ८ ॥

स्वभावस्य Svabhāvasya, of the nature of a thing. अनपायित्वात् Ana-apāyitvāt, on account of the undecaying-ness, unchangeableness, or permanence. अननुष्ठानलक्षणम् An-anuṣṭhāna-lakṣaṇam, characterised by non-performance. अप्रामाण्यम् Aprāmāṇyam, irrelevancy, unauthoritativeness.

8. (Were Puruṣa confined by nature), because the nature of a thing is unchangeable, (the instructions laid down in the Śâstras for the attainment of Release), would be conspicuous by non-performance, and, therefore, irrelevant and unauthoritative.—8.

Vṛitti:—The author only strengthens the argument of the preceding aphorism :

Whereas confinement or bondage which had an eternal nature, could not be dissolved, performance for the sake of its destruction would be, therefore, impossible.—8.

Bhāṣya:—(*Pârva-pakṣa*). “Let there be non-performance, what does it matter?” To this the author replies :

(Were bondage a part of the Puruṣa’s nature), the nature of a thing being co-eval with the existence of the thing itself, there could be no Release. Consequently, the teachings of the Veda for the attainment of Release, would not be carried into practice. And being thus characterised by non-performance, they would be irrelevant or unauthoritative.—8.

Above continued.

न अशक्योपदेशविधिरुपदिष्टेऽप्यनुपदेशः ॥ १ । ९ ॥

न Na, no. अशक्योपदेशविधिः A (im)-śakya (possible)-upadeśa-(instruction)-vidhiḥ, precept containing instruction for the impossible. उपदिष्टे Upadiṣṭe, were (it) instructed. अपि Api, even. अनुपदेशः An (non)-upadeśaḥ (instruction), non-instruction.

9. There can be no precept (in the Veda and other authoritative writings) imparting instruction for the attainment of that which is impossible. Were even (such attainment) instructed (in them), (the instruction would be) no instruction.—9.

Vṛitti:—It may be argued that someone, for the sake of deception, may instruct something impossible, as, *e.g.*, the presence of a hundred elephants on the tip of the finger. Accordingly the author says :

The meaning of the aphorism is clear.—9.

Bhāṣya :—To those who would contend that the practical observance of those precepts will follow by virtue of their being revealed texts, the author says :

It is not possible to carry into practice an instruction for a 'fruit' or result which is incapable of attainment. For, 'Upadiṣṭe api,' were even some means laid down (in a precept) for an impossible end, that (precept) would really be no instruction at all, but merely the semblance of an instruction, according to the maxim that even the Veda cannot teach that which is contrary to reality.—9.

Bondage is not natural to Puruṣa.—contd.

शुक्लपटवद् बीजवच्चेत् ॥ १ । १० ॥

शुक्लपटवत् Śukla (white)-pata (cloth)-vat (like), like a piece of white cloth.
बीजवत् Bija (seed)-vat, like a seed. चेत् Chet, if it is said.

10. (One may argue that change of nature is observed) as in the case of a piece of white cloth (when it is coloured otherwise) and as in the case of a seed (when it grows into a shoot or is burnt), (and that, therefore, there is nothing strange in the theory that Bondage is the natural state of Puruṣa, which, however, can be removed by appropriate means).—10.

Vṛitti :—The author apprehends an objection :

Annihilation of nature also is observed, as of whiteness in a piece of cloth, by means of colouring matter, etc., and of a seed, through the growth of the shoot.—10.

Bhāṣya :—At this place the author apprehends an objection :

An objector may argue as follows : Annihilation of even that which is natural is observed. For example, the natural whiteness of a piece of white cloth is removed by means of some colouring matter, so also the natural sprouting power of a seed is destroyed by fire. Hence, as in the case of a piece of white cloth, and as also in the case of a seed, annihilation of natural bondage also is possible in the case of the Puruṣa. In the very same way, therefore, as in the case of the analogues, there is legitimate ground for instruction of means for its (of bondage) dissolution.—10.

Bondage not natural to Puruṣa—(contd.)

शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां नाऽशक्योपदेशः । १ । ११ ॥

शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां Śakti (power)-udbhava (appearance, development)-an (non)-udbhavābhyām, by reason of the development and envelopment of power. न Na, no अशक्योपदेशः A (im)-śakya (possible)-upadeśaḥ (instruction), instruction for the impossible.

11. By reason of the development and envelopment of power, there is no instruction for the impossible (in the instances cited). —11.

Vṛitti:—The author concludes :

An effect being existent prior to its appearance as such, the whiteness of the cloth is not *destroyed*, but is enveloped by the colouring matter, and is again developed after washing. (For the same reason), in consequence of the growth of the sprout also, the seed is not *destroyed*, but is enveloped or overpowered. Its re-appearance, however, is not observed, owing to the variety of things in nature.—11.

Bhāṣya :—The author gives the solution :

In the case of the given examples also, people do not give instruction for the removal or *annihilation* of the Aśakya or impossible, that which is incapable of destruction, *i.e.*, the natural. Why not? Śakti-udbhava-anudbhavābhyām, by reason of the development and envelopment of power. For, in the case of the two given examples, only the appearance and disappearance of whiteness, etc., take place, and not, on the contrary, the non-existence or annihilation of whiteness and of the sprouting power, seeing that whiteness and sprouting power again appear in the reddened or coloured cloth and fried seed, respectively, by means of the operations of the washerman, etc., in the one case, and by the volition or will force of Yogins, in the other. Such is the import.

Objection :—Likewise let Release consist only in the disappearance of the power of pain in the Puruṣa (*i.e.*, of the influence of pain upon the Puruṣa).

Answer :—No ; for the common experience of mankind as well as the authority of the Veda and the Smṛiti prove that it is the absolute or permanent cessation of pain that is the (highest) object of desire, and not, on the contrary, the mere disappearance (of pain), as in the case of the instances cited.

Moreover, the theory that Release consists in the mere disappearance of the power of pain, would entail non-(permanent) release, by making

development of power of pain again possible in the case of the released ones also, as in the case of fried seeds, by means of the will force, etc., of Yogins and of God.

(Note.—A seed, for instance, does not really undergo a change of nature by burning. According to the Sāṃkhya theory of causation, all production is development and all destruction is envelopment, so that the effect antecedently exists in the cause in an undeveloped form and the cause afterwards exists in the effect in an enveloped form. Therefore, after burning, a seed still retains its power of sprouting as evidenced by the fact that the Yogins, by willing, can make a burnt seed to sprout again. That being so, if a man instructs another to take away (for a time) the sprouting power of a seed, he does not instruct something impossible, as the act does not involve a change of nature. But this is not so in the case of the Puruṣa. For Release or permanent removal of Bondage, Bondage, being *ex-hypothesi* the natural state of the Puruṣa, involves a change of nature which is impossible. The hypothesis, therefore must be abandoned)—11.

Neither is Bondage a temporal state.

न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य सर्वसम्बन्धात् ॥ १ । १२ ॥

n Na, not. कालयोगतः Kāla (time)-yoga (connection)-taḥ (from), from connection with time. व्यापिनः Vyāpinaḥ, of the pervading. नित्यस्य Nityasya, of the eternal. सर्वसम्बन्धात् Sarva(all)-sambandhāt (relation), on account of relation to all.

12. (The bondage of the Puruṣa can-) not (be constituted) by connection with time, because (time which is) all-pervading and eternal, is related to all (Puruṣas, released and unreleased).—12.

Vritti :—It may be contended that the Puruṣa may not be in bondage from nature, but that he will be in bondage by virtue of time. So the author says :

The Puruṣa would have been so bound, did his connection with time sometimes exist and sometimes not exist. But this is not the case, because relation to all times is one of his upādhis or adjuncts, since he is eternal and all-pervading.

(Note.—It will be observed that Aniruddha has taken the words, 'eternal' and 'pervading' as qualifying Puruṣa, whereas we have, following Viṣṇu, applied them to time.)

The sense of 'relation to all times' having been conveyed by the word, 'eternal,' the word, 'pervading,' has been stated simultaneously with the former, by reference to the next aphorism.—12.

Bhāṣya :—After refuting the theory of Bondage from nature, the author refutes, by a group of aphorisms, the theory of Bondage from Nimitas, occasional causes or conditions. Were pain, on the other hand, occasional in the Puruṣa, it would not be capable of being rooted out by

knowledge and like other means, inasmuch as subtle pain, in the form of not-yet-come, (i.e., the possibility or potentiality of pain) would remain so long as the substance in which it inheres, lasts. Having this in view, the author refutes the theory of occasional pain :

Nor is the Bondage of the Puruṣa occasioned by connection with time. Why not? Because time, all-pervading and eternal, by the determination or delimitation of everything, is connected with all Puruṣas, released and unreleased, and the determination of everything by time will entail the Bondage of all Puruṣas at all times, (so that Release would be impossible).

In this section the conditional, occasional, or instrumental causality of time, space, action, and the like is not confuted, because it is established by the Veda, Smṛiti, and argument. But that which is denoted by Naimittikatva, occasionality, that is, the characteristic of being produced by an occasion, condition, or instrument, as in the case of colour, etc., produced by burning (*vide* Kaṇāda Sūtram, VII. i. 6, S. B. H., Vol. VI, p. 212)—the same is forbidden in the case of Bondage, in consequence of the admission of the accidental nature of Bondage so far as Puruṣa is concerned.

Objection : Even in the theory that Bondage is occasioned or conditioned by time, etc., gradation or difference of status (as released and unreleased Puruṣas) can be accounted for by the presence and absence of other contributory causes.

Answer : In that case, it is proper for the sake of simplicity, to refer Bondage to that contributory alone, that is, that conjunction which taking place, Bondage must necessarily be caused, since there is no harm in the use of Bondage, with regard to the Puruṣa, in an accidental, transferred, or derivative sense.

Thus there is an end of the theory of the occasional or conditional nature of pain.—12.

Nor is Bondage a spatial state.

न देशयोगतोऽप्यस्मात् ॥ १ । १३ ॥

न Na, not. देशयोगतः Deśa (space)-yoga (connection)-taḥ (from), from connection with space. अपि Api, again. अस्मात् Asmât, for the same (reason).

13. Nor, again, (is Bondage constituted) by connection with space, for the same (reason as given above).—13.

Vṛitti :—May not the Puruṣa be in bondage by virtue of space? To this the author replies :

(It cannot be so), because Puruṣa, eternal and infinite as he is, has connection with all space.—13.

Bhāṣya :—Nor does Bondage result from connection with space. Why not? 'Asmāt,' owing to the same, as stated in the preceding aphorism, (objectionable) connection with all Puruṣas released and unreleased. The import is that the theory would entail the bondage of even the released Puruṣa.—13.

Nor does Bondage result from embodiment.

नावस्थातो देहधर्मत्वात् तस्याः ॥ १ । १४ ॥

न Na, not. अवस्थातः Avastātaḥ, from location, situation, environment, organisation, or circumstances. देहधर्मत्वात् Deha (body)-dharma (property)-tvāt, being a property of the body. तस्याः Tasyāḥ, its, of the environment.

14. Nor is Bondage constituted by organisation, the latter being the property of the body.—14.

Vṛtti :—Now, to meet the suggestion whether the Puruṣa may not be bound from organisation or circumstances, the author says :

'Tasyāḥ' means 'of circumstances.' 'Deha-dharmatvāt' is indicative; the ultimate significance is (that the reason why the Puruṣa cannot be bound by organisation or circumstances is) that (the Puruṣa) undergoes no change or transformation.—14.

Bhāṣya :—'Avasthā' consists in the form of the body described as the appearance of a particular Saṃghāta, organisation or embodiment. The bondage of the Puruṣa does not result from 'avasthā' or embodiment as an occasional or instrumental cause. Why not? Because 'avasthā' is a property of the body, that is to say, a property of an insentient object. The application of the property of one object as directly causing bondage in a different object, would be too wide, and would entail the bondage of the released ones also.—14.

Above continued.

असङ्गोऽयं पुरुष इति ॥ १ । १५ ॥

असङ्गः Asaṅgaḥ, free from all attachment or association, detached. अयं Ayam, this, he. पुरुषः Puruṣa, Self. इति Iti, because.

15. (Embodiment cannot be a property of the Puruṣa), because he, the Puruṣa, is free from all association.—15.

Vṛtti :—May not organisation be a property of the Self also? To the author replies ;

(It cannot be), as, in that case, the Śruti, असङ्गोऽयं पुरुषः, he, the Puruṣa, is free from all attachment (Bṛih-Āraṇ Upan. IV. iii. 15), would be contradicted.—15.

Bhāṣya :—But, it may be asked, what is the objection to 'avasthā,' organisation or embodiment, being a property of the Puruṣa? To this the author replies :

The word, 'iti,' gives the reason. This aphorism should be read with the preceding one : thus, the Puruṣa being free from all association or attachment, 'avasthā,' organisation or embodiment, must be a property of the body alone. The purport of the aphorism is that to admit change or transformation in the shape of 'avasthā' or embodiment, in the case of the Puruṣa, would entail that the Puruṣa possesses association or attachment which may be here described as conjunction with the cause of that change or transformation.

That the Puruṣa is free from all attachment is proved by the Śruti :

स यदत्र किञ्चित् पश्यत्यनन्वागतस्तेन भवति असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः ।

Whatever he sees here, cannot enter into him, for, he, the Puruṣa, is free from all attachment.—(Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, IV. iii. 15).

Saṅga, again, is not mere conjunction or connection. For, it has been stated above that the Puruṣa has connection or conjunction with time and space. It is also learnt from the Veda and Smṛiti that the freedom of the lotus leaf from attachment with the water resting on it is an example of the Puruṣa's freedom from all attachment.—15.

Nor does Bondage result from karma.

न कर्मणान्यधर्मत्वादतिप्रसक्तेश्च ॥ १ । १६ ॥

न Na, not. कर्मण Karmanā, by action. अन्यधर्मत्वात् Anya (another)-dharma (property)-tvât (being), being the property of a different object. अतिप्रसक्तेः Ati (over)-prasakteḥ (implication), going too far, being too wide. च Cha, and, also.

16. Nor (is the Puruṣa bound) by action, because (action) is the property of a different object, and also because (the argument) is too wide.—16.

Vṛitti :—The author shows the defect in the suggestion that the Puruṣa may be in bondage by virtue of action :

The Self being void of Guṇas, states or modifications, action possesses the characteristic of being the property of the Not-Self. If it be said that the Puruṣa will be bound by action, notwithstanding that the latter is the property of a different object ; that would be improper : for (i) nothing can be deposited by the property of one thing in another, (ii) the

diversity in the universe would not be explained, and (iii) the argument would be too wide, inasmuch as, in the absence of (the effect of) the distinction of other-ness, it would entail the bondage of the released Selves also.—16.

Bhāṣya :—Bondage does not certainly accrue to the Puruṣa by means of action, prescribed and prohibited, Anya-dharma-tvāt, because actions are the property of the Not-Self. For, the theory of the bondage of one being immediately caused by the property of another, would entail the bondage of the released Puruṣa also. Thinking that it may be argued that this defect will not arise if we admit that Bondage is caused by the action of the respective Upādhis or adjuncts of the Puruṣas, the author gives another reason in the words, 'Ati-prasakteḥ cha,' which mean that the theory of bondage by the action of the Upādhis would entail bondage in the form of conjunction or incidence of pain during Pralaya or dissolution of the cosmic system, and such other times. The supposition of the continuance of pain during Pralaya, in consequence of the continuance of other contributory causes, has been already controverted in the aphorism (12 ante) beginning with 'Na kāla-yoga.'—16.

Above continued.

विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ १ । १७ ॥

विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिः Vichitra (diverse)-bhoga (experience)-an (non)-upapattiḥ (proof, explanation), possibility of diverse experience. अन्यधर्मत्वे Anya (another)-dharma (property)-tve, (that which produces action in one thing), being the property of another thing. This is according to the Vṛitti of Aniruddha. Vijñāna-Bhikṣu interprets the terms as meaning, (bondage in the form of conjunction or incidence of pain) being the property of another thing.

17. Were it the property of a different thing, diversity of (worldly) experience would not be explained.—17.

Vṛitti :—The author points out another defect ;

Some people, it is observed, enjoy pleasure, while others suffer pain. Nor is it the case that in the beginningless Saṃsāra, stream of transmigration, neither action which is the source of pleasure, nor action which is the source of pain, has been performed by a single individual. Did the property of one produce change in another, all would either enjoy pleasure or suffer pain.—17.

Bhāṣya :—It may be objected : It is well known that pain is a property of the Chitta, the mind or intellect. In compliance, therefore, with the rule that action appears in the same substratum where that

which produces the action resides, let also bondage in the form of conjunction or incidence of pain be of the Chitta or intellect alone. Why do you suppose the bondage of the Puruṣa also?

Apprehending this, the author says:

If bondage in the form of conjunction or incidence of pain were the property of the Chitta or intellect alone, diversity of (worldly) experience would not be explained. For, if the experience of the Puruṣa described as Duḥkha-sākṣātkāra or the presentation of pain to the senses, be admitted, even in the absence of conjunction or incidence of pain, then, there remaining nothing to govern or determine the experience of pain, etc., the pain, etc., of all the Puruṣas will become the object of experience of all the Puruṣas. And consequently diversity of experience, such as, for example, "He is the experiencer of pain," "He is the experiencer of pleasure," and so on, will not be explained or justified. This is the meaning. Therefore, for the sake of the proof or explanation of diversity of experience, bondage in the form of conjunction of pain, etc., should be admitted in the Puruṣa also, (by the characteristic of its being the determinant of, or) as determining experience.

And this conjunction of pain in the Puruṣa, is, as has been already stated, merely of the form of a reflection, and the reflection is only of the Vṛitti or function of one's own Upādhi or adjunct, (i.e., of the states of consciousness). Hence the experience of all pains does not fall to the lot of all men. Such is the purport.

The above conclusion follows from the following passage in the Commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms:

चित्तवृत्तिबोधे पुरुषस्यानादिः स्वस्वामिभावः सम्बन्धो हेतुः

The beginningless relation of the Puruṣa (to the Chitta or intellect), namely, the relation of the thing owned and the owner of it, is the cause of (the Puruṣa's) knowing the function of the Chitta.

And the ownership of the Puruṣa in the Chitta or intellect consists in its possession of the Vāsanā, tendency, sub-conscious latency, persistence, or potentiality, of its own function which has been experienced by the Puruṣa. The declaration in the Vedas and Smritis, however, that Bondage and Release appertain to the Chitta or intellect alone, and not to the Puruṣa, should be understood by reference to Bondage in the ultimate or transcendental sense, namely Bondage constituted by conjunction of pain in the form of a reflecting disc.—17.

(Note.—The substance of Bondage is in the Chitta or intellect while its shadow falls on the Puruṣa.)

Nor is Bondage due to Prakṛiti.

प्रकृतिनिबन्धनाच्चेन्न तस्या अपि पारतन्त्र्यम् ॥ १ । १८ ॥

प्रकृतिनिबन्धनात् Prakṛiti-nibandhanât, from Prakṛiti as the cause. चेत् Chet, if, is it? न Na, no. तस्याः Tasyâh, her. अपि Api, also. पारतन्त्र्यम् Pâratantryam, subjection, dependence.

18. Does Bondage result from Prakṛiti as its cause? No, because Prakṛiti herself is not autonomous.—18.

Vṛitti:—It may be said that Prakṛiti will be the determinant in the matter of the production of change in one thing by the property of another thing, that is to say, that Bondage will accrue to that Puruṣa towards whom she will be inclined or active, or move. Hence the author says:

Prakṛiti also is all-pervading, and consequently there can be no distinction or peculiarity of her connection with all the Puruṣas. (She cannot, therefore, be the determinant, and) there can be no determination or uniformity without the help of action. Hence she too is dependent on action. And the defect in that case has been pointed out (*vide* 16 *ante*).—18.

Bhâṣya:—The author rejects the theory that Prakṛiti is the direct cause of Bondage:

But cannot Bondage follow from Prakṛiti as its cause? No. Because, in being a cause of Bondage, she also is, as will be shown in the sequel, dependent on conjunction. If it be contended that she may be the cause of Bondage even without the help of particular conjunctions, then it will entail (the existence of) pain and Bondage even during the state of Pralaya or dissolution, etc. This is the meaning.

Where the reading is, Prakṛit-nibandhanâ chet, there the meaning (or rather construction) is, 'if Bondage have Prakṛiti as its cause.'—18.

Bondage, in the form of reflection of pain, accrues to Puruṣa from connection with Prakṛiti.

न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तद्वियोगस्तद्वियोगादृते ॥ १ । १९ ॥

न Na, not. नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य Nitya (eternal)-śuddha (pure)-buddha (enlightened)-mukta (released)-svabhāva (nature)-sya, of him who is by nature, eternal, and eternally pure, enlightened, and released. तद्वियोगः Tat-yogaḥ, conjunction of that, i.e., Bondage. तद्वियोगादृते Tat-yogât-rite, without the conjunction of that, i.e., Prakṛiti.

19. Without the conjunction of Prakṛiti, (there can be) no conjunction of Bondage in the Puruṣa who is, by

nature, Eternal, and eternally Pure, Enlightened, and Unconfined.—19.

Vṛitti:—If there be no bondage of the Puruṣa caused by Prakṛiti, etc., and if, again, there be no bondage by nature also, then the teaching of a Mokṣa-Śāstra, Lessons on Release, will be fruitless. In reply to this possible objection, the author says:

Suddha means not attached or adhering to the Guṇas, states or modifications (of Prakṛiti). Buddha means transparent. Tat-yogaḥ means conjunction of bondage. Tat-yogât-rite means without the conjunction of Prakṛiti. Bondage can never accrue to the Self without A-viveka or non-discrimination between the Self and the Not-Self. But, on the other hand, that which arises from A-viveka or non-discrimination is (not actual bondage, but) the Abhimāna, sense or idea, that one is in bondage. And this (wrong notion) should be certainly removed by the teaching of the Śāstra.—19.

Bhāṣya:—Prakṛiti, then, in order to be the cause of bondage, is dependent on a particular (*vide* below) conjunction. It is, therefore, from the self-same species of conjunction that Aupādhi (due to Upādhi), reflectional, shadowy, adventitious, accidental, bondage results, like the hotness of water from the conjunction of fire. The author establishes the above conclusion of his own system, in this very context, in the middle of his criticism of the theories of different thinkers.

Therefore, Tat-yogât-rite, without the conjunction of Prakṛiti, Puruṣa's 'tat-yogaḥ,' association with bondage, does not exist. In fact, it is this (conjunction of Prakṛiti) that constitutes bondage. This roundabout statement, by means of two negatives, has been made for the purpose of obtaining the shadow-like, adventitious, or super-imposed character of Bondage. For, if Bondage were the *effect* of the conjunction of Prakṛiti, like colour produced by burning (*vide* Kanāda-Sûtram, VII. I. 6, S. B. H., Vol. vi, p. 212), then similarly to that also, it would continue even after the disjunction of Prakṛiti. Nor should it be supposed that the moment next to that in which pain is produced, and such other things will be the cause of the destruction of pain, as we have not made this supposition, seeing that the destruction of pain is explained or accounted for by the destruction of its cause alone, on the supposition that the destruction of the cause produces destruction of the effect. For, Vṛitti, function, activity, or modification, (of the chitta or intellect), is the material cause of pain, etc. Therefore, as in the case of the flame of a candle, destruction of pain, desire, and other properties or products of the Vṛitti (or activity of the chitta or intellect) becomes

possible entirely by means of the speedy destructibility of the Vritti which breaks down in a moment. Hence, non-existence of Bondage being consequent on (the non-existence of conjunction, *i.e.*) disjunction of Prakṛiti. Bondage is merely Anpādhika, (ideal as opposed to real), accidental or adventitious or reflectional, and neither natural nor occasional (*i. e.*, produced by instrumental causes or the necessary conditions as distinguished from the principal cause).

In like manner, it is also the effect of this indirect statement that the immediate means of the avoidance of pain is the dissolution of the conjunction of Prakṛiti, and nothing else. So also says the Smṛiti :

यथा ज्वलद्गृहादिलघ्वृहं विच्छिद्य रक्ष्यते ।

तथा सदेवप्रकृतिविच्छिन्नोऽयं न शोचति ॥

As a house attached to another, burning, house, is saved by dividing it off from the burning one, so he (Puruṣa), being separated from Prakṛiti, the mother of all faults, does not come to grief.—(Source not traced.)

Thinkers of the Vaiśeṣika School labour under the mistake that conjunction of pain is (not ideal but real, *i.e.*) ultimately true. In order that a similar mistake may not crop up here, the author declares Nitya, etc. As conjunction of redness does not take place in the crystal which is naturally pure, (*i.e.*, white), without the conjunction of the China rose, in the very same way, there being no possibility of the existence of pain, etc., by themselves, conjunction of pain cannot take place in the Puruṣa who is, by nature, eternally pure, etc., without the conjunction of Upādhi or adjunct or super-imponent. That is the meaning. So it has been declared in the Saura Purāṇa :

यथा हि केवलो रक्तः स्फटिको लक्ष्यते जनैः ।

रञ्जकाद्युपधानेन तद्वत् परमपूरुषः ॥

For, as the pure crystal is observed by people to be red on account of the superimposition laid on it by some red colouring matter, etc., so is the great Puruṣa.

Eternality consists in not being limited by time. The characteristic of being, by nature, pure, etc., also denotes eternal purity, etc. Therein, eternal purity means constant freedom from virtue and vice. Eternal enlightenment denotes possession of the form of inextinguishable sentiency. The being eternally released, *i.e.*, eternal freedom, denotes the characteristic of never being in conjunction with ultimately true, *i. e.*, real, pain. Conjunction of pain in the form of reflection, however, is not-ultimately-true, *i. e.*, not-real or ideal, bondage. This is the import.

As regards the eternal purity, etc., of the Self, there is the Śruti :

अयमात्मा सन्मात्रो नित्यः शुद्धो बुद्धः सत्यो मुक्तो निरञ्जनो विभुस्त्यादि ।

This Self is purely Existing, Eternal, Pure, Enlightened, True, Free, Stainless, Universal, etc. (Nṛsiṃha-Uttara-Tāpani Upaniṣat, II. ix. 9).

Objection :—But this being a Manana Śāstra, rational or intellectual science, reasons also must be given in support of the conclusion that the Self is eternal, etc.

Answer :—Quite so: By the expression ‘Na tat-yogaḥ tat-yogāt pite,’ reasons have been certainly advanced in proof of the eternal purity, etc., of the Self. Thus, eternality, universality, and other characteristics have been completely established in the Self in Darśanas or Systems of Thought like Nyāya, etc. (*vide* Kaṇāda Sūtram, III. ii. 5 and VII. i. 22, S. B. II., Vol. vi, pp. xxv, 131 and 229). Now, the Self being eternal and universal, there must exist some cause without which it can have no conjunction with pain and all other similar changes or disorders. That cause is, by common consent, no other than the Antaḥ-karāṇa or inner sense. For the sake of simplicity, therefore, Antaḥ-karāṇa or the inner sense itself should be properly regarded as being the only material cause of pain and other disorders. There is also another reason, namely, the concomitant variation of the Antaḥ-karāṇa or inner sense with regard to all changes or disorders (that is to say, that the activity of the Antaḥ-karāṇa is invariably present where there is any change, and is invariably absent where there is no change). In the case, again, of intra-organic changes or disorders, it will not be reasonable to suppose instrumental causality (or causality as a necessary condition) for the Manas or intellect, and material causality for the Self, since the supposition of two causes will involve superfluity.

Objection :—That the Self is the material cause of (pain and other) changes, is proved from perception such as “I feel pleasure,” “I feel pain,” “I do,” etc.

Answer :—Such is not the case. For, these perceptions, falling as they do within the class of hundreds of mistakes such as “I am fair in complexion,” etc., are not free from the apprehension of being invalid as means of proof, and accordingly carry less weight than the inference supported by the argument stated above.

The hint may be given here that the reason for the view that the Self is pure consciousness will be stated in the sequel.

The sense of this very aphorism has been declared in the Kārikā also.

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तव्यं भवत्युदासीनः ॥

Therefore, through proximity to him (sentient Puruṣa), the insentient Liṅga (*i. e.* Mahat, Ahaṁkāra, Buddhi, Manas, and the Tan-mātras) seems sentient; and, similarly, though agency or activity belongs to the Guṇas (states or modifications of Prakṛiti), the bystander (Puruṣa who is indifferent or inactive) appears as the agent.—Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛiṣṇa, verse 20.

The mere expression, agency or to be agent, is indicative of all changes or disorders, such as to suffer pain, etc.

In like manner, in the Yoga Aphorisms also, the sense of this very aphorism has been declared. Thus—

द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ॥ २ ॥ १७ ॥

Conjunction of the seer (Puruṣa) and the seen (Mahat or Buddhi) is the cause of the avoidable (i.e., pain).—Yoga Sūtram, II. 17. S. B. H., Vol. IV., p. 121.

Also in the Gītā :

पुरुषः प्रकृतिस्थो हि भुङ्क्ते प्रकृतिजान् गुणान् ॥ १३ ॥ २१ ॥

For the Puruṣa, dwelling in Prakṛiti, experiences the Guṇas, states or modifications, produced from Prakṛiti—Gītā, XIII. 21.

‘Prakṛitiṣṭhaḥ,’ dwelling in Prakṛiti, means being combined in Prakṛiti. Similarly in the Śruti also :

आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः ।

Thoughtful men call the Self, combined with the Senses or Powers of Cognition and Action and Manas, by the name, experiencer—Kāṭha Upa., III. 4.

Objection :—In the very same way as are time and the rest, conjunction of Prakṛiti also is common to all Puruṣas released and unreleased. How can it, therefore, become the cause of Bondage ?

Answer :—The objection does not arise. For, here the denotation of the word, Saṁyoga, conjunction, is exclusively or simply a particular form of the conjunction of Prakṛiti, reduced into, or appearing in, the form of individual Buddhis or Understandings or Reasons, which conjunction is otherwise designated as birth. In his commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms, the revered Vyāsa has explained the term in the above sense. Moreover, it is only by reason of the function of Buddhi as the Upādhi or super-imponent that conjunction of pain takes place in the Puruṣa. Again, just like the Vaiśeṣika and other thinkers, it is desired also by ourselves that conjunction of the Antaḥ-karaṇa or inner sense, having the effect of determining the power of causing experience (bhoga), possessed by conjunction of Buddhi, is different in kind from the latter conjunction. Consequently there is no implication of Bondage in dreamless sleep and such other states. On the other hand, the stream of whatever functions of the intellect it may be and its Saṁskāra, impression, receipt, or after-image, accompanied by the Vāsanā, sub-conscious latency or persistence, of the function respectively experienced by the Puruṣas, is beginningless, and hence the continuity or uniformity of the relation of the thing owned and the owner of it (between Mahat and Puruṣa, *vide* Aphorism 17 above) is sustained.

Some, however, are of opinion that the hypothesis of conjunction between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa would necessarily involve transformation and attachment of the Puruṣa, and that, therefore, the denotation of the word, Yoga, in this place, is only A-viveka or non-discrimination, and not conjunction. But their opinion cannot be upheld. For, by the aphorism नद्विवेकयोगश्चविवेकात् (I. 55 post, q. v.), the author of the aphorisms will declare that A-viveka or non-discrimination is (not the same as, but really) the cause of Yoga, association or conjunction. Again, in the (Yoga) System of Patañjali also, by the two aphorisms :

स्वस्वामिशक्तयोः स्वरूपोपोलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः ॥ २ । २३ ॥

Samyoga or conjunction is the name given to the cause of the knowledge of the true nature—(of the Puruṣa) as he who experiences and (of Prakṛiti) as the object of experience—of the power of the thing owned (Prakṛiti) and of the power of the owner of it (Puruṣa), (i. e., perceptibility and percipieny respectively).—Yoga Sūtram, II. 23.

तस्य हेतुर्विद्या ॥ २ । २४ ॥

A-vidyā, Nescience, is the cause thereof (i. e., of Samyoga or conjunction).—Yoga Sūtram, II. 24. S. B. II. Vol. iv. p. 144.

A-vidyā has been declared as being only the cause of conjunction. Moreover, were A-viveka (non-discrimination), in the form of absence of Viveka or discrimination, the same as Samyoga or conjunction, then Bhoga or experience, etc., would be entailed during Pralaya or dissolution, etc., also, by reason of the existence therein of the conjunction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. To hold that conjunction consists in A-viveka or non-discrimination in the form of false knowledge, would involve a form of Âtma-âsraya, (Self-dependence) i. e., the fallacy of arguing in a circle, inasmuch as conjunction of the Puruṣa and Prakṛiti is the cause of false knowledge, etc. (In the above passage of the Śruti), therefore, Yoga (in 'yuktam') must denote something more than A-viveka or non-discrimination. The same is nothing but Samyoga, conjunction or union, there being no reason for any other supposition.

Samyoga or conjunction, again, is not the same as Parināma, development or evolution, since we speak of a thing as undergoing development or evolution only when some particular property, in addition to the general attributes of the class, is produced in it. Otherwise, the universality of the immutable (Puruṣa, etc.), in the form of omnipresence, would not be proved or possible. Nor, again, does Saṅga or attachment or association consist in mere Samyoga or conjunction, as it will be later on declared that it is Samyoga or conjunction which is the cause of Parināma or evolution, that is the denotation of the word, Saṅga or attachment or association.

Objection:—But, still, how does temporary conjunction which is the origin of Mahat, etc., take place between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa both of whom are eternal ?

Answer:—There is nothing impossible in this. For, Prakṛiti appears in the form of the sum-total or collection of the three Guṇas, states or modifications, conditioned as well as unconditioned, and thus production of conjunction with Puruṣa is possible by means of the limitation imposed by the conditioned or manifested Guṇas. This conjunction of Prakṛiti and her perturbation (by which the Guṇas are manifested) are proved by the Veda and the Smṛiti. And upon the same theme we have elaborately discoursed in our Yoga-Vārtika.

There are, however, others who think that the conjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti consists merely in their respective fitness as the enjoyer and the enjoyable. But this too cannot be admitted; for, if fitness were eternal, it would be unreasonable to say that it could be terminated by knowledge. If it be non-eternal, then there is no harm in admitting Saṃyoga or conjunction, as the objection of entailing the characteristic of undergoing Parīṇāma or evolution on the part of the Puruṣa, equally applies to both. Moreover, the view that fitness as the enjoyer and the enjoyable constitutes the form of Saṃyoga or conjunction, has been nowhere declared in the aphorisms, etc., and is, therefore, unauthoritative.

It follows, therefore, that only a particular form of conjunction is here intended by the author of the aphorisms as the cause of the avoidable. Thus the cause of Bondage, according to the author, is ascertained—19.

Nor is Bondage caused by A-vidyâ.

नाऽविद्यातोऽप्यवस्तुना बन्धयोगात् ॥ १ । २० ॥

न Na, not. अविद्यातः A-vidyâ-taḥ, from A-vidyâ, i. e., non-existence of Vidyâ or knowledge. अपि Api, too, again. अवस्तुना Avastunâ, by an unreality, a non-entity. बन्धयोगात् Bandha-ayogât, on account of unfitness, non-adaptation, or impossibility of bondage.

20. Nor (does Bondage result) from A-vidyâ also, because of the impossibility of Bondage by means of a non-entity.—20,

Vṛitti :—If it be asserted that Bondage will accrue to him (Puruṣa) by means of A-vidyâ, so the author says :

(It cannot). For, A-vidyâ denotes either the antecedent non-existence of Vidyâ or knowledge or its consequent non-existence, (i. e.,

either that knowledge has not yet been acquired but that it may be acquired afterwards, or that knowledge which was acquired, has been afterwards lost). And, either way, it is a non-entity. Nor is Bondage by means of a non-entity possible in the case of the Self which is an entity. It is, therefore, a mere form of speech, and no truth, to say that Bondage results by means of A-vidyā.—20

Bhāṣya :—The causes of Bondage maintained by the unbelievers (Nāstikas, *i. e.*, those who say that it—God, Veda, etc.,—does not exist) also should be now refuted. Amongst them, a sect of the Bauddhas who hold the theory that the Self is a stream of temporary states of consciousness, as evidenced by the description or saying :

षडभिज्ञो दशबलेऽद्वयवादी विनायकः ।

The Vināyaka (Bauddha) (is he) who holds the theory of non-duality, is armed with the ten, and is conversant about the six, —Amara-koṣa I. i. (1) 9.

argue as follows : There is no second, external, reality or entity, such as Prakṛiti and so forth, whereby Bondage, real or reflectional, may take place through conjunction with it. But the mere continuity of succession of momentary states of consciousness is the reality, and it is without a second. All else is due to Samvṛitti or obscurity. And Samvṛitti or obscurity is A-vidyā, described as false knowledge, from which alone results Bondage. Thus has it been declared by them :

अभिज्ञोऽपि हि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासनिदर्शनैः ।

प्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥

For, although the Self consisting of Buddhi or Reason or Understanding, is not different from acts or instances of Viparyāsa or inversion of correct knowledge, yet it is observed as though possessing the distinction of the consciousness of that which is apprehended and the consciousness of that which apprehends.—Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha.—(Ed. Bibl. Ind., p. 16.)

Their opinion is first of all being disproved :

The word, 'Api,' also, has been used by reference to time, etc. mentioned above. From A-vidyā also, there is no immediate possibility of Bondage. The A-vidyā of the above non-dualists is also a non-entity, and hence no bondage can properly take place by means of it ; for, the binding of any one with a rope seen in a dream has never been observed. This is the meaning.

It cannot be asserted, that Bondage too is unreal ; as the author of the aphorisms himself will afterwards show that it is not, and also because the theory that Bondage is unreal, would be in conflict with the admission or concession that, subsequent to the learning of the theory of the non-dualism of consciousness or idealistic monism, practice of Yoga or holy communion should be resorted to for the annihilation of Bondage,

inasmuch as it is not probable or reasonable that men should observe the practices subsidiary to Yoga, which can be done with great hardship, when in consequence of the teaching of the unreality of Bondage, there can remain no doubt that the fruit or result, called annihilation of Bondage, is already accomplished.—20.

Nor is Bondage caused by A-vidyā. A-vidyā cannot be an entity.

वस्तुत्वे सिद्धान्तहानिः ॥ १ । २१ ॥

वस्तुत्वे Vastu-tve, in the case of the reality of A-vidyā. सिद्धान्तहानिः. Siddhānta (tenet)-hāniḥ (loss, abandonment), abandonment of the tenet, A-vidyā is a non-entity.

21. If the reality (of A-vidyā be asserted by the monist, then there is) abandonment of (his) tenet.—21.

Vṛitti :—It may be said that A-vidyā denotes something different from Vidyā or knowledge, and is, as such, an entity. So the author lays down :

In our view, A-vidyā certainly possesses the form of that which exists. Consequently, there being no destruction of it, there is no Release. The A-vidyā of the non-dualists, on the contrary, is not transcendental or real. While the A-vidyā of the dualists is beginningless and is an entity, and, therefore, on account of the impossibility of its destruction, the teaching of the annihilation of Bondage is useless.—21.

Bhāṣya :—If, on the other hand, the reality of A-vidyā be admitted, then there will be abandonment of the non-reality or non-existent character of A-vidyā already admitted or advanced by the monist himself. This is the meaning.—21.

Above continued.

विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिश्च ॥ १ । २२ ॥

विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिः Vijātiya (heterogeneous)-dvaita (duality)-āpattiḥ (entailment), entailment of duality through there being an entity of a different kind. च Cha also.

22. (On the assumption of the reality of A-vidyā, there would be) entailment of duality by means of a heterogeneous second.—22.

Vṛitti :—The author points out another defect in the theory of the reality of A-vidyā :

Were A-vidyā existent as an entity, and beginningless, it would be, like the Self, eternal. It being different from the Self, the duality constituted by it would be heterogeneous duality.—22.

Bhâṣya :—Moreover, if the reality of A-vidyâ be assumed, there will be then involved a second entity different in kind from the succession of momentary states of consciousness, which is not desired by you (*i.e.*, the monists). This is the meaning.

The adjective, heterogeneous, has been used in view of the possible reply, (in case homogeneous duality were also raised as a point in objection), that, owing to the infinity of the individuals falling within (and making up) the stream of consciousness, homogeneous duality is certainly desired.

Objection :—Well, but A-vidyâ also being a species of knowledge, how can there arise heterogeneous duality by means of A-vidyâ also?

Answer :—The objection cannot stand. For, A-vidyâ which is a form of knowledge, is subsequent to Bondage, whereas it is only A-vidyâ in the form of Vâsanâ or acquired tendency of the Self, that is recognised by them (the non-dualists) as the cause of Bondage. And Vâsanâ is certainly different in kind from knowledge.

The mistake must not be committed that by these aphorisms the tenet of the Vedânta System is confuted, inasmuch as it has not been declared therein, even by a solitary aphorism, that Bondage results from mere A-vidyâ. Moreover, even in the case of the reality of A-vidyâ and the like, there is no contradiction of the non-duality characterised as non-division or non-differentiation, which is intended in the Brahma-Mimâṃsâ, by such aphorisms as—

अविभागे वचनात्

(There is) non-division (of Brahman into many), (as follows) from the declaration (of the Veda).—Vedânta Sûtram, IV. II. 10, (S. B. H., Vol. V, p. 717).

As regards, however, the modern doctrine of Mâyâ or limitation, preached by the so-called Vedânta thinkers, of which the characteristic mark is in evidence in this context, the author's remarks quite properly apply to them also, because they form a sub-division of the (Bauddha) Vijñânavâdins or idealists, as we learn from the traditions of the sayings of Śiva in the Padma-Purâṇa beginning with :

मायावादमसच्छास्त्रं प्रच्छन्नं बौद्धमेव च ।

मयैव कथितं देवि कलौ ब्राह्मणरूपिण ॥

In the Kali Age, O Devi, the system of non-existence, namely, the doctrine of Mâyâ, which is merely Buddhism in disguise, has been declared by no other than myself in the form of a Brâhmaṇa.

The doctrine of Mâyâ, however, is not a tenet of the Vedânta System as we learn from the concluding words of Śiva :

वेदार्थवनमहाशास्त्रं मायावादमवैदिकम् ।

That great system, the doctrine of Mâyâ, containing the truths of the Veda, but not supported by the Veda.

The Mâyâ-vâdins (those who hold the doctrine of Mâyâ) are not directly attacked here, as, in that case, the use of the adjective, heterogeneous, would be meaningless, inasmuch as in the doctrine of Mâyâ homogeneous duality also is not recognised. In this section, therefore, only the explanation of the cause of Bondage, given by the Vijñâna-vâdins or idealists, is directly refuted. It should be understood that, by the self-same method (of reasoning), the view of the moderns, the disguised Bauddhas, *i. e.*, the Mâyâ-vâdins also, that an insignificant thing like mere A-vidyâ is the cause of Bondage, is refuted.

In our view, on the other hand, A-vidyâ, of course, lacks transcendental or ultimate reality in the form of immutability and eternality, but it possesses as much reality as a water-pot, etc., and, therefore, there is no opening for the impediment or objection stated above in respect of its being the cause of Bondage by means of the conjunction to be declared in the sequel. Similarly, in the view of the Yoga and also in the view of the Brahma-Mīmāṃsā Darśana.—22.

Above continued.

विरुद्धोभयरूपा चेत् ॥ १ । २३ ॥

विरुद्धोभयरूपा Viruddha-(contradictory)-ubhaya (both)-rûpâ (form), possessing the form of both the contradictories, *i. e.*, the real and the unreal. चेत् Chet, if it be assumed.

23. If it be assumed that A-vidyâ possesses the form of both the contradictories (*i. e.*, is both real and unreal).—23.

Vṛitti :—Well, such will be the fate of other predicables, but A-vidyâ which is real and beginningless, will be also perishable, in our theory. The author states the above argument of the opponent :—

‘Viruddha-ubhaya-rûpâ,’ possessing mutually contradictory forms, that is, although (A-vidyâ) is beginningless, yet, inasmuch as it undergoes annihilation, it also possesses the form of antecedent non-existence, (like things which have a beginning).—23.

Tikâ of Vedântin Mahâdeva : An objection is apprehended : A-vidyâ is not real or existent, wherefrom duality of dissimilar things might result, nor is it unreal or non-existent, as its effects are observed. On the other hand, therefore, it possesses both real and unreal forms.

Bhâṣya :—The author apprehends (an objection) :

It may be asserted by the objector that A-vidyâ should be conceived as possessing exclusively the form either of the two which are contradictory

to each other, viz., the real and the unreal, or of that which is different from the real and the unreal, and that consequently there is no harm of (the theory of) transcendental non-duality. Such is the meaning of the aphorism. The author himself will, however, afterwards declare that the fabric of creation is both real and unreal. But there reality and unreality, in the form or sense of manifestedness and unmanifestedness, are not really contradictory to each other. This is indicated by the inclusion of the word, Viruddha (contradictory), in the aphorism.—23.

Above continued.

न तादृक्पदार्थाप्रतीतेः ॥ १ । २४ ॥

न Na, not. तादृक्पदार्थाप्रतीतेः Tâdrik (such)-padârtha (thing)-a (non)-pratîteḥ (perception, observation), because of the non-observation of such a thing.

24. (It can-) not, because of the non-observation of such a thing.—24.

Vṛitti:—The author gives the reply:

Such a thing (as is both real and unreal) has never been observed by any man whatever in any place.—24.

Bhâṣya:—The author removes the above apprehension:

(The sense is) quite clear. Moreover, were A-vidyâ the direct cause of Bondage described as connection with, or liability to, pain, then there will be left no possibility of the experience of Prârabdha or operative Adṛiṣṭam after the annihilation of A-vidyâ by means of knowledge, in consequence of the destruction of the cause of the experience of pain, of which Bondage is a synonym. In our and other theories, however, this is no defect, for, (we maintain), A-vidyâ, Karma or moral conduct, and the like become causes of Bondage by way of (establishing) conjunction (of soul with body). And the conjunction (of body and soul) described as birth (*vide* Kapâda Sâtram, VI. ii. 16, S. B. II., Vol. vi, page 207) does not pass away except on the termination of Prârabdha or operative Adṛiṣṭam.—24.

(Note:—Prârabdha: Karma or Merits and Demerits are divided as past and future. The former, i.e., consequences of action which have been already acquired, are further divided as Sañchita, stored up, and Prârabdha, operative. Sañchita Karma is that the experience of which has not yet begun. Prârabdha is that Karma for the experience of the consequences whereof the present birth has taken place. The future or Âgâmi Karma is that which will be afterwards acquired).

Above continued.

न वयं षट्पदार्थवादिनो वैशेषिकादिवत् ॥ १ । २५ ॥

न Na, not. वयं Vayam, we. षट्पदार्थवादिनः Ṣaṭ (six)-padârtha (predicable)-vâdinah (holding the theory), those who hold the theory of the six predicables.

वैशेषिकादिषु Vaiśeṣika (the Vaiśeṣika school of thought)-ādi (other)-vat (like), like the Vaiśeṣika and other thinkers.

25. We do not hold the theory of Six Predicables, like the Vaiśeṣika and other thinkers (*vide* Kaṇāda Sūtram, I. i. 4, S. B. H., Vol. vi, page 8, Gautama Sūtram, I. i. 1, S. B. H., Vol. viii, page 1).—25.

Vṛtti:—Our opponent may ask: If this be your argument, where will Prakṛiti, etc., enter, when they are essentially different from the Six Predicables? So, with reference to it, the author says:

(The meaning is) clear. — 25.

Note.—The word, *Adi*, refers to the Nyāya School who teach the theory of Sixteen Predicables.—*Vedāntin Mahādeva*.

Bhāṣya:—The author further apprehends:

Well, like the Vaiśeṣika and other Āstika or orthodox philosophers, we do not hold the theory that Predicables are constant in number, *e.g.*, six, sixteen, and so on. Hence a predicable which embraces the nature of both the real and the unreal, or which is different from both, for example, A-vidyā, should be admitted by us, although it may remain unobserved. This is the import.—25.

Above continued.

अनियतत्वेऽपि नायौक्तिकस्य संग्रहोऽन्यथा

बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वम् ॥ १ । २६ ॥

अनियतत्वे A (in)-niyata (constant)-tve (ness), in the case of the inconstancy or unlimitedness of the number of predicables. अपि Api, even. न Na, not. अयौक्तिकस्य A (un)-yautikasya (reasonable), of that which is unreasonable. संग्रहः Saṃgrahah, inclusion. अन्यथा Anyathā, otherwise. बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वम् Bāla (children)-unmatta (madmen)-ādi (and the like)-samatvam (equality), equality with children and madmen and the like.

26. Even in the case of the indefiniteness (of the number of predicables), inclusion of something illogical (can-) not (be allowed), (as), otherwise, we would come to the level of children and madmen and the like.—26.

Vṛtti:—If the predicables are indefinite (in number), how, it may be asked, can we say that, there are twenty-five Principles? Hence the author declares:

We do not say that there are only six predicables, but we do not say that we do not admit even that which is established by valid

arguments. Otherwise, we shall be on the same footing with children and madmen. So it has been said :

न ह्याप्तवचनान्नभसो निपतन्ति महासुराः ।

युक्तिमद्वचनं ग्राह्यं मन्यन्तैश्च भवद्विधैः ॥

Hugo giants do not verily drop from heaven, because an Āpta, competent or trustworthy person, so says. Only sayings which are supported by reason, should be accepted by me and others like yourself.—26.

Bhāṣya :—The author removes the above apprehension :

Let there be no fixed rule regarding the number of predicables ; still it is not possible for the disciples to accept or admit, relying upon your bare words, a predicable, (A-vidyā), at once real and unreal, which is opposed to reason by means of the opposition between existence and non-existence. Were it otherwise, there should be acceptance also of unreasonable things mentioned by children and the like. This is the meaning. On this subject (*i.e.*, the conception of A-vidyā as at once real and unreal) there is no clear text of the Veda, etc., and a different object is proved from passages of the Veda rendered doubtful on account of their opposition to reason. This is the import.

The same is the sense of such sentences of the Saura Purāna, etc., as—

नासद्रूपा न सद्रूपा माया नैवोभयामिका ।

सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वाच्या मिथ्याभूता सनातनी ॥

Māyā (the principle of determination) possesses neither the form of unreality nor the form of reality, nor does it partake of the nature of both. It is indescribable by the terms, real and unreal. It is falsity itself, and is everlasting.

Prakṛiti, designated as Māyā, and proved by such texts of the Veda as—

विकारजननीं मायामष्टरूपामजां ध्रुवाम्

Māyā, the mother of transformations or modifications, possessing eight-fold form, unborn, permanent.—*Śālikā Upaniṣat*, 3.

cannot be real in the ultimate sense or as a transcendental object, inasmuch as she undergoes waste or passes away by the forms of successive modifications, the prior giving rise to the posterior. Nor can she be absolutely unreal, since she differs from the (imaginary) horns of a hare by the characteristic of being capable of producing object and exerting activity. Nor can she partake of the nature of both, because of the self-contradiction involved in the supposition. Hence सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वाच्या—“indescribable by the terms, real and unreal,” that is, incapable of teaching, after obtaining certain knowledge, that she is real and nothing but real, and that she is unreal and nothing but unreal. But she is मिथ्याभूता—“false-like,” that is, she possesses practical or phenomenal unreality designated as (laya dissolution), the state of dissolution of all phenomenal existences, and at the same time also possesses practical or phenomenal

reality in the form of eternally undergoing transformation. The hint is hereby given that we shall develop this point in the sequel.

And everyone of the defects brought out in this sub-division of the book can be put down also against the modern doctrine of Mâyâ.—26.

Nor is Bondage caused by unbroken influences of external objects.

नानादिविषयोपरागनिमित्तकोऽप्यस्य ॥ १ । २७ ॥

न Na, not. अनानादिविषयोपरागनिमित्तकः Anādi (beginningless)-viṣaya (object)-uparāga (stain)-nimittakaḥ (occasioned), occasioned by the tint of objects from all eternity. अपि Api, again. अस्य Asya, his, of the Puruṣa.

27. His bondage, moreover, is not caused by means of the tint (reflected) from objects from all eternity.—27.

Vṛitti.—The author refutes the Bauddha view.

It cannot be maintained that 'his', i. e., of the Self, bondage will be caused by the instrumentality of the Vâsanâ, tendency to or longing for, objects, from all eternity or of which no beginning can be traced. With us there can be, by no means, connection of the Self with Vâsanâ, and consequently bondage cannot result from it. (While) in the Bauddha System, since a permanent Self does not exist, and Vâsanâ also does not endure for ever, who will be bound?—27.

Bhâṣya :—Others, the Nihilists, assert that external objects of momentary duration, exist, and that in consequence of their influence, or tendency towards them, bondage of the Jīva or embodied Self takes place. The author condemns this view also :

Bondage occasioned by tendency towards objects which continues from all eternity in the form of a stream (of temporary tendencies), is also not possible for the Self. Such is the meaning.

The reading निमित्ततोऽप्यस्य Nimittato'pyasya,—(Nor does) his (bondage) result from (the influence or reflection of objects from all eternity as) the instrumental cause, is preferable to निमित्तकः Nimittikaḥ, having, etc., as the instrumental cause.—27.

Above continued.

न बाह्याभ्यन्तरयोरुपरज्योपरज्जकभावोऽपि

देशव्यवधानात् शुद्धस्थपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव ॥ १ । २८ ॥

न Na, not. बाह्याभ्यन्तरयोः Bāhya (external)-abhyantara (internal)-yoh, between the external and the internal. उपरज्योपरज्जकभावः Uparajya (that which is tinted by adjacent object)-uparājaka (that which tints)-bhāvaḥ (relation), relation of that which is tinted and that which tints. अपि Api, also. देशव्यवधानात् Deśa

(space)-vyavadhânât (interval), because of interval of space. Aniruddha reads देशभेदात् Deśa-bhedaât, because of difference of space. शृङ्गनास्थापतालपुत्रास्थयोः Śṛṅghna-sthā-pāṭaliputra-sthayaoh, between one staying at Śṛṅghna (an ancient place to the north of Thaneshvar) and another staying at Pāṭaliputra (Patna). इव Iva, as.

28. Also between the external and the internal there is not the relation of that which is tinted and that which tints, because of the interval of space (between them), as between one staying at Śṛṅghna and another staying at Pāṭaliputra.—28.

Vṛitti.—It may be replied (by the Bauddha) that bondage of the continuous stream of conscious states composing the self, will take place with the continuous stream of Vāsanâ, tendencies, arising from reflections cast by external objects. Hence the author declares :

If it is said that the relation of that which is tinted and that which tints has been observed also between the sun and a vessel of water, (we reply that) there the infusion of colour is due to the connection (established) by the sun-beam, and that in the present case, no such connection exists. If it be rejoined (that, in the present case, 'infusion of colour,' i. e., affection, is possible) by means of Vāsanâ or tendency or impression (supplying the connecting link, we say, it is) not; when it does not exist for all time, how (can Vāsanâ form) the connection? If it is said (that the required connection consists not of an individual impression, but) of the continuous stream (of impressions, in that case), if that to which the stream of the passing states, belongs, be different from the states, then your theory (that the Self is but a stream of conscious states) is gone. On the other hand, (if you say that) although it (the soul) is not different (from the stream of passing states), yet something may be deposited or superimposed upon it by the latter, (we reply that) to deposit or superimpose is impossible on account of its momentary character. While, in the case of non-superimposition, what is the use of it which is almost a non-entity, (as it has no reason for its existence)? —28

Bhāṣya.—The author gives the reason for the above :

In your theory, it is something limited and lying wholly within the body, that is called the soul. Now, also the relation of the tinted and the tinter is not possible in the case of that which is thus *within*, as regards an *external* object. Why? Because of the intervention of space, as in the case of two persons, the one of whom remains at Śṛṅghna and the other at Pāṭaliputra. Such is the meaning. For it is only

where conjunction exists that adjacent tincture, called Vāsanā or affection, is observed, as in the case of madder and cloth, or of flower and crystal.

By the word, *api* (also), it is implied that absence of conjunction, etc., apply to the author's own theory *also*.

Śrughna and Pātaliputra are two particular places at a distance from each other.—28.

Above continued.

द्वयोरेकदेशलब्धोपरागान्न व्यवस्था ॥ १ । २६ ॥

द्वयोः Dvayoh, of the two. एकदेशलब्धोपरागात् Eka (same)-deśa (place)-labdha (received)-uparāgāt (tincture), on account of tincture received from the same place. न Na, no. व्यवस्था Vyavasthâ, rule.

29. The Law (of Bondage and Release) will be impossible, in consequence of tincture of both of them received from the same place.—29.

Vṛtti.—(The objector may continue :) Granted that internal tincture cannot be induced by means of Vāsanā or affection. Inasmuch, however, as the soul is all-pervading, tincture will arise through the connection of the soul with a portion of the external (world).

To this the author replies :

(On this theory), there is no Release for those who hold that there is but one soul, because they *always* receive tincture, and hence, with them, there can be no rule or distinction (of bondage and release). On the other hand, it does not exist in the case of those who hold that there are a multiplicity of souls, because equal knowledge will be produced, at one and the same time, in all of them, through their connection with the entire universe of objects.—29.

Bhāṣya :—(The objector may reply :) The tincture of objects should be asserted (in the soul) by means of conjunction with objects, because the soul, according to us, goes out to the place of objects, just as the senses do according to you.

In that case the author declares :

In consequence of 'tincture,' *i. e.*, the tincture of objects, 'in both' *i. e.*, in bound and released souls, 'received' at the 'same' 'place,' *i. e.*, the place of objects, there will be no rule or distinction of bondage and release, because of the liability, (according to this hypothesis), of the released soul also to bondage. Such is the meaning.—29.

Above continued.

अदृष्टवशाच्चेत् ॥ १ । ३० ॥

अदृष्टवशात् A (un)-driṣṭa (seen)-vaśât (virtue), in virtue of Adriṣṭam or the un-seen i. e., destiny. चेत् Chet, if (you suggest).

30. If (the objector suggest that a distinction between the bound and the released souls does exist) in virtue of Adriṣṭam, (the answer is as given in the next aphorism).—30.

Vṛitti:—The author apprehends :

Although (equal) knowledge is entailed in all cases through connection with objects at all times, still it is the same Adriṣṭam by which a particular knowledge is produced in a man, that is the cause of that—that distinctive knowledge—in him). Hence no knowledge can arise universally—30.

Bhāṣya :—Here the author apprehends :

Granting that they (the bound and the released soul) are alike in respect of their conjunction with objects by means of connection with the same locality, yet the reception of the tincture may (or may not) result from the force of adriṣṭam alone. Such is the meaning.—30.

Above continued.

न द्वयोरेककालायोगादुपकार्योपकारकभावः ॥ १ । ३१ ॥

न Na, not. द्वयोः Dvayoh, between the two. एककालयोगात् Eka (same)-kāla (time)-a (non)-yogât (possibility), on account of non-compossibility at one and the same time. उपकार्योपकारकभावः Upakârya (the benefited)-upakâraka (the benefactor)-bhâvaḥ (relation), the relation of the deserver and the bestower.

31. The relation of deserver and bestower (can-) not (subsist) between the two on account of their non-compossibility at one and the same time.—31.

Vṛitti :—The author points out the defect (in the above suggestion) :
(The meaning is) clear.—31.

Bhāṣya :—The author discards (the above suggestion) :

On the admission of momentary duration (of souls), the agent-soul and the experiencer or patient-soul cannot exist at the same (moment of) time, and hence the relation of deserver and bestower cannot subsist. Tincture of objects, pertaining to the patient-soul, is not possible by means of Adriṣṭam pertaining to the agent-soul. Such is the meaning.—31.

Above continued.

पुत्रकर्मवदिति चेत् ॥ १ । ३२ ॥

पुत्रकर्मवत् Putra (son)-karma (performance)-vat (like), like the performances towards a son. इति चेत् Iti chet, if it is suggested.

32. If (it is suggested that the case is) like that of performances toward a son, (we reply that the illustration is not a fact for the reason given in the next aphorism).—32.

Vṛitti :—The author (further) apprehends :

Just as by Prutreṣṭi, a sacrifice for the birth of a son, and like other performances, (in which the father is the agent), benefit is conferred on the son, the patient, who is yet unborn, through the purification of his flesh, so it will be here also.—32.

Bhāṣya :—The author (further) apprehends :

The objector may urge that as benefit accrues to the son by means of ceremonies in regard to the son which (really) belong to the father who performs them, in like manner tincture of objects may be induced (in the soul, for instance, of to-day) by Adṛiṣṭam inhering in a different subject (i. e., for instance, the soul of yesterday). Such is the meaning.—32.

Above continued.

नास्ति हि तत्र स्थिर एकात्मा यो गर्भाधानादिना

संस्क्रियते ॥ १ । ३३ ॥

न Na, not. अस्ति Asti, is, exists. हि Hi, because. तत्र Tatra, there, in the opponent's theory. स्थिरः Sthirah, permanent. एकात्मा Eka (one)-ātmā (soul), self-same soul. यः Yah, which. गर्भाधानादिना Garbha (embryo)-ādhāna (depositing)-ādi, (etc.)-nā, by the ceremony of depositing the embryo in the womb, and the like. संस्क्रियते Samskriyate, is consecrated.

33. (The above illustration is not a real one), because in your theory there is no self-same permanent soul which could be conscreated by the ceremonies beginning with the ceremony of depositing the embryo in the womb.—33.

Vṛitti :—The author declares a demonstrated fact :

(The opponent's illustration is not a real one on his own theory). In our theory, on the other hand, the soul is uncaused, eternal, pure, and enlightened. Oblation of clarified butter, and like other performances,

for its benefit, are quite possible. Thus the soul, conceived as permanent, is proved.—33.

(N. B.—The words, 'In our theory, on the other hand,' and 'Thus the soul, conceived as permanent, is proved' are not found in Garbe's edition of Aniruddha's Commentary, with the result that the portion of the Commentary under notice is not easily intelligible.)

Bhāṣya :—The author removes the above apprehension by showing the falsity of the illustration :

Even by the sacrifice for the sake of a son, no benefit can accrue to the son on your own theory : 'hi,' because, 'tatra,' in your view, there is no permanent, self-same soul, continuing from the time of depositing the embryo in the womb up to the moment of birth, which could be consecrated by the *Putreṣṭi* sacrifice, so as to acquire fitness for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth. Hence follows the falsity of the illustration also. Such is the meaning. On the other hand, the permanency of the soul being an implied tenet of our theory, at that time also, (*i. e.*, at the time subsequent to birth), *Adṛiṣṭam* certainly co-exists with the soul in its self-identity, (in which it was originally produced), inasmuch as it is by means of *Adṛiṣṭam* belonging to the *Upādhi* or the sum-total of external conditions which make the son what he is, that benefit accrues to the son through the *Upādhi* or external condition of sonship. Hence does not follow the falsity of the illustration in our theory also. Such is the import.—33.

Bondage is permanent :

Theory of the transiency of things criticised.

स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेः क्षणिकत्वम् ॥ १ । ३४ ॥

स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेः Sthira (permanent)-kārya (effect)-a (want of)-siddheḥ (proof,) since there is no proof of a permanent effect. *क्षणिकत्वम्* Kṣaṇikatvam, momentariness.

34. Since there is no proof of a permanent effect, the momentariness (of Bondage is to be admitted).—34.

Vṛitti :—The author cites the view that the soul is not-permanent-consciousness :

Existence and possibility of particular uses (belong to the soul). These characteristics are pervaded by succession and non-succession. And they cannot possibly belong to a non-momentary thing. Hence they establish momentariness.—34.

Bhāṣya :—Well, bondage also being momentary, let bondage either have no fixed cause or have non-being for its cause. With this in mind, another unbeliever puts forward :

'Of bondage'—such is the complement. The import has been verily stated above. Here the application of the argument is as follows:

The subject in dispute, bondage, etc., is momentary,
Because it exists,
(For whatever exists is momentary),
As the flame of a lamp.

And, (continues the unbeliever), the argument does not fail in the case of (what you choose to regard as a permanent product, such as) a water-pot, and the like, because that also (in my opinion) is like the subject in dispute (in being momentary). This is precisely what is asserted in the expression "Since there is no proof of a permanent effect."—34.

Above continued.

न प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् ॥ १ । ३५ ॥

न Na, nay. प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात् Pratyabhijñā (recognition)-bādhāt (obstruction), on account of obstruction to recognition.

35. Nay, (things are not momentary in their duration), as (in that case) there would be obstruction to knowing them over again.—35.

Vṛitti:—The author rejects the above view:

Although the existence of a permanent thing should be demonstrated by arguments that a thing is a principal cause or is not a principal cause, according to the presence or absence of co-operative causes, yet, (the fact of recognition) being proved by the common consent of all thinkers, obstruction to unobstructed recognition in the form, 'This is that,' has been mentioned here. This has been elaborated elsewhere, and hence it is not here dealt with at large.—35.

Bhāṣya:—The author proves his theory of permanency of things:

"Momentariness does not belong to a single thing"—such is the complement. Facts of recognition such as "What I saw,—that same do I touch," prove permanency, and consequently there is obstruction to the theory of momentariness, that is, by an opposite argument to that of the unbeliever, which may be fully stated as follows:

Bondage, etc., is permanent,
Because it exists,
(For whatever exists is permanent),
As the water-pot, etc.

It is only in our theory that, by the existence of favourable arguments, there is no opposition by an equally valid argument to the contrary.

And in the case of the lamp and the like, the idea of momentariness is merely an error which the others fall into by not recognising the numerous minute instants through which they endure.—35.

Above continued.

श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च ॥ १ । ३६ ॥

श्रुतिन्यायविरोधात् Śruti (Veda)-Nyāya (logic)-virodhât (contradiction), because of contradiction by the Veda and by logic. च Cha, and, also.

36. And (things are not momentary), also because this is contradicted by the Veda and by logic.—36.

Vritti:—The author points out another defect (in the unbeliever's theory):

The Veda says:

अस्ति जन्मान्तरोपभोग्यमेता पुंशः

There exists Puruṣa, Self, the experiencer of the objects of experience in a different birth.

Logic also: Who so will exert himself in an act which is incapable of enjoyment or in the employment of means for its accomplishment?

(The objector may say that) the activity of kind-hearted persons is observed (to proceed) from unselfishness; but this is really not so, since even in such cases one acquires merit for oneself by doing good to others, and since, although this merit is not directly aimed at, still it becomes the means of Release.—36.

Bhāṣya:—The meaning is that nothing whatever is momentary, because the inference of momentariness, in the whole web of the world consisting of effects and causes, is contradicted by texts of the Veda such as—

सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्

All this, O peaceful one, was verily existing at the beginning.—Chhând. Up. VI. ii. 1, S. B. H., Vol. III, p. 380.

तम एवेदमग्र आसीत्

At the beginning all this was mere darkness.—Maitreya Upaniṣat, V. 2. and by such scriptural and other arguments as—

कथमसतः सज्जायेत

How can that which exists proceed from that which exists not?—Chhând. Upa., VI. ii. 2, S. B. H., Vol. III, p. 280.—36.

Above continued.

दृष्टान्तासिद्धेश्च ॥ १ । ३७ ॥

दृष्टान्तासिद्धेः Dṛṣṭānta (instance)-a (un)-siddheḥ (reality), because of the unreality of the instance. च Cha, also.

37. (Things are not momentary), also because the instance (adduced in the above syllogism, *vide* Sūtram 34) is not a fact.—37.

Vṛitti:—The author points out another defect (in the opponent's theory).

All things, without exception, being included in the pakṣa (the subject of the conclusion proposed to be drawn, *i.e.*, the minor term in which the existence of the major term, *i.e.*, momentariness, is doubtful), there is no (independent) familiar example. If it is not included therein, the same is permanent (falling, as it would do, outside the class of momentary things). If you say that the momentariness of this also may be established by another syllogism, we reply that there too the unreality of the instance will (similarly) be a defect.—37.

Bhāṣya:—The meaning is that there can be no inference of momentariness, also because there is no proof of momentariness in such instances as the flame of a lamp and the like.—37.

Above continued.

युगपज्जायमानयोर्न कार्यकारणभावः ॥ १ । ३८ ॥

युगपज्जायमानयोः Yuga-pat, (simultaneously)-jāyamānayoḥ (produced), between (two things) simultaneously produced. न Na, no. कार्यकारणभावः Kārya (effect)-kāraṇa (cause)-bhāvaḥ (relation), relation of effect and cause.

38. (There can be) no relation of effect and cause between (two things) simultaneously produced.—38.

Vṛitti:—The author declares that it is only on the theory of momentariness that no predication is possible.

“Between (two things) simultaneously produced,” that is, between (two things) possessing predicates identical with themselves, (because, on the theory of momentariness, they perish no sooner than they are produced), as, *e. g.*, between the right and the left horn, (there can be no relation of effect and cause). And this has been declared more than once.—38.

Bhāṣya:—Moreover, the author declares, the relation of effect and cause which, according to those who maintain the transiency of things, is established by the impossibility otherwise of activity and inactivity, does not hold good even in the case of earth and water-pot, and so forth:

Does the relation of effect and cause subsist, between (two things) simultaneously produced, or between successive ones? Of these, the former (is) not (the case), as there is no particular reason for believing that it is so, and on other grounds. Such is the import.—38.

Above continued.

पूर्वापाये उत्तरायोगात् ॥ १ । ३६ ॥

पूर्वापाये Pûrva (precedent)-apâyo (passing away), on the passing away of the precedent. उत्तरायोगात् Uttara (subsequent)-a (no)-yogât (connection), because there can be no connection with the subsequent.

39. (The relation of effect and cause cannot subsist between temporary things even though they be successive), because, on the passing away of the precedent, there can be no (causal) connection with the subsequent.—39.

Vṛitti :—(The opponent may reply that) the relation of effect and cause will arise from the mere appearance of the things in prior and posterior times. Hence the author says :

It would be so, if it (the prior or the posterior thing) could extend beyond itself. But that is impossible on account of its momentariness.—39.

Bhāṣya :—The author shows that the latter also cannot be the case :

The relation of effect and cause is not possible on the theory of momentariness, because the production of the 'subsequent,' *i. e.*, the effect, cannot properly take place at the time of the passing away of the 'precedent,' *i. e.*, the cause, inasmuch as the effect is observed only as dependent upon, or being made up of, the material cause. Such is the meaning.—39.

Above continued.

तद्भावे तदयोगादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न ॥ १ । ४० ॥

तद्भावे Tat-bhāve, during the existence of that, *i. e.*, the cause. तदयोगात् Tat-ayogât, on account of the non-connection of that, *i. e.*, the effect. उभयव्यभिचारात् Ubhaya (both)-vaybhichârât (violation), because of the violation of both. (*N.B.* Here 'both' refers to the two rules of positive and negative inference, *viz.*, that if there is a cause there will be an effect, and that if there is no cause there will be no effect.) अपि Api, also. न Na, not.

40. (The relation of effect and cause is) not (possible on the theory of transiency), because of the violation of both (the rules of positive and negative inference) in consequence of the non-appearance of the effect during the existence of the cause.—40.

Vṛitti:—The author elucidates the above proposition :

The relation of effect and cause is not possible, because of the violation of both, in consequence of the non-existence of the effect during the existence of the relation of the cause and that of which it is the cause. Let aside the question of predication or practical use, uses such as 'This is the cause, this is the effect,' will also be not possible.—40.

Bhāṣya:—The author points out yet another defect by reference to the material cause alone :

The meaning is that the relation of effect and cause cannot subsist, also 'Ubhaya-vyābhichārāt,' because of the violation of (the rule of) positive and negative inference, in consequence of the non-connection of the subsequent during the existence of the precedent. Thus, apprehension of the relation of effect and cause between the constituent and the constituted is possible only by the rules of agreement and disagreement, *viz.*, that where there is production of the constituted there is the constituent, and when there is non-existence of the constituent there is absence of the production of the constituted. That being so, the relation of effect and cause is not established on the theory of momentariness, because of the violation of the rules of agreement and disagreement, in consequence of the fact, that these two things, the constituent and the constituted, being successive and having only a momentary duration, belong to two different, opposite, moments of time.—40.

पूर्वभावमात्रे न नियमः ॥ १ । ४१ ॥

पूर्वभावमात्रे Pārva (prior)-bhāva (existence)-mātre (mere), in the case of mere antecedence. न Na, no. नियमः Niyamaḥ, uniformity, restriction.

41. In the case of mere antecedence there will be no uniformity.—41.

Vṛitti:—The opponent may argue that the existence of the cause at the time of the production of the effect is inoperative, and that the effect will result by the mere existence of the cause at the preceding moment. Hence the author says :

(Will the effect result by the mere antecedence) of something belonging to a different series, or of something belonging to the same series with the effect? If you say 'of something belonging to a different series,' then the causation will be too remote (*i. e.*, the cause will operate where it exists not). If, on the other hand, you say 'of something belonging to the same series with the effect,' in that case also as, (being momentary), it would perish without subsequence (of the effect), it would be similar to

something belonging to a different series, and therefore there will be no uniformity. That there can be no subsequence or agreement between them has been already stated (*vide* Sūtram 40).

It may be said that the causality of a non-existent cause also is observed. For example, an archer shoots another man with an arrow, and immediately dies of apoplexy; afterwards the man shot with the arrow dies; here the death of the former is the cause of the death of the latter. But it is not so, because the subsequence of the death of the latter, even in the non-existence of the archer, is due to the (physiological) processes which resulted in death.—41.

Bhāṣya:—(The opponent may urge:) Let the causality of the material cause also, like that of the efficient or instrumental cause, arise solely by means of mere antecedence. To this the author replies:

On the admission, again, of mere antecedence, there will be no such uniformity or fixed certainty as 'It is this that is the material cause,' because there is no distinctive peculiarity in the antecedence of the efficient causes also. (Whereas) the division of material and efficient causes is recognised by all men. Such is the meaning.—41.

The cause of Bondage really exists. The world is not an idea.

न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतिः ॥ १ । ४२ ॥

n Na, not. विज्ञानमात्रं 'Vijñāna (idea)-mātram (mere), mere idea. बाह्यप्रतीतिः Bāhya (external)-pratīteḥ (intuition), on account of the intuition of external things.

42. (The world is) not a mere idea, on account of the intuition of objective reality.—42.

Vṛtti:—It has been stated that Bondage results from the tinctorial reflection cast upon the Self by adjacent external objects. But external reality, says the Vijñāna-vādin, (Bauddha) Idealist, does not exist, since the world is in its essence ideal. The author replies to him:

The world is not mere idea. Had it been so, the intuition would have been 'I am a water-pot,' and not 'This is a water-pot,' (as is the case). It cannot be said that the difference is caused by a distinctive peculiarity in the Vāsanâ, mental impression or recept; for, in the absence, *ex-hypothesi*, of external reality, the recept of the water-pot itself can have no existence, and consequently how can there be any such distinctive peculiarity? What, again, is the cause of the mental impression? Is it the mental impression itself or some other impression coming from the outside? In the case of the (second) alternative, that it is some

external impression, something else also would exist, and consequently the same would be an external reality.

But external reality, our opponent may argue, cannot verily exist, by reason of the non-existence of a whole exceeding the parts of which it is made up. For, thus, the parts and the whole being identical, there is the intuition of unity. When the part moves, the whole moves; where the part is small, the whole does not move. By the attribution of the contradictory property, *viz.*, that it does not move, there exists difference (between the part and the whole), and hence there is no unity. In like manner, other defects such as being red and not-red, covered and not-covered, confined-to-a-place and not-confined-to-a-place, and so forth, may be cited in example.

We reply: Granted that the whole (containing properties contradictory to those of its component parts) does not exist; still there is no disproof of external reality, inasmuch as it is of the cluster of ultimate atoms that apprehension or intuition takes place under the characteristic of largeness.

It is not so, rejoins our opponent. For, ultimate atoms have to be inferred (as the cause) by means of the whole as (their) effect; in the case of its non-existence, by means of which are they to be inferred? Ultimate atoms being super-sensible, they cannot also deposit in their cluster something which they themselves do not contain; consequently, 'It is large or bulky,' such intuition is erroneous. Hence follows that the world is mere idea.

Here it is said: (This is not so), because of the difference between part and whole. Moreover, the two being different from each other, the whole does not move when the parts move. Where, however, there is movement or vibration of a larger number of parts, there the whole certainly moves. Similar reconciliation in the case also of the contradiction of red and not-red, etc., may be declared. External reality, therefore, is proved.

In the case of the other alternative, *viz.*, that it is the mental impression itself that is the cause of the mental impression, there would be production of knowledge at all times.—42.

Bhāṣya:—Other unbelievers, again, say: There is no existence of an entity which is not an idea. Therefore, Bondage also is a mere idea, like an object seen in a dream. Hence, it being absolutely unreal, there is no cause of it.

The author sets aside their opinion :

The meaning is that reality is not limited to ideas only, because like ideas, external objects also are proved by intuition.—42.

Nor is the world a Void.

तदभावे तदभावाच्छून्यं तर्हि ॥ १ । ४३ ॥

तदभावे Tat-abhâve, in the non-existence or absence of that, i.e., external objects. तदभावात् Tat-abhâvât, there being non-existence of that, i.e., knowledge. शून्यं Śūnyam, void. तर्हि Tarhi, therefore.

43. There being non-existence of external objects, there is non-existence of knowledge : (the world), therefore, is a void.—43.

Vṛitti :—Knowledge, devoid of object, is not observed. Therefore, (if the external reality does not exist, then,) in consequence of the non-existence of objects to be known, knowledge also does not exist. Thus declares the Śūnya-vâdin, the Bauddha Nihilist :

Void follows from the non-existence of knowledge in the absence of objects to be known. If knowledge were its own object, there would be the contradiction of the agent and the patient.—43.

Bhāṣya :—“Well, (the mere fact of intuition does not prove external reality.) ‘The simple and natural form of reasoning is,” argue those heretics, “the inference, by means of the examples of dreams and the like, of the unreality appertaining to the object supposed to be the cause of presentation to the senses or sensible appearances. By this inference the sensation of external reality as such should be opposed. On this point there is also the testimony of your Śruti and Smṛiti. For example—

चिद्विदं सर्वम्

Verily all this is consciousness.—*Nṛsiṃha-Tâpani Upa.*, II. 1. 7.

तस्माद् विज्ञानमेवास्ति न प्रपञ्चो न संसृतिः

‘Therefore, only Thought exists, neither creation nor transmigration.—*Linga-Purāṇa* (?)’

Hence the author points out another defect :

Were it so, from the non-existence of external reality only the Void would result, and not even Thought. Why not? Because, ‘Tat-abhâvât,’ in the absence of external reality, there being the implication of the non-existence of thought or idea also, the inference is possible that the intuition of idea also, like the intuition of external reality, corresponds to no reality as its object. The infallibility of the evidence of Thought is also sometimes disproved. Furthermore, the proofs of (the existence of)

Thought are also repudiated, because they are derived from external sources. Such is the meaning.

(The Vijñāna-vādin may reply): The fact of intuition is disputed by none whatever, and hence it does not stand in need of any proof. But this is not so, because the Śūnya-vādins themselves dispute that.

If (the Vijñāna-vādin contends): (The existence of) a thing is proved by a non-existent thing also as the means of proof, inasmuch as it is the non-opposition to (the existence of) the object (to be proved) that is the cause of certain knowledge (of its existence), and not the ultimate or absolute reality of the means of proof.

(We reply): It is not so, as, in that case, non-existent things, as means of proof, being everywhere easily available, there would be no (need of) seeking after the means of proof with regard to any object whatever.

Now, (if the Vijñāna-vādin admits): Even amongst non-existent things, a distinction in the form of practical or phenomenal existence is desirable in the case of those which serve as means of proof.

(We say): You have come to the path. What, again, is (the meaning of) this practical or phenomenal existence? If it denotes the characteristic of undergoing change of form, then it is existence of this kind only that is also desired by us in the case of the means of proof of the perceptible and the percipient, for we exclude from the web of the universe—creation—only its imputed resemblance to the illusory silvery appearance of the oyster shell. If, on the other hand, it denotes mere appearance or manifestation, in that case also, by means of proof exactly similar to those (of the existence of Thought), the proof of (the existence of) external objects also would result. Opposition to proof of existence, by means of the very same kind of haphazard inference under the auspices of simple and natural form of reasoning, (as is raised against the existence of external reality), would equally arise in the case of Thought also.

Hereby is set at rest the opinion of the so-called Vedāntins of the present day, which stands on no stronger basis than the teaching of the Vijñāna-vādin.

On the other hand, the texts of the Śruti and the Smṛiti (quoted above), demonstrative of the reality of Thought alone, refute only the absolute or transcendental existence of external objects in the form of freedom from change, but not also their practical or phenomenal

existence in the form of the characteristic of being liable to transformation.

वस्तु राजेति यल्लोके यत्तु राजभटादिकम् ।

तथान्यच्च नृपेत्यं तु न सत् सङ्कल्पनामयम् ॥ ९४ ॥

यत्तु कालान्तरेणापि नान्यसञ्ज्ञामुपैति वै ।

परिणामादिसम्भूतां तद्वस्तु नृप तच्च किम् ॥ ९५ ॥

‘This entity is the king,’ ‘These are the king’s army,’ and so on,—these and such other (predications), O king, are similarly made (i. e., made by reference to the body). These designations are not real but purely imaginary (94). But the reality is that which, even by the passage of time, does not pass into a different designation derived from change of form and the like. O king, what is it (i. e., how shall I describe it to you)? (95.)—Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, II. XIII. 94-95.

From these verses of the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa and from other sources we learn that it is the liability to change of form that is regarded as possessing the characteristic of non-existence. ‘Samkalpanâ-mayam,’ i. e., invented by the imagination or mind of Īśvara and others.

Hereby it should be understood that by—

विज्ञानमयमेवैतदशेषमवगच्छत

Know all this, in its entirety, to be constituted by Thought alone.—Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, III. XVIII. 18.

this and other propositions, ‘it was just the truth that was taught, as the story is related in the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, to the Asuras, the enemies of the Gods, by Viṣṇu in the form of Mâyâ-Moha (vide Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, III. XVIII), but that they, owing to their unfitness for these instructions and other imperfections, received these instructions in a contrary sense, and thereby became Vijnâna-vâdin Nâstikas or Idealistic Heretics.

All this, however, has been elaborately dealt with by us, in our Commentary on the Brahma-Mīmāṃsâ, in connection with the refutation of the Doctrine of Mâyâ.—43.

Above continued.

शून्यं तत्त्वं भावो विनश्यति वस्तुधर्मत्वाद् विनाशस्य ॥ १।४४ ॥

शून्यं Śūnyam, the void. तत्त्वं Tattvam, reality. भावः Bhâvaḥ, existence. विनश्यति Vināśyati, perishes. वस्तुधर्मत्वाद् Vastu (thing)-dharma (nature)-tvât, being the nature of things. विनाशस्य Vinâśasya, of destruction.

44. The Void is the reality, existence passes away, it being the nature of things to pass away.—44.

Vritti:—(The Śūnya-vâdin goes on :)

If reality consisted in the form of existence (as perceived by us), then on the destruction of existence there being destruction of reality,

there would be no emancipation. 'Vastu-dharma-tvât vinâśasya,' because a thing, (phenomenal being), must necessarily perish.—44.

Bhāṣya :—Let it be so, rejoins the high priest of the heretics, that only the Void is the reality. Then, necessarily, the enquiry into the cause of Bondage is not justified, being altogether useless.

Only the Void is the reality, because all (perceptible) existence whatever perishes, and that which is by nature perishable, is unreal, as a dream. Hence all things, being non-existent at the beginning and at the end, have a temporary existence during the interval, and so Bondage, etc., are creational, incidental or occasional, and not real in the ultimate sense. Consequently, which will be bound by which? Such is their inward significance. The reason, (for the assertion), that existences are by nature perishable, is (given in the words): 'Vastu-dharma-tvât vinâśasya,' which mean that to perish is of the nature of things. And no object can continue to exist after divorcing its nature. Such is the meaning.—44.

Above continued.

अपवादमात्रमबुद्धानाम् ॥ १ । ४५ ॥

अपवादमात्रं 'Apavāda (incorrect or false statement)-mātram (mere), a mere false statement. अबुद्धानाम् Abuddhânām, of the unenlightened.

45. ('Existence passes away'—this is) a mere false declaration or cavillation on the part of the unenlightened.—45.

Vṛitti :—The author states his own solution (of the doubt raised by the Sūnya-vādin):

Non-existence does not perish,—this is a mere form of speech, and not a real proposition, 'A-buddhânām,' on the part of those to whom the Śāstras or sacred writings are unknown. For, the destruction of antecedent non-existence is observed, and on the establishment of the theory of Sat-kārya, i.e., that of the existence of the effect in the cause even prior to its appearance as the effect, there is non-destruction of existence. Even if the term, destruction, is applied to denote disappearance, there is still non-destruction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa.

(If the Sūnya-vādin asks): Non-existence itself does not exist, how can arise the consideration of its destruction and non-destruction?

(We reply): How, then, takes place the cognition, the water-pot does not exist on the ground, (*lit.*, the ground is where-the-water-pot-does-not-exist)? If it arises by the help of the ground, the result would be that cognition of the non-existence of the water-pot will take place even when

the water-pot exists on the ground, inasmuch as the ground remains the same in both the cases.

(If the Sūnya-vādin holds): Cognition of Non-existence arises by the help of the bare ground. But the water-pot being there, the ground lacks bareness.

(We ask): Is bareness a mere part of the nature of the ground, or is it something beyond that? If it constitutes the very nature of the ground, then, inasmuch as it would continue to exist even during the existence of the water-pot on it, cognition of non-existence would take place. If, on the other hand, it is something beyond that, then the same is non-existence.

(If the Sūnya-vādin argues): The use of (the term), non-existence, is in respect of the aloneness or singleness of the ground. While the water-pot exists, there is no singleness in the ground. Where, then, is the reason for the application of (the term) non-existence?

(We say): Such is not the case. Is singleness the number unity, or something else? The number unity, again, exists in the ground even when it contains the water-pot. In the case of the second alternative, *viz.*, that it is something else, the very same would be non-existence. For, where there is no characteristic difference in the objects, there can be no characteristic difference in the cognitions thereof.

(If the Sūnya-vādin asks): How can there be cognition of non-existence, when there is no relation between existence and non-existence?

(We reply): As the cognition, this is a water-pot, arises from the agreement and non-agreement, stimulation, and non-stimulation, of the senses, in like manner, the cognition of non-existence also proceeds from a cause. For, the supposition of the cause is made by the observation of the effect, but it is not possible to wilfully disregard (the existence of) an observed effect, (*e.g.*, the cognition of non-existence). Moreover, as we hold the theory of an indefinite number of predicables (*vide* Sūtram 25 and 26 *supra*), it will do us no harm if there exists some such relation also (between existence and non-existence) as is required.

Non-existence, therefore, is established.—45.

Bhāṣya :—The author discards (the above view):

Existence as such is perishable,—such is 'Apavāda-mātram,' merely a false declaration, of the ignorant. For by reason of the non-existence of destructive causes, the destruction of (simple) substances which are not made up of parts, is impossible. There is also no proof of the destruction of even effects; just as the intuition, the water-pot is worn out,

(proves the worn out condition of the water-pot, so intuitions such as, the water-pot is past and gone, prove nothing but the condition of the water-pot, etc., designated as past. The unmanifested state (of a thing) also really enters into our theory on the admission of the past (or un-produced) state of the effect. Further, even if it is conceded that destruction is of the essence of the web of the universe, still it is possible that the destruction of Bondage can properly become an object of desire.

Someone, however, explains (the Sūtram as follows) :—

The Void is the reality,—this is only a coarse theory of the ignorant, while there is no argument in its favour. For it does not bear the alternatives of the existence and non-existence of proof: if you admit that there is proof of the existence of the Void, then, by that very proof, voidness is disproved; if you do not admit this, then, owing to the absence of proof, the void is not proved; and if you say that the Void proves itself, then the implication would be that it possesses the form of consciousness, and the like. Such is the meaning.

It cannot be contended that the void is established as the reality by the Śruti and the Smṛiti also in such passages as—

न निरोधो न वात्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।
न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

Neither suppression nor, again, production, neither entangled nor, again, engaged in the pursuit of freedom, neither desirous of release nor, again, released; such is the absolute truth.—Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā, II. 32; Brahma-Bindu Upa., 10.

सर्वशून्यं निरालम्बं स्वरूपं यत्र चिन्त्यते ।
अभावयोगः स प्रोक्तो येनात्मानं प्रपश्यति ॥

Where the pure form (of the soul), devoid of everything else, and having no other support but itself, is meditated upon, that is called Abhāva-yoga, connection with non-existence or communion in non-existence, whereby one fully beholds the Self.—Kārma-Purāṇa, II. XI. 6.

For, in similar passages of the Śruti, it is the non-existence of the suppression or destruction, and so forth, of the Puruṣas that is declared to possess the characteristic of reality, inasmuch as we get it from the preceding and succeeding passages that it is the Puruṣa that is the subject-matter of discourse there. Besides, in such passages of the Smṛiti as quoted above, it is the firmament or sphere of consciousness in which the universe has found its setting, that is established as the reality, inasmuch as these passages convey the same meaning as the following and like others :—

त्रैलोक्यं गगनाकारं नभस्तुल्यं वपुः स्वकम् ।
वियद्गामि मनो ध्यायन् योगी ब्रह्मैव गीयते ॥

The Yogin is regarded as having become Brahman itself, when he contemplates the three-fold world as possessing the form of the sky, his own body as similar to the sky, and his Manas or mind as dissolving into the sky.—(Source not traced.)

Sky and void are synonymous terms. 'Manas' denotes all the inner senses, viz., the principles of Mahat, Ahankâra, and Manas. 'Viyat-gâmi' means dissolved into the firmament of consciousness.—45.

Above continued.

उभयपक्षसमानक्षेमत्वादयमपि ॥ १ । ४६ ॥

उभयपक्षसमानक्षेमत्वात् Ubhaya (both)-pakṣa (party)-samâna (same)-kṣematvât (preservation or worth), because it possesses as much worth as both the (other) theories (of transiency and idealism). अयम् Ayam, this, the theory of the void. अपि Api, also.

46. This (theory) also (should be rejected), because it possesses no more worth than the other two theories (viz., of transiency and idealism).—46.

Vṛtti:—The author gives another solution :

This also, the theory of the void, should be set aside, because it possesses as much strength as the theory of momentariness and the theory of idealism. As momentary existence is contravened by the recognition of things previously perceived, as ideal existence is contravened by the perception of external entities, in like manner this also, the theory of the void, should be contravened by the observation of the entire universe in perception itself —46.

Bhāṣya:—The author points out another defect (in Sūnya-vāda):

'This theory also falls to the ground, 'Samâna-kṣematvât,' because the reason for its rejection is the same as that for the rejection of 'Ubhayapakṣa,' the theories that things are momentary and that external objects are mere ideas,—such is the sentence rendered complete by means of words brought over from elsewhere. For, the ground for the rejection of the theory of momentariness, e.g., impossibility or unaccountableness of recognition, etc., is equally applicable to the theory of the void also. Similarly, the ground for the rejection of the theory of idealism, e.g., intuition of external objects, etc., equally applies here also. Such is the meaning.—46.

अपुरुषार्थत्वमुभयथा ॥ १ । ४७ ॥

अपुरुषार्थत्वात् A (not)-puruṣa (Puruṣa)-artha (object)-tvam, the not being an object of desire to the Puruṣa. उभयथा Ubhyathâ, in both ways.

47. Either way the void cannot be an object of desire to the Puruṣa.—47.

Vṛitti.—The author shows another defect in Sānya-vāda.

If void means non-existence, (it cannot be an object of desire), for what sober-minded man will strive after a non-existence? Again, the use of the word (Mokṣa, release) denoting positive existence, in 'Release is the object desired by the Puruṣa,' will be meaningless. If the void denote, on the other hand, something beyond existence and non-existence, then also it cannot be an object of desire to the Puruṣa, because also of the non-observation of a thing of this nature.—47.

Bhāṣya.—These heretics again think that voidness itself may become an object of desire to the Puruṣa, either as being of the form of cessation of pain, or as being the means thereof. But, the author shows, that also is impossible.

For voidness, to be an object of desire to the Puruṣa, is not possible, intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Because pleasure and the like possess the characteristic of being objects of desire to the Puruṣa by the very fact of its being inherent in them. Besides (the existence of) a permanent Puruṣa is not admitted (by these heretics). Such is the meaning.—47.

Nor does Bondage result from particular movements of Puruṣa.

न गतिविशेषात् ॥ १ । ४८ ॥

न, Na, not. गतिविशेषात् Gati (going)-viśeṣāt (distinction), because of the distinction of movement.

48. (The Void is) not (the reality), because (in the reality) there is the distinction of movement. (Aniruddha). Or, (Bondage does) not (accrue to the Puruṣa) from (his) particular movements. (Vijñāna-Bhikṣu).—48.

Vṛitti.—With a view to discard the Sānya-vādin, the author states the doctrine of the Kṣapaṇakas (another section of the Bauddhas) that the soul is of the measure of the body:

The Void is not the reality, because the Void is not capable of movement. Movement (of the soul) is, on the other hand, observed. For instance, (we find in) the Śruti—

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चर्षं बलाद् यमः

Yama, the Moral Governor of the World, forcibly extracted the Puruṣa having the size of the thumb only.

पापेन नरकं याति पुण्येन स्वर्गाति ज्ञानेन ब्रह्मलोकं याति

By vice, (the Puruṣa) goes to hell, by virtue to heaven, by knowledge to the world of Brahman.—48.

Bhâṣya.—(The author has done with the unbelievers, Nāstikas, so far as the cause of Bondage is concerned.) Some of the theories of the Âstikas (those who believe in Revelation, etc.) also have been already refuted. The remaining other causes of Bondage that may be possibly attributed by them, are also now going to be refuted :

The word, Bondage, is obtained from the context. The meaning is that Bondage does not accrue to the Puruṣa, also ' Gati-viśeṣāt,' from particular movements, such as entering into a body, etc.—48.

For Puruṣa is incapable of movement.

निष्क्रियस्य तदसम्भवात् ॥ १ । ४६ ॥

निष्क्रियस्य Niṣkriyasya, of the inactive. तदसम्भवात् Tat (that)-a (im)-sambhavāt (possibility), owing to impossibility thereof, i. e., of movement.

49. Because that which is inactive, is incapable of movement.—49.

Vṛitti.—The author condemns the above view.

The sense of the Sûtram is obvious.—49.

Bhâṣya.—The author gives the reason for the above conclusion :

The meaning is (that Bondage does not accrue to the Puruṣa from particular movements), because movement is impossible for the Puruṣa who is inactive and all-pervading.—49.

Above explained.

मूर्तत्वाद्घटादिवत् समानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः ॥ १ । ५० ॥

मूर्तत्वात् Mûrtatvât, being consolidate or corporeal. घटादिवत् Ghaṭa (water-pot)-âdi (and the like)-vat (like), like water-pot, etc. समानधर्मापत्तौ Samâna (similar)-dharma (property)-âpattau (implication), in view of the implication of similar properties. अपसिद्धान्तः Apa (wrong)-siddhântaḥ (conclusion,) wrong or reverse conclusion.

50. If the Puruṣa were corporeal, (and, therefore, limited or finite), like the water-pot, etc., then he would possess properties similar to those of the latter, and hence the reverse conclusion (would follow).—50.

Vṛitti.—The author explains the inactivity or unchangeableness of the Puruṣa.

Corporeal or finite things, the water-pot, etc., undergo change. If the Puruṣa possess a like property, he would also perish. But the mortality of the Puruṣa is the reverse of truth. Moreover, in the course of

migration into different births, the Puruṣa would have, according to the supposition of his having a finite size, to adapt himself to the size of the body of the elephant and the worm. If he thus undergoes contraction and expansion, he must be a whole made up of parts, and, therefore, non-eternal, (which also is the reverse of truth).—50.

Bhāṣya.—The doubt may arise that only finiteness, and not infiniteness, probably belongs to the Puruṣa, inasmuch as we hear from the Śruti and the Smṛiti about his going and not going to this world and to the world beyond. Thus, there is the Śruti also—

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा

The Puruṣa, of the size of the thumb, the inner Self.—*Kaṭha Upa.*, II. vi. 17, *Śvetāśvatara Upa.*, III, 13.

The author removes the above apprehension :

If, again, the Puruṣa is admitted to be 'Mūrta,' divided off from other things, i. e., definite, like the water-pot, etc., then the result would be that he will possess properties similar to those of the water-pot, etc., by being a whole made up of parts, perishable, and so forth. Hence the finiteness of the Puruṣa is a perverse conclusion. Such is the meaning.—50.

Above continued.

गतिश्रुतिरप्युपाधियोगादाकाशवत् ॥ १ । ५१ ॥

गतिश्रुतिः Gati (going)-śruti (text of Śruti), teaching of the Śruti about the going of the Puruṣa. अपि Api, also. उपाधियोगात् Upādhi (adjunct, investment, condition or limitation)-yogāt (connection), in respect of connection with external investment. आकाशवत् Ākāśa (sky)-vat (like), as in the case of the sky.

51. The teaching of the Śruti about the 'going' (of the Puruṣa) is in respect of his external investment, as in the case of the sky.—51.

Vṛitti.—(It may be said that), such being the case, there is conflict with the Śruti, e. g., 'of the size of the thumb,' etc. Accordingly the author explains (those passages of the Śruti.)

As, according to the division caused by the external investment such as the water-pot, etc., the cognition, viz., that Ghaṭa-ākāśa (the portion of the sky confined within the water-pot) moves, arises while the water-pot moves, likewise arises the intuition, viz., that the Self moves, from the delimitation caused by the bodily vesture, etc.—51.

Bhāṣya:—The author explains the teaching of the Śruti about the going of the Puruṣa :

There are, of course, Vedic declarations about going with reference to the Puruṣa. But these should be regarded as having been made certainly in accordance with the arguments and teachings of the Śruti and Smṛiti about the universality or all-pervading character of the Puruṣa, and, therefore, only with reference to his connection with an external investment, in the same way as motion may be attributed to the sky. Such is the meaning.

On this point, the evidence is as follows :

(i) Śruti: e.g.—

घटसंवृतमाकाशं नीयमाने घटे यथा ।

घटो नीयेत नाकाशं तद्वज्जीवो नभोपमः ॥

As the sky, enveloped within the water-pot, (seems to move), while the water-pot is carried (from place to place), (whereas, in reality), the water-pot is removed, and not the sky, so the Jīva, the embodied Self, which is like the sky (in this respect).—*Brahma-Bindu Upaniṣat*, 13.

बुद्धेर्गुणेनात्मगुणेन चैव आराग्रमात्रोहवरोऽपि दृष्टः

Another (Self, the Jīva) also is observed, of the size of the half-moon, (attended) with the quality of the Buddhi (Understanding) and with the quality of Ātman (Self).—*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣat*, V. 8.

(ii) Smṛiti: e.g.—

नित्यः सर्वगतः स्थाणुः

(The Self is) eternal, all-penetrating, immoveable, etc.—*Bhagavat-Gītā*, II. 24.

(iii) Argument: e.g. —

(a) If the Self is held to be of medium size, (i.e., neither all-pervading nor atomic), then, he will be, by necessary implication, a whole made up of parts, and, consequently, perishable.

(b) If, on the other hand, it is said to be atomic in size, then, it will not be possible for it to have cognition, etc., spreading over the whole body.

It is for these reasons, that Prakṛiti alone is specifically mentioned as possessing motion in the form of activity or change, in such passages of the Smṛiti as—

प्रकृतिः कुरुते कर्म शुभाशुभफलात्मकम् ।

प्रकृतिश्च तदश्नाति त्रिषु लोकेषु कामगा ॥

Prakṛiti performs action which contains, as its essence, 'fruits' (consequences), good or bad. Prakṛiti also eats those fruits in the three worlds where she goes, being led by desire.—*Mahābhārata, Śānti Parvan*.—51.

Nor is Bondage caused by Adṛiṣṭam or Destiny.

न कर्मणाप्यतद्धर्मत्वात् ॥ १ । ५२ ॥

न Na, not. कर्मणा Karmaṇā, by action or adṛiṣṭam. अपि Api, also, even. अतद्धर्मत्वात् A (not)-tat (its)-dharma-(property)-tvât (being), not being its property.

52. Nor even by Action (Bondage results), Action not being a property of the Self.—52.

Vṛitti:—(The opponent may interpose): What will the Upâdhi do? Difference will arise from diversity of action.

Hence the author declares :

It would be so, if action were a property of the Self. But no property whatever belongs to the Self, it being devoid of all attributes.—52.

Bhāṣya :—Nor even does Bondage accrue to the Puruṣa directly by means of Karma or Adṛiṣṭam or destiny. Why not? Because it lacks the characteristic of being a property of the Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

Before this (*vide* Sūtram 16) has been refuted (the theory of) Bondage by means of action in the form of prescribed and prohibited observances. While here (is refuted the theory of Bondage) by means of Adṛiṣṭam or destiny produced thereby. Hence, owing to this difference in meaning, there is no tautology.—52.

(N. B.—Vijñāna-Bhikṣu, Nāgoṣa Bhaṭṭa, and Mahādeva Vedāntin, the last of whom, by the way, offers merely to explain the *Vṛitti* of Aniruddha, read the 53rd and 54th aphorisms in the order adopted by us, while Aniruddha transposes them).

Above continued.

अतिप्रसक्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे ॥ १ । ५३ ॥

अतिप्रसक्तिः Ati- (too far)-prasaktiḥ (implication), too far implication. अन्यधर्मत्वे Anya (different)-dharma (property)-tve (being), being properties of different things.

53. If (Bondage and its cause) be properties of different things, the implication would go too far.—53.

Argument concluded.

निर्गुणादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति ॥ १ । ५४ ॥

निर्गुणादिश्रुतिविरोधः Nirguṇa (absolute, devoid of attributes)-âdi (and the like)-śruti (Vedic declaration)-virodhaḥ (conflict), conflict with Vedic declarations such as that the Puruṣa is devoid of attributes, and the like. च Cha, and, also. इति Iti, finish. According to Vijñāna-Bhikṣu this word marks the close of the enquiry into the cause of Bondage. But Aniruddha does not seem to have taken notice of it. Perhaps this accounts for his transposition of the two aphorisms,

54. (Did Bondage result from any other cause than Upâdhi or external investment, there would be) also conflict with the Vedic declarations such as that the Puruṣa is devoid of attributes and the like.—54.

Vṛitti:—(The opponent may urge): Action may be just a property of the Self. Where is the conflict?

To this the author replies:

The Śruti—

असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः

For the Puruṣa is unattached.—*Bṛīhat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat*, IV. iii. 1 will be contradicted.—54.

Vṛitti:—(The opponent may still argue): Granted (that action is) not a property of the Self, (but of something else). Yet a particular action, *i.e.*, change, (that is to say, Bondage), may take place (in the Self), even by means of the property of another thing, inasmuch as the Self, being all-pervading, has connection with all things.

Accordingly the author declares:

(If it were so, then), there being nowhere any peculiarity in the universal connection of the Self, the theory would entail the bondage of the released Selves also.—53.

Bhāṣya:—If it is maintained that Bondage will accrue to one even by the property of another, the author replies:

If Bondage and its cause were properties of different things, 'Atiprasaktiḥ,' it would entail the bondage of the released Puruṣa also. Such is the meaning.—53.

Bhāṣya:—What is the use of further prolonging the discussion? The production of Bondage, in the case of the Puruṣa, cannot take place from any of the causes cited above, beginning with nature and ending with Adṛiṣṭam, or by any other cause whatsoever, inasmuch as in all these cases, there would be conflict with the Śruti. The author states this general objection:

On (the theory of) the non-reflectional character of the bondage of the Puruṣa, there would be conflict with such Vedic declarations as—

साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च

(The Puruṣa is) the witness, conscious, standing alone, and devoid of attributes.—*Śvetâśvatara Upaniṣat* VI. 11.

Such is the meaning.

The word, Iti, has been used to denote the close of the enquiry into the Cause of Bondage.—54.

Association of Puruṣa with Prakṛiti happens by non-discrimination.

तद्योगोऽप्यविवेकान्न समानत्वम् ॥ १ । ५५ ॥

तद्योगः Tat (that)-yogaḥ (connection), connection with that, property and not-property (Aniruddha), Prakṛiti (Vijñāna-Bhikṣu). Aniruddha also reads the word with the locative inflection. **अपि** Api, also, even. **अविवेकान्न** Avivekān, through non-discrimination. **न** Na, no. **समानत्वम्** Samānatvam, equality, similarity.

55. (Puruṣa's) connection, with property and not-property (Aniruddha), or, with Prakṛiti (Vijñāna-Bhikṣu), takes place through Non-discrimination. Hence there is no similarity.—55.

Vṛitti:—(Our opponent may say quite complacently): In your theory also there is distribution of property and not-property to the Self; for, activity of the entangled Self, for the purpose of attaining release, is observed. What is your conclusion (solution of the difficulty) here, the same will be ours too. Thus (the two cases are) similar.

To him the author says:

Notwithstanding connection with property and not-property, there is no similarity in property between the entangled and the released Self, on account of non-discrimination. If the connection of property and not-property were real to the Self, there would be equality. But, on the other hand, the sense or idea, abhīmāna, of the connection of property and not-property arises in the Self on account of non-discrimination. Where, then, is the similarity?—55.

Bhāṣya:—Thus, therefore, in the above minor section beginning with “Nor.....of one who is bound by nature” (**न स्वभावत इत्यादि**, Sūtram 7), it is ascertained, by the exclusion of all other possible causes, that conjunction between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, and nothing else, is the immediate cause of Bondage. In that theory there is this apprehension. Well, (an objector may contend), why is not also the conjunction of Puruṣa with Prakṛiti affected with the qualifications of naturalness, etc.? And if the characteristics of being natural and of having time and the like as its instrumental causes, belong to that conjunction, then, the defects, such as the possibility of Bondage in the case even of the released Puruṣa, etc., are certainly correspondingly the same on both the theories.

The author avoids this very apprehension:

‘Tat-yogaḥ,’ connection with that which has been stated above (Prakṛiti or Dharma and A-dharma), ‘api’ (also), ‘a-vivekān’ (from non-discrimination) of Puruṣa. For conjunction (of Puruṣa with Prakṛiti) takes

place only from non-discrimination, which will be presently explained, as its instrumental cause. Hence the defects mentioned do not equally exist in this theory. Such is the meaning. And the same non-discrimination does not exist in the released Puruṣas ; hence they do not again enter into conjunction (with Prakṛiti).

Objection:—Well, non-discrimination here does not consist in the realisation of non-difference between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, because of its non-existence prior to conjunction, but it consists either in the antecedent non-existence of discrimination or in the vāsanā or tendency towards, or sub-conscious latency of, knowledge which is called discrimination. Neither of these is a property of the Puruṣa. But they are surely properties of Buddhi or Understanding. Hence conjunction takes place in one thing (*i. e.* Puruṣa) by means of the properties of another thing (*i. e.* Buddhi.) Thus arises the defect of too much implication, in which respect the two theories certainly stand on an equal footing.

Answer:—This is not so, because the characteristic of being a property of the Puruṣa belongs to non-discrimination by means of the relation of its being an object (to the Puruṣa). Thus, for the purpose of showing up all her modifications, Prakṛiti enters into conjunction, by the form of his Buddhi or Understanding, with that very Puruṣa to whom, as her lord, she, having taken the form of Buddhi, has not previously exhibited her body, discriminating every part thereof. Such being the rule, there is not too much implication. So has it been declared by the Kārikā :

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।

पङ्गवन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ सांख्यकारिका, २१ ॥

Conjunction of Puruṣa and Pradhāna is, like that of the halt and the blind, for mutual benefit, for the exhibition of Pradhāna to Puruṣa and for the purpose of the isolation of Puruṣa. From this Conjunction proceeds Creation.—Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛiṣṇa, verse 21.

The meaning is (that their conjunction takes place) in order that Pradhāna may exhibit herself to Puruṣa, her lord, and for the purpose of their separation.

To say that A-viveka, Non-discrimination, is, in form, a function or modification of Buddhi, is a mere figure of speech, and not a real proposition, because, as we shall explain in a future aphorism, of the continuance of the Chitta or mind (after the removal of A-viveka).

A-viveka, moreover, becomes the cause of Bondage only by way of Conjunction, inasmuch as Bondage is not observed during Dissolution, and also as the Jīvan-muktas are observed to experience pain even after A-viveka has been destroyed. For this reason, it has not been declared above that A-viveka is *directly* the cause of Bondage.

Note.—The Jīvan (living)-mukta (released) are those who have, before the close of their earthly career, acquired discriminative knowledge, and have thereby obtained release, but who have still to undergo the experiences of life and thereby to exhaust their past Karma.

Objection :—The supposition of the relation without beginning, of the thing owned and the owner, of it, has been made, (between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa), as being regulative of the relation of the object of experience and the experience of it. This relation of the thing owned and its owner, or Karma, or the like, may possess the characteristic of being the cause of Conjunction. How, then, A-viveka, Non-discrimination, also is desired to be the cause of Conjunction?

Answer :—There can be no question on this point, as it may be recalled that the conceit or misconception (abhimāna), designated as saṅga or attachment, has been declared to be the cause of Conjunction, in the Gītā :

पुरुषः प्रकृतिस्थो हि भुङ्क्ते प्रकृतिजान् गुणान् ।
कारणं गुणसङ्गोऽस्य सदसयानिजन्मसु ॥ गीता १३।२१ ॥

For, Puruṣa, resting in Prakṛiti, experiences the changes produced from Prakṛiti. The cause of his births in the pure and impure species, is his attachment to the Guṇas.—Gītā XIII. 21.

Besides, Release by means of knowledge, as demonstrated by the Veda and the Smṛiti, is not explainable otherwise than by the sayings and arguments which will be later on declared, and the like.

Objection :—If it is so, then, the Karma etc., which form the particular Upādhi or investment of Puruṣa, will also be a cause of Conjunction. Why, then, are these excluded, and A-viveka itself said to be the sole cause thereof?

Answer :—We reply : Karma and the like depend upon A-viveka, and, so, they also are related to Puruṣa only mediately. In other words, A-viveka alone is capable of being directly cut down by Puruṣa, while Karma and so forth are so capable only by means of the eradication of their cause, namely A-viveka. For this purpose, A-viveka alone has been declared as being primarily the cause of Conjunction.

And this A-viveka which consists in the knowledge of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti without apprehending the absence of attachment between them, is intended by the author just as holding the place of A-vidyā, as may be gathered from the following two aphorisms (of the Sāṃkhya Pravachana Sūtram) :

बन्धो विपर्ययात् ॥ ३।२४ ॥

Bondage results from Error (III. 24.)

विपर्ययभेदाः पञ्च ॥ ३।३७ ॥

Kinds of Error are five (III. 37).

Also in the Yoga Sûtras of (Patañjali)—

तस्य हेतुविद्या ॥ २।२४ ॥

A-vidyâ is the cause thereof. (II. 24, S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 144).

A-vidyâ alone, which contains five-folds, has been declared to be the cause of conjunction of Buddhi and Puruṣa. The distinction of the Sâmkhya from the Yoga on this point should be observed to lie only in the mere non-recognition of anyathâ-khyâti, *i. e.*, the mistaking of one thing for another, *e.g.*, of a shining oyster shell for a piece of silver, as a form of A-vidyâ.

Neither, again, is A-viveka here mere a-bhâva or non-existence, nor is it the antecedent non-existence of Viveka or Discrimination. Because that would entail the bondage of the released Puruṣa also. It would also entail bondage over again in the case of even the Jivan-muktas by means of the production of Merit and De-merit, by the antecedent non-existence of future manifestation of Viveka. Moreover, the familiar instance of darkness, given in the next aphorism, would be inapplicable, as it is impossible for non-existence to be the cause of obscuration, like darkness. Furthermore, the increase and decrease also of A-viveka, of which, we hear people speak, would not be justified.

In our theory, on the other hand, it is A-viveka only in the form of vâsanâ, aroma or tendency, that is the cause of birth designated as Conjunction, and consequently the causing of obscuration, like darkness, increase, decrease, and so forth, become at once explained. Commenting on the aphorism of Patañjali:—

तस्य हेतुविद्या ॥ २।२४ ॥

the Bhâsya-kâra also has explained the term A-vidyâ to mean the seed of A-vidyâ, inasmuch as the production of cognition being subsequent to that of Conjunction, the former cannot be the productive cause of the latter. Further, it is obtained from the sayings beginning with—

पुरुषः प्रकृत्यो हि भुङ्क्त इत्यादि

For Puruṣa, resting in Prakṛiti, experiences etc.,

that it is Conjunction designated as abhimâna or conceit or misconception, that is the cause of the Conjunction designated as the resting in Prakṛiti. For this very reason Vyâsa Deva has carefully ascertained, in his Commentary on Yoga, that A-vidyâ is not Non-existence, but a form of Cognition opposite to Vidyâ or Right Knowledge.

A-viveka and A-vidyâ being, therefore, similar in every respect, it is established that A-viveka also is a species of Cognition.

Now, this A-viveka becomes the cause of birth designated as Conjunction in three ways: (1) immediately, (2) by the production of Merit

and De-merit, and (3) by means of 'visiblo' influences such as Desire, and the like, as observed in the Yoga aphorism :

सति मूले तद्विपाकः ॥ २।२३ ॥

'It ripens into life-state, life-experience, and life-time, if the root remains' (Yoga Sūtras II, 15, S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 106).

in the Smṛiti :

कर्त्तास्मीति निबध्यते

He becomes confined, thinking that he is the agent.
and also in the Nyāya aphorism.

वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात् ॥ ३।२ ॥

Because of the non-observation of birth of those from whom Desire has fled away. (Nyāya Sūtras III. i. 25).

So also has it been said in the Mokṣa-dharma (Mahābhārta, Śānti-Parvan.)

ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्था नोपसर्पन्त्यतर्षुलम् ।

हीनश्च करणैर्देही न देहं पुनरर्हति ॥

तस्मात्तर्षात्मकाद्रागाद्वीजाज्जायन्ति जन्तवः ।

The powers of Cognition and the objects of the senses do not come near him who is not-thirsty. And Puruṣa who is devoid of (lit. deserted by) the senses, does not merit a future body. Beings, therefore, are born from Rāga or attachment in the form of thirst or desire as the seed of their birth.

Rāga or attachment, again, is the effect of A-viveka or Non-discrimination. This should be taken to be also the sense of the two aphorisms of Yoga, on account of the similarity of thought in the two systems. And these two aphorisms are :

क्लेशमूलः कर्माशयः ॥ २।१२ ॥

सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगः ॥ २।१३ ॥

The vehicle of actions has its origin in afflictions. It ripens into life-state, life-experience, and life-time, if the root exists.—Yoga Sūtras of Putaṅjali, II, 12 and 13, S. B. H. Vol. IV. pages 104 et seq.

And affliction is the pentad of A-vidyâ, etc. (Yoga Sūtra, II, 3, *ibid.* p. 91.)

The various ways in which A-viveka, or Non-discrimination operates towards the production of Bondage, have been thus declared in the Īśvara-Gītâ in a collected form :

अनात्मन्यात्मविज्ञानं तस्मादःखं तथेतरत् ।

रागद्वेषादयो दोषाः सर्वे भ्रान्तिनिबन्धनाः ॥

कार्योद्यमस्य भवेद्दोषः पुण्यापुण्यमिति श्रुतिः ।

तद्दोषादेव सर्वेषां सर्वदेहसमुद्भवः ॥

(A-viveka causes), in respect of the Not-Self, the Cognition that it is the Self. From this arises pain as well as its opposite, Desire, aversion, and all other passions (lit. faults) are linked with Error (i.e. A-viveka) as their cause. For, as declares the Veda, the effect thereof will be fault, viz. virtue and vice. From this fault alone results the incarnation of all beings into all bodies.—Kārma Purāṇa, II. ii. 20, 21.

The very same doctrine has been aphorised in the Nyāya. Cf.

दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः ॥ १ । १ । २ ॥

Pain, Birth, Activity, Faults, and False Cognition, —after the disappearance of these in turn, on the disappearance of each succeeding one, (in the order of mention), there follows Emancipation.—*Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama*, I. i. 2.

It follows, therefore, that *A-viveka* or Non-discrimination is the root cause of the Avoidable, designated as Bondage, which it effects through birth designated as Conjunction. Thus, then, the cause of the Avoidable is established.—55.

A-viveka is eradicable by Viveka alone.

नियतकारणान्तदुच्छित्तिध्वान्तवत् ॥ १ । ५ । ६ ॥

Niyata (uniform, constant, invariable and unconditional)-*kāraṇāt* (cause), from a determinate cause, *i. e.*, *Viveka* or discrimination. *तदुच्छित्तिः* Tat (its)-*ut-chchittih*, eradication thereof. *ध्वान्तवत्* Dhvānta ('darkness')-*vat* (like), as of darkness.

56. The removal thereof (*i. e.* *A-viveka*) takes place from a determinate cause (namely, *Viveka*); as of darkness.—56.

Vṛitti:—Granted, says an objector, that Bondage accrues from *A-viveka*; still there is a parity between our theories in this respect, that both of us have to admit or postulate *Dharma* or Merit for the annihilation of *A-viveka*, as, otherwise, Bondage would be continuous.

To this the author replies:

If the law of causes and effects established by the methods of agreement and difference, does not hold good, there can be no certainty and expectation in respect of anything. As light is the (sole) cause for the destruction of darkness, so, here too, annihilation of Non-discrimination follows from Discrimination (alone).

And where is the harm in the admission of Merit for the purpose of Discrimination? The purpose may be accomplished by Merit belonging to *Prakṛiti*.

Now, what is it that is called Darkness? Darkness, according to some, is non-existence. It is not so, as its apprehension arises in a positive way. If it be non-existence, is it the antecedent non-existence of light, or its consequent non-existence? If it be antecedent non-existence, then, as on the water-pot being produced, the antecedent non-existence of the water-pot is destroyed, in like manner, on the appearance of light, there would be the intuition that the antecedent non-existence of light is destroyed. (But), notwithstanding the existing light, Darkness will

remain undestroyed, there being the antecedent non-existence of the future light. On the other hand, if it be consequent non-existence, in that case also, Darkness (as non-existence) being indestructible, there will be occasion for the intuition of Darkness on the appearance of another light, in the same way as, when another water-pot is produced, consequent non-existence of the water-pot that has been destroyed, verily exists. Reciprocal non-existence, again, is found in existences also. Reciprocal non-existence, moreover, is faulty in theory and need not be apprehended.

So has it been said :

न च भासामभावस्य तमस्त्वं बुद्धसंमतम् ।

छायायाः काण्यमित्येवं पुराणेषु गुणश्रुतेः ॥

दूरासन्नप्रदीपाद्धि महदल्पा चलाचला ।

देहानुवर्तिनी छाया न वस्तुत्वाद्विना भवेत् ॥

That Darkness is the non-existence of light, is not approved by the elders. We hear of its quality in such passages of the *Parāyas* as 'blackness belongs to Darkness.' For, shadow, large or small according as the light is distant or near, moving or not-moving according as the body moves or does not move, could not be possible, were it not a reality.

That Darkness is a reality, is, however, a mere predication, as it is perceived only where some reality exists.

Objection :—Where light exists, objects are perceived. Where it does not exist, how can objects be perceived?

Answer :—A mere diversity of nature—as the owl sees objects even without the help of light, so also does the perception of Darkness take place even independently of light, from the variety of things in nature.

It, therefore, follows that Darkness is a particular kind of *Rūpa* or form-and-colour, and is perceived, where there is an object to obstruct light, by being referred to that object.

Others opine that Darkness is a different substance. So it has been said :—

तमः खलु चलन्नीलं परापरविभागवत् ।

प्रसिद्धधर्मवैधर्म्यान्नवभ्यो भेत्तुमर्हति ॥

Darkness, moving, blue, and capable of being distinguished as this and that, certainly requires to be divided off from the nine substances, as it possesses attributes different in kind from the well-known attributes of those substances.

Note.—The above verse directly refers to the *Vaiśeṣika Darśana*, S. B. H. Vol. VI. For these nine substances, see *Ibid.* page 17, for darkness, page 18, and for an account of the Theory of Non-existence, pages 287-298.

Now, whether Darkness be an attribute or a substance, it does no harm to our conclusion, as we hold the number of objects to be unlimited. We would, however, say that darkness is not non-existence,—56,

Bhāṣya :—Henceforward, up to the end of the Śāstra, the author establishes, in great detail, the Means of Avoidance which is the division (of the subject matter) next in order (of mention). In the course of it, he will also dilate upon the divisions discussed before.

‘Niyata-kāraṇa,’ the fixed and determinate cause, in question, is Viveka-sākṣātkāra, direct apprehension or realisation of the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, as established throughout the world in such cases as where a mother-of-pearl shell is mistaken for a piece of silver; from which follows eradication of A-viveka, as is the case with Darkness. As Darkness is dispelled by light alone as the fixed and determinate cause, and not by any other means, in like manner, A-viveka also is dispelled by Viveka alone, and not *directly* by Karma and the like. Such is the meaning. So has it been taught in the Yoga Aphorism (II. 26):

विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः ॥ २ । २६ ॥

The Means of Avoidance is undisturbed manifestation of Viveka.—S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 147.

Note.—The commentator explains the force of the word, directly, used above.

Karma, religious and social observances, and the like, on the other hand, are the instruments of knowledge only, as we find that, by the Yoga Aphorism (II. 28):

योगाङ्गानुष्ठानादशुद्धिक्षये ज्ञानदीप्तिराविवेकख्यातेः ॥ २ । २८ ॥

According as the impurity (in the Self) wears away on the performance of the (several) members of (the eightfold) yoga, the light of knowledge shines brighter and brighter till the manifestation of Viveka.—*Ibid.*, page 150.

it has been ascertained that all and sundry acts coming under the several members of Yoga, are instruments for the development of knowledge alone by means of the purification of the Sattva element (of Prakṛiti).

The older Vedāntins, on the other hand, declare that in regard to Mokṣa or Release also, Karma is a subsidiary part of knowledge; because, in the Śruti :

विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह ।

अविद्याया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्यायामृतमश्नुते ॥ ईशोपनिषत् ॥ ११ ॥

Vidyā, jñāna or knowledge, and A-vidyā, karma, pious observances, who knows both of them together, he transcends mortality by the help of Karma, and attains immortality by the help of Jñāna.—Īśa Upaniṣat, Verse 11, S. B. H. Vol. I.

and in the Vedānta Aphorism (III. iv. 33):

सहकारित्वेन च ॥ ३।४।३३ ॥

(Karma is to be performed) also as contributory (towards knowledge)—S. B. H. Vol. V. page 646.

and also in the Smṛiti :

ज्ञानिनाऽज्ञानिना वापि यावद्देहस्य धारणम् ।

तावद्वर्णाश्रमप्रोक्तं कर्त्तव्यं कर्म मुक्तये ॥

Whether a man possesses knowledge or does not possess knowledge, so long as he remains saddled with the body, he ought, for the purpose of Release, to perform Karma, enjoined for the different stages of life (āśrama) and society (varṇa).

it has been ascertained that Jñāna and Karma are contributory to each other, in the relation of principal and subsidiary. There is, however, another Vedānta Aphorism, (III. iv. 16), which says :

उपमर्दं च ॥ ३।४।१६ ॥

(Jñāna is pre-eminent, because it causes) the destruction (of Karma) also,—*Ibid.* page 628.

But it merely recites the fact that one who has ascended on yoga, is rightly entitled to give up Karma, with the object of teaching, that Jñāna is principally the cause of Mokṣa. For, the author (of the Vedānta Aphorisms) intends to say that if Karma, by causing distraction, becomes a hindrance to the cultivation of Jñāna, then, relying on the maxim that, on the disappearance of a quality, the thing of which it is the quality, does not disappear, it is Karma which is merely a part, that is to be given up for the sake of the preservation of the principal object, as was done by Bharata the (deliberate, idiot and others. Therefore, on the theory of these older Vedāntins also, the causality of Karma towards the destruction of A-viveka is surely not proved, without the intermediacy of Viveka. Hence our view does not conflict with theirs.

In this aphorism, darkness has been said to be destructible by light. Darkness also is, therefore, really a substance, and not non-existence of light. In the absence of any cause to the contrary, perceptions arise, for example, that darkness is deeply dark. To characterise them as erroneous, is unjustifiable. Nor can it be said that such perceptions being explained by known realities, the supposition of something additional is redundant, and that, therefore, the law of parsimony is a bar to the hypothesis of darkness being a substance. For, were this the case, then all the events of practical life being, like dreams, capable of explanation as pure ideas only, a similar redundancy of supposition would be entailed as an impediment to the intuition of external realities also, (which is not desirable). Hence, in the case of darkness, the hypothesis being supported by evidence, redundancy does not count as a fault.

It might be objected that, as even in the absence of the knowledge of Viveka or discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, individual instances of that knowledge which is called A-viveka or non-discrimination, must needs be destroyed of themselves at their respective third moments, there is no necessity for intending Jñāna to be the cause of their destruction. But it should be remembered that, in the previous

aphorism, the word, A-viveka, has been explained to mean, not individual acts of non-discrimination, but non-discrimination as a Vāsanā, an instinct, a tendency, the resultant effect of all individual acts of non-discrimination in the past. We also maintain that A-viveka, in the state of not-yet-come, is capable of destruction.—56.

Discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti includes all discrimination.

प्रधानाविवेकादन्याविवेकस्य तद्धाने हानम् ॥१५७॥

प्रधानाविवेकात् Pradhāna-avivekāṭ, from non-discrimination of Pradhāna or Prakṛiti from Puruṣa. अन्याविवेकस्य Anya-avivekasya, of non-discrimination in respect of other things. तद्धाने Tat-hāne, on annihilation thereof. हानम् Hānam, annihilation.

57. Non-discrimination of Prakṛiti (from Puruṣa) (is the cause) of non-discrimination of other things (from Puruṣa); (therefore), on the annihilation of this, annihilation (of that will take place).—57.

Vṛitti.—It has been declared that Release comes through Viveka, Discrimination. Discriminative knowledge of a water-pot, a piece of cloth, and so forth, exists in such as ourselves also. Release of all, therefore, is entailed. (Thus argues the opponent.) To this the author replies :

The root of all is Pradhāna (Prakṛiti). From want of discrimination about Pradhāna, arises non-discrimination in respect of others. Whether there be want of discrimination, or discrimination, of objects amongst themselves, Bondage or Release does not result by it, but by discrimination and want of discrimination with regard to Pradhāna only. Hence, on the annihilation thereof, i.e., on the annihilation of non-discrimination about Pradhāna, results annihilation of non-discrimination in respect of all.—57.

Bhāṣya.—Well, then, it is non-discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti that is the cause of Bondage in this way that it brings about conjunction (in the form of birth or embodiment), and it is discrimination between them that is the cause of Release. Release, therefore, will take place in spite of the misconception (abhimāna) that the body, etc., are the Self. And this is contrary to Śruti, Smṛiti, and reason. To this objection, the author replies :

'Anyā-aviveka,' non-discrimination in respect of Buddhi and the like, is produced, in Puruṣa, from non-discrimination of Prakṛiti, as its cause. The non-discrimination which is thus produced, is an effect, and has its root in the non-discrimination which is its cause and is itself beginningless. Therefore, the annihilation of non-discrimination of

Prakṛiti (from Puruṣa) taking place, the annihilation of it must follow. Such is the meaning. Just as when the Self has been discriminated from the body, non-discrimination in respect of the form-colour (rūpa) and other properties, which are the products of the body, in other words, identification of the Self with any of these properties, is not possible, so, by parity of reasoning as well as from the disappearance of the cause, when Puruṣa has been discriminated from Prakṛiti by means of the characteristics of his immutability, etc., the misconception (abhimāna) cannot possibly arise that Puruṣa is any of the products of Prakṛiti, *e.g.*, Buddhi and the rest, which possess the characteristics of undergoing development (paripāma), etc. This is the import. So is it recorded in the Smṛiti:

चित्राधारपटत्यागे त्यक्तं तस्य हि चित्रकम् ।

प्रकृतेर्विरमे चेत्तथं ध्यायिनां के स्मरादयः ॥

As on the abandonment of the canvas which serves as the ground for a picture painted thereon, the painting also is necessarily abandoned, similarly in the case of the abandonment of Prakṛiti. What are love and the rest to a contemplative man?

'Virama' in the śloka means virāma, cessation, *i.e.*, abandonment. By the word, ādi, modifications in the form of substances are also included. Sometimes this also is said that Release takes place through discrimination between Puruṣa and Buddhi. Here Buddhi denotes both gross and subtle Buddhi, and thus includes Prakṛiti also (which is the subtle state, the cause, of Buddhi). Otherwise, notwithstanding the discrimination of Buddhi from Puruṣa, there will still remain the possibility of misconception (abhimāna) that Puruṣa is identical with Prakṛiti.

It cannot be objected that, because one and all misconceptions (abhimāna), such as, for example, 'I am ignorant,' etc., have Buddhi and the rest as their subject matter, there is, therefore, no proof of (the existence of such a thing as) misconception in regard to Prakṛiti over and above misconception (abhimāna) in regard to Buddhi and the rest. For, misconceptions (abhimāna) in such cases as—

मृत्वा मृत्वा पुनः सृष्टौ स्वर्गी स्या मा च नारकी ।

After each succeeding death, as I am born again, may I be a dweller in heaven, and not a dweller in hell.

cannot be accounted for, unless they refer to Prakṛiti as their subject matter. For, none of the manifold effects, *e.g.*, Buddhi, etc., after they are once past and gone, are created over again, and therefore, this birth or production after dissolution is of the Pradhāna (Prakṛiti), and it consists in modification in the form of other Buddhi, etc., by the giving up of previous modifications in the form of Buddhi, etc.

Neither can it be asserted that the birth and death of Puruṣa also, in the form of conjunction with, and disjunction from, the liṅga-sarīra or subtle body, are pāramārthika or ultimately true or transcendental (as opposed to phenomenal), and that, therefore, the consciousness of birth, etc., arising in the Self, cannot at all be a misconception (abhimāna). For,

न जायते म्रियते वा कदाचित्

नायं भूत्वा भविता वा न भूयः ।

(This, the Self) is never born nor does it ever die. Neither is it such that, once coming into being, it will pass away after a time and will come into being again.—Gītā, II, 20.

by sayings like the above, birth, etc., are disproved (in the Self). There was no need of such negations unless these events (birth, etc.) were in some way connected with the Self. It follows, therefore, that the consciousness of birth, etc., arising in the Self, is of the form of abhimāna or assumption or transference to itself of the production and destruction (of something else *i. e.*, the body, the senses, etc.).

Moreover, it is not possible to say that the self-identification (abhimāna) of Puruṣas with Buddhi, etc., is beginningless; because Buddhi, etc., are effects, and therefore, perishable. There must exist, therefore, some determining cause to explain and regulate the multifold cases of self-identification with the effects. Hence it is proved that self-identification with the cause of those effects (*i. e.* with Prakṛiti), is alone the determining cause here desired; because so is it observed in the world, and because supposition (hypothesis) follows facts observed. *E. g.*, from the assumption (abhimāna) of ownership of the field, arises the assumption (abhimāna) of ownership of the paddy etc. yielded by it, and from the assumption (abhimāna) of ownership of a piece of gold, arises the assumption (abhimāna) of ownership of the bracelet, etc. made of it, and by means of the cessation of the former, follows the cessation of the latter.

(There is, however, no further necessity for a determining cause of the mistake-abhimāna-about Prakṛiti), on account of both the mistake about Prakṛiti and the vāsanā or accumulating impression of it being beginningless, like seed and sprout.—57.

The Bondage of Puruṣa is merely verbal.

वाङ्मात्रं न तु तत्त्वं चित्तस्थितेः ॥१५८॥

वाङ्मात्रं Vāk-mātram, more speech. न Na, not. तु Tu, and. तत्त्वं Tattvam, reality. चित्तस्थितेः Chitta-sthiteḥ, because it resides in the chitta or mind.

58. The Bondage, etc. (of Puruṣa) are merely verbal, and not real, because they reside in the *mind*.—58.

Vṛitti.—Granted that Release comes through Viveka, Discrimination. Is it, Viveka, related (in the sense of inherence) to the Ātmā, Self or Puruṣa, or is it not? If it is related to the Ātmā, an impediment is thereby caused to the Kūṭastha, undisturbed, or immutable nature of the Ātmā (as postulated in the Śaṃkhya Darśana). If it is not so related, then, the application (of Viveka, as cause, to Release, as consequence) is too wide, (because Viveka, although it does not exist in Puruṣa, is all the same said to be the means of his obtaining freedom). To these objections the author replies :

(Viveka is) 'related to the Ātmā'—this is a mere verbal statement. There is no true or material relation between them. And although they are unrelated, still, inasmuch as Viveka resides in the Chitta (Buddhi-Ahaṃkāra-Manas collectively), the assumption of Viveka as its own takes place, we will submit, in the Ātmā, owing to its close proximity to the Chitta.—58.

Bhāṣya.—Thus the four divisions of the subject-matter of the Śāstra are established. But there still remains this apprehension : Well, our opponent may say, if Bondage (at one time) and Release (at another time), Discrimination (at one time) and Non-discrimination (at another time) are admitted in Puruṣa, then, this is in contradiction to the assertion "Who is by nature, Eternal, and eternally Pure, Enlightened, and Unconfined" (*vide* aphorism 19 above), as well as to the Vedic declarations such as

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्न बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥

There is neither destruction, nor, again, production (of Puruṣa); (he is) neither bound, nor, is, again, active (in the pursuit of freedom); he is neither desirous of release nor is, in fact, ever released. Such is the absolute truth.—Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, II, 32, Brahma-Bindu Upa. 10.

The author removes this apprehension.

Because bondage and the rest reside in the chitta or mind alone, all of them are mere words in the case of, or as applied to, Puruṣa, being mere reflections like the redness (reflected) in the crystal (which is naturally white), and are not 'tattvam,' the natural state of Puruṣa, as is the unimputed redness of the China rose. Such is the meaning. Hence there is no contradiction to what has been stated before. This is the

import. On this point there is the authority of Vedic texts such as the following :

स समानः सन्नुभौ लोकावनुसंचरति ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव

He, being immutable, moves between the two worlds, as if thinks, as if desires, etc.
—Bṛihat Âraṇyaka Upanisat, IV. iii. 7.

Puruṣa is 'samâna' i. e., possesses the same form in the two worlds. By the two words, 'iva,' as if, the manifoldness of form is declared to be due to upâdhis or adjuncts or extraneous causes.

So has it been said :

बन्धमोक्षौ सुखं दुःखं मोहापत्तिश्च मायया ।

स्वप्ने यथात्मनः ख्यातिः संसृतिर्न तु वास्तवी ॥

Bondage and Release, Pleasure, Pain, and the incidence of Bowilderment (Moha) by means of Mâyâ, are, like the manifestation of the Self in dream ; Transmigration (Saṃsâra) is (due to Mâyâ and) not real.

"Mâyâyâ," by means of Mâyâ, due to Mâyâ, in the above, means, caused by the upâdhi or external condition which is Prakṛiti called Mâyâ.

Our opponent may ask : How then can the removal of Bondage which thus appears to be of minor importance, be a Puruṣârtha, an object desired by Puruṣa? How, again, on the admission of Bondage and Release being caused to Puruṣa by the properties, namely, Discrimination and Non-discrimination, of another (i.e., Buddhi), there does not follow an absence of regularity, or certainty as in the case of their being caused by Karma, and the like ?

Therefore we explain more in detail what has been almost completely explained before. Although Bondage in the form of conjunction of pain, and Discrimination and Non-discrimination in the form of functions, are of the Chitta or mind alone, still Puruṣa's bhoga or suffering consists in the mere reflection of pain in him ; hence, inspite of its non-reality, the removal thereof is a Puruṣârtha, an object desired by Puruṣa. So they pray : " Let me not suffer pain."

Similarly, under the influence of his vâsanâ or desire for her, Prakṛiti binds, by way of conjunction, that Puruṣa alone to whom she has exhibited herself in the aspect of non-discrimination, and none else. Again, she sets free, by way of disjunction from her, that Puruṣa alone to whom she has exhibited herself in the aspect of discrimination. (Release, then, depends) on the eradication of vâsanâ or desire ; hence regularity is obtained. While, on the admission of Bondage by means of Karma and the like, such regularity is not obtained. Because Karma and the like cannot

directly throw their reflections in Puruṣa, inasmuch as they lack the characteristic of being revealed by him who witnesses (sākṣi) them (i. e. Puruṣa).—58.

Bondage is not removeable by mere Learning or Reasoning but by Spiritual Intuition of the truth about Puruṣa and Prakṛiti.

युक्तितोऽपि न बाध्यते दिङ्मूढवदपरोक्षादृते ॥१५६॥

युक्तिः Yuktitaḥ, by reasoning. अपि Api, also. न Na, not. बाध्यते Bādhyate, counteracted, removed. दिङ्मूढवत् Dik-mūḍha-vat, as of one perplexed about the points of the compass. अपरोक्षादृते Aprokṣāt rite, without immediate cognition, direct vision.

59. (Bondage) is not to be removed by reasoning also, without direct vision of the truth, as is the case with one perplexed about the points of the compass.—59.

Vṛitti.—Let knowledge of Viveka, distinction of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, be obtained from Śravaṇa (hearing from Scriptures and preceptors) alone. What is the use of transcendental knowledge which can be realized only by the labour of successive births? To this the author replies :

The sense is clear.—59.

Bhāṣya :—But if Bondage etc, as applied to Puruṣa, are mere words, let their removal take place by śravaṇa, learning, or by manana, reasoning, (that such is the case). Why, then, in the Veda and the Smṛiti, is there enjoined, as the cause of Release, the discriminative knowledge (of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) going the length of sākṣātkāra, or developed into, spiritual intuition of the truth?

To this the author replies :

‘Yuktiḥ’ means mananam, thinking or reasoning. The word, ‘api,’ also, is intended to include śravaṇa, hearing, i. e., learning. Even the merely verbal Bondage, etc. of Puruṣa cannot be removed by mere learning and reasoning, without immediate cognition; as in the case of a person confused in regard to the points of the compass, the inversion of the directions in space, even though it is merely verbal, i. e., apparent or illusory, is not removed by hearing or by reasoning, without his realizing for himself, how the points of the compass really lie. Such is the meaning. And in the case of the subject-matter of the discourse, removeability is nothing but the cessation or disappearance of the idea of Bondage, etc. in Puruṣa, and not the immediate cognition of a non-being, because there does not exist even the possibility of the production of such cognition by hearing and the like.

Or, the aphorism may be explained as follows : By the aphorism : The removal thereof takes place from a determinate cause (Aphorism 56), it, discriminative knowledge, has been declared to be the eradicator of non-discrimination. Now, is that knowledge commonly derived from hearing, etc. or is there any peculiarity in it? There being room for this further enquiry, the author enounces the present aphorism beginning with 'Yuktitaḥ api.' The meaning is that non-discrimination, 'na bādhyate,' is not removed, 'yuktitaḥ,' by reasoning nor by learning, without direct vision of the discrimination (viveka) of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti; like the confusion about the points of the compass; because it is the perception of a particular intuition that alone can remove an error in respect of that intuition.—59.

Note :—For example, a man with the jaundice perceives white objects as if they were yellow. He may infer that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the testimony of a friend that it is white: but still nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk except a direct perception of its whiteness.—Ballantyno.

Inference also is a pramāṇa or instrument of right knowledge.

अचाक्षुषाणामनुमानेन बोधो धूमादिभिरिव वह्नेः ॥१६०॥

अचाक्षुषाणाम् A-chākṣuṣaṇām, of things imperceptible. अनुमानेन Anumānena, by inference. बोधः Bodhaḥ, knowledge. धूमादिभिः Dhuma-ādibhiḥ, by means of smoke and the like. इव Iva, as. वह्नेः Vahneḥ, of fire.

60. The knowledge of imperceptible things is by means of inference, as is that of fire by means of smoke, etc.—60.

Vṛitti.—If it be urged that, 'that Prakṛiti and the rest exist or that they evolve in the order of Mahat and so forth, is not seen, (and that they, therefore, neither exist nor evolve); so the author says :

It would have been so, were Pratyakṣa, Perception, the only pramāṇa, means or measure of knowledge, and not Anumāna, Inference, etc. For, although Prakṛiti and the rest are not objects of preception, their existence is nevertheless established by the form of inference known as Sāmānyato Dṛiṣṭa or generally seen (Vide I. 103. below).—60.

Bhāṣya :—Having thus, then, established that Release results from the direct vision of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), the next thing to be demonstrated is viveka or discrimination. This being the topic, at the beginning thereof, Pramāṇas or Proofs are being recited, with a view to establish Prakṛiti, Puruṣa, and the rest as different entities.

'A-châkṣuṣāṇām' means, of things not cognizable by the senses. There are many objects such as the gross elements, their products, *e. g.*, the body, and so forth, which are verily proved to exist by sense-perception. Of those that are not proved by sense-perception, namely, Prakriti, Puruṣa, etc., the knowledge, *i.e.*, cognitive proof, the fruit of which appertains to Puruṣa (Puruṣa-niṣṭha-phala-siddhi), is brought about by that form of Pramāṇa which is called anumāna or inference; as fire is proved to exist (where it is not directly perceptible) by the inference occasioned by the smoke and such other signs. Such is the meaning.

Moreover, it is to be understood that what is not established even by inference, is established by the Revelation or Scripture. It is because this Sāṃkhya-Śāstra is principally built on Inference, that Inference alone has been mentioned in this aphorism by way of pre-eminence only, and not that there is no need of Revelation in this Śāstra. For, thus says the Kārikā :

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानम् ।

तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥

The knowledge of super-sensible objects is obtained from Sāmānyato Dṛṣṭa inference; what is not proved even by this and is imperceptible, is proved from Revelation.—Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, Verse VI.

From this aphorism it is found that this Śāstra is a Manana-Śāstra or a rational system.—60.

The Twenty-five Principals: the order of their evolution and their inter-relation as cause and effect.

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः, प्रकृतेर्महान्, मह-
तोऽहंकारो, अहंकारात् पञ्च तन्मात्राण्युभयमिन्द्रियं, तन्मात्रेभ्यः
स्थूलभूतानि, पुरुष इति पञ्चविंशतिर्गणः ॥ १ । ६१ ॥

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां Sattva-rajās-tamasām, of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, the three essential constituents of Prakriti. साम्यावस्था Sāmāyavasthā, the state of equilibrium or quiescence. प्रकृतिः Prakriti, Prakriti, the Prime Cause. प्रकृतेः Prakriteḥ, from Prakriti. महान् Mahān, Mahat, the Great One. महतः Mahataḥ, from Mahat. अहंकारः Ahaṃkāraḥ, Ahaṃkāra, the I-maker, Egoity. अहंकारात् Ahaṃkārat, from Ahaṃkāra. पञ्च Pañcha, five. तन्मात्राणि Tan-mātrāṇi, Tan-mātrās, Essences, Subtle elements. उभयम् Ubhayam, both. इन्द्रियं Indriyam, sense, faculty, power. तन्मात्रेभ्यः Tan-mātrebhyah, from the Tan-mātrās. स्थूलभूतानि Sthūla-Bhūtāni, gross elements. पुरुषः Puruṣa, Puruṣa, Spirit, Self. इति Iti, such. पञ्चविंशतिः Pañcha-vimśatiḥ, twenty-five. गणः Gaṇaḥ class, group.

61. Prakṛiti is the state of quiescence of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. From Prakṛiti, (evolves) Mahat; from Mahat, Ahaṁkāra; from Ahaṁkāra, the five Tan-mâtras and the two sets of Indriyas; from the five Tan-mâtras, the gross elements. (Then there is) Puruṣa. Such is the group of the twenty-five (Principles).—61.

Vṛitti.—The author sets forth the order of evolution of Prakṛiti and the rest :

Although Prakṛiti is the state of equipoise of the three, yet, it is conventional to apply the term Prakṛiti to every one of them also. Mahat denotes Buddhi Tattva, the Principle called Buddhi, the substance of Buddhi or Intelligence. Ahaṁkāra denotes Abhimāna, Self-assumption, Self-attribution, the I-maker, the substance of individual personality. The five Tan-mâtras (That-only), essences, or universals, are Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour, and Smell.

Two-fold Indriyas or Instruments are, externally, five Instruments of Action, called Voice, Hands, Feet, Anus and the Genitals, and five Instruments of Cognition, called Ear, Skin, Eye, Tongue, and Nose, and, internally, Manas or mind, of perception as well as of action.

The Sthûla-Bhûtas, gross elements, are Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth. It should be understood that these also are evolved from the five Tan-mâtras. The word, Sthûla, is indicative, and includes Sûkṣma, fine or subtle, elements also. The mention of Puruṣa is for the purpose of completing the number (of the twenty-five Tattvas), and not for showing the order of evolution, seeing that the Âtmâ is eternal.—61.

Vedântin Mahâdeva: Sattva, etc are substances, as the qualities of lightness, etc. inhere in them. That the word, Guṇa (which ordinarily means quality), is still applied to them, is because they serve the purpose of Puruṣa. Prakṛiti is this triad of Guṇas, and not a different entity which is their substratum, as it will be declared later on (VI. 39) that Sattva, etc., are not the attributives of Prakṛiti but her very form. State of equipoise denotes absence of dissolution in the relation of more or less, in other words, existence in the state of producing no effects. So that, it comes to this that the triad of Guṇas, in so far as it stands apart from effects, is Prakṛiti. And this is the definition of Mûlâ Prakṛiti, Root Evolvent. The definition of Prakṛiti as a general term is that Prakṛiti is that which is the material cause of another Tattva (as Buddhi is of Ahaṁkāra).

Bhāṣya:—Now follows an aphorism enumerating together all the Predicables which are subversive of, and subservient to, (the immediate cognition of) the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) established by the proofs stated above: wherein the author also exhibits the relation of cause and effect (amongst them) which will subserve the inference to be stated in the sequel.

Sattva, etc., (*i. e.* Rajas and Tamas) are substances, and not Guṇas in the Vaiśeṣika sense of the word, *i. e.*, are not qualities or attributes, because they admit of conjunction and disjunction, and also because they possess the properties of lightness, activity, weight etc., (whereas the Guṇas, attributes, of the Vaiśeṣikas do not themselves possess attributes, and are not independent causes of conjunctions and disjunctions, *vide* Kaṇāda-Sūtram I. i. 16, S. B. H. Vol. VI. page 28). In this, Sāṃkhya, Śāstra and in the Veda, etc., the word, Guṇa, is employed to denote them (Sattva, etc.), because they exist only to serve the ends of Puruṣa (and are, therefore, of secondary importance), and also because they form the cord, (as it were), namely Mahat, etc., which essentially consist of the three Guṇas, and which bind the brute-beast, (so to speak), Puruṣa.

Note.—The different meanings of the word, Guṇa, that are referred to here, are quality, A-pradhāna, not-principal, secondary, subordinate, and cord. It may also be that Sattva etc., are called Guṇas, not-principals, because that which is constituted by them, namely, Prakṛiti, is called Pradhāna, the Principal.—*Vide* Tattva-Samāsa, Aphorism 5, Commentary.

Of these, *i. e.*, the substances Sattva, etc., (Prakṛiti is) “Sāmya-avasthā”, the state of being neither less nor more, (one than another), in other words, the state of not being combined together in the relation of less and more, that is to say, the state of not being developed into effects. Prakṛiti is the genus of the Guṇas characterised by the state of not becoming an effect. Such is the meaning. For, on the appearance of the state of inequilibrium in the genus of the Guṇas characterised by the state of not becoming an effect, there is entailed the disappearance of Prakṛiti. And, further, all the Guṇas individually are said to possess the nature of Prakṛiti in such texts of the Smṛiti as the following:—

सर्वं रजस्तम इति एषैव प्रकृतिः सदा ।

एषैव संसृतिर्जन्तोरस्याः पारे परं पदम् ॥

Sattva, Rajas, Tamas : it is every one of them that is Prakṛiti at every moment. It is every one of them that is the transmigration or worldly life of living beings. Beyond it lies the supreme abode.

The word, genus, in “Prakṛiti is the genus...effect” above, is intended to include Sattva, etc. The word, Guṇa, is used in order to exclude Puruṣa from the scope of the definition. And the phrase,

characterised etc., excludes Mahat, etc., for Mahat &c., which are forms of Sattva etc. modified into effects, also become Guṇas or subsidiaries, being subservient to Puruṣa.

Here, then, only the svarûpa, the essential form or intrinsic nature, of Prakṛiti has been declared. The specific forms of Prakṛiti will, however, be stated just now. The effect or product of Prakṛiti is 'Mahân,' i.e., the Tattva, Reality or Principle, called Mahat.

The intrinsic nature and the specific forms of Mahat, etc. are being stated.

The product of Mahat is Ahaṁkāra. The product of Ahaṁkāra is two fold : the Tan-mâtras and the two sets of Indriyas. Of these, the two sets of Indriyas, being divided into external and internal ones, are of eleven kinds. The products of the Tan-mâtras are the five gross elements. By the use of the word, gross, it is admitted that the Tan-mâtras are the subtle elements. Puruṣa, on the other hand, is characterised neither as effect nor as cause.

Such, then, are the 'pañcaviṁśatiḥ gaṇaḥ,' the (twenty-five-fold) array of Predicables. The meaning is that, over and above these, there is no Predicable. Or, the word, gaṇa, declares the infiniteness of the individual manifestations of Sattva, etc.

And these twenty-five members of the class are of the form of substance and nothing else. Attribute, Action, Genus, etc. (i.e., Species, and Combination, for instance, of the Vaiśeṣikas), however, are really included in these, there being no difference between a property and the thing of which it is a property. For, did there exist Predicables in addition to the above, it would have been necessary to discriminate Puruṣa from them also, and consequently the non-enumeration of them would have been a defect.

Hereby it is shown that the wild talk of the stupid that the Sāṃkhyas do admit an indefinite number of Predicables, is worth of no serious attention.

Dik, (direction in) Space, and Kāla, Time, again, are nothing but Ākāśa, Ether(?), as we shall find from a future aphorism (II. 12) that Space and Time are determinate forms of Ākāśa.

It follows herefrom that, by means of their inclusion and non-inclusion amongst themselves, the Predicables have been taught to be only one in number in some System (e.g., the Vedānta), six in another System (e.g., the Vaiśeṣika), sixteen in yet another System (e.g. the Nyāya), and by other numbers in other Systems. It should be remarked, however,

that their individual distinction consists merely in the possession of similar and dissimilar properties. Thus has it been declared in the Bhâgavatam :

एकस्मिन्नपि दृश्यन्ते प्रविष्टानीतराणि च ।
पूर्वस्मिन् वा परस्मिन् वा तत्त्वे तत्त्वानि सर्वशः ॥
इति नानाप्रसङ्गान् तत्त्वानामृषिभिः कृतम् ।
सर्वं न्याय्यं युक्तिमत्त्वाद्भिदुषा किमशोभनम् ॥

Even in a single Tattva, Principle or Reality, be it anterior or posterior, all the other Tattvas are found to be included. For this reason, the Rîṣis have made various enumerations of the Tattvas. All are justified, being based on reason. What does not become a learned man ?

And these Predicables have been enumerated in the Śrutis also :

e. g.,

(a) in the Garbha Upaniṣat (Verse 3)

अष्टौ प्रकृतयः षोडश विकाराः ।

There are eight Prakritis and sixteen Vikâras or Transformations.

(b) in the Prasna Upaniṣat (IV, 8) also :

पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा च ।

Earth and the fine part of Earth.

(c) and in the Maitreya Upaniṣat, etc.

Note :—The entire passage of the Prasna Upaniṣat, from which Vijñāna Bhikṣu has made the above quotation, may be transcribed here with advantage :

× × × कस्मिन्नु सर्वे सम्प्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति ॥ १ ॥
× × × × × ×

स यथा सौम्य वयांसि वासो वृक्षं सम्प्रतिष्ठन्ते । एवं ह वै सत्सर्वं पर आत्मनि सम्प्रतिष्ठते ॥ ७ ॥ पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा चापश्चापोमात्रा च तैजश्च तैजोमात्रा च वायुश्च वायुमात्रा चाकाशश्चाकाशमात्रा च चक्षुश्च द्रष्टव्यं च श्रोत्रं च श्रोतव्यं च घ्राणश्च घ्रातव्यं च रसश्च रसितव्यं च त्वक् च स्पर्शयितव्यं च वाक् च वक्तव्यं च हस्तौ चादातव्यञ्चोपस्थश्चानन्दयितव्यं च पायुश्च विसर्जयितव्यं च पादौ च गन्तव्यं च मनश्च मन्तव्यं च बुद्धिश्च बोद्धव्यं चाहङ्कारश्चाहङ्कर्तव्यं च चित्तं च चेतयितव्यं च तैजश्च विद्योतयितव्यं च प्राणश्च विधारयितव्यं च ॥ ८ ॥

एष हि द्रष्टा स्पष्टा श्रोता घ्राता रसयिता मन्ता बोद्धा कर्ता विज्ञानात्मा पुरुषः । स परेऽक्षरे आत्मनि सम्प्रतिष्ठते ॥ ९ ॥

Question by Gârḡya : In whom are all things firmly established ?

Answer by Pippalâda : As the birds, O Calm One, rest secure on their dwelling tree, so does verily all that is existent, rest secure in the Higher Self : Earth and the fine parts (Mâtrâ) of Earth, Water and the fine parts of Water, Fire and the fine parts of Fire, Air and the fine parts of Air, Âkâśa and the fine parts of Âkâśa, the Eye and the object of seeing, the Ear and the object of hearing, the Nose and the object of smelling, the Tongue and the object of tasting, the Skin and the object of touching, the Voice and that which is

to be said, the Hands and that which is to be grasped, the Genitals and the pleasure of love, the Anus and that which is to be excreted, the Feet and the place to go to, Manas and the object of thinking, Buddhi and the object of ascertaining, Ahaṁkāra and the object of Ahaṁkāra, Chitta and the object of consciousness, Light and the object of illumination, Prāṇa and that which is to be supported by it.

Verily this Puruṣa who is knowledge itself, is the seer, toucher, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker, ascertainment, doer. He stands firm on the Supreme, Immutable Self.

Moreover, the eight Prakṛitis have been explained by the Kārikā (Verse 3):

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।

षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥

Prakṛiti, the Root, is not an evolute. Mahat and the seven following are both evolvents and evolutes. Evolute is sixteen fold. That which is neither an evolvent nor an evolute, is Puruṣa.

It is, however, a common saying in the Śrutis and the Smṛitis that reality is one and one only, without a second. But this unity is obtained by the absorption of all other realities in Puruṣa, on the principle of the identity of the energy and that which possesses the energy. Hence there is no conflict (between our teaching and the teaching of the Śruti and the Smṛiti).

Absorption (laya), moreover, means involution or existence in a subtle form, and not annihilation. So has it been said :

आसीज्ज्ञानमथैवार्थ एकमेवाविकल्पितम्

There were knowledge and object of knowledge, absolutely one and undivided.

'A-vikalpita,' unelaborated, means undivided. And this has been established in detail in our Commentary on the Vedānta in connection with the doctrine of A-dvaita or Non-duality.

There is, however, a difference, and it is this: In the theistic theory, in consequence of the non-differentiation of all other realities therein (*i.e.* in Īśvara, the Lord), it is Īśvara-chaitanyam, Divine Consciousness, that is the only reality. In the non-theistic (nir-Īśvara, God-less, *i.e.* which does not invoke divine intervention in the affairs of man and the world) theory, on the other hand, Mahat and the rest, remaining undivided like the confluence of three streams, are not differentiated in the Kūṣastha, the Immutable (*i.e.*, Puruṣa or Pure Consciousness in which nothing can enter from the outside), in the Sūkṣma or subtle form or state called Prakṛiti, just as the orb of light is not differentiated in the solar orb, and, consequently, it is the Self that is the only one reality. This the author will teach afterwards by the aphorism (I. 154):

नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् ॥ १ । १५४ ॥

There is no conflict with the Śrutis declaring non-duality, because the reference is to the genus of Self.---61.

Proof of the existence of the Tan-mâtras.

स्थूलात् पञ्च तन्मात्रस्य ॥ २ । ६२ ॥

स्थूलात् Sthûlât, from the gross. पञ्च तन्मात्रस्य Pañcha-tan-mâtrasya, of the five Tan-mâtras, subtle elements.

62. (Knowledge of the existence) of the five Tan-mâtras is (by inference) from the Gross (Elements).—62.

Vṛitti.—For the purpose of the inference of cause from effect, the author takes them in the reverse order.

Knowledge of the five Tan-mâtras, is obtained from the gross, *i. e.*, the five gross elements as their effects, and as having the forms of being Śânta, pacific, Ghora, terrific, and Mûdha, stupid, according to the differences of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas.—62.

Bhâṣya :—The author, by a number of aphorisms, establishes the knowledge, by means of inference, of those amongst the above Predicables, which are not objects of direct observation.

The word, knowledge, comes down from the 60th aphorism above. 'Gross' denotes nothing but whatever is visible, *i. e.*, directly perceptible. And it has been declared to be the effect or product of the Tan-mâtras. By the inference of the Tan-mâtras as the cause thereof, from the Gross Elements as the effect, knowledge, discriminative of the Gross, arises. Such is the meaning.

In order that it may belong to Ākāśa, Ether, in common (with Earth, etc.), grossness here denotes the possession of an attribute cognisable by the external senses, or the possession of the Viśeṣa or distinctions of Śânta, pacific, etc.

And the Tan-mâtras are fine substances, the undifferentiated (*a-viśeṣa*) originals of the Gross Elements, which form the substratum of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour, and Smell, belonging to that class (that is, in that stage of their evolution) in which the distinctions of Śânta etc., do not exist. So we find from the Viṣṇu-Purâṇa and other sources, *e.g.*,

तस्मिंस्तस्मिंस्तु तन्मात्रास्तेन तन्मात्रता स्मृता ।

न क्षान्ता नापि घोरास्ते न मूढाश्चाविशेषिणः ॥ १ । २ । २२ ॥

In them severally reside their parts (mâtrâ), wherefore the Smṛiti describes them as Tan (their)-mâtra (part). They are neither Śânta, pacific, nor Ghora, terrific, nor, again, Mûdha, stupefying, but are indistinguishables,—Viṣṇu Purâṇa, I. ii. 22.

The meaning of the above śloka is this: In all these elements, exist the parts thereof. This being the case, and there being no

distinction between a property and its subject, the Smṛiti speaks of the substances also as Tan-mâtras. And these Predicables are devoid of the distinctions of Sound, etc. belonging to the Gross, and called as Sânta, Ghora, and Mûḍha, because they are all of one form. The import, therefore, is that when the Elements appear as the Tan-mâtras of Sound, etc., all that the expression means is that they possess Sound, etc. devoid of the distinction of Sânta, etc. Hence they are designated as Indistinguishables.

Sânta means pleasurable, Ghora, painful, and Mûḍha, stupefying. And the Tan-mâtras, being enjoyable to the gods and the like alone, are simply pleasurable, as the element of pleasure predominates in them.

Here the process of inference is as follows : The Gross Elements, arrived at the extreme limit of descent, must, on account of their grossness, have, as do a water-pot, a piece of cloth, etc., as their material cause, substances possessing the distinctive attributes of their own. The subject of inference is not at all pushed further than the Subtle, as, otherwise, the result would be non-finality.

An argument favourable to the above inference, is that, in the absence of any counteracting agent, the production of the attributes of the effect according to the attributes of the cause, is irresistible.

The Veda and the Smṛiti also confirm the above inference.

There is, on the other hand, objection to the possession of Sound, Touch, etc. by Prakṛiti ; e. g., numerous passages in Viṣṇu Purâṇa, etc., such as the following :

शब्दस्पर्शविहीनं तद्रूपादिभिरसंयुतम् ।

त्रिगुणं तज्जगद्योनिरनादिप्रभवोऽयम् ॥

It (Prakṛiti) is devoid of Sound and Touch, and is unconnected with Form and the like. It is constituted by the three Guṇas, is the origin of the world, and is without production, development and destruction.

The impediments to the possession of Sound, Touch, etc. by Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra, again, are the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti which declare that they are the causes of the Bhûtas, gross and subtle elements. For, the mark of an element is this, and nothing else, that it possesses a distinctive attribute belonging to the class cognizable by the external senses. Whence it would follow that if Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra possessed Sound, etc., they too would be elements, and consequently the causes of themselves, which is impossible.

In the absence of Form, etc. in the causal substances, what, it may be asked, is the cause of Form, etc. of the Tan-mâtras ? We would reply

that it is nothing but specific conjunctions in different combinations amongst the causal substances themselves, as we find that the conjunction of turmeric and lime is the cause of redness, etc., appearing in the substance originated by them jointly.

When, in accordance with the facts of observation, it is quite possible for the conjunctions themselves amongst the causes of the substance which give support to them, to be the cause of Form, etc., the supposition of Form in the ultimate atoms made by the Logicians (*e.g.*, the Vaiśeṣikas), is not justifiable. Nor is it a rule with them also that only the attributes of homogeneous causes can originate attributes in the effects. For, we may point out, they also admit that the only cause of the increased volume of a triad of atoms is the plurality of their parts, etc.

The inference of the Indriyas (Powers of cognition and action), again, is, like the inference of Ākāśa, made by means of their functions, *e.g.*, sight, touch, speech, etc. which are directly perceptible. Hence it has not been stated here. The subject under treatment is only the inference of the Tattvas or Principles, one by means of another. Hence the exclusion of the Indriyas is not a defect.

In the matter of the production of the Tan-mâtras, the process described in the Commentary on Yoga should alone be accepted. Thus, the Tan-mâtra of Sound is produced from Ahaṃkāra; then, from the Tan-mâtra of Sound, accompanied by Ahaṃkāra, is produced the Tan-mâtra of Touch, possessing the attributes of Sound and Touch. In a similar order, the (other) Tan-mâtras are produced by the addition of one attribute at each step.

In the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (I. ii. 38), we, however, find :

आकाशस्तु विकुर्वाणः स्पर्शमात्रं ससर्ज ह ।

बलवानभवद्वायुस्तस्य स्पर्शो गुणो मतः ॥ १ । २ । ३८ ॥

While spreading out the modification of Ākāśa, He (the Creator) created pure Touch (the Tan-mâtra of Touch). Vāyu, Air, became dominant, and it is held that Touch is its attribute.

So, it has been declared there that the creation of the Tan-mâtras of Touch, etc. proceeds from the four Gross elements of Ākāśa and the rest (excluding Earth). But this is not really the case. For, the creation mentioned there, should be understood in the sense of transformation (*pariṇamana*) by the form of the elements. For, the Gross elements beginning with Ākāśa and ending with Water transform the Tan-mâtras appertaining to them individually, by the form of their respective succeeding element, by means of their predominance over them.—62.

Proof of Ahaṁkāra.

बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चाहंकारस्य ॥ १ । ६३ ॥

बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां—Bāhya (external)-ābhyantara (internal,)-bhyām (by), by the external and internal ones, *i. e.*, Indriyas or Powers of cognition and action. तैः Taiḥ, by them, *i. e.*, the Tan-mātras. च Cha, as well as. अहंकारस्य ahaṁkārasya, of Ahaṁkāra.

63. (The knowledge of the existence) of Ahaṁkāra is (by inference) by means of the external and internal ones as well as by them.—63.

Vṛitti :—Knowledge of Ahaṁkāra is derived by means of the external and the internal, that is, Indriyas or Instruments, as well as of those, that is, the five Tan-mātras, as its effects.—63.

Bhāṣya :—The meaning is that the knowledge of Ahaṁkāra arises by inference of it as the cause, by means of the external and internal Indriyas as well as by means of the five Tan-mātras, as its effects.

Now, Ahaṁkāra is a substance which serves as an antaḥ-karaṇa or internal instrument, and of which the function is abhimāna, thinking with reference to itself, assumption of everything to itself, conceit. It is not merely abhimāna, because, in the world, we find that it is substances only that can be the material cause of other substances. Moreover, in the state of dreamless sleep, etc., because the cessation of the function of Ahaṁkāra would entail the annihilation of the Elements, the existence, therefore, is proved of a substance called Ahaṁkāra simply as the seat of vāsanā, desire or the resultant tendency of accumulated experience.

The process of inference here is as follows: The Tan-mātras and the Indriyas have the substance, possessing abhimāna, as their material cause, because they are substances which are the products of Abhimāna; whatever is not thus (*i. e.* constituted by Ahaṁkāra), is not thus (*i. e.* a product of abhimāna), as, for instance, Puruṣa etc.

It cannot be said that a substance possessing abhimāna, self-assumption, is itself unproved; as there is proof of it by its being the material cause of such modifications as, *e.g.*, 'I am fair' etc., as is the case with the eye, etc., and, by the same inference, it can be proved that, that which is other than Manas, etc., is the cause of such modifications.

Here there is favourable argument also. *E. g.*

बहु स्यां प्रजायेय ।

I shall be many, I shall procreate,—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 3,

From such texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, it appears that the creation of the Elements and all the rest is preceded by abhimāna or impersonation, and hence abhimāna is proved as the cause of creation which is preceded by acts of intelligence. And, for the sake of simplicity, the causality of abhimāna in creation is conceived as arising by means of mere proximity in the form of combination in one and the same object.

But, if this be the case, (i.e., if objects are made of Ahaṃkāra), then, (says an objector), since the Ahaṃkāra of the potter would be the material cause of the water-pot, the water-pot made by him would disappear, when the potter obtains release, and, consequently, his Antaḥ-karaṇa disappears, and this is not reasonable, because, (after the death of the potter), another Puruṣa recognises that this is that same water-pot.

To this we reply that it is not so, because, on the release of the potter from his antaḥ-karaṇa, there is an end only of that particular transformation which could be the cause of the worldly experience of the released Puruṣa, but not an end of transformation in general, nor of antaḥ-karaṇa in its pure form or essence (svarūpa), because, in the Yoga aphorism (II. 22),

कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् ॥ २ । २२ ॥

“Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved, it is not destroyed, being common to others.”—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. IV. page 188.

it has been proved that the equipment of an emancipated Puruṣa may also become the means of accomplishing the objects of other Puruṣas.

Or, let the Ahaṃkāra of Hiranya-Garbha (the one appearing in the Golden-Cosmic-Egg, i. e., Brahmâ, the Creator) be the cause in the case of the water-pot etc., also, and not the Ahaṃkāra of the potter, etc. Even, then, the application of the general law being so extended, there would be no violation of any particular law, because it is collective Buddhi, etc., that has been established, in the Purâṇas and in the Sâṃkhya and Yoga, as being the material cause of Creation, and not distributed Buddhi, etc. which are their parts; as, for example, the characteristic of being the material cause of movable and immovable objects, belongs to the Great Earth (the Element of Earth as a whole) alone, and not to clods of earth, pebbles, etc. which are its parts—63.

Proof of Antaḥ-karaṇa.

तेनान्तःकरणस्य ॥ १ । ६४ ॥

तेन—Tena, thereby. अन्तःकरणस्य Antaḥ-karaṇasya, of the inner instrument.

64. The proof of Antaḥ-karana is by means of Ahaṃkāra.—64.

Vṛitti :—Knowledge of the Antaḥ-karaṇa (the inner sense), that is, Buddhi, is derived (by inference) from that, that is, Ahaṃkāra, as its effect.—64.

Bhāṣya :—The meaning is that the knowledge of the Antaḥ-karaṇa, i. e., the principal Antaḥ-karaṇa, namely Buddhi, called Mahat, as the cause thereof, is by inference by the mark of Ahaṃkāra, as its effect. The application of the process of inference here is as follows : The substance, Ahaṃkāra, must have, for its material cause, a substance possessing the function of niśchaya, ascertainment or certainty, because it is a substance which is the product of certainty ; that which is not so, is not so, as Puruṣa, etc.

Here the following argument also should be understood. Every man, without exception, having first ascertained the essential nature of an object, after that, thinks with reference to himself by such forms as, “ This is I,” “ This ought to be done by me,” etc. So much is quite settled. Now, in the present instance, some cause of the substance called Ahaṃkāra being looked for, since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions (of niśchaya and abhīmāna), it is assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that the relation of cause and effect also subsist between the two substances which give support to them, because the occurrence of a function of the effect follows, as a matter of course, from the occurrence of a function of the cause.

In the Veda also there are texts, such as,

इक्ष्वाकवे

He looked round etc.—Bṛihat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, I. iv. 2.

तदैक्षत

This the same Deity saw etc.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 2.

from which we learn that it is from the Buddhi alone, produced at the beginning of Creation, that all subsequent Creation proceeds.

Although the Antaḥ-karaṇa is one and one only, still for simplicity's sake, it is treated as being threefold according to diversity of functions. Thus says the Liṅga Purāṇa :

गुणक्षोभे जायमाने महान् प्रादुर्बभूव ह ।

मनो महांश्च विज्ञेय एकं तद्वृत्तिभेदतः ॥

Disturbance of the Guṇas (Sattva, etc.) having been produced, Mahat came to light. Mahat should also be known as Manas. It is one, but possesses a variety of functions.

In the Vedānta Sūtras (II. iv. 12) also we find :

पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवद्व्यपदिश्यते ॥ २ । ४ । १२ ॥

“ The chief Prāṇa is designated as having five functions like the Manas.”—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V. page 405.

In a similar manner, by taking the case of Prāṇa as an example, the manifoldness of Manas also is proved according to the diversity of functions only.

(The phrase, for simplicity's sake, above, is now being explained.) Otherwise, as by means of the functions of ascertainment, etc., so also by means of the functions of error, doubt, sleep, anger, etc., etc., quite an infinite number of Antaḥ-karaṇas would have to be admitted, at the rate of one Antaḥ-karaṇa for each function.

Moreover, the use of the words, Manas, etc., irrespective of (the three-fold distinction herein recognised of) Buddhi, etc., cannot be justified on the System of Patañjali or on any other System of Thought. Still, as in the case of the knots in a bamboo, an order of succession as well as the relation of cause and effect have been declared amongst the threefold Antaḥ-karaṇas, by taking the minor distinctions in them into consideration, that is, it should be observed, following the terminology given in those texts of the Veda and Smṛiti which subserve the System of Yoga. Thus is it declared in the Yoga Vâsîṣṭha Rāmāyaṇam :

अहमर्थोदयो योऽयं चित्तात्मा वेदनात्मकः ।
 एतच्चित्तद्रुमस्यास्य बीजं विद्धि महामते ॥
 एतस्मात् प्रथमोद्भिन्नोद्भूतकुरोऽभिनवाकृतिः ।
 निश्चयात्मा निराकारो बुद्धिरित्यभिधीयते ॥
 अस्य बुद्ध्यभिधानस्य याङ्गुरस्य प्रपीनता ।
 सङ्कल्परूपिणी तस्याश्चित्तचेतोमनोऽभिधा ॥

This, that which is called Chitta-âtmâ (the Self reduced to the form of Chitta), of which the nature is consciousness or to feel, wherein takes place the manifestation of the object, Aham, the "I", know it, O great thinker, to be the seed of this Tree of Chitta. From this, as it first breaks up, issues forth a sprout of quite a novel form ; certainty is its nature, and it is formless; it is designated as Buddhi. What appears as the fullness of this sprout of which the designation is Buddhi, which (fullness) possesses the form of saṃkalpa or thinking, of this the designations are Chitta, Chetas, and Manas.

The 'object, Aham,' is a general term for Antaḥ-karaṇa, (i.e., does not denote Ahamkāra alone).

In the above extract it has been declared by the maxim of the seed and the sprout, that the different states called Chitta, etc., are, by the forms of functions merely, three successive transformations of the Tree of Antaḥ-karaṇa which is one and one only.

In the Sâmkhya Śāstra, again, Chitta of which the function is thinking, is included in Buddhi itself. Whereas in the above passage Ahamkāra is included in Buddhi,—64,

Proof of Prakṛiti.

ततः प्रकृतेः ॥ १ । ६५ ॥

ततः Tataḥ, thence, from Mahat. प्रकृतेः Prakṛiteḥ, of Prakṛiti.

65. (The knowledge) of Prakṛiti is (by inference) from Mahat.—65.

Vṛitti :—Knowledge of Prakṛiti is obtained from that, that is, Mahat Tattva, as the effect.—65.

Bhāṣya :—The meaning is that knowledge of Prakṛiti is, by inference as the cause, from that, *i.e.*, Mahat Tattva, as the effect.

That Antaḥ-karāṇa in general is also an effect, is proved, according to the authority of the Veda and Smṛiti, in this way that, since cognitions belonging to all the five senses do not appear at one and the same time, therefore, it must be the required intermediate transformation, just like the body, etc.

The application of the process of inference that it is an effect of Prakṛiti, is as follows : Buddhi possessing the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, must be the product of a substance which possesses the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, because, whilst it is an effect, it is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment ; like lovely women.

The argument favourable to the above inference is this that the attributes of an effect can properly be accounted for only in accordance with the attributes of its cause. The Veda and Smṛiti also, it should be observed, support the above inference.

But, our opponent may say, there is no proof that Pleasure, etc. inhere in objects, the feeling being “ I am happy ” and the like. How then can objects such as a lovely woman, etc., be cited as examples ?

Such, we say in reply, is not the case. By the fact that objects are the products of Buddhi the essence of which is Pleasure, etc. as well as by the feeling of “ the pleasure of a garland ”, “ the pleasure of sandal paste ”, etc., it is proved that objects also possess the properties of Pleasure, etc. There is besides the authority of the Veda and Smṛiti. Moreover, that thing alone is conceived as having Pleasure, etc., as its material cause, which is always found to be present or absent according as Pleasure, etc., are present or absent. To take them as instrumental causes, and then to suppose something else as the material cause, would involve two suppositions which would be superfluous.

Further, a permanent element of Pleasure, common to all Puruṣas, is proved to exist in all objects by means of their agreement with one another

and by the fact of recognition. For the apprehension of this Pleasure we have made an elaborate supposition of functions, their laws, and the like, which, however, conveys no fault in our System, having been made with reference to the results. Otherwise, a whole consisting of parts would not be proved by recognition, as the supposition of its cause (parts), etc., would be redundant.

The existence of Pleasure, etc., in objects also has been declared in the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa :

तत् सन्तु चेतस्यथवापि देहे

सुखानि दुःखानि च किं ममात्र ॥

Let pleasures and pains exist in the mind or in the body ; what is that to me ?

The perception "I am happy", etc., again, like the perception "I am rich", etc., has for its subject matter the relation called the relation of the thing owned and the owner thereof (i.e., an extrinsic relation and not an intrinsic one). For the purpose of dispelling the error that these perceptions have the relation of inherence for their subject matter, Puruṣa is differentiated in the Śāstras from the perceptions "I am happy," "I feel pain," and "I am bewildered."

Sound, etc., are treated as having the nature of pleasure, etc., because they combine in one and the same object (e.g., Ether, etc.) with them. Or, let Pleasure be present immediately in sound, etc., as would follow from the proofs cited above.

The theory that Pleasure, etc., appertaining to the objects, are capable of being apprehended by Buddhi alone, is made on the strength of what actually takes place. What, on the other hand, is manifested in dreamless sleep, etc., when there is no contact with objects, as the Sāttvic (consisting of Sattva) Pleasure of tranquillity or peacefulness, the very same is the property of Buddhi, the Pleasure of the Self.

Although the Vaiśeṣika and other Logicians formulate different theories regarding the order of the succession of causes and effects in the fabric of Creation, still the system inferred by us should alone be accepted by those who seek Release, because it is supported by a large number of the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, and because the inferences of others are weak in consequence of the insecurity of their foundation. For this reason, mere reasoning, on account of the defect of non-finality, involved in it, has been refuted by the Vedānta Sūtra (II. i. 11):

तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात् ॥ २ । १ । ११ ॥

(If it be said that) there being no finality about reasoning, (it is always possible to infer the truth of the opposite; we say "no," for then the undesirable consequence

would follow that there would be no final release also).—Sacred Books of the Hindus. Vol. V., page 235.

So has it been declared by Manu also :

आर्षे धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना ।

यस्तर्कणानुसन्धत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः ॥ १२ । १०६ ॥

He knows Dharma (Right Conduct, in the widest sense), and none else, who can bring arguments, not in conflict with the Veda and the Śāstra, to bear upon the teachings of the Rishis (Seers) about Dharma.—Manu Saṃhitā, Ch. XII., sl. 106.

It has been thus declared that it is reasoning which is not in conflict with the Veda, that alone can be the means of ascertaining objects. Therefore, it follows from passages like

श्रोतव्यः श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्तव्यश्चोपपत्तिभिः ।

(Truth about the Self) should be heard (i.e., learnt) from the words of the Veda, and reasoned out by means of arguments. (And after having been reasoned out, it should be constantly meditated upon. These, hearing, reasoning, and meditation are the causes of the vision of truth.)

that it is manana, reasoning, the object of which is similar to that of śravaṇa, hearing, (i. e., is Vedic), is strong, whereas the reasoning of others in other forms is weak.

The hint is given here that the inference of the existence of Pleasure, Pain, etc., in Puruṣa also, by means of the (seeming) possession of Pleasure, Pain, etc., is, in like manner, weak, on account of its conflict with a large number of the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti.

The distinctive peculiarity (viśeṣa) appertaining to Prakṛiti, we shall expound in the sequel.—65.

Proof of Puruṣa.

संहतपरार्थत्वात् पुरुषस्य ॥ १ । ६६ ॥

संहतपरार्थत्वात् Saṃhata (structure)-para (other)-artha (purpose)-tvāt, from the fact that a compage, a structure of many parts, exists to serve the purpose of another. पुरुषस्य Puruṣasya, of Puruṣa.

66. (The knowledge of the existence) of Puruṣa is (by inference) from the fact that a structure of many parts, (that is, Prakṛiti) exists for the sake of another.—66.

Vṛitti :—Knowledge of Puruṣa is not derived from Prakṛiti as the effect, because Prakṛiti is nitya or eternal (i.e., uncaused), and Puruṣa is not a kāraṇa or cause. But because Prakṛiti is a saṃghāta (a whole in which parts combine and co-operate), that is, an embodiment of the three Guṇas, she exists para-artha, for the sake of another. And this “another” (other than a saṃghāta) is Puruṣa. Hence knowledge of him is obtained.

To avoid infinite regression, it should be stated that Puruṣa is not a combination of many parts.—66.

Bhāṣya:—Well, the discrimination of Puruṣa from everything that is Jaḍa or unintelligent or unconscious, is alone the cause of Release. For what purpose, then, has the discrimination of material objects from one another been shown here? To this our reply is that there is necessity for such discrimination also, for the purpose of purifying the Sattva element from the taint of Rajas and Tamas, by directing attention to Prakṛiti and the other Principles, one by one.

Having exhibited the proof of the Principles ending with Prakṛiti, as discriminated from one another, by inference by means of the mark of cause and effect, the author now declares a similar proof by inference, in a different way, of the existence of Puruṣa who is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been mentioned.

Samphanana is originative conjunction. And, since there is no difference between a whole and its parts, it is common to the products of Prakṛiti. Thus, the meaning is that the knowledge of Puruṣa is by inference from the fact that Prakṛiti and her products, being constituted by combination of parts, exist for the sake of another.

The inference is made in this wise: The subject in dispute, namely, Prakṛiti, Mahat, etc., is para-artham, serving-an-external-purpose, i.e., has as its fruit or end the worldly experience and eventual emancipation of some one other than itself, because it is a structure of many parts, like a couch, a seat or the like. सम्यमेव जयते

By this inference is proved Puruṣa as other than Prakṛiti and only as a non-combination of parts, for, were he too a structure of many parts, the consequence would be infinite regression.

In the Yoga Darśana, the inference made by the aphorist, namely,

परार्थं संहत्यकारित्वात् ॥ ४ । २४ ॥

(And the mind) exists for another, (also because it is variegated by innumerable residua), inasmuch as it acts by combination.—Yoga Sūtras, IV. 24, S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 302.

is common only to the last member as heard (in *ibid* IV. 23) i.e. Chittam, mind, because the words “acting by combination” means simply this that it causes objects (artha) and acts (kriya), by association with others. Whereas Puruṣa, since he possesses the form of eternal light, does not depend upon anything else in causing his own objects in the form (i.e., sense) of illuminating objects. For, it is only in the matter of connection with objects, that Puruṣa stands in need of the function of Buddhi. But this connection with object is not an uncommon act of causing objects.

And the favourable arguments (which confirm the above inference) are furnished by texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, such as,

न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति ।

Nor does everything become dear for the sake of everything, but everything becomes dear for the sake of the Self.—Bṛihat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, II. iv. 5.

Another such argument is as follows : Were Prakṛiti, etc., possessing Pleasure, etc., for the sake of their own experience of Pleasure, etc., then, they would be immediately knowable by themselves, inasmuch as the manifestation of Pleasure is not possible without the manifestation of the subject in which it inheres ; hence there would be the conflict of the subject and object. For, the manifestation of Pleasure is not possible without the manifestation of the subject of the properties, as would appear from the perception of Pleasure being of this form as “I am happy.”

Moreover, it would be against the law of parsimony to suppose innumerable attributes in the form of consciousness for the manifold Guṇas and their products, *i. e.*, innumerable vikâras or transformations which enter into originative combination with one another. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, it is proper to make, (in each case), the supposition of a single Puruṣa only, in the form of the light of consciousness, as that which is other than all that is originated by combination of parts.

By the present aphorism, has been stated the inference of Puruṣa as the nimitta or occasional cause, inasmuch as it has been declared that the fulfilment of the object of Puruṣa is the nimitta or occasion for all combination of things. It is for this reason that, after having proposed Puruṣa produced at the beginning of Creation, it is remembered in the Viṣṇu and other Purāṇas.

निमित्तमात्रमेवासौ सृज्यानां सर्गकर्मणि ।

प्रधानकारणीभूता यतो वै सृज्यशक्तयः ॥ १ । ४ । ५१ ॥

गुणसाम्यात्तत्तस्मात् क्षेत्रज्ञाधिष्ठितान्मुने ।

गुणव्यञ्जनसंभूतिः सर्गकाले द्विजोत्तम ॥ १ । २ । ३३ ॥

He (Puruṣa) is merely the occasion in the matter of the act of creation of all things producible. Whence the powers of producible things come to have Prakṛiti as their cause. Then, from that equipoise of the Guṇas (Prakṛiti), under the superintendence, of the Knower of the Field (Puruṣa), O Muni, takes place the production of the (first) manifestation of the Guṇas (Mahat) at the time of Creation, O excellent Brāhmaṇa.—Viṣṇu Purāṇa, I. iv. 51 and I. ii. 33.

“Superintendence of the Knower of the Field” means mere conjunction of the unfulfilled object of Puruṣa. “Manifestation of the Guṇas”

means the Principle of Mahat, because it manifests or reveals Pradhâna (Prakṛiti) constituted by the three Guṇas, as its cause.

Thus, then, it has been declared, in the above manner, that the proof of invisible (i. e., super-sensible) objects is by means of inference.—66.

Prakṛiti is uncaused.

मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम् ॥ १ । ६७ ॥

मूले Mûle, in the root. मूलाभावात् Mûla (root)-abhâvât (absence), on account of the absence of root. अमूलं Amûlam, rootless. मूलम् Mûlam, root.

67. Since the root has no root, the root is rootless.—67.

Vṛitti:—Now, lest it be imagined that there may be a cause of Prakṛiti, so the author says:

There being no root, that is, no cause, of Mûla Prakṛiti, the Root Evolvent, the cause which is rootless, is the root (of all). The same is Prakṛiti.—67.

Bhâṣya:—Now, in order to establish that she is the cause of all, the eternality of Prakṛiti is being established, for the purpose of proving that Puruṣa is kûṭastha or immutable in all circumstances.

The root material cause of the twenty-three Principles, that is, Pradhâna, is rootless, because a further root cannot be possible, as in that case, there would be an infinite regression. Such is the meaning.—67.

Prakṛiti is a mere name.

पारम्पर्येऽप्येकत्र परिनिष्ठेति संज्ञामात्रम् ॥ १ । ६८ ॥

पारम्पर्ये Pâramparye, in the case of a succession. अपि Api, even. एकत्र Ekatra, at some one point. परिनिष्ठा Pariniṣṭhâ, rest, halt. इति Iti, so. संज्ञामात्रम् Saṃjñâ-mâtram, mere name.

68. Even in the case of a succession, there must be a stop at some one point, and so it (Prakṛiti, the root cause) is merely a name (that is given to such a point).—68.

Vṛitti:—The author states the argument in regard to the above:

There is a different cause of Prakṛiti, of that, again, there is a different cause, and so on and on. In view of the defect of non-finality which would, otherwise, be thus entailed, an uncaused something at the end should be stated to be the root. The very same is (called here) Prakṛiti. Moreover, the admission of more than twenty-five Principles would be redundant.—68,

Bhāṣya :—Well, it may be argued by our opponent, we learn from such texts as,—

तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम ।

Therefrom, O excellent Brāhmaṇa, was produced A-vyaktam, the Unmanifested, consisting of the three Guṇas.

that Pradhāna also is produced from Puruṣa. Let, then, Puruṣa himself be the root of Prakṛiti. There would, in this case, be no non-finality, since Puruṣa is eternal. Nor would any harm be caused to the immutability of Puruṣa, because the succession of Prakṛiti and her transformations would issue forth through the gateway of Avidyā. So also is it remembered :

तस्मादज्ञानमूलोऽयं संसारः पुरुषस्य हि ।

Verily, therefore, the saṃsāra, or worldly experience of Puruṣa has Ignorance for its root.

Apprehending the above objection, the author says :

Even if Puruṣa be the root cause of the world by a succession of intermediate transformations through the gateway of A-vidyā, etc., there must be a termination of the succession in some one or other of A-vidyā, etc., *i. e.*, at some one or other eternal or permanent (nitya) gate, inasmuch as Puruṣa undergoes no transformation. Hence, where this termination or rest takes place, the same is eternal Prakṛiti. Here Prakṛiti is merely a name for the root cause. Such is the meaning.—68.

The Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya view of Prakṛiti are the same.

समानः प्रकृतेर्द्वयोः ॥ १। ६६ ॥

समानः Samānaḥ, same. प्रकृतेः Prakṛiteḥ, of Prakṛiti. द्वयोः Dvayor, of both of us.

69. (In regard to the origin) of Prakṛiti, (the position) of both of us, is the same.—69.

Vṛitti :—But, Prakṛiti being supersensuous, how can it be known that she is a cause? To this the author replies.

Both, *i. e.*, the asserter (Sāṃkhya) and the disputant (Naiyāyika) fare equally. For, as, notwithstanding that the ultimate atoms (paramāṇu) are supersensuous, the inference of ultimate atoms is made from the observation of their attributes in the water-pot and the like, similarly, here too, from the observation of the world as being made up of, or having the nature of, the three Guṇas, it is inferred that its cause, Prakṛiti, is constituted of the three Guṇas. Thus, to give an example, (showing that everything in the world possesses the nature of the three Guṇas), a woman is pleasurable to her husband, and thus partakes of

the nature of Sattva; through insubordination, she causes pain to him, and thus partakes of the nature of Rajas; she causes hallucination to him, in consequence of separation from her, and thus partakes of the nature of Tamas. All existences should be looked at similarly.—69.

Bhāṣya.—But, then, our opponent (a Vedāntin) may object, the position that there are just twenty-five Principles is not made out, for, in addition to the A-vyakta, Unmanifested, which is the cause of the Principle of Mahat, another unintelligent Principle, called Ajñāna, Ignorance, presents itself. With this apprehension in his mind, the author states the final conclusion about the ultimate root (of Prakṛiti).

Really, however, in the discussion of the root cause of Prakṛiti, the Pakṣa or subject of proof is the same for both of us, *i.e.*, the asserter and the opponent. That is to say, as we hear of the production of Prakṛiti, so do we hear of that of A-vidyā also, from such texts as—

अविद्या पञ्चपर्वैषा प्रादुर्भूता महात्मनः ।

This A-vidyā which has five divisions, was produced from the Great Self.

Hence a secondary production must needs be asserted in respect of one or other of them, and, of these two, it is of Prakṛiti only that a secondary production in the form of a manifestation through conjunction with Puruṣa, etc., is reasonable, as there is a recollection of the secondary production of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti in the following passage of the Kūrma Purāṇa :

संयोगलक्षणेनोत्पत्तिः कथ्यते कर्मज्ञानयोः ।

Of action (Karma, Prakṛiti) and knowledge (Jñāna, Puruṣa) is said to be the production, the characteristic of which is conjunction.

while there is no mention, in any place whatever, of the secondary production of A-vidyā. The texts about A-vidyā having no beginning, should, however, be explained in the same way as the texts which declare that Vāsanā or tendency, etc., are beginningless only in the form of a stream or unbroken succession of Vāsanās or tendencies.

And it has been declared in an aphorism of Yoga that A-vidyā which possesses the form of false knowledge, is a property of Buddhi. Hence the number (twenty-five) of the Principles is not exceeded.

Or, the meaning of the aphorism is that the reasoning in favour of both, *i.e.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, is the same. For, we hear of the production of Puruṣa also from such passages as—

यतः प्रधानपुरुषौ यतश्चैतच्चराचरम् ।

कारणं सकलस्यास्य स नो विष्णुः प्रसीदतु ॥

From whom are produced Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, and from whom proceeds this creation, movable and immovable, He, Viṣṇu, the cause of all this, may be pleased to us!

Thus, as of Puruṣa, so also of Prakṛiti, the production is purely

secondary. Again, both Puruṣa and Prakṛiti are declared to be eternal. Hence there is similarity on this point also.

It is proved, therefore, that Prakṛiti alone is the material cause of the world, and that A-vidyā is the nimitta or occasional cause of the world, and that so also is Puruṣa.

In the Mokṣa-Dharma section of the Mahābhārata, however, we find :

अविद्यामादुरव्यक्तं सर्गप्रलयधर्मिणम् ।

सर्गप्रलयनिर्मुक्तं विद्यां वै पञ्चविंशकम् ॥

The sages declare the Unmanifested (Prakṛiti) possessing the property of creation and dissolution, to be A-vidyā, and that which is free from creation and dissolution (Puruṣa), to be Vidyā or knowledge. These make up the twenty-five Principles.

This, no doubt, is a declaration that Prakṛiti is A-vidyā or Ignorance, and that Puruṣa is Vidyā or knowledge. But the declaration has been made only from the practical point of view, in consequence of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa being the subjects of A-vidyā and Vidyā respectively. For, on account of undergoing transformation by nature, Prakṛiti, by comparison with Puruṣa, is a non-being : hence she is said to be the object of A-vidyā or Ignorance. In the very same manner, in the same section of the Mahābhārata, the whole range of effects ending with the Elements, have been declared to be A-vidyā by comparison with their respective causes, and, by comparison with themselves, their respective causes have been declared to be Vidyā.

But Puruṣa's being the material cause of the world in the form of transformation, is due only to the Upādhi or investment of Prakṛiti. Like agency, etc., such causality has been translated in the Veda and Smṛiti only for the purpose of drawing greater attention to him through easy stages, as, otherwise (were Puruṣa in reality the material cause of the world), it should be observed, there would be conflict with the texts of the Veda such as the following :

अस्थूलमनण्वहस्यम् ।

Neither large nor small, neither short etc.—Bṛi. Āraṇ. Upa. III, viii, 8.

And by the word Māyā, Prakṛiti and nothing else is denoted, as will appear from the text of the Veda :

माया तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् ।

But one should know Māyā to be Prakṛiti. etc.—Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣat, IV, 10.

Because there is the declaration in the following extract that Māyā which follows from the context, possesses the essential form of Prakṛiti :

अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत् ।

तस्मिंश्चान्यो मायया सन्निरुद्धः ॥

From this, the Lord of Mâyâ (Parama-âtmâ) creates this universe, wherein the other (Jîva-âtmâ) is confined by Mâyâ,—*Ibid.* IV. 9.

And also from the texts of the Smṛiti such as,—

सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति प्राकृतं तु गुणत्रयम् ।

एतन्मयी च प्रकृतिर्माया या वैष्णवी श्रुता ॥

लोहितश्चेतकृष्णेति तस्यास्तादृग्बहुप्रजाः ।

Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas,—these are the three Guṇas belonging to Prakṛiti. Prakṛiti is constituted by them. In the Veda, she is called Vaiṣṇavī Mâyâ, the Mâyâ of Lord Viṣṇu. She is red, white, and black. Many such progeny are born from her.

A-vidyâ which can be destroyed by Jñâna, cannot be the meaning of the word Mâyâ in the above passage of the Veda, as, in that case, the eternality of Mâyâ would not be established. Moreover, if A-vidyâ be a substance, the difference between A-vidyâ and Prakṛiti would be merely verbal; and, if it be an attribute, the existence of Prakṛiti as its substratum, is thereby proved, inasmuch as Puruṣa is devoid of attributes, etc.

Now, it cannot be asserted by our opponent that A-vidyâ is something different in characteristic from Substance, Attribute, and Action, because, as has been already pointed out by us (*vide* Aphorism 24 above), there is no knowledge of any such Predicable.—69.

Only the most competent people can know the truth.

अधिकारित्रैविध्यान्न नियमः ॥ १ । ७० ॥

अधिकारित्रैविध्यात् Adhikâri-traividhyât, persons competent to reason about the truth, being divided into three classes. न Na, no. नियमः Niyamaḥ, rule.

70. (It is) not a rule (that every one should be able to reason out the discrimination of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti), because persons entitled to reasoning, are of three descriptions.—70.

Vritti:—If Release comes through seeing the discrimination (of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti), then Release should result at once from only hearing (*i.e.* learning) that discrimination from the Śāstras. But this is not the case, as we see that some attain Release quickly, and that some, after a length of time. With such an objection in view, the author says:

Those who are adhikâri, *i.e.*, fit for engaging in an enquiry about the truth, fall into three classes, good, middling, and bad. These differences are due to the differences of the attendant causes in the shape of A-vidyâ, etc, which, again, arise from the difference of Adriṣṭam. Therefore, there is no hard and fast rule (niyama) that Release should result at once from learning the discrimination of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa.—70.

Bhāṣya :—But, then, if there is (as shown above) a mode of arriving, by inference, at a knowledge of Prakṛiti, Puruṣa, etc., how is it that manana or mental realisation of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) does not take place in the case of all men? In regard to this point, the author says :

As in hearing (*i.e.*, learning or receiving the truth from the Śāstras and other reliable sources), so in manana or assimilation thereof in thought also, the adhikāris or persons entitled to engage in the enquiry, are of three descriptions, *viz.*, dull, mediocre, and good. Hence there can be no universal rule that mental assimilation should take place in the case of all men, because it is possible for the dull and mediocre to be confronted with contradictory (bādha, obstruction) and contrary (sat-pratipakṣa, equally valid argument to the contrary) views by means of misleading arguments, etc. Such is the meaning. For, by the dull, the (Sāmkhya) arguments set forth above are opposed (and altogether set aside) by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Bauddhas, etc. By the mediocre, again, these inferences are brought face to face with what appear to be equally valid conclusions to the contrary (and thereby rendered doubtful), by means of fallacious marks of inference, namely, the contradictory and the non-existent, (*vide* Vaiśeṣika Sūtram, III. i. 15, S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 116.). It is, therefore, the best of the adhikāris only in whose case such mental assimilation can take place. Such is the import.—70.

By Mahat is meant Manas.

महदाख्यमाद्यं कार्यं तन्मनः ॥ १ । ७१ ॥

महदाख्यम् Mahat-ākhyam, called Mahat. आद्यम् Ādyam, taking place first of all. कार्यं Kāryam, product, effect. तत् Tat, that. मनः Manaḥ Manas.

71. The first product of Prakṛiti is called Mahat; it is Manas.—71.

Vṛitti :—It may be thought that, in the previous aphorism (I. 61), “From Prakṛiti (evolves) Mahat,” the relation of cause and effect has been established, but not the order (of the succession of the products of Prakṛiti). So the author removes this error:

That which is the *first* product of Prakṛiti, is the Principle of Mahat, that is Buddhi. It is called Manas or the thinking principle, because it thinks (manana).—71.

Bhāṣya :—It has been already declared that the svarūpa or essential or intrinsic form of Prakṛiti is the equipoise of the Guṇas. The Subtle

Elements, etc., again, are too well known for any special mention. Hence, by the next two aphorisms, the author declares the svarūpa of the remaining two Principles, viz., Mahat and Ahaṁkāra.

The first product (of Prakṛiti), which is called Mahat, is Manas, that is, that which has the function of manana or thinking. Manana or thinking here means ascertainment or certainty. That of which this is the function, is Buddhi. Such is the meaning. For, from sayings like,

यदेतद्विस्तृतं वीजं प्रधानपुरुषात्मकम् ।
महत्तत्त्वमिति प्रोक्तं बुद्धितत्त्वं तदुच्यते ॥

This all-pervading seed which partakes of the Nature of Pradhāna and Puruṣa, the same is called the Principle of Mahat. It is said to be the Principle of Buddhi.

we know that it is Buddhi that is the first product of Prakṛiti.—71.

Note :—Mahat, Manas, and Buddhi are thus synonymous terms.

The next product is Ahaṁkāra.

चरमोऽहंकारः ॥ १ । ७२ ॥

चरमः Charamah, last. अहंकारः Ahaṁkārah, Ahaṁkāra, the I-maker.

72. The next (product of Prakṛiti is) Ahaṁkāra.—72.

Vṛitti :—The product next to Buddhi, is Ahaṁkāra.—72.

Bhāṣya :—That which is next to it, is Ahaṁkāra, that is, that which egotises or creates the “I,” of which the function is abhimāna or self-assumption. Such is the meaning.—72.

The subsequent ones are products of Ahaṁkāra.

तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषाम् ॥ १ । ७३ ॥

तत्कार्यत्वम् Tat-kārya-tvam-to be the products thereof. उत्तरेषाम् Uttareṣām, of the subsequent ones.

73. To the subsequent ones, it belongs to be the products of Ahaṁkāra.—73.

Vṛitti :—To be the products of Ahaṁkāra belongs to the others, viz., to the eleven Indriyas and the five Tan-mātras. Herein it is also declared that the (Gross) Elements which are the products of the Tan-mātras, are also the products of Ahaṁkāra, through the chain of causation.—73.

Bhāṣya :—The author now says that, since Ahaṁkāra possesses the function of abhimāna or the making of the “I” (which by supplying the required antithesis, makes knowledge of objective existence possible), therefore, it is established that the subsequent ones are the products of Ahaṁkāra.

The meaning of the aphorism can be easily grasped,

By explaining this set of the three aphorisms in the above way, the apprehension or charge of useless repetition (*Cf.* "From Ahaṁkāra, etc.," aphorism 61) is prevented.—73.

The primary causality of Prakṛiti is not impaired.

आद्यहेतुता तद्द्वारा पारम्पर्येऽप्यणुवत् ॥ १ । ७४ ॥

आद्यहेतुता Ādya-hetutā, causality of the Primordial, *i.e.* Prakṛiti. तद्द्वारा Tat-dvārā, mediately through that, *i.e.*, Mahat. पारम्पर्ये Pāraparye, in succession. अणु अपि Aṇu, even. अणुवत् Aṇu-vat, like that of the atoms.

74. Even though the evolution is successive, Prakṛiti, through that, *i.e.*, Mahat, is still the cause (of all), as are the Atoms (the causes, though not immediate, of water-pots, etc.).—74.

Vṛitti :—Well, if this be the case, says the opponent, then you give up the conclusion that the world is the product of Prakṛiti. To meet him, the author says :

As the ultimate Atoms are, by a number of successive stages, the causes of a water-pot which is directly the product of a lump of clay, so also is Prakṛiti the root cause.—74.

Bhāṣya :—Well, if this be so, then there would be contradiction of those texts of the Veda and Smṛiti which declare that Prakṛiti is the cause of all. Apprehending such an objection, the author says :

'Pāraparye api,' although she is not immediately the cause, still, 'adyāyāḥ,' of Prakṛiti, 'hetutā,' causality, in regard to Ahaṁkāra, etc., exists through Mahat, etc., in the same way, for example, as, in the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, the causality of the Atoms, in regard to water-pot, etc., exists through di-atoms, etc. Such is the meaning.—74.

Why Prakṛiti, and not Puruṣa, is the cause.

पूर्वभावित्वे द्वयोरेकतरस्य हानेऽन्यतरयोगः ॥ १ । ७५ ॥

पूर्वभावित्वे Pūrva-bhāvitve, being pre-existent. द्वयोः Dvayoh, of the two, *i.e.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. एकतरस्य Ekatarasya, of the one, *i.e.*, Puruṣa. हाने Hāne, on the loss. अन्यतरयोगः Anyatara-yogaḥ, application of the other, *i.e.*, Prakṛiti.

75. While both (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) pre-exist (all products), on the loss of causality of the one, follows the application of the other as the cause.—75.

Vṛitti :—In consequence of the eternality of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa,

the question arises as to whom belongs the causality in creation, etc. The author removes this curiosity :

Causality does not arise by mere antecedence, but by (invariable) agreement (anvaya) and difference (vyatireka). Of the two, the fitness of the one, *i.e.*, Puruṣa, for association with causality, is gone, there being Vedic declarations that he undergoes no modification. Hence conjunction with causality is of the other, *i. e.* Pradhâna.—75.

Bhâṣya :—But, when Prakṛiti and Puruṣa are both of them eternal, what is there, it may be asked, to determine that Prakṛiti alone is the cause? So the author says :

Although both of them, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, are antecedent to all products, still, because the one, *i.e.*, Puruṣa, undergoes no transformation, and, therefore, lacks causality, causality appropriately belongs to the other (Prakṛiti). Such is the meaning.

Now, the argument in favour of Puruṣa's never undergoing any transformation, is, in a seed form, as follows: If Puruṣa act by entering into combination, his existence would be for the sake of another, and infinite regression would be the result. If he act not by entering into combination, the production of Mahat, etc. would take place every moment. If, on the other hand, it be supposed that Puruṣa undergoes transformation through (the intervention of) Prakṛiti, then, for the sake of simplicity, let transformation be of Prakṛiti alone.

Because Puruṣa is the lord (in the sense of ownership) of Creation, the characteristic of being the Creator is attributed to him, in the same way, for example, as victory and defeat, present in the soldiers, are attributed to the King, because he, being the owner of the army, experiences the pleasurable and painful consequences of victory and defeat.

Moreover, by the evidence (*i.e.* hypothesis, in the logical sense) which cognises the subject of proof as possessing a particular property, Prakṛiti having been proved under the characteristic of causality alone, there is no necessity for looking for any other cause, as, on the other hand, by similar evidence, Puruṣa having been proved as the On-looker, there is no necessity for looking for any other on-looker.

Further, were the nature of Puruṣa to undergo transformation, he would at times commit failures, like the eye, Manas, etc. With the result that even actually existing Pleasure, Pain, etc. would not be cognised, and, consequently, doubts would arise such as "whether I be happy or not," etc. Hence it is proved, without detriment (and this is the reason for the inference) to his essential form of having the nature

of unfailing light, that Puruṣa is not by nature subject to transformation. Thus has it been declared by the Yoga Sūtra (IV. 18):

सदा ज्ञाताश्चित्तस्य वृत्तयस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वात् ॥ ४ । १८ ॥

“To its lord, the Puruṣa, the modifications of the mind are always known, on account of (his) unchangeability.”—S. B. H. Vol. IV. page 294.

And also by the comment thereon :

सदा ज्ञानविषयत्वं तु पुरुषस्यापरिणामित्वं परिदीपयति

While their being always the object of knowledge clearly brings out the unchangeable nature of Puruṣa.

We shall later on show why Puruṣa does not at one time illuminate the world, although he is intrinsically of the form of ever shining light—75.

Prakṛiti is all-pervading.

परिच्छिन्नं न सर्वोपादानम् ॥ १ । ७६ ॥

परिच्छिन्नं Parichchinnam, circumscribed, limited. **न** Na, not. **सर्वोपादानम्** Sarva-upādānam, material cause of all things.

76. What is limited cannot be the material cause of all things.—76.

Vṛtti :—But, then, (when there is so much dispute about the causality of Prakṛiti), let, (some one may say), the Ultimate Atoms be the causes, since there is no dispute about their causality. So the author says :

That which is limited, cannot be the material cause of all things, as, for example, threads cannot be the (material) causes of a water-pot. Consequently, separate causes would have to be asserted for all objects severally, whereas it would be simpler to assume one (universal) cause (namely, Prakṛiti).—76.

Bhāṣya :—In order to establish the simultaneous causality of Prakṛiti, the author demonstrates her universality also.

Pradhāna, the material cause of all things, is not limited, that is, is all-pervading. Such is the meaning. “The material cause of all things” is an adjective, containing the reason (for the inference of universality), namely, that this is not possible in the case of what is limited.

But the unlimitedness of Prakṛiti is not made out, objects our opponent ; for, Prakṛiti is nothing more than the triad of the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., as would appear from the future aphorism (VI. 39) :

सत्त्वादीनामतदुधर्मत्वं तद्वरूपत्वात् ॥ ६ । ३९ ॥

Sattva, etc. are not the properties of Prakṛiti, being the very essence of her. and as has been clearly and definitely declared by the Yoga Sūtra and the Comment thereon. Now, of these, Sattva, etc., lightness, mobility, weight, etc. are, you are going to say, the properties. But they would be contradicted by the (suggested) universality of Prakṛiti. Moreover, conjunction, disjunction, etc., which are causes in creation, would not also be established.

To this, our reply is as follows: Limitedness here denotes the characteristic of being confined to a part, which (characteristic) serves to determine the characteristic of being the counter-opposite of spatial non-existence (that is, in plainer language, the occupation of a portion of space which would have otherwise been empty); and the non-existence of this (limitedness) is universality. So that, it comes to this that the universality of Prakṛiti is nothing but the characteristic of not serving to determine the counter-oppositeness of spatial non-existence. As the characteristic of Prāṇa (the vital principle), namely, of being pervasive of all bodies, movable, immovable, etc., is denoted by the genus Prāṇa (the generic characteristic of being Prāṇa), on account of the relation of the individual manifestations of Prāṇa to all bodies; similar is the universality of Prakṛiti.

The other characteristics of Prakṛiti, e. g., inactivity (akriyā), unity, etc., we shall demonstrate in connection with the aphorism on her resemblances and differences (Vide I. 124 below).—76.

The Veda also supports the Theory of Prakṛiti.

तदुत्पत्तिश्च ॥ १ । ७७ ॥

तदुत्पत्तिश्चेति : Tat-utpatti-śruteḥ, from the Vedic declaration of the production of limited things. च Cha, and also.

77. (Prakṛiti is the cause of all things, and not the Atoms), also because there are Vedic declarations of the production of limited things.—77.

Vṛitti :—The author shows that there is Vedic evidence also on this point:

Argument has already been stated. The Veda also declares that Pradhāna is the cause of the world. Thus,

प्रधानाज्जगज्जायते

The world is produced from Pradhāna.—77.

Bhâṣya :—Not only because she is the material cause of all things, but :

also because the Veda speaks of the production of limited things. Thus, we learn of the production of limited things, as we find that they are by nature perishable, as declared in such texts of the Veda as,

यदल्पं तन्मर्त्यम्

That which is finite, is perishable.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VII. xxiv. 1. and in other texts. Such is the meaning.—77.

Ex nihilo nihil fit.

नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्धिः ॥ १ । ७८ ॥

न Na, not. अवस्तुनः A-vastunah, from non-entity, non-existence. वस्तुसिद्धिः Vastu-siddhiḥ, production of entity or existence.

78. From a non-entity, an entity cannot be produced.
—78.

Vṛitti :—Production of a water-pot which was non-existent before, is observed. Let antecedent non-existence, then, be the cause, since it is the invariable antecedent of all things. To this the author replies :

The production of an existence is not from non-existence. (If it were not so, then), as the effect is found to be of the same nature as the cause, the world also would be a non-entity.—78.

Bhâṣya :—Now, in order to establish the causality of Prakṛiti, the author sets aside the causality of Non-existence, etc.

‘A-vastunah,’ from non-existence, is not ‘vastu-siddhiḥ,’ the production of an existence. Because (1) by deriving the world from the horns of a hare, Release, etc. cannot be established, and (2) such production is never observed. Such is the meaning.—78.

The world is not unreal.

अबाधाददुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च नावस्तुत्वम् ॥ १ । ७९ ॥

अबाधात् A-bādhāt, from the absence of any contradiction to its reality
अदुष्टकारणजन्यत्वात्, A-duṣṭa-kāraṇa-janya-tvāt, from its not being the product of depraved causes. च Cha, and. न Na, not. नावस्तुत्वम् A-vastutvam, unreality.

79. (The world is) not unreal, because there is no fact contradictory to its reality, and also because it is not the product of depraved causes.—79.

Vṛitti:—Let the world also be a non-entity, what harm is that to us? one may ask. So the author says:

The knowledge that it is not silver, is the contradiction of the silver in the (wrong) cognition, in regard to a shell of pearl-oyster, that it is silver. But, in the present instance, it has never been the cognition of any body that this world is not of the form of existence, whereby there would be contradiction of its having the form of existence.

Again, a thing is inferred to be unreal, if it is the product of depraved causes; as some one's cognition of a conch-shell as yellow, through such a fault as jaundice, etc. But, in the present case, there is no such depravation of the senses, because all men at all times cognize the world as a reality. Hence it follows that the world is not a non-existence.—79.

* *Bhāṣya*:—If it be said that the world also may be an unreality, like dreams and the like, so the author says:

There is no contradiction of the reality of the fabric of the world by means of Vedic and other proofs, as there is of the objects seen in a dream. Nor can it be said that the cognition of the reality of the world is the result of depraved senses, etc., as it is in the case of the yellowness of a conch-shell; because there is no reason for the supposition of such depravation; hence the effect, *i.e.*, world, is not unreal. Such is the meaning.

It cannot be said that there is contradiction of the reality of the fabric of Creation by such texts of the Veda as,—

वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्

Modification (*e. g.*, a water-pot) is a creation of speech, a mere name; (while, "It is clay," only this much is the truth.—Chh. Upa, VI. 1. 4.

and that, there being this contradiction, the fault called A-vidyā also exists in the cause of the world. For, such passages are directed to show the non-existence (of those modifications) in the form of duration dependent upon their cause, because it is not possible otherwise to prove the example of the clay. Also, if the import of those passages were otherwise, it would conflict with the passages on creation, etc. Moreover, the contradiction of the reality of the fabric of creation by the Veda would involve the fallacy of "ātma-āśraya," *i.e.*, would depend for its validity on the authority of the Veda itself (which is fallacious), and, again, the Veda also being included in the fabric of Creation, and its reality being consequently contradicted by itself, there would be room for doubt as to the truth of what is made known by it. For this very reason, on account of the characteristic differences of contradiction, non-contradiction, etc., and also

on account of our being aware of them as existent, the (imputed) resemblance of the world as seen in the waking state, to a dream, a flower in the sky, etc., has been refuted with great care and earnestness by the following two aphorisms of the Vedânta :

नाभाव उपलब्धेश्च ॥ २ । २ । २८ ॥

वैधर्म्यान्न स्वप्नाविवत् ॥ २ । २ । २९ ॥

"The external things are not non-existent, because our consciousness bears testimony to their existence."—II. ii. 28.

"The ideas of the waking state are not like those of the dream state, because they are of a different nature."—II. ii. 29.—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V., pages 308, 310.

Passages such as नेति नेति Neti Neti, "Not this," "Not this" (Bri. Âraṇ. Upa. II. iii. 6) are intended simply for the purpose of viveka or discriminative knowledge, and not as negations of the reality of the world in its ultimate and essential form, as would appear from the Vedânta Sûtra (III. ii. 22) :

प्रकृतैतावच्छं हि प्रतिषेधति

"(The Śruti, Neti Neti) denies the previously mentioned limitation (only with regard to Brâhman), for it declares (him to be) more than that."—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V, page 482.

We have similarly explained many other such passages in our Commentary on the Vedânta.—79.

Why nothing can come out of nothing.

भावे तद्योगेन तत्सिद्धिरभावे तदभावात् कुतस्तरां तत्-
सिद्धिः ॥ १ । ८० ॥

भावे Bhâve, being existent. तद्योगेन Tat-yogena, by union with that, i.e., existence. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, production of that, i. e., existent effect. अभावे Abhâve, being non-existent. तदभावात् Tat-abhâvât, on account of the absence of the effect. कुतस्तरां Kutas tarâṃ, how then. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, production of an effect in the form of an entity.

80. If the cause is existent, then, by union with existence, takes place the production of an existent effect; if it is non-existent, then, on account of the non-existence of any effect, how can there be the production of an effect in the form of an entity?—80.

Vritti:—Well, our opponent may say, let non-existence be the cause (of the world), still, the world will not (necessarily, therefore,) be a non-entity. In regard to this the author says :

"Bhâve," in the material cause, "tat-yogena," by union with existence, according to the principle कारणगुणः कार्ये "The attribute of the

cause passes into the effect," "tat-siddiḥ," there is proof that the effect is an entity. "Abhāve," if the material cause of the world were a non-entity, "tat-abhāvāt," then, since the non-existence of the world must necessarily follow, "kutas tat-siddiḥ," (whence can there be proof of the reality of the effect)? Since non-existence is of the form of non-existence.—80.

Note :—In translating the latter part of the *Vṛitti* we have followed the text of the edition (1808 Śāka Era) of Pandita Kālivara Vedānta-Vāgīśa. According to the reading of the *Vṛitti* edited by Dr. Garbe (Calcutta, 1888) *abhāve jagato abhāvātve* etc.—the translation would be, If the world were a non-entity, then, since the non-existence of the world must necessarily follow (by the law of its nature),—which apparently is not very clear nor quite correct.

Bhāṣya :—It has been stated above that an entity cannot come out of a non-entity. The author here gives the reason why this is so.

"Bhāve," the cause having the form of existence, "tat-yogena," by union with existence, the production of an (existent) effect takes place. "A-bhāve," the cause having the form of a non-existent thing, however, "tat-abhāvāt," on account of the non-existence of the effect also, how can there be production or proof of an effect in the shape of an entity? As an effect can appropriately be only of the same essential form as the cause. Such is the meaning :—80.

Karma (Action) cannot be the material cause of the world.

न कर्मण उपदानत्वायोगात् ॥ १ । ८१ ॥

न. Na, not. कर्मणः Karmanah, from Karma or Action. उपदानत्वायोगात् Upādānatva-ayogāt, on account of non-adaptation to material causality.

81. (Production of an entity can) not (take place from Karma also), because (Karma has) no fitness for material causality.—81.

Vṛitti :—Let Karma itself be the cause of the world, what need have we of the hypothesis of Pradhāna? (if it be asked), so the author declares :

Let Adṛiṣṭam be the nimitta or instrumental cause (in creation). But material causality is never found in Merit and Demerit. When it is established that Release results from seeing the distinction (Viveka) between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, the existence of Prakṛiti is admitted.—81.

Bhāṣya :—But still, when Karma is a necessary factor in creation, let Karma alone be the cause of the world, what is the use, it may be asked, of the hypothesis of Pradhāna? In regard to this the author says :

Production of entities is not possible from Karma even. Root causality does not belong to Karma, because the attributes have no fitness

for being the material causes of substances. For, a legitimate hypothesis is only that which is in accordance with the facts of observation. And it is nowhere found that material causality belongs to the attributes mentioned by the Vaiśeṣikas. Such is the meaning.

The word "Karma" is here indicative of A-vidyā, etc. also. Since they equally possess the nature of attributes, they too are not adapted to be material causes. If it is said that like jaundice, etc. of the eye, A-vidyā is a substance appertaining to the conscious principle, then its difference from Pradhāna is in name only.—81.

Ritual observances are not the cause of Release.

नानुश्रविकादपि तत्सिद्धिः साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगादपुरुषार्थत्वम् ॥ २ । ८२ ॥

न Na, not. अनुश्रविकात् Ānuśravikat, from (performance of) Vedic rites and ceremonies. अपि Api, even, also. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, accomplishment thereof, i.e., of Release. साध्यत्वेन Sādhyaatvena, being a product. आवृत्तियोगात् Āvritti-yogāt, on account of liability to recurrence. अपुरुषार्थत्वम्, A-puruṣa-artha-tvam, not the characteristic of being Puruṣa-artha or the chief end of man or the supreme purpose of life.

82. The accomplishment of Release is not from scriptural observances also, because, being the result of Karma, it would be liable to repetition, and would thus lose the character of the supreme purpose of Puruṣa—82.

Vritti :—Since Release can be obtained through the performance of the rites and ceremonies enjoined in the Veda, what, it may be asked, is the use of Prakṛiti? To this the author replies :

'Ānuśravika' is that which is heard from the Veda, through the mouth of the preceptor, that is, sacrifice, etc. From that also is not the accomplishment of Release, because the Release, so obtained, being a product of temporary causes, is not permanent, and hence the released person is liable to revert to transmigration. Therefore, such Release is not the supreme purpose of Puruṣa.—82.

Bhāṣya :—Thus, then, has been exhibited the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti by the characteristics of being liable to transformation and of not being liable to transformation, of existing for the sake of another and of not existing for the sake of another. Now, by the next five aphorisms, the author explains, at some length, what has been already stated by the aphorism—

अविशेषश्रोतव्योः ॥ १ । ६ ॥

(As regards the temporary character of their effect, i. e., cessation of pain), there is no distinction between the two (i. e., visible means, on the one hand, and religious performances, prescribed in the Veda, on the other).—*Vide* page 23 *supra*.

namely, that it is only the knowledge of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti that, by causing of the destruction of A-viveka or non-discrimination, becomes the means for the attainment of the supreme purpose of Puruṣa, and that the Vedic performance have no immediate causality therein.

The word “*Api*” includes the visible means mentioned before, that is, in

न दृष्टात्तत् सिद्धिः ॥ १ । २ ॥

The realisation of that (i. e., permanent cessation of the experience of pain) cannot take place by ordinary means, such as men and money.—*Vide* page 19 *supra*.

“*Ānuśravika*” karma means action such as sacrifice, etc., enjoined in that which is heard from the mouth of the preceptor, i. e., the Veda. From that also, does not take place the accomplishment of the object of Puruṣa mentioned before (*vide* aphorism 1, above). Because, being the result of action, it has connection with repetition and is thus lacking in the characteristic of being the supreme purpose of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

That the result of Karma is not permanent, is proved by the Veda :

तद्यथेह कर्मचितोलोकः क्षीयते एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते

As here the world conquered by action wears away, so there too the world conquered by Merit wears away.—*Chhândogya Upaniṣat*. VII. 1. 6.

By the aphorism (I. 16).

न कर्मणान्यधर्मत्वात् ॥ १ । २ ॥

Nor (is Puruṣa bound) by Karma, because Karma is the property of a different object.—*vide* page 84 *supra*.

Bondage by Karma has been refuted before. And now Release by Karma is refuted. Hence there is no tautology.

It cannot be said that by the reason given above, namely, that Karma is the property of a different object, the causality of Karma towards Release, as towards Bondage, has been practically refuted before, and that therefore, the very apprehension of any misconception in this respect does not arise again, (so that the refutation in the present aphorism is superfluous). For, A-viveka or non-discrimination having been established as the cause of Bondage, it is possible to regard Karma as being the property of Puruṣa, because it is the result of the A-viveka belonging to him while in bondage.—82.

The Vedic texts on non-reversion in regard to Karma refers to those who have attained to discriminative knowledge.

तत्र प्राप्तविवेकस्यानावृत्तिश्रुतिः ॥ १ । ८३ ॥

तत्र Tatra, in regard to Vedic Karma (Vijñāna), between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa (Aniruddha). प्राप्तविवेकस्य Prāpta-vivekasya, of one who has attained to discrimination. अवृत्तिश्रुतिः An-āvṛitti-śrutiḥ, Vedic text on non-reversion or non-repetition of births and deaths.

83. The Veda declares the non-reversion of one who has attained to discriminative knowledge, from amongst those who have risen to higher worlds by virtue of the performance of Vedic Karma (Vijñāna) or, of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti (Aniruddha).—83.

Vṛitti.—The author shows what does constitute the supreme purpose of Puruṣa.

“Tatra”, of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, “Prāpta-vivekasya”, from knowledge of the discrimination, “an-āvṛitti-śrutiḥ”, i. e., the Vedic text.

न स पुनरावर्तते

He does not revert again.—Kālāgni Rudra Upaniṣat, 2.—83.

Bhāṣya.—But, then, how do you account for the Vedic declarations on the non-reversion of one gone to the world of Brahmā by virtue of action called worship in the form of Pañcha-Agni-Vidyā or the penance of five fires, as well as by virtue of action in the form of death at a sacred place, etc. ? In regard to this the author says :

The Vedic text that there is, in connection with the Vedic Karma, about the non-reversion to this world of those who have gone to the world of Brahmā, should be taken as referring to those who, while residing in the world of Brahmā, have attained to discriminative knowledge. For, otherwise, there would be conflict with those other texts of the Veda which establish reversion to this world even from the world of Brahmā. Such is the meaning. Still, it should be observed that non-reversion also is the result of discriminative knowledge alone, and not directly of Karma. And this point will be elaborately treated in the Sixth Book. In our Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras, we have quoted and explained the passages relating to them.—83.

Freedom from Samsāra (transmigration) is not the result of Karma.

दुःखाद्दुःखं जलभिषेकवन्न जाड्यविमोकः ॥ १ । ८४ ॥

दुःखत् Duḥkhāt, from pain. दुःखं Duḥkham, pain. जलभिषेकवत् Jala-abhiṣeka-vat, like the affusion of water. न Na, not. जाड्यविमोकः Jāḍya-vimokaḥ, relief from chilliness

84. Pain (results) from pain; like the affusion of water which does not give relief from chilliness.—84.

Vṛitti.—The author points out the defect in the opposite view.

Were Release the result of Karma, then, since Karma involves a large element of pain, Release, the product thereof, would also involve a large element of pain. At any rate, it would cause pain by being, at least, perishable. For, relief from chilliness is not given to one afflicted with chilliness, by the affusion of water, but, on the contrary, additional chilliness is thereby caused to him.—84.

Bhāṣya.—If it be said that the non-reversion mentioned above is the result of Karma, so the author says:

From the pain which follows from the performance of Vedic Karma, by reason of its entailing the defects of killing, etc., and by means of the painful experiences consequent thereon, results nothing but an unbroken series of pains, and not “relief from chilliness”, i. e., the surcease of *A-viveka* or Non-discrimination; while freedom from pain lies at a great distance. As, for example, by the affusion of water, it is non-relief from chilliness that is caused to one distressed with chilliness, and not certainly relief from chilliness. Such is the meaning.

So has it been said:

यथा पङ्केन पङ्काम्भः सुरया वा सुराकृतम् ।

भूतहत्यां तथैवैकां न यज्ञैर्मार्ष्टुमर्हति ॥

As turbid water cannot be made pure by means of mud, and as sins due to drinking wine cannot be expiated by means of wine, in the very same way, a single sin of killing a living creature cannot be expiated by a hundred of sacrifices.—*Bhāgavatam*, I. viii. 52.

It is also heard that even Jaya, Vijaya, etc., the attendants of Viṣṇu, and residents of the worlds of Brahmā, had to undergo a succession of painful existences in the race of the Rākṣasa (as Hiranyākṣa, Hiranya-Kaśipu, etc).

And this has been said by the Kārikā also:

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः

Like the visible, the scriptural performances also are affected with the defects of impurity, waste, excess.—Kārikā, Verse II, 84.

The result of Niṣkāma Karma also is equally transitory.

काम्येऽकाम्येऽपि साध्यत्वाविशेषात् ॥ १ । ८५ ॥

काम्ये Kāmye, (karma) being performed with the object of securing desirable consequences thereby. अकाम्ये A-kāmye, not being so performed, being disinterested. अपि Api, even. साध्यत्वाविशेषात् Sādhya-tva-a-viśeṣāt, on account of the absence of any difference in respect of Release being *producible* by Karma.

NOTE.—For kām्यe' kām्यe, Aniruddha reads kām्यākām्यe.

85. (Release cannot be attained even by disinterested Karma), for, whether Karma be interested or disinterested (Vijñâna), or, though in disinterested Karma there is some difference from interested Karma, (Aniruddha), it produces no corresponding difference in the characteristic of Release being something producible (and, therefore, perishable).—85.

Vṛitti:—The cause of the existence of a large element of pain in the Release accomplished by Karma is not, it may be argued, this that it is the product of Karma, but the cause is that it is the product of kâmya or interested Karma, because niṣkāma or disinterested Karma is capable of accomplishing Release, as the Veda declares :

कर्मभिर्मृत्युमुष्यो निषेदुः प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमिच्छमानाः ।

अथापरे ऋषयो मनोषिणः परं कर्मभ्योऽमृतत्वतमानशुः ॥

The sages endowed with progeny and greedy of wealth, entered into death by their Karmas. While other sages, possessing wisdom, obtained immortality through higher (disinterested) Karmas.

In regard to this the author says :

Granted that pain is not the consequence of niṣkāma or disinterested karma, but still, notwithstanding the difference of niṣkāma karma from the kâmya, the characteristic of release being the product of Karma remains undifferentiated. Because if it would be a product, it would be perishable, and, consequently, there would again be pain. The Vedic texts which declare that niṣkāma karma is the means for the attainment of Release, are for the purpose of knowledge, and Release comes through knowledge, so that niṣkāma karma is the means of Release through the intermediation of knowledge.—85.

Bhâṣya:—It it be said that, not Pain, but Release is heard to be the fruit of niṣkāma karma in the form of internal sacrifice, silent recitation of the mantra, etc., so the author declares :

In respect of karma, kâmya as well as akâmya, pain results from pain. Why? “Sâdhyatva-a-viśeṣât”, i.e., both being alike producible, because the knowledge which arises through the purification of the Sattva brought about by karma, is essentially of the form of pain, since the threefold Guṇas are its very essence. Such is the meaning. The import is that the Veda also bears testimony to the truth of the statement that Release is not directly the fruit of Karma. Thus,

न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेऽमृतत्वमानशुः

Neither by Karma, nor by progeny, nor by riches, but by renunciation, some attained to immortality.—Kaivalya Upaniṣat, I, 2,

"By renunciation," i.e., by giving up abhimāna or self-assumption. "Some," i.e., some only, "attained to" or obtained immortality, and not all, because the renunciation of abhimāna is a very rare thing, being the result of tattva-jñāna or knowledge of truth. Such is the meaning.—85.

Release producible by knowledge is not perishable.

निजमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसमात्रं परं न समानत्वम् ॥ १ । ८६ ॥

निजमुक्तस्य Nija-muktasaya, of one who is released (free) by himself. ध्वंसमात्रं Dhvaṃsa-mātraṃ, the mere annihilation of bondage. परं Param, sufficient, absolute, permanent. न Na, not. समानत्वम् Smānatvam, similarity, parity.

86. The mere annihilation of bondage is final in the case of one who is free by nature ; hence, there is no parity (between the theories of Release by Knowledge and Release by Karma).—86.

Vritti :—Supposing that Release may result from the knowledge of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, still, on account of its perishableness, saṃsāra or transmigration may again take place. Thus, one may say, the (Sāṃkhya) assertor and his opponent are on an equality. To this the author replies :

"Nija-muktasaya," of him who is released by nature ; "bandha-dhvaṃsaḥ": Bandha is A-viveka or Non-discrimination ; dhvaṃsa or destruction of A-viveka takes place by means of the opposite thereof (i.e., Viveka or discrimination). And how can there be a return of saṃsāra when the destruction of A-viveka is (what is technically called) Pradhvaṃsa or non-existence after annihilation, that is, is final ? Hence there is no such similarity, (as is imagined, between the two cases).—86.

Bhāṣya :—But, even on your own theory, how is it, may ask our opponent, that painfulness does not belong to (release which is) the product of knowledge, when you do not claim any peculiarity in its producibility ? To this the author replies :

"Nija-muktasaya," of him who is released by nature, the mere surcease of bondage, in the manner stated, by means of the annihilation of the cause thereof called A-vidyā, is "param" final. The destruction (of bondage) which is the result of the knowledge of discrimination (of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti), is imperishable, and not, like the fruit of Karma, something in the form of an existence, e.g., Pleasure, etc., whereby, on account of its perishableness, it might give pain. Karma, again, cannot become the immediate cause of the destruction of A-vidyā, without the help of

Adiṣṭam as an intermediate cause. Hence, knowledge being imperishable, there is no parity between Knowledge and Karma. Such is the meaning.

And, on account of knowledge, return to transmigration is not possible, in consequence of the destruction of the cause (of such return) called A-vidyā. This is proved.

Thus, then, is it declared that it is discriminative knowledge that alone is the immediate cause of the annihilation of pain.—86.

Definitions of Pramā or right cognition and Pramāṇa or proof.

**द्वयोरेकतरस्य वाप्यसन्निकृष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः प्रमा तत्साधकं
यत् तत् त्रिविधं प्रमाणम् ॥ १ । ८७ ॥**

द्वयोः Dvayoḥ, of both, Buddhi and Puruṣa. *एकतरस्य* Ekatarasya, of one of the two. वा Vā, or. *N. B.*—Aniruddha reads cha instead of vā. अपि Api, even, also. *असन्निकृष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः* A (not)-sannikṛṣṭā-(drawn near to, adjacent)-artha (object)-paricchhittih (determination), determination or ascertainment of distant objects. *प्रमा* Pramā, right knowledge. *तत्साधकं* Tat-sādhakam, the instrument of that. *यत्* Yat, which. *तत्* Tat, that. *त्रिविधं* Trividham, threefold. *प्रमाणम्* Pramāṇam, proof, evidence. *N. B.*—Aniruddha omits the words, trividham pramāṇam, from this aphorism, and reads them at the beginning of the next aphorism.

87. By Pramā we mean the ascertainment of objects which have not yet approximated both (*i.e.*, Buddhi and Puruṣa), or, even one or other of them; that which is the instrument thereof, is Pramāṇa which is threefold. (Vijñāna Bhikṣu).

Or, Pramā, that is, the determination of distant objects, is (in the case of Perception), the result of both (*i.e.*, sense and objects), and, (in the case of Inference or Verbal Cognition), of one or other (*i.e.*, of the inferential mark or word, as the case may be). That which is the best instrument thereof is (Pramāṇa).—(Aniruddha).—87.

Vritti :—It has been mentioned that the group of Principles is twenty-five-fold. Their proof is not possible without Pramāṇa. Accordingly the author shows what Pramāṇa is.

“Dvayoḥ”, of Sense and Object, which are existent; in the case of Perception. “Ekatarasya cha api,” of existent mark or word; in the case of Inference or Verbal Cognition. “A-sannikṛṣṭ-artha-paricchhittih”, determination of objects not previously determined. “Pramā”, right cognition,

is the result. Hereby it is declared that Pramāṇa or proof is that which reaches to objects, not previously got at. That which is the best instrument of Pramā, is Pramāṇa ;—such is the definition of Pramāṇa in general.—87.

Bhāṣya :—Now, the Pramāṇas which are the immediate means of discriminative knowledge, are going to be examined. Knowledge of the Self is acquired by means of the threefold Pramāṇa—this we learn verily from such texts of the Veda as,—

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः ।

Verily the Self is to be seen, to be heard about, to be reasoned about.—Bṛihat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, II. iv. 5, IV. v. 6.

Karma, etc., on the other hand, are the means of causing the purification of the other instruments such as Manas, etc.

“Asannikṛiṣṭa”, *i.e.*, not lodged in, that is to say, not got at by, the ascertainer (Pramātari). Of such objects, *i.e.*, entities, ‘parichchhittih’ *i.e.*, ascertainment, is Pramā. And it may be the property of both, *i.e.*, Buddhi and Puruṣa, or of only one or other of them in both ways. That which is the best instrument of that, *i.e.*, Pramā,—“the best instrument”, *i.e.*, the cause which is never dissociated from connection with effect, in other words, is unfailing in its effect,—the same is Pramāṇa, and it is threefold under the forms presently to be mentioned. Such is the meaning.

In the above comment, the term “not got at” has been used for differentiating (Pramāṇa) from Smṛiti or Memory, “entities” for differentiating it from Error, and “ascertainment” for excluding Doubt.

Now, if it is said that the result in the form of Pramā rests in Puruṣa alone, then, the modification of Buddhi is the only Pramāṇa ; if it is said to rest in Buddhi alone, then the contact of Buddhi and the Sense etc., is the only Pramāṇa, while Puruṣa is only the witness, and, not the maker, of Pramā or Right Cognition. If, again, the cognition belonging to Puruṣa as well as the modification of Buddhi, both of them, are said to be Pramā, then both of them are Pramāṇa, according to the differences of Pramā, while the application of the word, Pramāṇa, to the eye, etc., is only secondary or in an intermediate sense in all cases. Such is the import.

In the Commentary on the Yoga Sūtras, on the other hand, the revered Vyāsa Deva has declared that Pramā is the cognition resting in Puruṣa ; for, since the instruments (Senses) operate or become active only for accomplishing the object of Puruṣa, it is but proper that the result of

their activity should rest in Puruṣa. Hence here too the very same (cognition resting in Puruṣa) is the principal conclusion. Nor can it be asked that, since the cognition of Puruṣa is eternal in its intrinsic form, it cannot, therefore, be a result of causes; for, notwithstanding that it is eternal in its pure or absolute form, it can yet bear the character of being an effect, when tainted or coloured with the reflection of external objects, or, it may be that the result in question is nothing but the colouration or taint received from the chief end of Puruṣa.

Now, the process of knowing rightly is as follows: By means of the contact with objects, through the channels of the Senses, or by means of the knowledge of the (inferential) mark etc., is at first produced a modification of Buddhi in the form of the object (to be cognised.) Of these, the perceptual modification produced from the contact of the Senses, is dependent upon Buddhi together with or affected by the Senses, seeing that modifications in the form of the bile, etc., arise in consequence of the depravity of the bile, etc., appertaining to the eye, etc; this is the difference. And the same modification, tinged with the object, enters upon (the field of vision) of Puruṣa by the form of a reflection, and shines there, inasmuch as Puruṣa, since he is not liable and capable of transformation, cannot possibly be modified into the form of the object. And it is only modification into the form of the object that can apprehend objects; it is difficult to say this in respect of other things. This the author will declare later on by the aphorism (VI. 28):

जपास्फटिकयोरिव नोपरागः किञ्चभिमानः ॥ ६ । २८ ॥

As between the China rose and crystal, (there is) no uparāga or actual transference of 'colour' (from Buddhi to Puruṣa), but (only) abhimāna or an assumption (of such transference).

There is also the Yoga Sūtra (I. 4);

वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र ॥ १ । ४ ॥

"Identification with modifications elsewhere".—S. B. H. Vol. IV. p. 10.

Smṛiti too:

तस्मिंश्चिदर्पणे स्फारे समस्ता वस्तुदृष्टयः ।

इमास्ता प्रतिबिम्बन्ति सरसीव तटद्रुमाः ॥

All these same appearances of things are reflected in that large mirror of the mind, (as are reflected) in a lake, the trees that stand on the banks.—Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa.

Also the Commentary on Yoga:

बुद्धेः प्रतिसंवेदी पुरुषः ।

Puruṣa is the re-cogniser from Buddhi.—Yoga-Bhāṣya, I. 7, S. B. H. Vol. IV p. 15.

"Re-cogniser" (prati-samvedi), that is, the seat of prati-samveda or echo-like reflection of cognition. Such is the meaning.

Hereby it is shown that, although Puruṣas are immutable, universal, and of the form of consciousness, still, it does not follow that they will illumine (*i. e.* cognise) all things at all times, because while they are *asaṅga*, free from attachment, they cannot by themselves be modified into the form of the object, and, in the case of supersensuous objects, it has never been observed that there has been apprehension of objects by means of mere conjunction, without modification into the form of the object.

The supposition of the capacity in Puruṣas, of having thrown into them the reflections of the modifications of their respective Buddhis only, and not of others, is made from the force of the result (*i. e.*, from seeing that this is actually the case). As only things possessing rūpa or form-and-colour, and not others, have the capacity of casting reflection in water, etc.

The possession of form-and-colour is not the underlying cause of reflection in all cases, as we observe the reflection of sound also in the form of echo. It cannot be said that echo is nothing but a sound produced from another sound; for, in that case, it would follow that the redness, etc. of the crystals also are produced from the proximity of the China rose, and, consequently, the conclusion of the unreality of reflections (which appear as, but are not, entities) would be lost. Reflection (*pratibimba*), again, is a particular transformation of Buddhi itself, while the form of the reflected (*bimba*) is what is seen in the water, etc.

Some thinkers, however, are of opinion that Chaitanya or Consciousness, being itself reflected in the modification (of Buddhi), illuminates the modification, and that, likewise, it is the very reflection appearing in the modification that is the object of consciousness in the modification, and that it is not the case that the reflection of the modification is thrown in consciousness. But this is an incorrect view of the case. For, by reason of its contradiction to the Śāstra (*e. g.*, *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa* above) exhibited above as authority (for our view), their mere reasoning is perfectly useless. Secondly, without causing divorce from our conclusion, it is proved, by means of their having the form of the relation called the relation of being the object of each other, that the modification of Buddhi and Consciousness throw their reflections in each other. Thirdly, in the case of external perception, when it is established that it is modification in the form of the object that is the form of being the object of cognition, congruity requires that, in the interval also, modification into the form of those objects which appear in the interval, should also be the object of cognition. Those logicians, however, who do not desire that a cognition should be the object (of cognition), think that, since individual manifestations (*i. e.* acts) of

cognition do not have the property (Anugamaka* dharma) of being the form by which things are cognised, the use of language like "Cognition having a water-pot as its object," "Cognition having a piece of cloth as its object," etc., which proceeds from the assumption that they do possess such property, is improper.

Some other logicians, again, declare that by reason of the above impropriety or unjustifiability, it is an additional Predicable to be the object of Cognition. This view also is incorrect. Because there is redundancy in the supposition of a different objectivity (which is not perceived), leaving aside the modification into the form of the object, which is being perceived.

But still, it may be contended, let the mutual objectivity of the modification and of Consciousness consist only of the form of their respective Upādhis or adjuncts, the Anugama or leading to the cognition of things being possible by means alone of its being of the form of the modification of their own Upādhis or adjuncts; there is no use of having two reflections, called form of the object. The position, however, is not a tenable one. Because, without reflection, ownness (*i. e.* subjectivity) is hard to assert. For, ownness or subjectivity is the possession of the Vāsanā or tendency or residual potency of the modification experienced by the subject itself. Experience is cognition. So that, the characteristic mark of objectivity being constituted by the substance of the object, there is involved the fallacy of Ātma-āśraya or dependence upon itself. Therefore, is proved the mutual reflection of the conscious and the unconscious, in each other, in the form of their being the object of each other. More on this point, we may give the hint, will be found in the Yoga Vārtika.

The division of the cogniser, etc., here is as follows :

The pure intelligent one is the Pramâtā or the maker of right cognition. Pramāṇa is just the function (Vṛitti) of us. Pramā or right cognition is the reflection in the intelligent one of the modifications in the form of the objects. Meyā or the knowable is the subject matter of the reflected modifications. Sākṣitva or the being the witness which is of the form of immediate vision, the author will himself declare. Hence, on account of the absence of the cause, the intelligent one will be merely the witness of the modifications. Of Viṣṇu, etc., the being the witness of all things, is secondary, as it lacks the characteristic mark etc. of being the witness.—87.

* The form by which takes place the apprehension of objects, the very same form, is, in the Nyāya System, the anugamaka or leader or the means of reaching those objects, Anugama or the leading or reaching is its action,

No more than the above three Proofs are required.

तत्सिद्धौ सर्वसिद्धेर्नाधिक्यासिद्धिः ॥ १ । ८८ ॥

तत्सिद्धौ Tat-siddhau, on the establishment of that, *i.e.*, the three Proofs. सर्वसिद्धेः Sarva-sidheḥ, on account of the proof of all objects. न Na, not. अधिक्यासिद्धिः Ādhikya-siddhiḥ, proof of more.

88. These three Pramāṇas being established, all can be established; hence no additional Pramāṇa is established,—88.

Vṛitti:—How many Pramāṇas are there ? To this the author replies :

The Pramāṇas are Perception, Inference and Word. Should not Comparison, Presumption or Implication, Non-existence, Comprehension, and Tradition (for an account of which *vide* the Vaiśeṣika Sūtram IX. ii, 5, S. B. H. Vol. VI, pages 316-319) also be Pramāṇas ? In reply to this, it is declared : “These three Pramāṇas being established etc.” The admission of Pramāṇa is for the purpose of establishing the Prameya or provable. The three kinds of Pramāṇa being established, since the purpose of establishing the provables of all the Pramāṇas is served, there is, therefore, no establishment of anything as an additional, *i.e.*, separate Pramāṇa, because all these so-called additional Pramāṇas are included amongst the three kinds of Pramāṇa mentioned above. Inasmuch as the scholars include them in Perception, etc., as the case may be, according as they are based on the contact of the objects with the Senses, agreement and difference, etc., only additional differences of name have been created. Hence there is no establishment of additional Pramāṇa.—88.

Bhāṣya :—But our opponent may ask, in regard to the discrimination of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti, Comparison etc., have been given out as Pramāṇas, in such passages as,—

यथा प्रकाशयत्येकः कुत्स्नं लोकमिमं रविः ।

क्षेत्रं क्षेत्री तथा कुत्स्नं प्रकाशयति भारत ॥

As the single sun illuminates all this world, so does, O Bhārata, the Owner of the Field (Puruṣa) illumine all the Field (body).—Gītā, XIII. 33.

How, then can it be said that Pramāṇa is only threefold ? To this the author replies.

As, the threefold Pramāṇas being established, there is the establishment of all objects whatever, more Pramāṇa is not established, as there

would then be redundancy. Such is the meaning. For this very reason Manu also has laid down the triad of Pramāṇas in—

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विषयागमम् ।

अयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता ॥

Perception, inference and Śāstra or word are the means of getting at objects. The triad should be made thoroughly known by one who intends purity of Dharma or Pious Conduct.—Manu Saṁhitā, XII, 105.

Comparison, Tradition, etc. come under Inference and Word, and non-perception, etc., come under Perception. In the passage quoted from the Gītā, this Inference (which includes comparison, etc.) is intended. The whole (Field), from the foot to the head, is to be illuminated by the one different from itself, as it is not illuminative of itself. Illuminativeness is the Tejas or light common to consciousness. (The knower of the Field) of whom fullness is the Upādhi or adjunct, is established as the regulator of the phenomena of illumination.—88.

Definition of Perception.

यत् सम्बद्धं सत् तदाकारोल्लेखि विज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ १ । ८६ ॥

यत् Yat, which. सम्बद्धं Sambaddham, connected. सत् Sat, being, N. B.—For, sambaddham sat, Aniruddha reads sambandha-siddham, meaning, proved, i.e., produced by connection or relation. तदाकारोल्लेखि Tat-ākāra-ullekhi, portraying the form thereof, i.e., of the thing cognised. विज्ञानं Vijñānam, cognition. तत् Tat, that. प्रत्यक्षम् Pratyakṣam, sense-perception.

89. Perception is that cognition which, coming into relation to the thing cognised (Vijñāna Bhikṣu), or, being produced by means of relation to the thing cognised (Aniruddha), portrays the form thereof (i.e., of the thing cognised) —89.

Vṛitti:—The author gives the particular definitions of the three Pramāṇas.

By the phrase, “That which is produced through relation,” Inference and Word are excluded. “Tat-ākāra-ullekhi,” that which portrays the form of (the thing cognised), e.g., a water-pot. That is perception. Savikalpaka, discreet or sensuous perception also is herein included.

The Bauddhas, however, describe that perception should be nothing but nirvikalpaka, indiscreet or supersensuous cognition. But perception, they say, is kalpanā or mental elaboration, which is free from doubt and free from error. “Kalpanā” is the mental act, intuition, (Pratīti) consisting in the application of name, genus, etc. It is present in savikalpaka or discreet cognition

also. Hence, they argue, Perception is no Pramāṇa or Proof. But their argument is wrong. Perception is the cognition produced from the materials and conditions (sāmāgrī) which cause Pramā or right notion, containing direct vision of things, and not vitiated by any defect. It is both, i.e., savikalpaka, discreet, and nirvikalpaka, indiscreet. The consciousness (samvit) of name, genus, etc. is, however, produced by Memory by means of the revival of impressions or receipts (saṃskāra) through similarity. For this reason only, on account of the presence of an additional element in it, a special name, savikalpaka or discreet, has been created. Nor, by the presence of Memory, is any fault created, or any damage done to the materials of sensation.

Now, if it is maintained by them that, because it is accompanied by Memory, therefore, Perception is no Proof, we can only admire their argumentative skill which finds display in the proposition that a co-operative cause obstructs the validity of the principal instrument of proof. Thus,

संज्ञा हि स्मर्यमाणापि प्रत्यक्षत्वं न बाधते ।
 संज्ञिनः सा तदस्या हि न रूपाच्छादनक्षमा ॥
 ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यया ।
 बुद्धावलीयते सापि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन संमता ॥

For, a name, even though it is supplied by Memory, does not oppose the authority of Perception. For, it is the accidental or secondary mark of the thing bearing the name, and is not capable of obscuring the intrinsic form of the thing. Besides this, again, that by which an entity is completed or perfected in Buddhi by means of the properties such as genus, etc., is also recognised as having the characteristic of perception.—89.

Bhāṣya :—Pramā or right cognition is lodged in Puruṣa,—with the help of this principal conclusion, the author proceeds to state the specific definitions of the Pramāṇas.

That “cognition,” i.e., modification of Buddhi, which being related or connected, assumes the form of the thing with which it is connected, is perception. Such is the meaning. Here, the phrase ending with “being (sat),” is an adjective conveying the reason. So that the purport is that perception is the modification of Buddhi which is the support or seat of the (sensible) form produced from contact with its own object. As there is a future aphorism laying down that the modification of Buddhi moves to the object with which it is in relation, the being the product of contact does not belong to the modification; hence it has been taken as the seat of the form of object. While it is not impossible that the modification of Buddhi arising by means of the eye, etc., should, like the flame of the lamp, portray the form of the thing cognised immediately after the contact with the external objects—89.

The definition is not intended to apply to perception by the Yogins.

योगिनामबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न दोषः ॥ १ । ६० ॥

योगिनाम् Yoginām, of the Yogins or those practised in Yoga. अबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वात् A-bāhya-pratyakṣa-tvāt, because it is not external perception. न Na, not. दोषः Doṣah, fault, defect.

90. (It is) no fault (in the definition in that it does not apply to the perception of the Yogins), because that of the Yogins is not an external perception.—90.

Vṛitti :—If it be said that this is not the definition of perception, because it does not cover the perception of the Yogins, so the author says :

The definition given above is that of ordinary (laukika, popular), external perception, whereas the perception by the Yogin is not-external and extraordinary (alaukika). Hence the fault of being too narrow is not present in the definition.—90.

Bhāṣya :—But, then, some one may object, on account of the absence of the form of the object connected or in contact, the definition does not extend to the perception by the Yogin of things past, future, and screened from view. Apprehending this, the author reconciles, by pointing out that the Yogic perception is not aimed at in this definition.

External sense-perception alone is the object of the definition here, and the Yogins do not perceive through the external senses. Hence the fault mentioned does not arise, that is, the definition is not too narrow for their perception.—90.

Or, the definition is intended to, and does, apply to the perception of the Yogins.

लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धाद्वादोषः ॥ १ । ६१ ॥

लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धात् Līna (involute)-vastu (entity)-labdha (acquired)-atīśaya (excellence)-sambandhāt, (relation), on account of contact of that (i.e., the Yogin's mind) which has attained exaltation, with things enfolded in their causal state. वा Vā, or. अदोषः A-doṣah, no fault N. B.—For “Adoṣah”, Aniruddha reads Na-doṣah.

91. Or, (there is) no fault (in the definition), on account of the contact (of the Yogin's mind) which has attained exaltation (by the practice of Yoga), with things in their enfolded state.—91.

Vṛitti :—Or, by this definition, the perception of the Yogins also is included. The author sets forth this alternative view.

Effects remaining always existent (according to the Sāṃkhya Darśana), even that which is destroyed or has disappeared, exists enfolded in its own cause, by the characteristic of being past and gone, and that which is yet to be produced, also exists in its own cause, by the characteristic of being not-yet-come. The Yogin alone who has acquired excellence through favourable influence of the virtue born of Yoga, can have connection (*i.e.*, contact through mind) with Pradhāna (the root cause of all mundane existences), and thence, connection with all places, times, etc. Hence the definition is not too narrow.—91.

Bhāṣya :—The author gives the true solution of the case.

Or, that (Yogic perception) also is the scope of the definition, still there is no fault in it, *i.e.*, it is not too narrow, inasmuch as connection of the Yogin's mind which has attained exaltation produced by the virtue born of Yoga, takes place with objects in their enfolded state. Such is the meaning.

The word, *līna*, or enfolded, here denotes objects not in contact as intended by the opposite party. In the view of the *sat-kārya-vādins* (the Sāṃkhyas who hold the Theory of Existent Effects), things past, etc. also verily exist in their essential forms. Contact with them is, therefore, possible. Hence the adjective, *viz.*, "that which has attained exaltation," has been used to point out the cause by means of which contact takes place with objects concealed and distant. "Atisaya", excess or exaltation, is pervasiveness, and the surcease, etc. of the Tamas or obscurity hindering the modification (of *Buddhi* into the form of the object).

And, in this matter, the following should be attended to : From the statement "which being connected" in the previous (I. 89) aphorism, we have it that it is contact of *Buddhi* with the objects that is the cause of perception, and, consequently, that, in the case of Perception in general or commonly of all external objects, the contact of *Buddhi* and object is the cause. Contacts with the Senses, on the other hand, are the specific causes in the cases of visual and other perceptions. It would not, however, follow that, such being the case, perception of external objects would take place by means of *Buddhi* even in the absence of contact with the Senses, the virtue born of Yoga, etc. For, on account of the obstruction caused by Tamas, it is impossible that there should at that time be any modification of the *Sattva* element of *Buddhi*. And this Tamas or obscurity is removed, sometimes by the contact between the sense and the object, and sometimes by the virtue born of Yoga, in the same way that the dirtiness of the eye is removed by the eye-paint. It

cannot be said that, then, on the maxim : "Let that be the cause thereof," contact with the Senses, etc., should be the cause of the perception in general of external objects ; because, in the states of dreamless sleep, etc., it is proved that Tamas does obstruct the modification or function of Buddhi. From passages of the Smṛiti, *e.g.*,

सत्वाज्ञागरणं विद्याद्रजसः स्वप्नमादिशेत् ।

प्रस्वापनं तु तमसा तुरीयं त्रिषु सन्ततम् ॥

The waking state is, one should know, caused by Sattva ; dreaming, one should refer to Rajas as its cause ; dreamless sleep is caused by Tamas ; the fourth state runs through the three.

it, moreover, appears to be impossible that there should be any other cause of obstruction of the modification of Buddhi in the states of dreamless sleep, etc. Besides, in the case of ocular modification also, it is found that Tamas causes obstruction. Hardened logicians, however, imagine that the cause of cognition in general is the conjunction of the skin and Manas, in order to account for the non-production of modification in the state of dreamless sleep. But this is wrong. For, it is heard that even prior to the evolution of the skin-sense, Svayam-bhû (*Causa sui*, Brahman) had perception of all things by the help of pure Buddhi. Besides, we intend to say that, in regard to the non-production of the conjunction of the skin and Manas also, Tamas itself is the instrumental cause. While mere reasoning (as that of the logicians) is attacked with the fault of having no secure foundation. Such is the line of our argument in reply to the above.—91.

The existence of Īśvara or a Lord is above proof.

ईश्वरासिद्धेः ॥ १ । ६२ ॥

ईश्वरासिद्धेः : Īśvara-a-siddheh, on account of non-proof of Īśvara or Lord.

92. (It is no fault in the definition of Perception that it does not extend to the perception of Īśvara), because Īśvara is not a subject of proof.—91.

Vṛitti :—The perception of Īśvara, some one may say, is not covered by the definition (given above.) So the author says :

If there were evidence or proof to establish (the existence of) Īśvara, then, the consideration of the perception of Him would properly arise. But no such proof exists. If it be urged that such proof does exist in the form, namely, that Earth, etc., must have a creator, because they are products, we enquire whether he be embodied or un-embodied. Either way even, agency is impossible, because in the theory of the particularists

(the upholders of special creation), effects are mere appearances. This point has been elaborately discussed elsewhere.—91.

Bhāṣya :—But still, an opponent may say, the definition does not extend to the perception of Īśvara, because, being eternal, the perception of Him is not produced through contact. To this the author replies.

On account of the absence of proof in regard to Īśvara, it is no fault, the last four words following from the 90th aphorism (as the complement of the present one). And this negation of Īśvara is, as has been already established, only in accordance with the prauḍa-vāda or proud assertion of certain partisans. For, if it were not so, the aphorism would have been worded thus: On account of the *non-existence* of Īśvara (and not, on account of the *non-existence of proof* of Īśvara, as we have it).

It is, however, desired by us that perceptual cognition does arise in regard to Īśvara. The characteristic of perception in the present case is constituted by homogeneity with what is produced through contact, and homogeneity is constituted by the jāti or class directly pervaded by the quality or characteristic of cognition. Such is the import.—92.

Why the existence of Īśvara cannot be proved by evidence.

मुक्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः ॥ १।६३ ॥

शुक्तबद्धयोः Mukta-baddhayoḥ, of the released and the confined. *अन्यतराभावात्* Anya-tara-abhāvāt, owing to the non-existence of something different. * Na, not. *तत्सिद्धिः* Tat-siddhiḥ, proof thereof.

93. Proof of His existence is not possible, because He can be neither free, nor bound, nor something else.—93.

Vṛitti :—The author adduces a further reason.

Is He (Īśvara) bound or is He free? If bound, He cannot be Īśvara, owing to conjunction of Merit and Demerit. If free, He cannot be the agent or doer, on account of the absence of particular cognitions and desire to act and effort. Hence Īśvara is above proof. If, again, you say that your Īśvara is of a different description altogether, then, there being no example (*i.e.* nothing to compare with him), He would be something very extraordinary.—93.

Bhāṣya :—There is still room for the enquiry how the existence of Īśvara is not proved by the Veda and the Smṛiti. So the author points out that it is the popular conflict of arguments that is the impediment to such proof.

Is the desired Īśvara free from afflictions, or is He bound by them? (He can be neither). Nor is it possible that he should be of a different character. Hence there is no proof of Īśvara. Such is the meaning.—93.

Reasons for the above view.

उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वम् ॥ १ । ६४ ॥

उभयथा Ubhayathā, either way. अपि Api, also. असत्करत्वम् A-sat-karatvam, incapacity to effect anything.

94. Either way also He would be inefficient.—94.

Vṛitti:—The author explains the very same position.

This aphorism has been already explained above—94.

Bhāṣya:—If He were free, He would be unequal to the task of creation, etc., as He would not possess the abhīmāna or the will-to-be and the will-to-do, desires, etc. which instigate to creation, etc. And, again, if He were bound, He would be under delusion, and so, unequal to the task of creation: Such is the meaning.—94.

Texts which declare Īśvara, explained.

मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा उपाससिद्धस्य वा ॥ १ । ६५ ॥

मुक्तात्मनः Mukta-âtmanah, of the free Self (Vijñāna Bhikṣu), of the released-like or quasi-free Self (Aniruddha). प्रशंसा Praśaṃsā, laudation, glorification. उपासा Upāsā, worship, homage. सिद्धस्य Siddhasya, of the perfected one. *N. B.*—Aniruddha reads Upāsā-siddhasya as one word, meaning, accomplished by the cultivation of Yoga. वा Vā, or.

95. (The sacred texts which speak of Īśvara, are) either glorification of the free Self or homages paid to the Perfect Ones (Vijñāna Bhikṣu), or, glorifications either of the free-like Self, or of one made perfect by Yoga.—95.

Vṛitti:—If this be the case, then, there would be contradiction to such texts of the Veda as,—

स हि सर्ववित् सर्वस्य कर्ता

He is verily the Knower of all, the Creator of all.

To this the author replies.

“Mukta-âtmanah” means, of the Self resembling the released Self by not having attachment, etc., and not of the released (Self), as the released Self cannot have volition, agency, etc. (to which the texts refer). The texts are glorifications of such free-like Self made for the purpose of lending support to the injunctions (vidhis). “Upāsā-siddhasya vā”: Of the Yogin who, by worship (i.e., the practice of Yoga), has attained exaltation, and has acquired perfections in respect of animā or minuteness, etc., the glorification is for the purpose of making the practice of Yoga more attractive.—95.

Bhāṣya :—But, then, one may ask, what becomes of the Vedic texts which establish Īśvara? To this the author replies.

Accordingly as the case may be, some such texts of the Veda are, for the purpose of declaring the knowableness, “mukta-âtmanah,” of the pure Self universal, intended in the form of glorifications to serve as incentives by means of its aiśvarya or lordliness which consists in mere proximity (to the knowing Puruṣa); while some other texts, demonstrative of creatorship, etc. preceded by volition, are intended as extolment of the (comparative) eternality, etc. of the perfected non-eternal Īśvaras, such as Brahmâ, Viṣṇu, Hara, etc. (the Lords of Creation, Preservation, and Destruction, etc.), inasmuch as they, although they possess abhimâna, etc. (and are therefore liable to perish), still possess eternality in a secondary sense (*i. e.* cyclic or æonic immortality). Such is the meaning.—95.

The superintendence of Puruṣa over Prakṛiti is through proximity.

तत्सन्निधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत् ॥ १ । ६६ ॥

तत्सन्निधानात् Tat-sannidhânât, through proximity to that, *i. e.* Prakṛiti. अधिष्ठातृत्वं Adhiṣṭhâtṛitvam, governorship, superintendence. मणिवत् Maṇi-vat, as in the case of the gem, the loadstone.

96. The superintendence (of Īśvara or Puruṣa over Prakṛiti, etc.) is through proximity to Prakṛiti.—96.

Vṛitti :—Nor is proof of Īśvara, declares the author, from the argument that the non-intelligent cannot act without the superintendence of the intelligent.

As when a jewel containing the reflection of the body, moves, the abhimâna or self-assumption arises that the body moves, in respect of the body which does not really move; similarly “tat-sannidhânât,” through the Self containing the reflection of Prakṛiti, the agency, experiencership, superintendence of Prakṛiti are attributed to, or assumed by, the Self. Therefore, it is an error to think that the intelligent Principle is the superintendent. Thus has it been declared (Gitâ, III. 27):

प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः ।

अहंकारविमूढात्मा कर्ताहमिति मन्यते ॥ गीता । ३।२७ ॥

While acts are everywhere being performed by Prakṛiti, by means of the Guṇas, the Self, being deluded by Ahaṃkāra, thinks “I am the door.”

Bhāṣya :—But still, our opponent, may say, the superintendence of Prakṛiti and all the rest, of which we hear in the sacred books, will not

be explained, because, in the world, we find the use of the word superintendence only in the case of transformation by means of resolution or volition, etc. To this the author replies.

If it were alleged that superintendence consists in creativeness by means of volition, then this would have been a fault in our theory. But it is, on the other hand, desired by us that superintendence in the form of creativeness, etc., is through proximity, as is the case with the loadstone. As the loadstone acts as the attracter of iron by mere proximity, and not by volition, etc., similarly, by the mere conjunction of the Original Puruṣa, takes place the modification of Prakṛiti into the form of Mahat. And it is this alone in which consists His being the creator of His own upādhi or adjunct. And so has it been declared :

निरिच्छे संस्थिते रत्ने यथा लोहः प्रवर्तते ।

सत्तामात्रेण देवेन तथा चायं जगज्जनः ॥

अत आत्मनि कर्तृत्वमकर्तृत्वं च संस्थितम् ।

निरिच्छत्वादकर्तासौ कर्ता सन्निधिमाम्रतः ॥

As the iron acts while the gem (loadstone) which is devoid of volition, stands near by ; so does the world proceed under the influence of a Deva or deity who is mere existence. Thus, both agency and non-agency are lodged in the Self: being devoid of volition, it is not agent, and it is an agent through mere proximity.

Texts of the Veda, such as—

तदैक्षत बहु स्याम् ।

It looked up, " I shall be many."—Chhândyogya Upaniṣat VI ii. 3.

have, however, a secondary import, as when we say that a plum is *going* (lit., desiring) to fall down, owing to the fact that Prakṛiti has conjunction with a number of proximate attributes. Or, it may be that all such texts have the creation preceded by Buddhi as their subject, and do not refer to Original Creation, inasmuch as the Smṛiti speaks of it as being not preceded by Buddhi. Thus we find in the Kūrma Purāṇa (IV. 66):

इत्येष प्राकृतः सर्गः संक्षेपात् कथितो मया ।

अबुद्धिपूर्वकस्त्वेष ब्राह्मी सृष्टिं निबोधत ॥ ४ । ६६ ॥

Such, then, is the Prākṛita sarga or the creation of Prākṛiti or Original Creation, as briefly related by me. It is not preceded by Buddhi. Now listen to the creation of Brahmā,

It would be redundant to restrict the meaning of this passage by interpreting " abuddhi-pûrvaka " as meaning not produced by the Buddhi of the Âdi Puruṣa or Original Puruṣa.—96.

The Jīvas or Embodied Puruṣas also are agents only through proximity.

विशेषकार्येष्वपि जीवानाम् ॥ १ । ६७ ॥

विशेषकार्येषु Viśeṣa (Particular)-kāryeṣu, in particular or subsidiary effects. अपि Api, also. जीवानाम् Jīvānām, of the Jīvas or Embodied Selves.

97. (The superintendence) of the Jīvas, in the case of particular effects also, is through Proximity.—97.

Vṛitti:—If no intelligent superintendence were required, then a dead body would show the act of eating, etc. To this the author replies.

Buddhi, etc. (the Sūkṣma or subtle body), associated with Vāyu or Prāṇa, make up the Jīva, and not that the Ātmā or Self is the Jīva. In particular acts, such as, for example, of eating, etc., the agency is of the Jīvas alone, and not of Ātmā, because Ātmā does not undergo transformation.—97.

Bhāṣya:—Not only in creation, etc. alone there is creativeness of Puruṣa by mere proximity, but in other, *i.e.*, all sorts of particular effects, namely, the Elements, etc., the creation of which is preceded by volition, etc., there is a similar agency of all Puruṣas. This the author declares.

(The words) Superintendence through proximity (which form the complement of the aphorism) follow (from the preceding aphorism).

In the Sixth Book, the author will declare the denotation of the term, Jīva, to be that which is marked out by the possession of the Antaḥ-karaṇa or the internal instrument of cognition. (Vide VI. 63).

The aphorism, therefore, means that “Viśeṣa,-kārye,” in regard to particular effect called Visarga or specific creation, *i.e.*, the creation of individual (Vyāṣṭi) things, also, “Jīvānām,” of the Intelligences reflected in the Antaḥ-karaṇa, the superintendence is through proximity alone, and and is not by means of any activity whatever on their part, inasmuch as they are of the form of the Immutable (Kūṭastha) Consciousness itself.—97.

The Great Saying of the Vedānta: “Thou art That,” is not useless.

सिद्धरूपवोद्धृत्वाद्वाक्यार्थोपदेशः ॥ १ । ६८ ॥

सिद्धरूपवोद्धृत्वात्, Siddha-rūpa-boddhṛitvāt, because Brahmā, etc. (Vijñāna Bhikṣu), or Puruṣa, through Mahat, (Aniruddha), knows the true forms of Realities. वाक्यार्थोपदेशः Vākya-artha-upadeśaḥ, lesson conveyed by the Great Saying; the teaching of the Veda about knowledge.

98. The teachings of the Veda about cultivation of knowledge are not invalid, because they declare the true forms of the Realities.—98.

Vritti :—If knowledge does not exist in the Self, why, then, it may be asked, is instruction given for the cultivation of knowledge? To this the author replies.

The word “Antaḥ-karāṇasya,” of the Antaḥ-Karāṇa, appearing in the following aphorism, should be added on to this aphorism.

The meaning thereby is this: “Siddha-rûpa-boddhritvât,” because the Antaḥ-Karāṇa Mahat is the knower of the true form of Reality, therefore, instructions have been given for learning the meaning of the sayings of the Veda. And because Puruṣa is reflected in the Mahat, the transference (Abhimāna) of the characteristic of being the knower takes place in him.—98.

Bhāṣya :—But, then, one may say, if an Eternal, Omniscient Īvara did not exist, then the teaching of Discrimination which is the meaning of the Great Saying of the Vedānta, would become unauthoritative, through the apprehension of its coming down as a blind tradition. To this the author replies.

The teaching of the meaning of the Sayings of the Veda is authoritative, (and this is the complement of the aphorism), because Brahmā, etc. are the knowers of the true forms, i.e., of objects as they are, and because their authority is established beyond doubt by the authoritative-ness of the Āyurveda or the Science of Life, etc., of which they are the speakers.—98.

Actual superintendence belongs to the Antaḥ-Karāṇa.

अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाद्धोवदधिष्ठातृत्वम् ॥ १ । ६६ ॥

अन्तःकरणस्य, Antaḥ-karāṇasya, of the Antaḥ-karāṇa, तदुज्ज्वलितत्वात् Tat-ujjvalitavât, because it is lighted up by him. अधिष्ठातृत्वम् Adhiṣṭhâtṛitvam, superintendence. लोहवत् Loha-vat, as is the case with the iron.

99. (Actual) superintendence is of the Antaḥ-karāṇa, because it is lighted up by Puruṣa, as is the case with the iron.—99.

Vritti.—The author makes the very same point clear.

Superintendence belongs to the Antaḥ-karāṇa, because the apparent transference (Abhimāna) of the characteristic of being intelligent

takes place in it as it is lighted up by the intelligence of Puruṣa through the incidence of his shadow in Buddhi. "Lohavat": As the iron which attracts, though it is inactive, still attracts through mere proximity.—99.

Bhāṣya :—But, if the superintendence of Puruṣa, by mere proximity, is in a secondary sense of the term, then, it may be asked, to what does the primary superintendence belong? The author removes this curiosity.

Unimputed (actual) superintendence by the way of volition, etc., should be held to belong to the Antaḥ-karaṇa.

But, if it be said that superintendence cannot properly belong to unintelligent things like a water-pot, etc., so he says: "Loha-vat tat-ujjvilitatvāt:" For the Antaḥ-karaṇa is lighted up with the light of intelligence, as is the iron with fire. Hence, inasmuch as it is, in a manner, invested with intelligence, its superintendence, which, for the reason given, cannot be present in a water-pot, etc., is justified. Such is the meaning. But, if this be so, then, it may be objected, in the lightening up of the Antaḥ-karaṇa by Consciousness, the intelligent Principle would be associated with the Antaḥ-karaṇa, (which is not desired by the Sāṃkhya), in the very same way as fire, in lightening up of the iron, becomes associated with it. This, however, is not the case, we reply. For, the illumination of the Antaḥ-karaṇa consists merely in a particular conjunction with Consciousness which is eternally shining, that is, in nothing but the reflection of Consciousness produced through a particular conjunction. And not that Consciousness passes into the Antaḥ-karaṇa, whereby associatedness would be the result. The light, etc., of the fire also do not pass into the iron. But it is only a particular conjunction with the fire that is the lightening up of the iron.

It cannot be said that even then Puruṣa would be transformable through conjunction; for, we speak of transformation only when properties in addition to the general attributes are produced.

And the particular conjunction mentioned above takes place through the transformation of the Antaḥ-karaṇa alone in the form of the predominance of the Sattva element present in it. This hypothesis is made for the explanation of actual facts, namely, a peculiarity in the conjunction of which it is impossible that Puruṣa should be the instrumental (nimitta) cause, inasmuch as he does not undergo transformation.

And this same particular conjunction is the cause of the mutual reflection of Buddhi and Âtmâ in each other.

But when a particular conjunction is required as the cause of reflection, our opponent may say, the reflection theory, then, is useless, for the results obtained through reflection, *e. g.*, cognition of objects, etc., can be had from the particular conjunction alone. We reply that such is not the case. The supposition of the reflection of Consciousness in Buddhi has been made for the purpose of seeing Consciousness, in the same manner as is seen the reflection of the face in the mirror. Otherwise, on account of the contradiction of the subject and the object (*i. e.*, that one and the same thing cannot be both subject and object at the same time), it would not be possible for consciousness to have immediate vision of itself.

And it is this reflection of Consciousness in Buddhi that is also called Chit-*chhāyā-âpatti* or the falling of the shadow of Consciousness, Chaitanya-*adhyāsa* or the super-addition or super-imposition of Consciousness, and Chit-*āveśa* or the possession by Consciousness.

And that which is called the reflection of Buddhi in Consciousness, the same is desired for the manifestation of Buddhi together with the objects that have ascended to it. For, inasmuch as it is found that, in the case of Buddhi, the apprehension of objects takes place only by means of Buddhi assuming the forms of the objects, it is not reasonable to hold that, without the help of this, the manifestation of objects can appear in Puruṣa, by a mere particular conjunction. Moreover, the phrase, apprehension of objects, literally means assumption of the forms of the objects. And such transformation in the form of the objects is not possible in the case of Puruṣa. The meaning of the phrase, form of the object, therefore, comes to be the form of the object in the form of reflection. Such is the line of our argument.

And this theory of mutual reflection has been conclusively established by the revered Vyāsa in his Commentary on Yoga in the passage beginning with—

**चितिशक्तिरपरिणामिन्यप्रतिसंक्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनु-
पतति । तस्याश्चाप्राप्तश्चैतन्योपग्रहरूपाया बुद्धिवृत्तेरनुकारिमात्रतया बुद्धिवृत्त्यविशिष्टा
हि ज्ञानवृत्तिरित्याख्यायते ॥**

The power of Consciousness which is unchangeable and does not pass into the objects, imitates the modifications of changeful objects, as if it had passed into them. And because the modification of Buddhi which is endowed with the form of the influence of Consciousness, is mere imitation, so it is said that the modifications of Jñāna or cognition or consciousness are those that are not qualified by the modifications of Buddhi.—*Vide* Yoga Sūtram, II, 20, IV, 22. S. B. H. Vol. IV. pp. 134 and 299.

In the Yoga Vārtika also this point has been elaborately made out by us.

Some one, however, thinks that *Buddhi* alone is the knower of all objects by means of the shadow of *Consciousness* reflected in it, inasmuch as it is perceived that cognition has the same substratum or place of inherence with desire etc., and, secondly, it is not reasonable that one should be moved to action by the cognition of another. But this view should be disregarded, as it is based on the assumption of the absence of cognition from *Ātmā*. For, did the characteristic of being the knower belong to *Buddhi* alone, there would be contradiction of the two future aphorisms (I. 10 and I. 143), which declare that experience ends with discrimination and that the experiencer is *Puruṣa*; and there would also be an absence of proof of the existence of *Puruṣa*, on account of the inferential mark of *Puruṣa*, namely, experience, being taken as belonging to *Buddhi* alone.

Nor can it be said that, there being no other explanation of the reflection, *Puruṣa* will be proved to be the thing of which it is the reflection; because the argument involves the vicious circle: the proof of the consciousness lying in *Buddhi* as a reflection is dependent on the proof of a separate thing reflected, and, on the proof of it as a reflection, depends the proof of the thing reflected by way of the counter-opposite thereof. In our theory, on the other hand, when, after the proof of *Puruṣa* as the knower, we prove the reflection of him in *Buddhi* on the ground that his being knowable is not otherwise explainable, there is no such argument in a circle.

Now, if it be said that a conscious entity of the form of a thing reflected is proved by means of the characteristic of being the witness of the modifications of *Buddhi*; we reply that this is not proved, since, in that case, the witness itself should properly be the knower also, as the supposition of two knowers would be redundant, and, secondly, as we perceive that the cognition of the modification of *Buddhi* in the form of the water-pot and the cognition of the water-pot reside in one and the same substratum. Moreover, if this were the case, then, *Buddhi* itself being the experiencer, the proof of *Puruṣa* as the experiencer, by the subsequent aphorism (I. 143.): "Through experiencership," would be contradicted.

Now, if the import of the above proposition is described to be only this that cognition of a thing reflected takes place only through the relation in the form of the falling of shadow of the *Consciousness* in *Buddhi*, and not that the reflection of *Buddhi* is traced out in *Consciousness*; we reply that this view too is wrong. For it is not observed that the sun, etc., by the relation of the form of casting their own reflections, become the illuminators of the water, etc., as well as of

the things (reflection) lying in them. It is by the rays of the sun, etc. that both of them are illuminated. In the case of mirage in the desert, and other optical illusions, reflection of light has been verily found to be illuminative of the water, etc. super-imposed upon it. Pursuant to this observation, we have made the theory that it is the reflection of Buddhi in consciousness that is the relation which is the cause of the manifestation of all objects.

And, next, the statement that one is not moved to action by the cognition of another,—that also is wrong, *i. e.*, not a fact, inasmuch as it will be established by means of an illustration that cognition and activity may lie in different substrata, by the future aphorism (I. 105): Even who is not the agent, may be the enjoyer or experiencer of the fruit, as in the case of rice, etc. For, as Buddhi regulates the action of the body by means of resolution, so, here too, particular conjunctions, etc., alone regulate the relation of the sower and the reaper.—99.

Definition of Inference.

प्रतिबन्धदृशः प्रतिबद्धज्ञानमनुमानम् ॥ १ । १०० ॥

प्रतिबन्धदृशः Pratibandha-dṛśaḥ, of one who sees the invariable accompaniment. **प्रतिबद्धज्ञानम्** Pratibaddha-jñānam, knowledge of the accompanied. **अनुमानम्** Anumānam, an inference.

100. An Inference is the knowledge of the accompanied by one who sees the accompaniment.—100.

Vṛitti :—The author states the definition of Inference.

Inference is the knowledge of the pervader (vyâpaka, the major term), following the knowledge of the pervaded (vyâpya, the middle term), on the part of one who sees the relation of a-vinâ-bhâva or of one not being without the other. Hereby all forms of Inference, Anvayi or by agreement, Vyatireki or by difference, Anvaya-vyatireki or by agreement and difference, Pârva-vat or from cause to effect, Śeṣa-vat or from effect to cause, and Sâminyato dṛṣṭam or from the general to the general, are included. The inferential marks mentioned by the logicians are also included herein. Thus say they :

अनुमेयेन सम्बद्धं प्रसिद्धं च तदन्विते ।

तदभावे च नास्त्येष तल्लिङ्गमनुमापकम् ॥

A mark of inference is that which is connected with that which is to be inferred, is well-known in what is attended with it, and which is absent where it is absent.—100.

Bhāṣya :—Having defined the Proof called Perception, the author defines Inference.

“Pratibandha” means pervasion (vyâpti or invariable accompaniment of one thing, *e. g.*, fire, by another thing, *e. g.*, smoke). The knowledge of the pervader (vyâpaka) or what is so accompanied, which results from seeing the pervasion, is the Proof called Inference. Such is the meaning. While anumiti or the result of inference, *i. e.*, the knowledge produced by inference, is knowledge belonging to Puruṣa.—100.

Definition of Word or Verbal Testimony.

आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः ॥ १ । १०१ ॥

आप्तोपदेशः Āpta-upadeśaḥ, appropriate (Vijñāna Bhikṣu) or received (Aniruddha) declaration. **शब्दः** Śabdaḥ, Word or Testimony.

101. Word is an appropriate or received declaration.—101.

Vṛitti :—The author defines Word.

The received, *i. e.*, revealed, declaration is Word, and not one made by an āpta or trustworthy person, because the Veda is a-pauruṣeya or not composed by a Puruṣa. That the Veda is not the work of any Puruṣa, we shall establish in the Fifth Book in the aphorism (V. 46) which declares that it is not the work of any Puruṣa.

The word, śabda, in the aphorism, declares the cause or instrument of verbal cognition, while the result obtained from the use of the instrument, namely, cognition produced by Word as a Proof, is also called Śabda, through the transference of the nature of the cause to the effect.

The sayings of Buddha, etc., are mere appearances of truth, because, on account of their contradiction to the Veda, they are not supported by any authority.—101.

Bhāṣya :—The author defines the Proof called Word.

“Āpti” here means fitness, competence, intrinsic worth, inasmuch as it will be declared in the Fifth Book that the Veda is not the work of any Puruṣa. Thus, then, Word is that which possesses intrinsic worth, and cognition produced by it, called Word, is the Proof. And the result of this Proof is verbal knowledge belonging to Puruṣa.—101.

The object of setting forth the Proofs in this Śāstra.

उभयसिद्धिः प्रमाणात् तदुपदेशः ॥ १ । १०२ ॥

उभयसिद्धिः Ubhaya-siddhiḥ, establishment of both, *i. e.*, the Self and the Not-Self. **प्रमाणात्** Pramāṇāt, from Proof. **तदुपदेशः** Tat-upadeśaḥ, declaration thereof.

102. The establishment of both (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) is from Proof ; (hence) the declaration thereof.—102.

Vṛitti :—The beginning of this Sâstra is for the purpose of discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. And there is no Proof to establish them. Apprehending such an objection, the author declares.

“Siddhi,” knowledge, of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, is through the Proof presently to be mentioned (*vide* next aphorism). Therefore, instruction for the purpose of Discrimination is justified.—102.

Bhâṣya :—The author himself declares the object of establishing the above Proofs.

The establishment of both, *i. e.*, the Self and the Not-Self, by way of discrimination from each other, follows from Proof alone. Hence, declaration, for the purpose of instruction, has been made thereof, *i. e.*, of Proof. Such is the meaning.—102.

Proof of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti is by Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa Inference.

सामान्यतो दृष्टादुभयसिद्धिः ॥ १ । १०३ ॥

सामान्यतोदृष्टात् Sâmânyato dṛiṣṭât, from the inference called as such. उभयसिद्धिः Ubhaya-siddhiḥ, proof of both.

103. Proof of both (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti) is from the inference called Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa.—103.

Vṛitti :—What, then, is that Proof from which knowledge of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti is obtained? To this the author replies.

Prakṛiti being not an object of Perception, knowledge of Prakṛiti is obtained, in a general way (sâmânyena), as follows: That which is an effect, is preceded by the attributes of its cause; every effect in nature is essentially of the form of the three Guṇas; hence, something constituted by the three Guṇas, exists; and that is Prakṛiti.

Âtmâ or the Self also not being an object of Perception, it is proved as a different entity, not formed by combination of parts, by means of the argument that what is a structure of manifold parts (that is, Prakṛiti) must be for the sake of another. The author also will declare later on (I. 140): (Puruṣa is proved) from the fact that a combination of parts must exist for the benefit of another.—103.

Bhâṣya :—The author describes the particular form of inference by which, as Proof, amongst those mentioned above, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti should be established by being discriminated from each other.

All inference is of three kinds: Pûrva-vat, Śeṣa-vat, and Sâmânyato Dṛiṣṭa. Amongst these, Pûrva-vat is that which infers an object belonging to the class of objects perceived; as, *e. g.*, the inference

of fire by means of smoke, for, objects of the class of fire have been before perceived in the kitchen room and other places.

Śeṣa-vat is inference by the method of difference. "Śeṣa-vat" means that which has śeṣa or an object not known before as its subject matter (*i. e.*, residual). In other words, it is inference in which the object to be inferred (sādhya) does not belong to the class of any known objects. *E. g.* the inference of the difference of Earth from all other things by means of Earth-ness. For, the difference of Earth from all other things was not established before.

And Sāmānyato Dṛiṣṭa is inference which is neither Pūrva-vat nor Śeṣa-vat. It is where from the apprehension of the vyāpti or pervasion (or the general proposition which forms the major premise), by generalization (sāmānyataḥ) from the cases of object belonging to perceptible classes, etc., an object of a different class, *i. e.*, an imperceptible object, etc., is established by the force of the mark of inference being a property of the subject of the inference. *E. g.*, the inference of an instrument of cognition in the case of knowledge of form, etc., by means of its being an act. For here, after apprehending the vyāpti or invariable accompaniment of an act and its instrument, by taking into consideration, or by generalization from, the axe, etc., which belong to the class of Earthy objects, etc., as instruments of the acts effected by them, an object of a different kind from Earthy objects, etc., *i. e.*, an imperceptible object, namely, Indriya or the Sense, is established as the instrument of knowledge of form, etc.

Amongst these kinds of inference, from the Sāmānyato Dṛiṣṭa inference is the proof of both Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. Such is the meaning.

Of these two (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), the Sāmānyato Dṛiṣṭa inference is of Prakṛiti; *e. g.*, the Principle Mahat must have for its material cause a substance possessing the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, for, while it is an effect, it possesses the properties of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, as is the case with the ear-ring, etc., made of gold, etc.

In the case of Puruṣa, on the other hand, although there is no need of inference to prove his existence, his existence being admitted on all hands, still, in the matter of his discrimination from Prakṛiti, etc., it is the Sāmānyato Dṛiṣṭa inference that is required. The inference is made thus: Pradhâna exists for the benefit of another, because it acts by combination of parts, as is the case with a house, etc. For, here, after apprehending the fact which is proved by Perception, namely, that a house, etc. exist for the benefit of the body etc., inference is made of Puruṣa who belongs to a class different from the class to which body, etc., belong, as one other than

Prakṛiti etc., for the benefit of whom the latter exists. Body, etc., were before taken to be the experiencer in consequence of Non-discrimination. For this reason has it been said: "Proof of both."—103.

The end of Bhoga or experience is in Consciousness.

चिदवसानो भोगः ॥ १ । १०४ ॥

चिदवसानः—Chit-avasānaḥ, of which the end or completion, or cessation is in Consciousness. भोगः Bhogaḥ, experience of the joys and sorrows of the world (Aniruddha), attainment called Pramā or Right Cognition (Vijñāna Bhikṣu.)

104. Bhoga ends in Consciousness.—104.

Vṛitti:—Prakṛiti being eternal and by nature active, perpetual Bhoga or experience, one may say, will be the result, and, consequently, there will be no Release. To this the author replies.

"Chit" means Ātmā. Bhoga ends with the discrimination of that. As antecedent non-existence, although it is from eternity, disappears, so does eternal Prakṛiti continue to procreate till discriminative knowledge arises.

If it be said that such is the case in regard to non-existence and not in regard to existence; we reply, no. Here the characteristic of Non-existence is not instrumental, inasmuch as it is not so observed in the case of consequent non-existence.

Now, if it is asserted that theories should be in accordance with observation, we say that this is so even in the present case.—104.

Bhāṣya:—Attainment (siddhi) called Pramā or Right Cognition, has been declared to be the result of Proof. This, one may think, will entail the transformation of Puruṣa. To remove this apprehension the author declares the true nature (svarūpa) of that attainment.

("Chit-avasānaḥ" means) that of which the action is completed in consciousness which is the svarūpa or essential form of Puruṣa. Of this description is "Bhoga" or siddhi or perfection or attainment. Such is the meaning.

The word "chit-avasānaḥ" has been used to exclude Bhoga from Buddhi; the term "avasāna" for removing the apprehension that transformability, possession of properties, etc., may belong to Consciousness. Bhoga being reduced into its true form in Consciousness, there is no harm caused to the immutability, etc., of Puruṣa. Such is the idea.

Thus, Puruṣa, Prakṛiti, and other provables, having risen into the modification of Buddhi called Proof, shine in Puruṣa, being reflected there along with the modification. Hence it is only Consciousness in itself,

determined in finite forms by the reflection of the modifications of Buddhi which is coloured by objects from the outside, that is what is called bhâna, illumination or manifestation of objects, the experience of Puruṣa and the fruit or result of Proof. And thence follows that the modifications are instruments, because they, by the form of reflection, serve as gateways through which connection with objects takes place. Accordingly it has been declared in the Viṣṇu Purâṇa :

गृहीतानिन्द्रियैरर्थानात्मने यः प्रयच्छति ।

अन्तःकरणरूपाय तस्मै विश्वात्मने नमः ॥

He who makes over the objects, taken in by the Senses, to the indwelling Self, I bow down to that Universal Self in the form of the Antaḥ-karāṇa.—Viṣṇu Purâṇa, I. xiv. 85.

For it is found that the instruments or agents of a king make over all enjoyables to their master.

The word “ Bhoga ” means eating, in other words, appropriation to oneself. It applies commonly to all things beginning with the body and ending with the Conscious One. There is, however, this difference. On account of his not being transformable, the experience of objects by Puruṣa means merely the reception of the reflections of objects ; while, through their being transformable, growth, etc., takes place in the case of the rest.

And it is this absolute or primary (pâramâarthika) bhoga in the form of transformation, that is denied in Puruṣa by the śloka :

बुद्धेर्भोग ईवात्मनि ॥

Like the experience of Buddhi transferred to the Self, etc.—Śiṣupala-Vadham, II. 59.

In this aphorism it is proved that the fruit or consequence pervades or affects Puruṣa also, inasmuch as it is only of the ending in Consciousness that the being the proof of both is declared.—104.

He who does not act, may still enjoy the fruit.

अकर्तुरपि फलोपभोग अन्नाद्यवत् ॥ १ । १०५ ॥

अकर्तुः Akartuḥ, non-agent's. अपि Api, even, also. फलोपभोगः Phala-upabhogaḥ, enjoyment of fruits, experience of consequences. अन्नाद्यवत् Anna-ādya-vat, as in the case of food, etc.

105. Experience of consequences may belong even to him who is not the agent, as in the case of food, etc.—105.

Vṛitti.—If Pradhâna be, as you say, the agent, and Puruṣa the experiencer, then, the result would be that another would be the experiencer of the fruits of the acts done by a different one. To this objection the author replies.

As the cook is the agent in the preparation of food, etc., and his master is the experiencer of the fruits of his action, so is the case here also. If it be said that the master also is an agent (*Cf.* the final cause of Aristotle), because the food is intended for him, we reply that even so is the production of Prakṛiti also intended for the Self.—105.

Bhāṣya:—But, our opponent may say, in the world, the agent alone is observed to experience the fruits of acts, *e.g.*, the experience of the Pleasure and Pain arising from movement is of him alone who moves. How is it, then, asks he, that the experience of the fruits, that is, the properties produced by Buddhi, namely the pleasurable, painful and deluding modifications of Buddhi coloured with the reflections of objects, takes place in Puruṣa? Such being the apprehension in his mind, the author declares.

Experience of the fruit of the action of Buddhi, namely the modification of Buddhi, by Puruṣa, although he is not the agent, is reasonable or possible. “Anna-ādyā-vat,” as the enjoyment of the food, etc., prepared by others, belongs to the King, similarly. Such is the meaning.

Having admitted that Pleasure, Pain, etc., are the fruits of action, it is declared that Puruṣa experiences the fruits of action inhering in Buddhi.—105.

The notion that Puruṣa is the experiencer, is due to A-viveka.

अविवेकाद्वा तत्सिद्धेः कर्तुः फलावगमः ॥ १ । १०६ ॥

अविवेकात् A-vivekât, through non-discrimination. वा Vâ, or. *तत्सिद्धेः* Tat-siddheh, from proof thereof, *i. e.*, of the notion of experiencership. *कर्तुः* Kartuh, of the agent. *फलावगमः* Phala-avagamah, knowledge of fruit.

106. Or, the declaration made in the Sâstras that fruit belongs to the agent, is due to the non-discrimination of the production called experience. (*Vijñāna Bhikṣu*.) Or, the notion of experiencership in Puruṣa being derived from non-discrimination, it is known that fruit belongs to the agent. (*Aniruddha*).—106.

Vṛitti.—Having stated the popular or practical conclusion, the author declares his own conclusion.

Neither is Puruṣa the agent nor the experiencer, but the abhimāna or assumption of experiencership arises in him through his being reflected in the Mahat Principle. “A-vivekât vâ” : through non-apprehension of

the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. "Tat-sidheḥ" there being proof of the abhimāna on the part of the pseudo-agent that he is the experiencer of the fruit.—106.

Bhāṣya.—Now, admitting that it is only the experience belonging to Puruṣa that is the fruit of action, the author declares the principal conclusion that it is in Puruṣa himself that the fruit is produced by the action of Buddhi.

Or, it may be, that the fruit does not really accrue to the agent, inasmuch as, by such desires as "May I experience Pleasure", etc., it is indicated that it is experience alone that is the fruit of action. Hence it follows that the fruit is what inheres in the experiencer, and nothing else. On the other hand, the information that the fruit accrues to the agent, given in the Śāstras, in such passages as,

शास्त्रविहितं फलमनुग्रहाति

The fruit laid down in the Śāstra accrues to the performer.

is due to non-discrimination, in the idea of the agent, "tat-siddheḥ," of the production called experience inhering in the non-agent. Such is the meaning. For, the popular belief is: "I who act, the very same I do experience".

And the prayer that there is, namely, "May Pleasure result unto me", etc., the same can be accounted for only as the means of securing the fruit, like the prayer, "May a son be born unto me". Bhoga or experience, on the other hand, is not the means of securing anything else. Hence it follows that it (experience) alone is the fruit. Such is the principal conclusion.

Although Bhoga is the svarūpa or very form of Puruṣa, still, according to the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, it should be understood that it is as much an effect as the ear, because they hold that it is nothing but consciousness determined or conditioned by Pleasure, etc., that constitutes Bhoga. In this theory, if Bhoga is admitted to be the fruit, then, it should be further understood that it is nothing but the non-existence of the experience of Pain that constitutes Apavarga, the Grand Fulfilment or Release. Or, let the non-existence of Pleasure and Pain alone be the fruit by means of the relation of ownership, in the form of the capability of being experienced, seeing that by means of that relation, Pleasure, etc., also, like riches, etc., may possess the characteristic of being inherent in Puruṣa.—106.

Fruit of knowledge is absence of Pleasure and Pain.

नोभयञ्च तत्त्वाख्याने ॥ १ । १०७ ॥

न Na, not. उभयं Ubhayam, both, Pleasure and Pain. च Cha, and. तत्त्वाख्याने Tattva-ākhyāne, on the manifestation of the Tattva or Principle.

107. And when the Tattva is made known, there is neither agency nor experiencership (Aniruddha), or, neither Pleasure nor Pain (Vijñāna Bhikṣu).—107.

Vṛitti.—The author declares the result of the absence of A-viveka.

The Tattva or Principle, *i. e.*, Puruṣa, being known, through Viveka or discrimination, “na ubhayam”, (the wrong notion of) neither agency nor experiencership (exists).—107.

Bhāṣya.—Thus, having in the above manner established the Pramāṇas or proofs and the knowledge or proof of the Prameyas or Provables, which constitutes the fruit or result of Pramāṇa, the author declares also the fruit of the knowledge of the Provables.

“Tattva-ākhyāne”: On the immediate vision of the truth about Puruṣa and Prakṛiti by means of Pramāṇa (*i. e.* Sāmānyato Dṛiṣṭa Inference), “ubhayam,” Pleasure and Pain, also do not arise again, as established by reasoning and the Veda, *e. g.*,

विद्वान् हर्षशोकौ जहाति

He who knows, escapes joy and grief.—Kāṭha Upaniṣat, II. 12.

Such is the meaning.—107.

Mere non-perception cannot prove non-existence, as it is due to other well-known causes.

विषयोऽविषयोप्यतिदूरादेर्हानोपादानाभ्यामिन्द्रियस्य ॥ १ । १०८ ॥

विषयः Viṣayaḥ, an object of perception. अविषयः a-viṣayaḥ, no object of perception. अपि Api, even. अतिदूरादेः Ati-dūra-ādeḥ, on account of long distance, and other causes. हानोपादानाभ्याम् Hāna-upādānābhyām, through incapacity or capacity, through impairment or application. इन्द्रियस्य Indriyasya, of the Indriya or Sense.

108. What is an object of perception (at one time) may be (at another time) not an object of perception, because (there are conditions, such as) a great distance etc., which cause impairment or application, (as the case may be), of the Senses.—108.

Vṛitti.—Having stated the *Pramāṇas*, the author states the distribution of the *Prameyas* or the *Provables*.

A thing is “*viśaya*” or an object perceptible, through “*upādāna*” or connection, of the Sense. It is “*a-viśaya*” or not an object perceptible, through “*hāna*” or absence of connection, of the Sense. And non-connection is due to unfitness for conjunction of objects lying at a long distance, etc.: *e. g.*, on account of extreme distance, a bird flying far away in the sky is not perceived; on account of extreme proximity, the collyrium applied to the eye is not perceived; on account of intervention of another thing, a thing placed inside a wall is not perceived; on account of mental distraction, a person afflicted with grief, etc., does not perceive the thing that lies at his side; on account of its extreme fineness, an Atom is not perceived; on account of suppression or overpowering, *e. g.*, by the sound of a drum, the sound produced from a conch shell is not perceived; and so on. —108.

Bhāṣya.—*Puruṣa* and *Prakṛiti* have been established by inference, briefly showing their discrimination from each other. There are minor differences in the manner of the inference of the two, *viz.*, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛiti*. These minor differences are the subject matter of discussion from this place upto the end of the Book. Amongst them, at the beginning of the discussion, the author removes the impediments which cause non-cognition in the case of the inferences of *Prakṛiti*, etc.

The *Cbārvākas* (lit. Sweet-sayers) or Sensationalists cannot prove, by means of perception, the non-existence of *Prakṛiti* etc., like the non-existence of a waterpot etc., from the mere fact of their not being apprehensible by the Senses; inasmuch as even an existent object may be an object, or may not be an object, of the Senses, according to difference of time, on account of the impairment and application of the Senses, in consequence of the fault of its lying at a great distance, etc. Such is the meaning: Where all the materials or causes of the sense-perception of an entity exist, the cause of perception of the non-existence thereof, is nothing but failure of the Senses to reach that object. In regard to the sense-apprehension of *Prakṛiti*, however, full attention to all the causes of such apprehension cannot be possible, owing to the presence of the counter-agents presently to be mentioned. Such is the import.

The faults, *viz.*, extreme distance, etc., have been specifically enumerated by the *Kārikā*:

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
सौक्ष्म्याद्व्यवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥

(Non-apprehension of objects by the Senses arises) from extreme distance, extreme nearness, impairment of the Senses, non-presence of the mind, extreme fineness, intervention, suppression by others, and combination with likes.—Sâmkhya Kârikâ of Īśvara Kṛiṣṇa, Verse VII.

“Samânâbhihâra” or combination with likes, in the above, means association with things of the same class; *e. g.*, through mixing the cow’s milk with the milk of the buffalo, arises non-apprehension of the buffalo’s milk as such.—108.

Non-apprehension of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti by the Senses is due to their extreme fineness.

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः ॥ १ । १०६ ॥

सौक्ष्म्यात् Saukṣmyât, from subtlety. तदनुपलब्धिः Tat-anupalabdhiḥ, non-perception thereof, *i. e.*, of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti.

109. Non-perception of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti is due to their extreme subtlety.—109.

Vṛitti.—If it be asked, whence does arise the non-perception of Prakṛiti? So the author says.

“Subtlety” means difficulty of investigation, and not that Prakṛiti is of the size of an Atom, because Prakṛiti is all-pervasive or universal.—109.

Bhāṣya.—But, it may be asked, which of the faults mentioned above, *viz.*, extreme distance, etc., causes obstruction to the perception of Prakṛiti, etc.? To this the author replies.

The non-perception thereof, *i. e.*, of the two mentioned above, *viz.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, is, however, due to their subtlety. Such is the meaning.

“Subtlety” here does not denote atom-ness, because they pervade the whole universe; nor does it signify difficulty of investigation and the like, because it can be hardly predicated of them in that sense. But it denotes a class or general attribute which opposes the right cognition of them by means of Perception. The right notion about Puruṣa, Prakṛiti, etc., that is, however, derived, (in special cases), from Perception, is due to the excitation caused by the virtue born of Yoga. And the limitation thus put on the general attribute is not faulty. Or, it may be that subtlety here denotes only the characteristic of being partless substances. And the virtue born of Yoga is the excitant to their perception.—109.

Proof of the subtlety of Prakṛiti, etc.,

कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः ॥ १ । ११० ॥

कार्यदर्शनात् Kārya-darśanāt, from seeing the effect. तदुपलब्धेः Tat-upalabdheḥ, there being apprehension thereof, *i. e.*, of subtlety (Vijñāna Bhikṣu) or of Prakṛiti, etc., (Aniruddha).

110. Because the apprehension thereof arises from seeing the effect.--110.

Vṛitti.—How, then, it may be asked, is the existence of Prakṛiti established? To this the author replies.

As the knowledge of (the existence of) the Ultimate Atoms is derived from seeing the water pot (which is their product), similarly is derived the knowledge of the existence of Prakṛiti from seeing the products of the three Guṇas.--110.

Bhāṣya.—But, it may be asked, when their non-apprehension is quite likely to be due to their non-existence, what for is the supposition of subtlety made? Otherwise, again, why would not the non-apprehension of the horns of a hare, etc., be referred to subtlety as its cause? To this the author replies.

The existence of Prakṛiti, etc., having been already established by means of the fact that the effects which we observe in the world, cannot be explained otherwise than as produced from them, the supposition of their subtlety is made in order to account for their non-perception. And, prior to their inference, their non-existence cannot be ascertained, there being room for the doubt whether their non-perception may not be due to their subtlety, etc. Hence the inference is justified. Such is the meaning.—110.

Objection: Conflict of opinions is a bar to the existence of Prakṛiti.

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेस्तदसिद्धिरिति चेत् ॥ १ । १११ ॥

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेः Vādi-vipratipatteḥ, on account of the contradictory views of thinkers of different schools. तदसिद्धिः Tat-asiddhiḥ, non-proof thereof, *i. e.* of the existence of Prakṛiti (Aniruddha), or, of the theory of existent effects (Vijñāna Bhikṣu). इति चेत् Iti chet, if this be said.

111. If it be said that this is not proved in consequence of the contradictory theories of different thinkers.—111.

Vṛitti.—Some—the Vedāntins—say that the world has Brahma for its cause, while others, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, say that it has the Ultimate Atoms for its cause, and the elders (of the Sâmkhya School) say that it has Prakṛiti for its cause. The author raises the doubt involved in these contrary theories.

“Tat-asiddhiḥ” means the non-proof of the existence of Prakṛiti.
—111.

Bhāṣya.—In regard to the inference of Prakṛiti, the author apprehends an objection.

Well, if the effect existed prior to its production (as maintained by the Sâmkhyas), then, of course, an eternal Prakṛiti would be proved to exist as its substratum, inasmuch as it will be declared afterwards (Vide I. 135, page 191) that the inference of the cause is made only as being always the accompanier of the effect. But, in consequence of the disagreement of different thinkers, an existent effect itself is not proved. If such be the objection.—111.

Answer : *Existence of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti proved independently of the Theory of Existent Effects.*

तथाप्येकतरदृष्ट्या एकतरसिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥ १ । ११२ ॥

तथापि Tathâ api, still. एकतरदृष्ट्या Ekatarā-dṛṣṭyâ, by the observation of the one. एकतरसिद्धेः Ekatarā-siddheḥ, on account of the proof of the other. न Na, no. अपलापः Apalâpaḥ, negation, denial.

112. (Admitting, for the sake of argument, that there is no proof of the theory of Existent Effects), still, when by the observation of the one (*i. e.* the effect), the existence of the other is proved, there can be no negation (of the existence of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti).—112.

Vṛitti.—The author states his conclusion with regard to the above objection.

If the subject of inference, on one side, were disproved by the mere disagreement of theorists, then, since such differences of opinion exist in regard to the alternative or opposite side, how could there be proof of what they propose to be the cause? If they reply that it would be proved by the cognition by inference of that which pervades, from the cognition of that which is pervaded, on the strength of their not ever being one without the other, then, it is the same with us also. Hence our inference of the cause from the effect is not to be contradicted.—112.

Bhāṣya.—Admitting the validity of the above objection, for the sake of argument, the author avoids it.

Granting that the effect is not eternally existent, still by the observation of the one, *i. e.*, the effect, the existence of the other, *i. e.*, the cause, being proved, there is really no contradiction of our inference. Hence an eternal cause (Prakṛiti) is verily established.

Herefrom also is made the deduction of Release by means of discrimination of Puruṣa as not undergoing transformation, from this very cause (Prakṛiti) which undergoes transformation. Such is the meaning.

On this very Abhyupagama-vāda or doctrine of admission of counter-theories for the sake of argument, proceed the positive or āstika Śāstras, *e.g.*, the Vaiśeṣika, etc. Hence, it should be remarked that although they are in (apparent) conflict with the declarations in the Veda and Smṛiti of the Theory of Existent Effects, yet they are not unauthoritative in their other portions.—112.

Proofs of the Theory of Existent Effects: (a) Its denial would entail contradiction of the threefold aspect of things.

त्रिविधविरोधापत्तेश्च ॥ १ । ११३ ॥

त्रिविधविरोधापत्तेः Trividha-virodha-âpattē, on account of the entailment of a contradiction to the threefold aspect of things. च Cha, and.

113. (Denial of the Theory of Existent Effects) would entail contradiction of the threefold aspect of things (Vijñāna Bhikṣu). Or, (the inference of any other cause than Prakṛiti), would etc. (Aniruddha).—113.

Vṛitti.—Let a cause be inferred from the observation of the effect, but how can you say that the said cause is Prakṛiti? To this the author replies.

The Guṇas are threefold : Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. There would be contradiction thereof, (if Prakṛiti were not the cause), *i. e.*, the world would be devoid of them ; but it is not found to be so.—113.

Vedāntin Mahādeva : Were Brahman or the Ultimate Atoms the cause of the world, it would lack the characteristic, but which, we perceive, it does possess, of having the nature, and thereby being the cause, of Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment.

Bhāṣya.—The author states the true refutation of the objection. Now, all effect has, as admitted on all hands, a threefold aspect, *viz.*, past, future, and present. If the effect is not desired to be always

existent, then, its threefoldness would not be established. For, by the non-existence of the water pot, etc. in times past, etc., the possession of the properties of being past, etc., would not be established in the case of the water pot, etc., since there can subsist no connection between what is existent and what is non-existent.

*Note:—*A connection or relation involves two terms. When we say that a water pot lies on the ground, we assert a relation to exist between the ground and the water pot. The two terms of the relation are the ground and the water pot. Both of them are necessary to determine the relation, and, so, their general name is Nirûpaka or determinant. Specifically, the ground is called Anuyogi or that to which something is joined afterwards, and the water pot is called Pratiyogi or the counter-opposite which fills up and, thereby, destroys the blank caused by its non-existence until then.

Moreover, if counter-opposite-ness consist in being of the form of the counter-opposite, then, the same defect remains, because it would then be the same as the non-existence of the water pot. If it be the very form (svarûpa) of non-existence itself, then, the non-existence of the cloth, etc., would be the non-existence of the water pot, etc., because of the absence, on the supposition, of any distinctive peculiarity in non-existence. And, if any distinctive peculiarity is admitted to exist in the intrinsic form of non-existence, then, non-existence would lose its character as such, and be a mere technical name.

It cannot be said that the counter-opposite itself will be the distinctive peculiarity of the non-existence; since a non-existent counter-opposite cannot possibly be the distinction in the case of antecedent non-existence, etc.

It should, therefore, be said that the past, future and present are nothing but different states of the effect which is really eternal; since, it is but reasonable that the intuitions, viz., "The water pot is past", "The water pot is present", and "The water pot is coming-to-be", should have similarity of forms; and not that one of them should have existence as its object, while the other two, non-existence as their object.

And it is these two states, viz., the past and the not-yet-come-to-pass, that cause the use of the expressions, consequent non-existence and antecedent non-existence; since there is no proof of two more non-existences different from them. Such is the hint. More on this point may be found in the Yoga Sûtram of Patañjali.

Likewise, absolute non-existence and reciprocal non-existence also are nothing but the essential forms of their substrata. It cannot be said that, such being the case, even during the existence of the counter-opposite, since the essential form of the substratum does not depart from

it, there would, therefore, at that time, arise the intuition of absolute non-existence; because our opponents also admit the presence of absolute non-existence thereof in a place containing the counter-opposite, and, further, because it is in the case of the past and the not-yet-come-to-pass states only, that the connection of the counter-opposite can become the absolute non-existence for the time being. Therefore, in our conclusion, Non-existence is not an additional principle.

Moreover, some one thing being looked for, as determining or regulating such intuitions as, "The water pot is destroyed", "The water pot will come to be", "The water pot does not exist here," etc., it is just something having the form of existence, that is conceived by us, for the sake of simplicity; while, it should be observed, there would be redundancy and intricacy in the supposition of Non-existence which is nowhere observed.—113.

(b) *There can be no production of what did not exist before.*

नासदुत्पादो नृशृङ्गवत् ॥ १ । ११४ ॥

न Na, no. असदुत्पादः Asat-utpādaḥ, production of what was non-existent. नृशृङ्गवत् Nṛi-śṛiṅga-vat, like the horn of man.

114. (There can be) no production of what did not exist before, as a man's horn.—114.

Vṛitti.—The author repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed before or of what did not exist before.

Things of a purely non-existent nature are a man's horn, etc. Things of a purely existent nature are Ākāśa (Ether), etc. Things which partake of the nature of both the existent and the non-existent, are a water pot, etc. Hence, one may ask, how can there be comparison with a man's horn? We reply that there can be no such doubt. For, (according to the theory of the opponent), a water pot, etc., would be non-existent during the period of their antecedent non-existence (i. e., so long as they were not produced), while the non-existence of a man's horn, and the like is perpetual; what is the difference between the two? If it be replied by the objector that the observation of the production of a water pot, etc., constitutes the difference; we can only admire his argumentative skill, for he puts forward in reply the very fact which is the subject of discussion.—114.

Bhāṣya.—The author states that the Theory of Existent Effects is established by the following argument also.

The very production of that which, like a man's horn, is a non-existence, is impossible. Such is the meaning.—114.

(c) *For every production, there must exist some material cause.*

उपादाननियमात् ॥ १ । ११५ ॥

उपादाननियमात् Upâdâna-niyamât, owing to the regulation of material causes.

115. Because there must be some determinate material cause for every product.—115.

Vṛitti.—The author sets forth an argument in support of the existence of effects even prior to their production.

The connection of the effect follows from the connection of the cause. And connection can take place only between things existent. Otherwise, production of effect would take place everywhere and at all times —115.

Bhâṣya.—The author gives the reason for the above conclusion.

A water pot can be produced from earth alone, a piece of cloth from threads only, etc. Thus it follows that there is a uniformity in regard to the material cause of effects. This would not be possible, (if effects were non-existent prior to their production). For, prior to production, the effects being non-existent in the cause, no such peculiarity or principle of differentiation is found to be present in the cause whereby it would produce some particular non-entity only, and not any other else. And if the existence of some such peculiarity is admitted, then, in consequence of the existence of an entity (in the shape of the peculiarity) thus entailed, the (theory of) non-existence is gone. And it is this very same peculiarity that is declared by us to be the not-yet-come or future or potential state of the effect.

Hereby is also refuted the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas that it is the antecedent non-existence or non-existence prior to production that determines the production of effects in particular forms. For, the supposition of an entity is simpler than the supposition of a non-entity. Further, entities are visible, and are independent of others. Moreover, on the existence, (if it is so asserted), of a distinctive peculiarity in non-entities themselves, the non-entities would no longer remain non-entities but would become entities; while a peculiarity in the form of the counter-opposite does not exist during the non-existence of the counter-opposite.

Hence non-entities having no distinctions of their own, it is not reasonable to hold that they can determine the production of effects, —115,

(d) *Else anything might occur any time anywhere.*

सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वासम्भवात् ॥ १ । ११६ ॥

सर्वत्र Sarvatra, in all places. सर्वदा Sarvadâ, at all times. सर्वासम्भवात् Sarva-asam-bhavât, on account of non-production of all things.

116. Because all things are not produced in all places, at all times.—116.

Vṛitti.—The author continues the very same argument. The meaning is quite manifest.—116.

Bhāṣya.—The author lays down a proof of the uniformity of the material cause.

The meaning is easy to grasp. On the absence of uniformity of the material cause, on the other hand, everything would be possible everywhere, always. Such is the import.—116.

(e) *Everything cannot be produced from everything else.*

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् ॥ १ । ११७ ॥

शक्तस्य Śaktasya, of the capable or competent. शक्यकरणात् Śakya-karaṇât, because of the execution or production of what is possible.

117. Because the production of what is possible, can be only from what is competent to cause such production.—117.

Vṛitti.—But, even in the absence of any particularity in the material cause (for determining the production of particular effects), their production will be regulated, says our opponent, by this that what is capable of production from another thing, the same can be produced from that thing alone. For, the thread does not certainly become the (material) cause of a water pot. Whence, then, can there be production of all things (I. 116)? To this the author replies.

“Śaktasya,” of the competent: Śakti or competency or potentiality: does it have the śakya or the possible as its subject or does it not? we ask. If it has the possible for its subject, then, the *existence* of the possible should be affirmed. If, on the other hand, it has not, then, there would be the production of a water pot from the thread, and the position would be the same (as discussed in I. 115 *supra*).—117.

Bhāṣya.—The author states that production of a non-entity cannot take place, for this reason also, namely :

Material causality is nothing but the possession of the power to become the effect. It can hardly be said to denote anything else. Besides, our interpretation is the simplest possible.

That power or potentiality is nothing but the not-yet-come-to-pass or undeveloped state of the effect. Hence, because that which is competent, can produce the effect that is capable of being produced from it, production of a non-entity cannot take place. Such is the meaning.—117.

(f) *Cause and Effect are identical.*

कारणभावाच्च ॥ १ । ११८ ॥

कारणभावात् Kāraṇa-bhāvāt, from the effect having the nature of the cause
च Cha, also.

118. And also because the effect possesses the same nature as the cause.—118.

Vṛitti.—The author states another argument.

Because the cause and the effect are one and the same. Even though modified into the form of the water pot, (it) does not cease to have the nature of earth. On the other hand, there can be no identity between what is existent and what is non-existent.

But, if they are identical, then, one may say, water should be carried by means of a lump of earth, as it is done in a pitcher. We reply that such would have been the case, were their identity atyanta or absolute. But it is not absolute.

In the case of their identity in difference, as maintained by us, there is, however, no fault. Thus

असत्त्वान्नास्ति संबन्धः कारणैः सत्त्वसंगिभिः ।

असंबन्धस्य चेत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्यवस्थितिः ॥

नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।

उभयोरपि दृष्टोऽन्तस्त्वनयोस्तत्त्वदर्शिभिः ॥

No connection takes place, from non-existence, with causes which attach themselves to existence. And with him who desires the production of what is not connected (with a cause), there is no regularity.

There is neither the production of what is non-existent, nor is there non-existence or destruction of what is existent. Those who have found out the Tattva or Reality, have seen the end of both of these.—Gītā II. 16.—118.

Bhāṣya.—From this also (follows the non-production of the non-existent).

The Veda declares the non-difference of the effect from the cause, even prior to its production. From this too, (eternally) existent effects being proved, production of what is non-existent, cannot be maintained. Such is the meaning. For, were the effect non-existent (prior to production), identity of the existent and the non-existent, as declared in the Veda, would be disproved.

On the identity of the effects with the causes, prior to their production, the declarations of the Veda are :

तद्धोदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्

That the same as this, was, then, unmodified.—Bṛi. Āraṇ Upa. I. iv. 7.

सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्

This (the world), O peaceful one, was verily existent at the beginning.—Chh. Upa. VI. ii. 1.

आत्मैवेदमग्र आसीत्

This, (the world), was verily the Self at the beginning.—Maitrī Upa. V. 2.

आप एवेदमग्र आसुः

This, (the world), was verily waters at the beginning.—Bṛi. Āraṇ. Upa. V. v. 1.—118.

Note :—In this connection (aphorisms 113-118), compare Kārikā IX :

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥ कारिका ॥ ९ ॥

The effect is always existent; because that which is non-existent, can never be brought into existence; because there must be a determinate relation of the cause with the effect; because all things are not produced in all places, at all times; because a competent cause can do that only for which it is competent; and also because the effect possesses the nature of the cause.

A doubt :—How can that which exists, be said to be produced?

न भावे भावयोगश्चेत् ॥ १ । ११६ ॥

न Na, not, भावे Bhāve, in existence. भावयोगः Bhāva-yogaḥ, conjunction of existence. चेत् Chet, if.

119. If (it be objected that there can be) no adjunction of existence (*i.e.*, production) to an existence, (we reply as in the next aphorism).—119.

Vṛitti—The author apprehends an objection.

If, “bhāva-yogaḥ” or production of the effect existent, “bhāve” be from the existent cause, then, there would be no such predication as “A water pot will be produced, is being produced, is destroyed.”—119.

Bhāṣya.—The author apprehends an objection.

But, then, the effect being thus eternal, “bhāva-yogaḥ,” adjunction of production, is not possible, in the case of the effect which is already of the form of an existence. Because we speak of the production of the non-

existent from the existent only. If this be the objection. Such is the meaning.—119.

Answer :—Production is only manifestation.

नाभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ ॥११२०॥

न Na, not, nay. अभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ Abhivyakti-nibandhanau, occasioned by manifestation (and non-manifestation). व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ Vyavahāra-avyavahārau, use and non-use (of the term 'production').

120. Nay ; the application and non-application of the term 'production' to an effect are occasioned by the manifestation (and non-manifestation of the effect as such).—120.

Vṛitti.—The author states the established tenet on the subject.

As the whiteness of a white cloth which had become dirty, is brought into manifestation by means of washing, etc., so is the water pot brought into manifestation through the operation of the potter ; whereas through the impact or blow of a mallet, it is made to disappear.

And manifestation is a fact of daily observation ; e. g., of the oil, from the sesamum-seeds, by pressure ; of milk, from the cow, by milking ; of rice, from paddy, by thrashing ; etc.

It is established, therefore, that the use of language (such as production, etc.,) as well as the difference in the denotation and function or use of the things are dependent on their manifestation.—120.

Bhāṣya.—The author repels the above doubt.

The employment or non-employment of the expression "production of an effect," has the manifestation (or non-manifestation) of the effect for its occasional cause. The predication of production depends on its manifestation, and the absence of the predication of production depends on the absence of manifestation ; but not on the coming into existence of a non-existence. Such is the meaning.

And manifestation is not a (subjective) cognition, but the present (actually existing) state of the effect. The operation of the cause also produces only that transformation of the effect which is characterised as being present (as distinguished from the past and the future). In the world also it is observed that it is only the manifestation of an effect which was existent from before, that takes place from the operation of the cause. As, for example, it is the manifestation only of the statue inherent in a block of marble, that takes place from the operation of the sculptor ; of oil inherent in sesamum-seeds, by pressure ; of rice grains in the paddy, by thrashing.

So has it been declared in the Yoga-Vâsiṣṭha Rāmāyaṇa :

सुषुप्तावस्थया चक्रपद्मरेखा शिलोदरे ।
यथा स्थिता चित्तेरन्तस्तथेयं जगदावली ॥

As the outlines of the discus and the lotus lie dormant in a block of marble, so does the system of the world lie within the mind or consciousness in a dormant state.

“In a dormant state,” *i.e.*, not the manifested world, but the world lies within the mind through Prakṛiti, *i.e.*, in the causal state.—120.

Destruction is disappearance in the cause.

नाशः कारणलयः ॥ १ । १२१ ॥

नाशः Nāśaḥ, disappearance, destruction. कारणलयः Kāraṇa-layaḥ, dissolution into the cause.

121. Destruction (of a thing means) the dissolution (of the thing) into its cause.—121.

Vṛitti.—But, (some one may say,) if production is due to the occasion of manifestation, to what occasion is due the predication of destruction? To this, the author replies.

From the blow of a club occurs the dissolution of the water pot into its cause (*i.e.*, the particles of earth from which it was produced); and this dissolution is the occasion for the predication of destruction about it. Thus arise the differences in the use of words (*e. g.*, production, destruction, etc.) and the object denoted (*e. g.*, water pot, etc.) and its use (for bringing water in, etc.)

But, (some one may say), if destruction is disappearance merely, re-appearance should be observed, but it is not observed. To this we reply that re-appearance is not observed by the stupid, but is observed by those who can discriminate. Thus, for example, when a thread is destroyed, it is changed into the form of earth; and the earth is changed into the form of the cotton-tree; and this transforms into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread. So is it with all existences.—121.

Bhāṣya.—Well, granted that the existent, (as supposed by you), somehow or other, may have an origin prior to its ‘production’ (as a manifested effect): but how can there be ‘destruction’ of an existence continuing from eternity? There being room for this enquiry, the author says.

“Laya,” according to the teaching of its derivation from the root *Lā* in the sense of enfoldment, means absence of disjunction from the causes, in consequence of subtlety. This very same state, called the

past, is said to be destruction or disappearance. Such is the meaning. And the Laya that is called not-yet-come-to-pass (future) state, is said to be antecedent non-existence. Thus the answer is complete.

Of the (very same) effect which, having once been manifested, has passed into dissolution, there can be no re-manifestation, since it would entail the recognition, etc. (of the re-produced effect), which is never found to occur. On these grounds the suggestion of re-manifestation has been refuted in the Aphorisms of Patañjali. (*Vide* Yoga Sûtras.)

Besides, in common with our opponents, we too hold that the not-yet-come-to-pass or potential state, called antecedent non-existence, is the cause of the manifestation (of an effect).

But, where is the evidence, may ask our opponent, to show that what is past and gone, does also exist? For, the Veda, etc., are not found to declare in plain terms the existence of what is past, as they do in the case of the existence of what has not-yet-come-to-pass.

Such is not the case, we reply. For both the past and the not-yet-come-to-pass are the objects of perception by the Yogin, which they could not be unless they were existent; hence the existence of both of them is proved. For, it is the object that is the cause of perception in general; as, otherwise, the consequence would be that even a present or actually existing object also would not be proved by perception. Therefore, when it is established beyond doubt that cognitions or ideas or percepts are adventitious, *i. e.*, caused by transference of forms of objects from the outside, and when no obstruction or cause of aberration exists, it is proved, by the perception of the Yogin, that the past object also exists. And the evidence of the Veda, Smṛiti, Itihâsa, etc., on the perception by the Yogin of things past and not-yet-come-to-pass, has been set forth in detail by us in our Yoga-Vârtika. Such is the hint.

Thus, then, is made out the predication of production and destruction in respect of the effects in consequence of their manifestation and dissolution.

Well, our opponent may ask, is this manifestation also existent from before, or is it non-existent from before? If it be existent, then, by means of the manifestation of the effect even prior to the operation of the cause, it would by itself be the cause of production of the effect (which is not desired by you), and, consequently, the operation of the cause would be ineffectual (which also is not desirable). If, on the other hand, it be non-existent, then, in the very admission or fact of manifestation, your doctrine of Existent Effects is lost; inasmuch as you then admit the manifestation of a non-existent manifestation.

To this our reply is as follows : By the admission of the constant existence of all effects prior to the operation of the cause, no room is left for the raising of such a dilemma. As in the case of a water pot, manifestation of the manifestation of the effects, (so long as it, the first manifestation, is not actually manifested as the manifestation of the effect), is in the state of antecedent non-existence in its present or actual manifested form, and, therefore, for the termination of that antecedent non-existence, it depends upon the operation of the cause. While its non-existence by the not-yet-come-to-pass or potential state, causes no harm to the doctrine of Existent Effects.

Neither is in this view the contradiction of Existence and Non-existence involved ; for, the difference between them has been declared to be in mode or manner of appearance only, and not real.

Nor can it be argued that, even so, by the non-admission of antecedent non-existence, the non-existence itself of the effects prior to the operation of the cause (i. e. the antecedent non-existence of effects) can hardly be asserted ; for, it is the state of the effects past, future, and present, which constitute the forms by which one state is non-existent, in relation to the other states.—121.

The Theory of Manifestation does not entail infinite regression.

पारम्पर्यतोऽन्वेषणा बीजाङ्कुरवत् ॥११२२॥

पारम्पर्यतः Pāramparyataḥ, of one from the other. अन्वेषणा Anveṣaṇā, seeking, pursuit. बीजाङ्कुरवत् Vija-āṅkura-vat, as is the case with the seed and the sprout or plant.

122. (There is no infinite regression), because they seek each other, as is the case with the seed and the plant. (Aniruddha.) Or, their reciprocal pursuit (is quite logical), like that of the seed and the plant. (Vijñāna Bhikṣu.)—122.

Vṛitti.—But, some one may ask, is this manifestation something existent, or is it something non-existent? If it be existent, then, apprehension of the effect should occur at every moment. If it be something non-existent, then, the theory of Existent Effects falls to the ground, because, of this also there would be another manifestation, of that also, again, yet another, and so on, and consequently, non-finality would be the result.

To this the author replies.

Let there be thousands of manifestations ; still it is no fault, as the succession is coming down reciprocally, from eternity, without beginning, like the reciprocal succession of the seed and the plant.—122.

Bhāṣya.—But, then, the opponent may say, a manifestation also of the manifestation should be desired for the purpose of maintaining the tenet of Existent Effects, and, accordingly, infinite regression would be the consequence. Apprehending this, the author says.

Manifestation should be followed up, “pâramparyatah,” only by the form of one after the other, and *vice versa*. And such eternal succession, or, rather, rotation, being, like that of the seed and the plant, quite logical (prâmāṇika or authoritative), is faultless. Such is the meaning.

And from the case of the seed and the plant, there is, in the present case, this difference that, in the case of the seed and the plant, the non-finality arises by means of *successive* reciprocity, while in the case of manifestation, it arises by means of *simultaneous* reciprocity. The validity of the inter-dependence is, however, the same in both the cases. The revered Vyāsa also has recognized this non-finality as valid or logical, while observing in his Commentary on the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali :

सर्वकार्याणां स्वरूपतो नित्यत्वमवस्थाभिर्विनाशित्वं च ।

All effects are eternal in their intrinsic forms, and are perishable in their manifested states. Vide S. B. II. Vol. IV. page 233, Sūtra IV. 12.

And here the example of the seed and the plant has been adduced from the popular point of view. In reality, however, it stands for Janma-karmavat, like that of birth and action, and signifies that, as birth leads to karma and karma leads to birth, so does one manifestation lead to the other, and *vice versa*. Although, therefore, the succession of seed and the plant is terminated by the original creation, and consequently, cannot be said to be infinitely regressive, still there is no harm to the present illustration.

And it is well known in the Veda and the Smṛiti that at the time of the original creation, even in the absence of the plant, the seed is produced at the will of Hiranya-garbhā or Brahmanā from his body, etc. ; *e. g.* it is declared to be so in the following passage of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, amongst others.

यथा हि पादपो मूलस्कन्धशाखादिसंयुतः ।

आदिबीजात् प्रभवति बीजान्यन्यानि वै ततः ॥

For, as the plant consisting of the root, the stem, the branches, etc., takes its rise from the original seed, so do many other seeds also from it.—Viṣṇu Purāṇa, II. vii. 32.—122.

Objection to the Theory of Manifestation retorted.

उत्पत्तिवद्वादोषः ॥११२३॥

उत्पत्तिवत् Utpatti-vat, like the Theory of Production or Creation (of the objectors). वा Vā, or. अदोषः A-dosaḥ, faultless, blameless.

123. Or, (at all events), (our Theory of Manifestation is) as faultless as that of production.—123.

Vṛitti.—The author states another argument.

Is 'production' produced, or is it not? If it be produced, then, of this (production) also there must be another production; and hence the result is non-finality, (the same as is alleged against our Theory of Manifestation). If it be not produced, then, is this because it is non-existent, or because it is eternal? If, because it is non-existent, then, production there is never at all, and, consequently, it would never be perceived, (a result which, of course, you do not desire). Again, if it be not produced because it is eternal, then, production of effects should take place at all times, (which, however, is not the case). Now, if you say: production itself being of the form of production, what need have we of supposing an ulterior production (of production)? then, in the same manner, we ask: since manifestation itself is of the form of manifestation, what need have we of supposing an ulterior manifestation (of manifestation)? So that the two theories are on a par with each other. What is your conclusion on this point, is ours also, (and thus all the objections alleged against our theory apply with equal force to yours also).—123.

Bhāṣya.—In reality, however, non-finality also is not entailed. This the author declares.

As, on the ground of simplicity, it is desired by the Vaiśeṣika and others who hold the Theory of the Production of the Non-existent, that production of the production of a water pot, for example, is essentially of the same form as the very form of it (production of the water pot), (so that the two productions are really one and the same thing and hence there is no infinite regression); in like manner, on the ground of simplicity, should it also be desired by us, that manifestation is the essential form of the manifestation of a water pot, for example. Hence, as in the Theory of Production, so also in the Theory of Manifestation, the fault of non-finality does not lie. Such is the meaning.

Now, it cannot be said that, manifestation of the manifestation being thus not admitted, the Theory of Existent Effects would be lost in

consequence of the impossibility of the existence of the manifestation prior to the operation of the cause. For, the idea is that, in the view we now express, the Theory of Existent Effects does not go further than saying that it is of the existent alone that manifestation can take place. It does not, in consequence, come to be the same as the Theory of Non-existent Effects, even though there be the non-existence of the manifestation prior to the operation of the cause on account of the non-existence of the manifestation of the manifestation.

But, our opponent may say, in like manner, the antecedent non-existence of Mahat, and the rest themselves may be desired (instead of that of their manifestation); what need of supposing their existence in the state called fitness for manifestation or potentiality? We reply that the question does not at all arise; the manifestation of those effects only which do exist in the Avyakta or unmanifested state, being established by such texts of the Veda as

तद्दीदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्

That, the same as this, was, then, unmodified-Bri. Ârap. Upa I. iv 7.

But still, may continue our opponent, it (denial of manifestation of manifestation) would entail the admission of the antecedent non-existence etc. of the manifestation. We reply, it would not; because, as has been already pointed out, the three states, not-yet-come-to-pass, etc., are of the form of the non-existence of one another mutually and because it is by the termination of the non-existence of this kind only that the operation of the cause can be fruitful. **सद्यमेव जयते**

For, the difference of the authors of the Theory of Existent Effects from the authors of the Theory of Non-existent Effects consists in this only that what are declared by them to be the antecedent non-existence and consequent non-existence, are declared by the authors of the Theory of Existent Effects to be the states, not-yet-come-to-pass and past respectively, of the effects having the form of existence. And the state of manifestation called present existence, is desired to be other than the (effects, e. g.,) the water pot, etc. (of which it is the state), because it is seen that the water pot, etc., possess the three states. In other respects, however, the two theories are similar. Hence there is no room for greater doubt in regard to our theory. Such is the hint.—123,

Points of resemblance in all products or effects.

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ॥११२४॥

हेतुम् Hetu-mat, having a cause, caused. अनित्यम् A-nityam, non-eternal, perishable. अव्यापि A-vyâpi, non-pervasive, finite. सक्रियम् Sakriyam, undergoing

change, mutable. अनेकम् Anekam, more than one, multitudinous. आश्रितं Āśritam, supported by something else, dependent. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, product, effect.

124. Effect (in general) is caused, non-eternal, non-pervasive, changeable, multitudinous, dependent.—124.

Vṛitti—The author states the similarity in property amongst the effects or products of Prakṛiti mutually.

“Hetu-mat,” having a cause. “Anityam,” perishable. “Sakriyam”, giving up the body previously assumed; the earth and the bodies have internal molecular movements also. “Anekam”, (multitudinous), in proportion to the multiplicity of different Puruṣas. “Āśritam,” (dependent) on the cause. “Liṅgam” (mergent), that which sets or is dissolved into its own cause.—124.

Vedāntin Mahādeva :—The word, Vyaktam, the manifested, i. e., the products, should be supplied as the complement of the aphorism.

Bhāṣya.—By the aphorism (I. 110 *supra*), “Because the apprehension thereof arises from seeing the effect,” it has been declared that the Root Cause should be inferred by means of the effect. Now, in regard to that, with a view to determine how far the range of effects extends, the author states the resemblance in property of all the effects, (in other words, gives the definition of the effect).

“Liṅgam,” mark of inference, or that which undergoes dissolution, denotes the whole class of effects, because they serve as the marks of inference of their causes, or because they pass into dissolution. Here it is not intended to denote the Principle Mahat alone, inasmuch as the characteristics of having a cause, etc., are common to all effects whatever. For this very reason, in the Kārikā also, all effect without exception, called the manifested, has been declared to be “Liṅgam”. Thus,

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।

सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ कारिका ॥ २० ॥

The Manifested is producible, perishable, finite, mutable, multiform, dependant, serving as the mark of inference, a combination of parts, subordinate. The Unmanifested is the reverse of this.—Kārikā, Verse X.

Thus, that (the Manifested), the “Liṅgam,” possesses the properties of being caused, etc. Such is the meaning of the sentence.

Of these (properties), that of being “hetu-mat” denotes the having a cause; “anityam,” destructibility; “a-vyāpi,” the opposite of the pervasiveness previously mentioned as belonging to Prakṛiti; “sakriyam,” the habit of constant activity, of the form of making ascertainment (in the

case of Mahat, for example), etc. ; while Prakṛiti, being the cause of all acts in general, cannot be said to act in merely a part of an effect. Nor can it be said that activity or acting is nothing but karma or act ; because in that case, activity would belong to her also, inasmuch as it follows, from the hearing from the Veda that Creation proceeds from the disturbance of Prakṛiti, that she too possesses acts (in the sense of giving birth to them).

“Manifoldness” consists in diversity according to the difference of creation, that is to say, that they are not the same in any two creation, and not the inclusion of, or extension to, many individuals of the same kind (jāti), as it would then be too wide and extend to Prakṛiti, because Prakṛiti also has many forms such Sattva, etc., as would appear from the subsequent aphorism (VI. 39) : Sattva and the rest are not the properties of Prakṛiti, because they are the very form thereof.

And “dependence” is on the parts of which they are made of.—124.

Proof of existence of effects as separate from the cause.

**आञ्जस्यादभेदतो वा गुणसामान्यादेस्तत्सिद्धिः प्रधान-
व्यपदेशाद् वा ॥११२५॥**

आञ्जस्यात् Āñjasyât, essentially (Aniruddha), easily, by perception (Vijñāna Bhikṣu). अभेदतः A-bhadatah, from identity. वा Vâ, or. गुणसामान्यादेः Guṇa-sāmānya-âdeh, of the common attributes, e. g., knowledge, pleasure, etc. of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (A), of the genera of Guṇas and karma or act, etc. (V). तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ, proof of existence in them, i. e., the twenty-four Principles (A), proof of the existence of the Liṅgam or effect as other than the cause (V). प्रधानव्यपदेशात् Pradhāna-vyapadeśât, from the use of the term pradhāna. वा Vâ, or.

125.—There is proof of the existence of these (common attributes of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School which you mention, e. g., cognition, pleasure, etc.) in the twenty-four Principles, from the fact that they are essentially identical with them as well as from the use of the term Pradhāna (which mediately is the cause of them all).—Aniruddha.

Or, there is proof of the separate existence of the Liṅgam or effect, in some cases by preception, in some, from its identity with the genera of Guṇa, Karma, etc., and in some, from the very use of the term Pradhāna which necessarily implies a separate effect.—Vijñāna Bhikṣu.—125.

Vṛitti.—But, some one may say, if the principles be the twenty-five, then, are such common acts as cognition, pleasure, etc., absolutely non-existent? If you say that it is so, then you give up what you see.

To this the author replies.

“Āñjasyât,” essentially. “A-bhedha,” (non-difference), i. e., from the twenty-four Principles, because the common attributes, etc., possess the character of these (twenty-four). “Tat-siddhiḥ,” proof of their existence through their inclusion just in these (twenty-four). The word “vâ” indicates an alternative reply. “Pradhâna-vyapadesât vâ”: the proof of the existence of these ordinary common attributes, knowledge, etc., is from the very use of the term Pradhâna, inasmuch as, since there is non-difference or identity between cause and effect, these attributes, etc., are not different from Pradhâna, being the effects thereof mediately through Mahat, etc. So that the non-enumeration of them by the author is not due to their non-existence. —125.

Bhāṣya.—The characteristics of being caused, etc., (mentioned in the preceding aphorism) can be established on the proof of the difference of the effect from the cause. For this reason the author sets forth the proofs which establish the existence of effects as contra-distinguished from the cause.

“Tat-siddhiḥ,” proof of the existence of the effect called Liṅgam, as other than the cause, is, in some cases, “Āñjasyât,” easily from Perception itself: e. g., by means of the grossness, or bulkiness, and other properties, a piece of cloth, etc., are proved to be separate from their causes, the threads, etc. In some cases, it is by means of inference by the mark, “Guṇasāmāny-âdêḥ abhedataḥ,” of their having the nature of the Guṇas, etc., in general: e. g., that of Mahat, etc., by means of their difference in property from their causes, which difference is of the form of their having the nature of the attributes such as ascertainment, etc.: also that of the earth, etc., by means of their difference in property from the Tan-mâtras, which difference is of the form of the Tan-mâtras having the nature of such higher genera as the being the Great (Element of) Earth, etc. In some cases, again, it is by means of the difference in property constituted by having the nature of karma or action, etc., alluded to by the word “âdi”: as e. g., that of the one with the members of the body moving, as other than the one with the members of the body remaining still.

So, again, existence of the effect as other than the cause, is proved also, “Pradhâna-vyapadesât,” from the use of the term Pradhâna in the Veda. For, it is called Pradhâna because all effect whatever, pradhîyate, is

founded in it. And this cannot possibly take place without the relation of identity-and-difference between the cause and the effect, inasmuch as, if they were absolutely non-different, it would be the foundation or substratum of itself, which is impossible. Such is the meaning.—125.

The common properties of Prakṛiti and her products.

त्रिगुणाचेतनत्वादि द्वयोः ॥११२६॥

त्रिगुणाचेतनत्वादि Triguṇa-achetanatva-ādi, the being constituted by the three Guṇas, the being unconscious, etc. द्वयोः Dvayoḥ, of both, i. e., the cause Prakṛiti and the effects, her products.

126. To both (Prakṛiti and her products) (belong) the characters of being constituted by the three Guṇas, being unconscious, etc.—126.

Vṛitti.—The author declares the resemblances between Prakṛiti and her effects or products.

Constituted by the three Guṇas. Unconscious. The word “ādi” denotes existence for the sake of another. “Dvayoḥ,” of the cause and the effect.—126.

Bhāṣya.—By the two preceding aphorisms have been shown the character of the effects consisting of the community of properties amongst themselves and also the evidence to prove the existence of the effects as other than their cause. Now, for the purpose of the inference of the cause (Prakṛiti), by means of its having properties similar to those of the effects, the author displays the similarity of properties also between the cause and the effects.

Similarity of properties, e. g., the being constituted by the three Guṇas, etc., “dvayoḥ,” belong to the cause and the effect only. Such is the meaning.

And the other properties included by the word “ādi” have been declared in the Kārikā, namely,

त्रिगुणमविवेकिविषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।

व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ कारिका ॥ ११ ॥

The Manifested (i. e. the effect) is constituted by the three Guṇas, is non-discriminative, objective, common, unconscious or non-intelligent, prolific. So is also Pradhāna (Prakṛiti). Puruṣa is the reverse of them both in these respects, and yet is similar (to Pradhāna in those other respects mentioned in Kārikā X).—Kārikā XI.

“Tri-guṇam,” that in which the Guṇas consisting of the forms of the substances Sattva, etc., lie. Of these two, the inference of Sattva,

etc., in Mahat, and the rest, is by the form of (being) their cause, while the inherence of Sattva, etc., in Pradhāna is by the form of a collection of the three Guṇas, as that of the individual trees in a forest. Or, since the words Sattva, etc., also denote Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, the cause and the effect may be said to be constituted by the three Guṇas in one and the same sense.

“A-viveki-*viṣayaḥ*,” visible or perceptible by the ignorant only. If the compound is split up into the two words “a-viveki” and “*viṣayaḥ*,” then, the being “a-viveki” would mean co-operativeness or acting by combination for the sake of another, and the being “*viṣayaḥ*” would mean the being the object of experience.

“Sāmānyam” common to all Puruṣas, that is to say, undifferentiated even in the case of Puruṣas being different.

“Prasava-dharṁi” undergoing transformation.

“Vyaktam” the effect or product.

“Pradhānam” the cause.

Such is the meaning.

The mutual difference in properties of the cause and the effect has also been displayed by the Kārikā.

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।

सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ कारिका ॥ १० ॥

The Manifested is producible, perishable, finite, mutable, multiform, dependent, serving as the mark of inference, a combination of parts, subordinate. The Unmanifested is the reverse of this.—Kārikā X.

In this verse, *ekatvam*, oneness, in “*anekam*,” more than one, denotes not-different-ness or identity even in different creations. Hence, although *Prakṛiti* covers lots of individuals, there is no harm caused thereby to her unity. That *Pradhāna* comprises a multitude of individuals is proved from the declaration of its innumerability in the following passage of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (II. vii. 25-26).

महान्तं च समाकृत्य प्रधानं समवस्थितम् ।

अनन्तस्य न तस्यान्तः संख्यानं चापि विद्यते ॥ विष्णुपुराणम् ॥ २।७।२५-२६ ॥

Pradhāna lies intact, unfolding *Mahat*. As it is infinite, there exists neither the end of it nor any enumeration.—126.

Points of dissimilarity amongst the Guṇas.

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यैर्गुणानामन्योऽन्यं वैधर्म्यम् ॥ १।१२७ ॥

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यैः *Prīti-aprīti-viṣāda-ādyaiḥ*, by means of pleasantness, unpleasantness, dullness, etc. *गुणानां* *Guṇānām*, of the *Guṇas*. *अन्योन्यं* *Anyonam*, from one another. *वैधर्म्यं* *Vaidharmyam*, difference in properties.

127. The mutual difference in property of the Guṇas arises by means of their pleasantness, unpleasantness, and dullness, etc.—127.

Vṛitti.—The author states the mutual differences of character amongst the three Guṇas which are the constituent parts of Prakṛiti.

“Pṛitiḥ” is Pleasure. By the word, ādi, is denoted the light and illuminating Sattva Guṇa. “Apritiḥ” is Pain. By the word, ādi, is denoted the exciting and restless Rajas Guṇa. “Viśādaḥ” is Bewilderment. By the word, ādi, is denoted the heavy and enveloping Tamas Guṇa.—127.

Bhāṣya.—For the purpose of the mutual discrimination of the Guṇas which are the causes of the world and are collectively called Pradhāna, the author establishes their minor differences of character also. An establishment of their dissimilarities is also necessary for the purpose of explaining how the three Guṇas can be the causes of this diversified world, inasmuch as variegated effects cannot possibly be produced from the same kind of causes.

“Guṇānām,” of the three Substances, viz., Sattva, etc., mutual dissimilarity is caused by their being of the nature of Pleasure, Pain, etc., because these qualities are observed in their effects. Such is the meaning. And, it has been declared, Pleasure, etc., are the properties of also the water pot, etc., just as Form-Colour, etc., are their properties, since the other effects (those which come after the production of the Antaḥ-karṇa), have the Antaḥ-karṇa for their material cause.

The properties included in this aphorism by the word, ādi, have been thus declared by Āchārya Pañchasikha :

सत्त्वं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रोतितितिश्वासन्तोषादिरूपानन्तभेदं समासतः
सुखात्मकम् । एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतः दुःखात्मकम् । एवं तमोऽपि
निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतौ मोहात्मकम् ॥

What is called Sattva, is of infinite variety under the forms of purity or clearness, lightness, love, agreeableness, renunciation, contentment, etc., which are summed up by the word Pleasant. Similarly, Rajas also possesses many varieties, such as, grief, etc., which are summed up by the word Painful. So, also, does Tamas possess many varieties, such as, sleep, etc., which are summed up by the word Bewildering.

Whereas in the present aphorism pleasantness etc., are declared to be the properties of the Guṇas, and whereas in the next aphorism lightness, etc., are going to be similarly declared, the substanceness of Sattva, etc., is thereby established. That the Guṇas partake of the nature of Pleasure, etc., is, however, justified according to the maxim that the

subject and its (essential) property are identical, as is the case with the Manas partaking of the nature of volition; and not that it is Pleasure, etc., just the same as mentioned by the Vaiśeṣikas, that are the qualities of Sattva, etc.

The triad of Sattva, etc., again, are also infinite according to the diversity of individuals. For, the alternative tenet that while the Guṇas are universal merely, diversity of effects would follow from the diversity of their concurrence with one another, would not be a reasonable one, since, in a case of concurrence, there is no possibility of the appearance of minor or secondary differences.—127.

Assimilation and differentiation of the individual manifestations of the Guṇas.

लघ्वादिधर्मैः साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं च गुणानाम् ॥११२८॥

लघ्वादिधर्मैः Laghu-ādi-dharmaih, by the properties of lightness, etc. साधर्म्यं Sādharmyam, similarity. वैधर्म्यं Vaidharmyam, dissimilarity. च Cha, and. गुणानाम् Guṇānām, of the Guṇas.

128. By means of the properties of Lightness, etc., arise the similarity and the dissimilarity of the Guṇas.—128.

Vṛitti.—In the course of describing their dissimilarity, the author states their similarity.

("Laghu-ādi-dharmaih"), by (the properties or) of Lightness (Sattva), Restlessness (Rajas), and Heaviness (Tamas). Hereby their dissimilarity is declared. Similarity is indicated by the word "adi." And it consists of existence for the purpose of accomplishing the end of Puruṣa, and mutually predominating over one another, producing one another, and consorting together.—128.

Bhāṣya.—Were the Guṇas each a single manifestation only, their increase, decrease, and the like would not be reasonable. So, again, if, (for the purpose of accounting for the increase, decrease, and the like in the infinite number of individual manifestations—objects—in the world), they are said to be conditioned, determined or divided into parts by means of limiting conditions, then, in consequence thereof, their collective form, Pradhāna, would be similarly determined (which is not desirable), and, consequently, the simultaneous existence of innumerable worlds, etc., as proved in the Veda and the Smṛiti, would not be explained. Hence (the manifestations of) the Guṇas being proved to be innumerable, the author, for the purpose of accounting for the application of the number three to

them as well as for the purpose of their mutual discrimination, establishes their similarity and dissimilarity.

The meaning is this :—The expression “Laghu-âdi” points to the state (of being Light, *i. e.*, Lightness, etc.) as the chief import. By means of the properties of Lightness, etc., arises the similarity of all individual manifestations of Sattva, as well as their dissimilarity from (those of) Rajas and Tamas. So that, as that of the individual manifestations or products of Earth, by means of the characteristic of their being of earth, earthy, likewise are justifiable the oneness of the individual manifestations of Sattva, by means of their being of one and the same kind, as well as their increase, decrease, and the like, by means of the excitation or motion caused by the predominance of their likes. Such is the import. Similarly, by means of the properties of Restlessness, etc., arise the similarity of all the individual manifestations of Rajas, as well as their dissimilarity from Sattva and Tamas. The rest is as before. Similarly, again, by means of the properties of Heaviness, etc., arise the similarity of all individual manifestations of Tamas, as well as their dissimilarity from Sattva and Rajas. The rest is as before.

Dissimilarity having been stated before, the repetition of it here is only incidental.

In this aphorism the reading “Vaidharmyam cha” is clearly erroneous.

In this aphorism, it is established that each of the *causal* substances, Sattva, etc., has manifold individual manifestations. Because, otherwise it would not be reasonable to say that Lightness, etc., are similarities, since it is the property of similars that alone constitutes their similarity. It cannot be said that Lightness, etc., would be the similarity in consequence of the manifoldness of Sattva, etc., as *effects*; because, in that case, since a water pot, (which is not light but is heavy), etc., also, being essentially made of the three Guṇas, are of the form of Sattva, etc., as *effects*, the similarity of Sattva, etc., in respect, of Lightness etc., would not be proved. It follows, therefore, that it is of the Guṇas as *causes* only that similarity, etc., are declared here.

And the Lightness, etc., of Sattva, etc., have been declared by the Kârîkâ.

सत्त्वं लघुप्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलंच रजः ।

गुरु वरणकमेव तमः प्रक्षीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ कारिका ॥ १३ ॥

Sattva is considered to be Light and Illuminating, and Rajas, to be Exciting and Restless, and Tamas, Heavy and Enveloping. Like a lamp (consisting of oil, wick, and fire), they co-operate for a purpose (by union of contraries),—Kârîkâ, Verse XIII.

“Arthataḥ”, in the above verse, means: because the fulfilment of the end of Puruṣa is the nimitta or occasion or the instrumental cause of their action.

But, some one may ask, what is the difference (of the Sāṃkhya) from the Vaiśeṣika doctrine in regard to the innumerable conditioned or finite individual manifestations of the Root Cause? We would reply that it is just this that the Causal Substance (of the Sāṃkhya) is devoid of the attributes of Sound, Touch, etc., as taught in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, etc. Thus,

शब्दस्पर्शविहीनं तु रूपादिभिरसंयुतम् ।

त्रिगुणं तज्जगद्योनिरनादिप्रभवाव्ययम् ॥ विष्णुपुराणम् २।२।२०-२१॥

The Combination of the three Guṇas (Prakṛiti) is devoid of Sound and Touch, and is unconnected with Form, etc. That is the origin of the world, and is without beginning, production and destruction.—Viṣṇu Purāṇa I. ii. 20-21.

And this point has been elaborated by us in the Yoga Vārtika (on the Aphorisms of Patañjali.)—128.

Proof that Mahat, etc., are effects.

उभयान्यत्वात् कार्यत्वं महदादेर्घटादिवत् ॥११२६॥

उभयान्यत्वात् Ubhaya-anyatvât, being different from both, *i.e.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. कार्यत्वं Kâryatvam, effectueness. महदादेः Mahat-âdeḥ, of Mahat, etc., घटादिवत् Ghaṭa-âdi-vat, like a water pot, etc.,

129. Since they are different from both (*i.e.*, Puruṣa and Prakṛiti—the only two uncaused entities), Mahat, etc., are effects, like a water pot, etc.—129.

Vṛitti.—By the aphorism “Hetumat etc.” (I. 124 *supra*), Mahat, etc., have been declared to be effects. The author now gives the proof of this.

(“Ubhaya-anyatvât”): because they are other than Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, the eternal ones. The rest of the aphorism is clear. — 129.

Bhāṣya.—But, some one may say, that, although Mahat, etc., may be said to be established (by what has been stated above), so far as their svarūpa or essential form (*i.e.*, subtle, causal or Prakṛitic state) is concerned, still, when their production is not seen by Perception, there is no proof that they become effects, whereby the being caused (hetumatva, I. 124 *supra*) would be their similarity in property. In regard to this, the author says.

The Principles beginning with Mahat and ending with the five (Gross Elements,) which form the subject of dispute, by no means, belong

to the category of Puruṣa, because they are the objects of experience (bhogya). Neither do they belong to the category of Prakṛiti, because, since they are perishable, Release would not result otherwise, (that is, if they belonged to the category of Prakṛiti, they would not be perishable, and, consequently, Release would not be possible. The fact that Release can be attained, is one of the reasons for the conclusion that Mahat, etc., are perishable). Hence it follows that everything other than Puruṣa and Prakṛiti is, in consequence of their very otherness, an effect, as is the case with a water pot, and the like. Such is the meaning.—129.

A second proof.

परिमाणात् ॥११३०॥

परिमाणात् Parimāṇāt, from measure, delimitedness, finiteness.

130. Because of their limitedness.—130.

Vṛitti.—The author states another reason.

(Mahat, etc., are effects), because they are of a limited size.—130.

Bhāṣya.—But Release, etc., being possible by the very means of burning, etc., (i. e. counteracting, and not destroying) the powers of the Transformations, their perishableness also is not established. With this apprehension, the author gives other reasons to show that they are effects.

(“Parimāṇāt”): because they are conditioned or circumscribed, that is to say, because they possess the jāti or class or general characteristic which serves to determine their being the counter-opposite of spatial non-existence or emptiness in space. Such is the meaning. Therefore, although some of the manifestations of the Guṇas are of a finite measure, still there is no violation of the rule in regard to them (that is, they are not imperishable).—130.

A third proof.

समन्वयात् ॥११३१॥

समन्वयात् Samanvayāt, from conformity, agreement, correspondence.

131. Because of their correspondence (with Prakṛiti), (Anirudha). Or, because of their assimilation. (Vijñāna-Bhikṣu).—131.

Vṛitti.—The author states another argument.

Because of their complete correspondence with Pradhāna, as it is observed that the attributes of Pradhāna exist in all objects.—131.

Bhāṣya.—Moreover :

For, the principle Buddhi, etc., which had become weak on account of fast and the like, grows strong again by means of food, etc. “samanvayāt,” through the complete assimilation of the food with it. Hence from assimilation, it is inferred that they are effects. Such is the meaning. For, in the case of that which is eternal, and consequently partless, assimilation in the form of the entering of parts from the outside does not take place.

In regard to assimilation, there is the evidence of the Veda, with reference to Manas :

एवं ते सौम्य षोडशानां कलानामेका कलातिशिष्टाभूत् सान्नोपसमाहिता
प्राज्वालीत्

Likewise, O peaceful one, only one kalā (sixteenth part) among the sixteen kalās of yours, was left in you. Being nourished with food (rice), it was kindled up again.—Chh. Upa. VI. vii. 6, S. B. H. Vol. III.

There is also the testimony of the Yoga Sūtras (IV. 2) :

जात्यन्तरपरिणामः प्रकृत्यापूरात् ॥४२॥

Transformation into other life-states, (e. g., from man to god), takes place through assimilation of parts of the body and the senses taken from the all-pervading Prakṛiti.—S. B. II. Vol. IV. page 209.—131.

A fourth proof.

शक्तितश्चेति ॥११३२॥

शक्तिः.—Śaktitah, through the power of Prakṛiti (Aniruddha), through their being the instruments of Puruṣa (Vijñāna Bhikṣu). च Cha, and. इति Iti, finally.

132. And, finally, because they energise through the power of Prakṛiti (Aniruddha), or, because they are the instruments of Puruṣa (Vijñāna Bhikṣu).—132.

Vṛtti.—The author continues the same chain of arguments.

An effect energises through the power of the cause. Accordingly, Mahat, etc., being powerless themselves, produce their effects by drawing upon the power of Prakṛiti or through being filled with power by Prakṛiti. Otherwise, since it is their habit to be active, they would at all times produce their effects, (which however is not the fact).—132.

Bhāṣya.—Furthermore :

Also because they are instruments. Such is the meaning. That which is a karaṇa or instrument of Puruṣa, is an effect, as is the case with the eye, etc. Such is the import.

It is not the case that Prakṛiti directly hands over objects to Puruṣa. Therefore, Prakṛiti is not the instrument of Puruṣa.

Hence the principle Mahat being established as an effect by means of its instrumentality, it necessarily follows that the rest also are effects.

The word "iti" indicates the end of the series of the arguments.—132.

Note :—With reference to those four aphorisms, (129-132), compare Kārikā XV :—

भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् शक्तिः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

कारणकार्यविभागाद् विभागाद्वैश्वरूपस्य ॥ कारिका ॥ १५ ॥

(The Unmanifested cause exists): since specific objects (Mahat, etc.) are finite; since they possess a certain similarity in form as a general characteristic; since they enorgise through power which they themselves do not possess; since there is the division of cause and effect; since there is undividedness or reunion of the universe at the time of dissolution.

Negative proof that Mahat, etc. are effects.

तद्धाने प्रकृतिः पुरुषो वा ॥११३३॥

तद्धाने Tat-hāne, on the quitting or elimination thereof, i. e., of the condition of the effect. प्रकृतिः Prakṛtiḥ, Prakṛiti. पुरुषः Puruṣaḥ, Puruṣa. वा Vā, or.

133. On the elimination of the character of the effect, what remains must be either Puruṣa or Prakṛiti.—133.

Vṛitti.—The author gives a negative proof (by showing what becomes of Mahat, etc., when they pass away from the state of being effects).

Effect and not-effect, these are the two alternatives. So that when Mahat, etc. give up the condition of effect, they necessarily enter into the category of either Puruṣa or Prakṛiti.—133.

Bhāṣya.—And even if it be admitted that, among Mahat, etc., there may be some which are not effects, still then the same must be either Puruṣa or Prakṛiti, and thereby our object will be accomplished, because the whole scope of our philosophy is just this that, after establishing the existence of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, they should be discriminated from each other by means of their transformability and non-transformability. This the author declares.

"Tat-hāne," on the elimination of the condition of effect, if it is transformable, then it is Prakṛiti, and if, on the other hand, non-transformable experiencor, then, Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—133.

What is not an effect, and, at the same time, is neither Puruṣa nor Prakṛiti, is a void.

तयोरन्यत्वे तुच्छत्वम् ॥११३४॥

तयोः 'Tayoḥ, from them. अन्यत्वे Anyatve, being different. तुच्छत्वम् Tuchchhatvam, nothingness, voidness.

134. If (a non-effect is) other than these two (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti,) it would be nothing.—134.

Vṛitti.—If it be said that Mahat, etc. may very well be quite outside the pair of alternatives mentioned above: so the author declares.

If Mahat, etc. be other than these, *i. e.*, effect and not-effect, they would be nothing, *i. e.*, of the form of non-existence.—134.

Bhāṣya.—But, it may be said, even an eternal entity may very well be different from both (Puruṣa and Prakṛiti). To this the author replies.

If a not-effect be other than Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, it would be void, like the horn of a hare, on account of absence of proof of its existence. For, a not-effect is proved either as the cause (Prakṛiti) or as the experiencer (Puruṣa), and not otherwise. Such is the meaning.—134.

Ground of inference of cause from effect.

कार्यात् कारणानुमानं तत्साहित्यात् ॥११३५॥

कार्यात् Kāryât, from effect. कारणानुमानं Kāraṇa-anumānam, inference of cause. तत्साहित्यात् Tat-sāhityat, through accompaniment thereof, *i. e.*, of the effect by the cause.

135. The inference of the cause from the effect is made through the accompaniment of the effect by the cause.—135.

Vṛitti.—But why should Mahat, etc., be the inferential marks of Prakṛiti, by means of the characteristic of being effects thereof, (*i. e.* through causation)? They will be the mark of inference, some one may say, merely through the relation of a-vinâ-bhâva or of one not being without the other (*i. e.* co-existence.) In regard to this the author says.

This may be the case, (that is, a-vinâ-bhâva may be the ground of inference), where the form or nature of the cause is not seen in the effect, as, *e. g.*, in the case of the inference of the swollenness of the ocean from the rising of the moon. In the present case, on the other hand, from seeing the form or nature of Pradhâna in Mahat, etc., it is the inference of the cause that is made from the effect.

“Tat-sāhityât”: from seeing the form or nature of Prakṛiti in Mahat etc.—135.

Bhāṣya.—Thus, then, after establishing the character of effect as belonging to Mahat, etc., the author now points out a peculiarity, not mentioned before, in the inference of Prakṛiti by means of them as the inferential marks.

The inference, Sāmānyato Dṛṣṭa, that has been stated above (*vide* aphorism I. 103 *supra*), of the cause (Prakṛiti) through the effects, Mahat Tattva, etc. as marks, that, in order to prevent its being of an external character as that of the inference of two independent things only externally related, should be made “tat-sāhityāt”, just by means of the relation of the cause accompanying the effect, in accordance with the teachings of the Veda, *e. g.*,

सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्

This, O peaceful one, was verily existent at the beginning.—Chh. Upa. VI. ii. 1.

तम एवेदमग्र आसीत्

This was verily Tamas or Darkness at the beginning.—Maitr. Upa. V. 2.

And that (process of inference) is as follows :

Mahat, etc. have for their material cause a substance constituted by the three Guṇas which are super-imposed upon them,

Because they are effects,

As is the case with the statue inherent in a block of marble,

As is also the case with the oil, etc. present in oil-seeds, etc.

Such is the meaning.

Argument favourable or in support of the above inference has been set forth before.—135.

The Manifested is the mark of inference of the Unmanifested.

अव्यक्तं त्रिगुणाल्लिङ्गात् ॥११३६॥

अव्यक्तं Avyaktam, the Unmanifested, Prakṛiti. त्रिगुणात् Trigunāt, made of the three Guṇas. लिङ्गात् Liṅgāt, from the effect.

136. The Unmanifested must be inferred from the Liṅgam or effect in which the three Guṇas are present.—136.

Vṛitti.—But, (it may be objected), if it be so (*i. e.*, that the nature of Prakṛiti is present in Mahat, etc.), then, let the Principle Mahat itself be the cause of the world ; what need of Pradhāna? To this the author replies.

Pradhāna should be inferred from the Liṅgam, *etymologically* that which goes to dissolution, namely, the Principle Mahat, containing the three Guṇas. And it is established by Perception that the Principle Mahat which is of the form of ascertainment, is a manifested entity, and is perishable. By means of it is made the inference of that (*viz.*, Prakṛiti) of which it is the Liṅgam, effect or mark.—136.

Bhāṣya.—For the purpose of discriminating the difference in property of this Prakṛiti from the effects, the author says.

The Root Cause, the Unmanifested, is subtler than even the manifested Principle Mahat made of the three Guṇas; because the attributes of the Principle Mahat, *e. g.*, Pleasure, etc., are directly perceived, while no attribute of Prakṛiti is directly perceived. Prakṛiti is absolutely unmanifested, whereas, by comparison with her, the Principle Mahat is a manifested entity. Such is the meaning.—136.

The existence of Prakṛiti cannot be ignored.

तत्कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेर्नापलापः ॥११३७॥

तत्कार्यतः Tat-kāryataḥ, from the effect thereof, *i. e.*, of Prakṛiti. तत्सिद्धेः Tat-siddheḥ, because there is proof thereof, *i. e.*, of Prakṛiti. न Na, no. अपलापः Apalāpah, denial, ignoring.

137. There can be no denial of Prakṛiti, because the existence of Prakṛiti is established through her products.—137

Vṛitti—But, some one may say, something quite different may be the cause of the world; what need of Prakṛiti? To this the author replies.

The cause in question must be either an effect or a not-effect. If it be an effect itself, then, the same being the case with its cause, there would be infinite regression. If it be the original or root or primordial effect, then, this itself is that, namely, Prakṛiti. “Tat-kāryataḥ”, from the effects of Prakṛiti, existence of Prakṛiti being established, there can be no ignoring of Prakṛiti.—137.

Bhāṣya.—But, some one may say, if Prakṛiti were transcendently subtle, then, it deserves to be ignored altogether. There being room for this doubt, the author reminds of what has been stated before.

The aphorism is easy to understand.—137.

Existence of Puruṣa requires no proof.

सामान्येन विवादाभावाद्धर्मवन्न साधनम् ॥११३८॥

सामान्येन Sāmānyena, in a general way, as to the existence of Puruṣa. विवादाभावात् Vivāda-abhāvāt, there being no dispute. धर्मवत् Dharma-vat, as is the case with Dharma or Merit. न Na, no. साधनम् Sāadhanam, means of proof, ground of inference. Aniruddha reads tat, that, between ‘na’ and ‘Sāadhanam.’ This ‘tat’ refers to the relation of cause and effect which is the ground of inference in the case of Prakṛiti.

138. No means of establishing (the existence of Puruṣa is required), because there is no dispute on the general question (that Puruṣa exists), as is the case with Dharma.—138.

Vṛitti.—Granted, may say our opponent, that the existence of Prakṛiti is established; but the existence of Puruṣa cannot be established, because Puruṣa does not, according to your theory, produce any effect. In regard to this the author says.

There is no dispute whatever in regard to the Self on the general question (of its existence, for everybody is agreed that there exists such a thing as Self); for, the dispute is as to its particular character, that is, whether it be manifold or one, all-pervading or not all-pervading, etc. As, for example, in all systems of philosophy, there is no dispute that such a thing as Dharma exists, and opinions differ only as to its particular nature.

“Na tat-sâdhanam”;: the relation of cause and effect is not the means of proof of the existence of Puruṣa. “I will mention some other means”—such is the intention.—138.

Bhâṣya.—The peculiarities belonging to the inference of Prakṛiti have been discussed in detail. Henceforth, until the end of the Book, the peculiarities belonging to the inference of Puruṣa are the subject of discussion. From among them, the author mentions one peculiarity which presents itself at the beginning.

The establishment of a thing in its essential form (svarûpa) or in the form of an existence merely, is not looked for, where there is no dispute in respect of the thing in its universal or general aspect of being existent: as of Dharma. Such is the meaning.

The idea is as follows: As the establishment of Prakṛiti was looked for even under the general aspect of her existence, because there was dispute as to the existence of something which might be taken to be the subject of properties (*viz.*, Pleasure, Pain and Bewilderment) actually observed, so is not looked for the establishment of Puruṣa, inasmuch as on the ignoring of the existence of a conscious being, the world would become dark, and also because even the Bauddhas do not dispute the existence in general of something of which the “I” may be predicated, as the experiencer. As is the case with Dharma: For Dharma is generally (though not in the particular characters given to it by thinkers of the orthodox schools) admitted by the Bauddhas also, when they admit

that the power of walking upon heated stones is due to Dharma or Merit. Hence, in respect of Puruṣa, should be made the inference only of his eternality, discrimination, etc.

Also, by the previous aphorism (I. 66 *supra*): “Saṁbhata-para-
artha-tvât”, it is only the inference of the discrimination of Puruṣa, that
is intended; and it is not intended there that Puruṣa is by no means an
object of Perception.*—138.

Puruṣa is different from Prakṛiti and her products.

शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः पुमान् ॥११३६॥

शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः Śarīra-âdi-vyatiriktaḥ, different from, other than, the body, etc.
पुमान् Puman, Puruṣa.

139. Puruṣa is something other than the body, etc.—
139.

Vṛitti.—But, it may be said, it is the body, the senses, and the like,
that is the Self; what need of imagining anything else? In regard to this
the author says.

The meaning is quite plain.—139.

Bhāṣya.—Of these, (eternality, discrimination, etc.), at the opening of
the present discourse, the author lays down an aphorism enunciating the
discrimination of Puruṣa.

Puruṣa, *i. e.*, the Experiencer, is other than the things, beginning
with the body and ending with Prakṛiti, which are made of the twenty-
four Principles. And experiencership consists in being the witness of
the changes in the products of Prakṛiti.—139.

The discernible is subservient to the indiscernible.

संहतपरार्थत्वात् ॥११४०॥

संहतपरार्थत्वात् Saṁbhata-para-artha-tvât, because a structure made up of parts
exists to serve the purpose of another who is not so made.

140. Because a structure formed by a combination of
parts, exists for the benefit of another not so formed.—140.

Vṛitti.—The author states an argument in support of the above
proposition.

That which is formed by a combination of parts, exists to serve the
purpose of some other not formed by a combination of parts. If it were

* Garbe, Hall, and Jivânanda all read this passage as part of the introduction to the
next aphorism. This, however, is wrong, as the sense and context would at once show.

said to exist for the benefit of some other formed also by a combination of parts, the result would be infinite regression.

And the being formed by a combination of parts means the production of effects by the Guṇas by means of the relation of their consorting with one another. Or, the being formed by a combination of parts denotes the possession of fluidity (including liquidity) and solidity. And this (the being formed by a combination of parts) lies hidden in Prakṛiti, etc., as, otherwise, the consequence would be the non-observation of the condition of being formed by a combination of parts in their effects.—140.

Bhāṣya.—Now the author gives the reasons for the above proposition in the following aphorisms.

Inasmuch as all that is formed by a combination of parts, *e. g.*, Prakṛiti, etc., is for the benefit of some other not so formed, as is the case with a bed, etc; hence is established something other than the body, etc., which are formed by combinations of parts, that is, something not formed by a combination of parts, that is Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

And this argument has been explained under the aphorism: “Samhata-para-artha-tvât Puruṣasya” (I. 66 *supra*). The repetition of the argument which has been already stated before, is for the purpose of collecting all the arguments in one place.—140.

A second argument

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् ॥११४१॥

त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात् Triguṇa-âdi-viparyayât, from the absence of the properties of the three Guṇas, etc.

141. (Puruṣa is different from the body, etc., also) because there is in him the reverse (of the properties) of the three Guṇas, etc.—141.

Vṛitti.—The author elucidates the same point.

“Triguṇa-âdi-viparyayât”: from the non-observation of the properties of the three Guṇas, etc., in Puruṣa. The word “âdi” implies the non-observation of the other properties also of Prakṛiti.—141.

Bhāṣya.—Moreover :

From (seeing in Puruṣa) the reverse of the characteristics of partaking of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Bewilderment etc. Such is the meaning. For, the property of partaking of the nature of, and thereby being the cause of, Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment, which belongs to the body, etc., cannot belong to the experiencer of Pleasure, etc., since, in that case, Pleasure, etc., being the experiencer of themselves, there would be the

contradiction of the act and the agent; since the perception of Pleasure, etc. takes place only by seeing them reflected in the subject of the properties, *i. e.*, Buddhi in which Pleasure, etc. inhere.

But, our opponent may say, Pleasure, etc. (which according to him would be the properties of Puruṣa), being reflected in the modifications of Buddhi, may be received by Puruṣa, as is the case with himself (*i. e.*, cognition of himself through reflection in Buddhi). We reply that it cannot be so; as, in that case, it would be but proper to suppose Pleasure, etc., to be properties of Buddhi itself, because of redundancy in the supposition of the reflection in Buddhi of Pleasure, etc., belonging to Puruṣa.

Intuitions, again, such as "I feel pleasure," "I feel pain," "I am in delusion," etc., do not prove that Pleasure, etc., inhere in Puruṣa, because they can be attributed to the fact that Pleasure, etc., belong to Puruṣa in the sense in which a thing belongs to its owner, as well as to the fact that Pleasure, etc. reside in Buddhi. For, Buddhi also must be the subject of the idea of the "I" current among the common people, because the faults in the shape of false knowledge, tendency or desire, etc., re-appear or enter into it, and, further, because there would be redundancy in the supposition of these intuitions being only reflections in Buddhi.

By the word "âdi" here are to be included non-discriminateness, etc. declared by the Kārikâ beginning with

त्रिगुणमविवेकि

The Manifested (*i. e.* the effect) is constituted by the three Guṇas, is non-discriminative.—Kārikâ, verse X (*vide* page 182 *supra*, under aph. 126).

Similarly should also be included the properties of the body, etc., namely, Form (Rûpa), etc.—141.

A third argument.

अधिष्ठानाच्चेति ॥११४२॥

अधिष्ठानात् Adhiṣṭhânât, from superintendence or governorship. च Cha, and, also. इति Iti, finally.

142. And, finally, (Puruṣa is different from the body, etc.), because of his superintendence (over them).—142.

Vṛitti.—The author states another argument.

For, a superintendent must be an intelligent being, while Prakṛiti is non-intelligent. Such is the meaning.—142.

Bhāṣya;—Furthermore:

From the fact that the experiencer is the superintendent, it follows that he is other than the entities that are superintended over, *viz.*, those ending with Prakṛiti. Such is the meaning.

For, superintendence consists in the conjunction of the experiencer. And this conjunction is the cause of the transformations of Prakṛiti, etc., which (transformations) cause experience, as will appear from the future aphorism (V. 114) :

भोक्तृरधिष्ठानात् भोगायतननिर्माणम्॥५॥११४॥

From the superintendence of the Experiencer, takes place the building of the house of experience (i. e., the body).—Sâmkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram, V. 114 *infra*.

And conjunction is possible only where there is difference (of the things conjoined). Such is the import.

The word “iti” marks the end of the series of arguments.—142.

A fourth argument.

भोक्तृभावात् ॥१॥१४३॥

भोक्तृभावात् Bhoktri-bhâvât, from being the experiencer.

143. (Puruṣa is other than the body, etc.), because of his being the Experiencer.—143.

Vṛtti.—The author states another argument.

The object of experience is Prakṛiti, the experiencer is Puruṣa. Although experiencership does not properly belong to the Self on account of its remaining immutable in all ages, still it is attributed to it, as has been already explained (*vide* aphorism 58), because of the fact that the reflection of Buddhi occurs to it or that it casts its reflection in Buddhi, and thereby comes in contact with the objects of experience.—143.

Bhâṣya.—By the next two aphorisms the author sets forth favourable arguments confirming the above inference of the discrimination of Puruṣa from Prakṛiti.

For, were the experiencer to be essentially of the same form as the body, etc., and nothing else, then experiencership itself would be contradicted and disproved, on account of the contradiction of the act and the agent ; since there is so proof that a thing can directly be the experiencer of itself. Such is the meaning. The absence of proof just now alluded to has been already explained.

In the present aphorism, it should be remembered, it is admitted that experience belongs to Puruṣa. And the experience of Puruṣa who does not undergo transformation, has been explained in the aphorism (I. 104 *supra*.) “Chit avasâno bhogah” : The end of experience is in Consciousness.—143.

A fifth argument.

कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥११४४॥

कैवल्यार्थं Kaivalya-artham, for the purpose of the absolute independence or isolation of Puruṣa. प्रवृत्तेः Pravritteḥ, exertion or activity being. च Cha, and.

144. (Puruṣa is other than the body, etc.), because all activity is for the purpose of the isolation of Puruṣa.—144.

Vṛitti.—Activity is with a view to Release. Now, is this activity for the benefit of the Self or of Prakṛiti? To this the author replies.

Since she partakes of the nature of the three Guṇas, there can be no lapse or deviation of nature (as, for instance, by means of isolation) in the case of Prakṛiti. Further, because that would entail her non-eternality. Isolation (kaivalya) is possible of that of which the attributes are adventitious and not constitutive; and that is the Self.—144.

Bhāṣya.—Still further:

If it be said that the experiencer is nothing but the body, etc., then, for the purpose of the isolation, *i. e.*, for the purpose of the absolute or permanent eradication of pain, activity on the part of any one whatever would not be reasonable or possible, seeing that the body, etc., are by nature perishable. In the case of Prakṛiti, again, isolation is not possible, because Prakṛiti is established as having Pain for its essence, by “dharmi-grāhaka-māna” (*i. e.*, the evidence of observed but otherwise unexplained facts leading to the supposition of something as the subject, and thus the cause, of those unexplained properties, in other words, by hypothetical inference); and absolute eradication of nature never takes place. Such is the meaning.

The reading of the present aphorism as “Kaivalyārtham Prakṛiteḥ” is erroneous and, as such, should be discarded. The reading “Kaivalyārtham Pravritteḥcha” is obtained from the Kārikā also:—

संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।

पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृ भावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ कारिका ॥ १७ ॥

Puruṣa exists : since a structure of manifold parts (which the world is), is for the benefit of another of a different character; since the reverse of the nature of the three Guṇas must exist; since there must exist a superintendent; since there must be an experiencer; since activity is with a view to isolation.—Kārikā, Verse 17.

The other reading should be rejected also because it is not in harmony with the sense intended to be expressed.—144.

Nature of Puruṣa is Light or Illumination.

जड़प्रकाशयोगात् प्रकाशः ॥११४५॥

जड़प्रकाशयोगात् Jada-parkāśa-a-yogāt, from the absence of connection of the unintelligent with the light. प्रकाशः Prakāśaḥ, light.

145. Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light (must be the nature of the intelligent, *i. e.*, Puruṣa).—145.

Vṛitti.—Of what form or nature is this Self? To this the author replies.

It is a settled point that the unintelligent does not throw light on, *i. e.*, manifest, objects. If the Self also were to be unintelligent, then there must exist something else to illuminate it. (And in this way the result would be non-finality.) And also, on the ground of simplicity, let the Self itself be of the form of light. The Veda also bears testimony to the Self being of the nature of light. Thus

येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात् ।
विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ॥

Wherewith shall one cognize that wherewith one cognizes all this? Wherewith Lo, shall one cognize the cognizer?—Bṛi. Āraṇ. Upa. IV. iv. 14. —145.

Bhāṣya.—Puruṣa has been established as being other than the twenty-four Principles. Now, with a view to make this discrimination more manifest, the peculiarity appertaining to Puruṣa is going to be inferred.

The Vaiśeṣikas say : Through conjunction of Manas, is produced the light, called cognition, of the Self which was unintelligent and of the form of not-light before. But this is not the case, because connection of light cannot take place in what is unintelligent, as, in the world, we never observe the production of light or illuminativeness in a clod of earth, etc., which are unintelligent and non-illuminative. It follows, therefore, that Puruṣa is, like the sun and the like, truly and essentially of the form of light. Such is the meaning.

Thus says the Smṛiti :—

यथा प्रकाशतमसोः सम्बन्धो नापपद्यते ।
तद्वद्वैक्यं न शंसध्वं प्रपञ्चपरमात्मनोः ॥

As no relation can take place between light and darkness, do not likewise suspect the unity of the fabric of the world and of the Supreme Self.—Kālikā Purāṇa, II. ii. 10.

And also

यथा दीपः प्रकाशात्मा ह्रस्वो वा यद्वि वा महान् ।
ज्ञानात्मानं तथा विद्यात् पुरुषं सर्वजन्तुषु ॥

As the lamp is of the nature of illumination, no matter whether it be large or small ; likewise, one shall know Puruṣa, in all creatures, to be of the nature of cognition.

And lightness denotes Tejas or "fire," penetrating all consciousnesses manifested in the Sattva Guṇa as individual beings. The upādhi or the adjunct that may be imposed on it is that it is one and undivided, because it is treated as penetrative.—145.

Consciousness is not an attribute, but the essence, of Puruṣa.

निर्गुणत्वाच्च चिद्धर्मा ॥११४६॥

निर्गुणत्वात् Nir-guṇa-tvāt, being devoid of attributes. न Na, not. चिद्धर्मा Chit-dharmā, that which has consciousness or intelligence as a property.

146. Intelligence is not a property of Puruṣa, because he is free from attributes.—146.

Vṛitti.—But, our opponent, the Naiyāyikas, may say, let the Self be unintelligent, and although it is unintelligent, as they hold, still have intelligence as a property. Thereby it will illumine the world. But it cannot be of the form of intelligence. To this the author replies.

If the Self were to be connected with a property, then, it would be liable to transformation, and, consequently, would never obtain Release, (its transformation going on eternally).—146.

Bhāṣya.—But, it may still be asked, even though Puruṣa be essentially of the form of light, does the relation of the property and the subject of the property exist in the present case, as it does in the case of Tejas or 'fire,' or does it not? To this the author replies.

The meaning is quite plain.

When, it being established that Puruṣa is of the form of light, other uses of Puruṣa are made possible by means of this relation of identity with light, it would be redundant to imagine that Puruṣa possesses a property having the nature of light. This should also be understood.

Of Tejas or 'fire,' again, although a particular form called light is not perceived, still, since it is perceived through Touch, the difference of light and fire is established. Of the Self, on the other hand, there is no knowledge or apprehension at all during the non-apprehension of the light called cognition. Hence, on the ground of simplicity, the Self is conceived as a substance absolutely of the form of light and devoid of the relation of the property and the subject of the property.

And the Self is not an attribute, since it possesses conjunction, etc., and is not dependent upon anything else as a support. So is it recollected in the Smṛiti,

ज्ञानं नैवात्मनो धर्मो न गुणो वा कथञ्चन ।

ज्ञानस्वरूप एवात्मा नित्यः पूर्णः सदा शिवः ॥

Cognition is in no sense a property of the Self nor an attribute. The Self is just constituted by cognition as its essence, is eternal, entire, and blissful always.

But, what, it may be asked, is the reason for the statement itself that the Self is devoid of attributes? To this we reply as follows: It is not possible to say that the desire, etc., of Puruṣa should be eternal, because they are found by perception to be producible; and, if you admit a producible attribute in the case of Puruṣa, it would entail his liability to transformation. So that, redundancy would be the result on the supposition of both of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti as the cause of transformation. And since a blind transformation would sometimes entail Puruṣa not being the knower, the result would be the doubt as to whether cognition, desire, etc., be within the cognizance of Puruṣa. Similarly from what has been already stated, namely, that the unintelligent has no fitness for association with light, it is impossible to have cognition of the eternal as non-eternal.

Again, by the methods of agreement and difference, desire etc., are, on the ground of simplicity, established in Manas alone; since the supposition that the conjunction of Manas as well as the Self are the causes of desire, etc., would be redundant.

And the word "guṇa" in "nir-guṇa", it has been already stated, signifies particular attributes, (and not the universal guṇas, Sattva, etc.).

It follows, therefore, that the Self is devoid of attributes.

Moreover, with those Logicians who desire the agency of the Self, there can be no proof or possibility of Release, since it is this modification of Buddhi, namely, "I am the agent," that has been declared in the Gîtâ (*vide* III. 27 for instance), etc., as being the cause of the production of Adṛiṣṭam or Merit and Demerit. Again, as, in their opinion, such modification of Buddhi or idea does not possess the nature of false knowledge, it is impossible that it should be removed by knowledge of truth. Hence, seeing that the Release taught in the Veda is not possible on any other theory, it is desired by us that the Self is not the agent. And, from its not being the agent follows the non-existence of pleasure, etc., in the shape of Adṛiṣṭam. And thereafter Manas having to be conceived as the cause of deeds to be done, etc., the supposition is made within the limitations imposed by attributes internally or occultly visible.

It follows, therefore, that the Self is devoid of attributes.

In the Yoga-Vâsîṣṭha-Râmâyana, the svarûpa or essential form of the absolutely subtle and pure Self, as shown above, has been described as

clearly as an Āmalakī (emblemic myrobalan) in the hand, and established discriminatively. Thus

असम्भवति सर्वत्र दिग्भूम्याकाशरूपिणि ।
प्रकाश्ये यादृशं रूपं प्रकाशस्यामलं भवेत् ॥
त्रिजगत् त्वमहं वेति दृश्येऽसत्तामुपागते ।
द्रष्टुः स्यात् केवलीभावस्तादृशो विमलात्मनः ॥

That shall be the pure form of the Light (i.e., the Self), which exists in the illuminable in the shape of Space, Earth, Ether, during their non-production.

When the three worlds, you and I,—all the illuminable vanishes out of existence, then would be the isolated state of the beholder ; similar is the state of the Pure Self.—146.

The Veda is higher evidence than Perception.

श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य नापलापस्तत्प्रत्यक्षबाधात् ॥११४७॥

श्रुत्या Śrutyā, by the Veda. सिद्धस्य Siddhasya, of that which is established. न Na, no. अपलापः Apalāpah, negation, denial, ignoring. तत्प्रत्यक्षबाधात् Tat-pratyakṣa-bādhāt, from contradiction of the perception thereof, i.e., of attributes, etc.

147. There can be no ignoring of what is established by the Veda, because of the contradiction by the Veda itself of the perception of attributes, etc., in the Self.—147.

Vṛitti.—The author points out that the theory of the Logicians is in contradiction to the Veda.

The text of the Veda in question is

असङ्कोहयं पुरुषः

For this Puruṣa is free from attachment.—Bṛi. Āraṇ. Upa, IV, iii. 15.

It would be contradicted if there were any association of attributes in the Self.—147.

Bhāṣya.—But, the Logician may urge, from the perception of the relation of the property and the subject of the property between Consciousness and Puruṣa in such cases as “I cognize,” it is established that Consciousness belongs to Puruṣa as a property. If there is any redundancy here, it is no fault, being authoritative or valid. To this the author replies.

Your objection could stand, if we established that consciousness, etc., are not properties of Puruṣa, because, by *mere reasoning*, we find that he is free from attributes. But we do so by the help of Vedic texts also. Hence contradiction of Puruṣa's being devoid of attributes, etc., as established by the Veda, is not possible, because of the contradiction of the

perception thereof, *i.e.*, of attributes, etc., by the Veda itself, as of the perceptions "I am fair," etc. Such is the meaning. For, otherwise, on the strength of the perception "I am fair," would be contradicted or obstructed also the arguments which establish the Self as other than the body; and triumphant would be the Nâstikas or Nihilists.

As to Puruṣa's being devoid of attributes, the texts of the Veda are, for example :

साक्षी चेत्ताः केचलो निर्गुणश्च

The Self is the Witness, Intelligent, Pure, and Attributeless.—Śveta-Aśvatara Upaniṣat VI. 11.

As to Puruṣa's being mere or pure consciousness, the texts of the Veda are, for example :

अकर्ता चैतन्यं चिन्मात्रं सच्चिदेकरसो ह्ययमात्मा

For this Self is Non-agent, Consciousness, Pure Intelligence, of the form of the uniform and unmixd flow of Existence and Consciousness.—Vedānta-Sāra, 158.

The texts of the Veda, on the other hand, which declare Omniscience etc., in regard to the Self, are mere translations of the empty imaginations of the common people, which convey no more sense than that of "the head of Rāhu" (Rāhu being all head). For, these texts being in conflict with those cited above, authoritativeness belongs to the latter and not to the former, according to the accepted rule of interpretation that, among Vedic texts, prescriptive and prohibitive, it is the negative texts, that are the stronger of the two; there being such negative texts of the Veda as the following :

अथात आदेशो नेति नेति न ह्य तस्मादति नेत्यन्यत् परमस्ति

Now, then, the direction "Neti" "Neti" Not, Not, for does *not* something other than, and beyond, this (visible world) *not* exist?—Bṛi. Āraṇ. Upa. II. iii. 6.

Moreover, the very supposition that the intuition of the ignorant in the form of "I cognize," is a valid or right cognition (pramā), is redundant, since, when the fault of eternal Nescience or Ignorance pursues all mortals, to err is the ordinary rule. Hence, as it falls in the midst of hundreds of errors and is thereby attacked or affected with the apprehension of unauthoritativeness, inference (apart from the declaration of the Veda) supported by considerations of simplicity, etc., is alone sufficient as a confutation of such intuition as "I cognize."

But, it may be asked, what sort of simplicity there is in the conception of the Self as having eternal knowledge as its essence? To this we reply as follows : By the Naiyāyikas, etc., four Padārthas or Predicables are conceived, *viz.*, Antaḥ-karaṇa or the internal instrument, Vyavasāya

or certainty, Anu-vyavasāya or pro-certainty (or subsidiary processes), and the substratum thereof; while, by us, three Padārthas or Predicables are conceived, *viz.*, Antaḥkāraṇa, the function or modification thereof in the place of certainty as well as in the place of the infinite instances of pro-certainty, and the Self in the form of eternal and uniform cognition.—147.

Puruṣa is merely the witness of the states, dreamless sleep, etc.

सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षित्वम् ॥११४८॥

सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षित्वम् Suṣupti-ādyā-sākṣitvam, the being the witness of the states of dreamless sleep, etc., (Vijñāna Bhikṣu). सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षित्वम् Suṣupti-ādi-a-sākṣitvam, the not being the witness etc., (Aniruddha).

148. (If Puruṣa were not intelligent, he would) not be the witness of the states of dreamless sleep, etc. (Aniruddha.)

Or, Puruṣa is merely the witness of the states of dreamless sleep, etc., (hence Puruṣa's being of the nature of light does not affect them).—(Vijñāna Bhikṣu).—148.

Vṛitti.—The author points out another defect in the opposite theory.

If the Self were unintelligent, then, in dreamless sleep, etc., it would not be the witness, *i.e.*, the knower, of those states. But this is not the case, because of the recollection on awakening, in the form of “I slept pleasantly.”

By the word “ādi,” dreaming is included.—148.

Bhāṣya.—But, it may be argued, if the Self be absolutely of the form of light, then, the difference of the states of dreamless sleep, etc., would not be justified, because of this that the light would never for a moment depart. In regard to this the author replies.

• Puruṣa is merely the witness, and, nothing more, of the three states of dreamless sleep, (dreaming and waking) which pertain to Buddhi. Such is the meaning. So has it been declared :

जाग्रत् स्वप्नं सुषुप्तं च गुणतो बुद्धिवृत्तयः ।

तासां विलक्षणे जीवः साक्षित्वेन व्यवस्थितः ॥

The states of waking, dreaming, and dreamless sleep are modifications of Buddhi according to differences of the Guṇas. The Jīva or transmigratory Self which is of a different character from them, is established as their witness.

The Jīva who is “Tat-vilakṣaṇa” *i.e.*, bereft of the waking and the other states, has been ascertained as being the witness, “tāsām” of these modifications of Buddhi. Such is the meaning.

Among these states, that is called the waking state in which takes place the modification of Buddhi into the form of the objects through the channel of the Senses ; and dreaming is that state in which such modification is produced from saṃskāra or impressions merely. And dreamless sleep is twofold, according as the laya or passing into latency is partial or complete. Of these, in the state of half latency, modification of Buddhi into the form of objects does not occur, but Buddhi is modified into the shapes only of the Pleasure, Pain, and Bewilderment inhering in it ; since, otherwise, it would not be possible for one rising from sleep to have remembrance of Pleasure, etc., experienced during dreamless sleep, in such forms as " I slept pleasantly," etc. Accordingly it has been declared by the aphorism of Vyāsa (Vedānta Sūtras, III. ii 10) :

मुग्धेऽर्धसम्पत्तिः परिशेषात् ॥३१२१०॥

In the swooning condition, the Jīva is in half combination with Brahman; because the rule of the remainder shows this.—S. B. II. Vol. V, page 405.

In the state of complete latency, on the other hand, there is absence of the modification in general of Buddhi, as in the case of death and the like ; as, otherwise, there would be no justification for the future aphorism,

समाधिसुषुप्तिमोक्षेषु ब्रह्मरूपता ॥५१११६॥

Modification into the form of Brahman takes place in the states of Trance, Deep Sleep and Release.—V. 116 *infra*.

And since this complete deep sleep is of the form of the non-existence of the modifications of Buddhi, Puruṣa does not become the witness of it, because Puruṣa is the witness of the modifications merely. For, if it were not so, then Saṃskāra or impression and other properties of Buddhi also would be the objects to be illumined by the witness.

We will, however, say that the being the witness of the states of dreamless sleep, etc. consists in the illumination of similar transformations of Buddhi reflected in Puruṣa. Hence, for the purpose of cognition, the transformation of Puruṣa is not needed.

It might be so, says our opponent. If modification of Buddhi, cognizant of Pleasure, Pain, etc., is desired, in deep sleep, then, it is but proper to admit, that, in the waking and other states also, all the modifications are capable of being apprehended by the modifications themselves. And this being admitted, the supposition of Puruṣa as the witness of these modifications is useless, since it is more easy generally to say that they are the cause of their own uses or phenomenal appearances just by means of their being the modifications, which are within their own cognizance.

We reply that the case is not thus. On the supposition that, as a rule, the modifications are the objects of cognition by themselves, the consequence would be non-finality and redundancy. Moreover, since pleasure, etc. are distinctive peculiarities in such modifications as "I am pleased" etc., indiscrete or abstract or absolute cognition of these modifications is in the first instance looked for. And in regard to that, supposition is made by us of cognition which forms the essence of the Self and is eternal and absolutely one and undivided, since it is simpler and more natural than an infinite indiscrete modification. In order to account for such discrete or particular cognitions as, "I am pleased", etc., we hold that it is the modification of Buddhi that assumes similar forms; for, since the admission of even a nominal similarity in form of Puruṣa with the modification of Buddhi would amount to a non-admission of a form of Puruṣa other than the form of the modification, the consequence would be the transformation of Puruṣa by an independent form different from his own.—148.

Proof of Plurality of Puruṣas.

जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः पुरुषबहुत्वम् ॥११४६॥

जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः Janma-ādi-vyavasthā-taḥ, from the several allotment or disposition or distribuion of birth, etc. पुरुषबहुत्वम् Puruṣa-bahutvam, multiplicity of Puruṣas.

149. Multiplicity of Puruṣas (is proved) from the several allotment of births, etc.—149.

Vṛitti.—The Self is one and one only, thus say the Vedāntins. Thus

नित्यः सर्वगतः ह्यात्मा कूटस्थो दोषवर्जितः ।

एकः स भिद्यते शक्त्या मायया न स्वभावतः ॥

For, the Self is eternal, omnipresent, immutable, and free from blemish. Being one, it is divided (into a seeming multiplicity) by Māyā, its energy, but not through its own nature or essence.

In regard to this the author says.

Were the Self one only, then, one being born, all would be born. - 149.

Bhāṣya.—Now, when the unity of Puruṣa is also thus made out by his being merely the witness of the states of deep sleep, etc., the doubt arises whether he be one or many. In this Adhikaraṇa, * case or topic, the

* An Adhikaraṇa is the complete statement of a case, and consists of five members : viz., Viśaya or thesis, e. g., Puruṣas are manifold; Saṁśaya or doubt, e. g., whether Puruṣa be one or many; Pūrva-pakṣa or antithesis, e. g., Puruṣa is one; Siddhānta or synthesis or conclusion, e. g., Puruṣas are manifold; and Saṅgati or connection or agreement of the Siddhānta with other parts of the system.

Pûrva-pakṣa, the objection or *prima facie* view, is this : From texts of the Veda declaring non-division or non-duality, which are supported by the argument that this is the simple and natural view of the case, the Self is established as being one and one only ; while the dissimilarities or differences in the form of the states of waking, etc., may be attributed to Buddhi as its properties. Although this single Self thus comes to be the witness of all Buddhis, still, according as a modification takes place in a Buddhi, it is that Buddhi alone, that, by means of its being thus particularized with the possession of that modification, apprehends the witness by such forms as "I cognize the water pot," etc. Hence, while the modification, *viz.*, "This is a water pot," appears in a particular Buddhi only, the intuition, *viz.*, "I cognize a water pot" does not arise by means of the modifications of the other Buddhis.

In regard to this Pûrva-pakṣa, the author states the demonstrated conclusion or Siddhânta.

Since there is no other reason for the "Vyavasthâ," *i. e.*, distribution or differentiation of Puruṣas made in the Veda and the Smṛiti, namely, that a virtuous Puruṣa is born in heaven, that a vicious one in hell, that an ignorant Puruṣa is bound, that a knowing one is released, etc., it follows that Puruṣas are manifold. Such is the meaning.

Birth and death, however, do not here signify production and destruction, since they do not pertain to Puruṣa, but conjunction with, and disjunction from, a particular structure or combination of body, sense, etc., which determine Experience, and the absence thereof.

As regards the distribution of births, etc., the text of the Veda is

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।

अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥

The one Unborn (Puruṣa), for enjoyment, consorts with the one Unborn (Prakṛiti) having the colours of red, white, and black, the procreatrix of manifold progeny like unto herself. The other Unborn deserts her, after she is enjoyed.—Śveta-Aśvatara-Upaniṣat, IV. 5.

ये तद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्त्यथेतरे दुःखमेवापियन्ति ॥

They who know this, become immortal, while others come in for a share of pain only. *Ibid.* III. 10.—149.

The Vedânta view : That the apparent multiplicity of Puruṣa is due to the multiplicity of upâdhis or investments.

उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभिः ॥११५०॥

उपाधिभेदे Upâdhi-bhede, there being difference of upâdhi or investment. अपि Api, also, even. नानायोगः Nâna-yogaḥ, connection or appearance or production of

multiplicity. आकाशस्य Âkâśasya, of Akâśa or Ether. इव Iva, as. घटादिभिः Ghata-Âdi-bhiḥ, by reason of water pots, etc.

150. (The Vedântins maintain that) from difference of upâdhis or investments also arises the appearance of multiplicity of the one Self ; as of Âkâśa, by reason of water pots, etc. (which divide it into many parts). (Aniruddha.)

Or, even in the case of differences of upâdhis or investments (as maintained by the Vedântin), the appearance of multiplicity will be of the one Self only ; as of the Akâśa, by reason of water pots, etc., (and consequently the same defects will remain, *e. g.*, when one is born all would be born). (Vijñâna Bhikṣu).—150.

Vṛitti.—The author apprehends the view of an opponent (the Vedântin) as an objection to his theory of multiplicity of Puruṣas.

Just as, in consequence of the difference of Upâdhis, *e. g.*, water pot, etc., it is predicated of the one Âkâśa that the water-pot-Âkâśa (*i. e.* the portion confined within it) is destroyed, when the water pot is destroyed ; similarly, in the case of the unity of the Self also, in consequence of the determination or delimitation caused by the body, it is a mere predication or form of speech to say, when the body is destroyed, that the Self is destroyed. In the case of the multiplicity of the Self, again, since the Self is otherwise eternal, (as the Sâṃkhyas hold), how can there be the allotment of births and deaths?—150.

Bhâṣya :—But, it may be said, even in the case of the unity of Puruṣa, distribution of births, etc., will be possible by means of the difference of the determining conditions in the form of the upâdhis. In regard to this the author says.

Even in the case of differences of upâdhis, connection with manifold upâdhis would be really of the one Puruṣa only ; as, for example, connection with manifold upâdhis such as the water pot, walls, etc., is of the one Âkâśa only. Hence, by means of the difference of determining conditions, it is of the one Self only that diverse births, deaths, etc. would take place, as in the case of the physical organisms, etc. So that distribution of births, etc., such as one Puruṣa is born and not another, would not be possible. Such is the meaning. For, by means of the difference of determining conditions, in respect of one and the same tree possessing conjunction with a monkey and with the absence thereof, distribution

or differentiation is not possible, as it is in such cases as when we say that one tree possesses conjunction with a monkey, while another does not.

Moreover, since a portion of the Self which has been freed from one upâdhi, would be still liable to be confined by other upâdhis, the irregularity of Bondage and Release is also in the same state (of defectiveness); that is, as a portion of Âkâśa, freed from a water pot, is again established as the water-pot-Âkâśa through connection with another water pot, similarly.

It must not be said that the texts of the Veda on the distribution or allotment of Bondage and Release are also mere translations of popular errors; since Release (is not a subject for discussion by ordinary people, but) is alaukika or above the conception of the ordinary people. Besides, (if the Veda held up an error as the supreme object of life, then), by establishing a false object of desire to Puruṣa (Puruṣa-artha), the Veda would be guilty of deception, etc. (a charge, however, for which there does not exist the slightest justification).—150.

The Vedânta view further criticised.

उपाधिभिद्यते न तु तद्वान् ॥११५१॥

उपाधि: Upâdhiḥ, the adjunct, investment. भिद्यते Bhidyate, is different. न Na, not. तु Tu, but. तद्वान् Tat-vân, the possessor or holder thereof.

151. The Upâdhi is different, but not the holder thereof (i. e. Puruṣa).—151.

Vṛtti.—The author gives the solution of the difficulty created by the above view of the Vedântin.

“The upâdhi is different.” Nor, from the destruction of one thing (upâdhi), can there be the predication of destruction in respect of another thing (Puruṣa), since the predication would be too remote. And, in the case of the unity of the Self (as held by the Vedântin), there is the imputation or attribution (adhyâsa) of contradictory properties, *e. g.* Bondage and Release (to the same Self), when he says that one man is bound and that another man is released, because Bondage and Release cannot simultaneously exist in one and the same Self. Of Âkâśa, on the other hand, conjunction and non-conjunction with smoke and the like, are not contradictory to each other, because conjunction does not reside in a thing by wholly pervading it, (while it would be absurd to say that Bondage affects one part of Puruṣa, while Release abides in another part).—151.

Bhāṣya :—But, the Vedāntin may urge, even on the theory of the unity of Consciousness, distribution of Bondage and Release can be established by admitting (the popular conception of) the separate existences of the one Self, under the particular forms given to it by the several upādhis. To this the author replies.

It is the upādhi that is manifold ; “ but not the holder thereof,” that is, that also which possesses the upādhi as a distinctive peculiarity, should not be admitted to be manifold ; since, were that which possesses a distinctive peculiarity, a separate existence, then, it is only the manifoldness of the Self that would have to be admitted in the other Śāstra (the Vedānta) also, (a result which the Vedāntin would not certainly accept). Such is the meaning. There are also other defects in the theory: *e. g.*, if that which undergoes Bondage, were a Viśiṣṭa or thing particularized with a specific distinction, then, since, on the separation of the distinction from it, the thing particularized would also vanish, Release would not be established (as a positive state of the thing, but as a void, in which form Release is conceived by none).

But the Vedāntin may interrupt by saying that the author of the (Sāṃkhya) aphorisms is himself going to declare in the Sixth Book that it is that alone which is particularized with Ahankāra as a specific distinction, that constitutes the character of the Jīva or the mundane Puruṣa, by the aphorism (VI. 63):

विशिष्टस्य जीवत्वमन्वयव्यतिरेकात् ॥ ६ । ६३ ॥

The character of the Jīva belongs to that which is particularized, because Agreement and Difference prove this.

But this is not so, we would reply ; because it is the character of the Jīva in the form of being the supporter of Prāna or Life, that only has been declared there to be inherent in that which is particularized. It will not be declared there that the distribution of Bondage and Release is dependent upon, and is regulated by, the thing particularized, inasmuch as the thing particularized has no existence at the time of Release.

And what a few moderns who pose as Vedāntins, say, namely, that the Jīvas and Isvaras are the reflections of the one and only one Self, thrown into the upādhis in the form of effects and causes, and that through the mutual difference of the reflections, the distribution of births and all the rest is established ;—this too is erroneous, because it does not stand the test of the alternatives of difference and non-difference. If the reflected and the reflection were different in character from each other, then, since the reflection would be unintelligent, Experiencership,

Bondage, Release, etc., would not be established, and also the tenet, held by them, of the identity of the Jîva and Brahman would be impaired, and, further, the existence of a Self different from the Jîva and Brahman would be invalid. In the case of the non-difference or identity of the reflected and the reflection, on the other hand, promiscuity, *i.e.*, simultaneous presence of contradictory properties in one and the same thing, cannot be avoided. While, on the admission of their identity-and-difference, the above tenet would be lost, and, further, the contradiction inherent in the conception of the simultaneous identity and difference of two things, would be entailed. In our theory, on the other hand, non-difference or identity is characterized as non-division, and difference means reciprocal non-existence (as that of the nature of the cow in the horse, and *vice versa*), and hence there is no contradiction. And as regards the passages giving illustrations of the reflections, determinations or divisions, etc., we will explain them in the sequel.

It might be so, may say those so-called Vedântins, but what we say is only this, that, imagining the difference of the reflected and the reflection as if it were present in the case of the Jîva and Brahman, the Veda has imagined the distribution of Bondage and Release, and not that the condition of the reflected, the difference of the reflected and the reflection, Bondage, Release, etc., are desired as being transcendently true. But this interpretation of the Vedic texts cannot be allowed. For, when matters stand thus, it is proper, for the sake of simplicity, to restrict the scope of the texts declaring pure identity or simply the non-difference of the Jîva and Brahman, by interpreting them as signifying the non-division or non-disjunction of the Jîva and Brahman, rather than to contradict, and thereby to render null and void, both those groups of texts which declare the distribution of Bondage, Release, etc., and also the difference of the Jîva and Brahman. There is also this further reason in support of the position we take up, that the non-division of the Jîva and Brahman has been established by other Vedic writings and the Smritis.—151.

Conclusion of the criticism of the Vedânta view.

एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः ॥११५२॥

एवम् *Evam*, thus. एकत्वेन *Ekatvena*, by unity. परिवर्तमानस्य *Parivartamânasya*, of (the Self) existing everywhere. न *Na*, no. विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः *Viruddha-dharma-adhyâsaḥ*, imputation or imposition of contradictory properties.

152. Thus, (*i. e.* on the Theory of the Multiplicity of Puruṣas, as held by the Sâmkhyas), (there is) no imputation

of contradictory properties, (as is entailed in the case) of one universal Self (of the Vedântins). (Aniruddha.)

Or, the imputation of contradictory properties, in the way indicated above, to a Self present everywhere by its unity, (as imagined by the Vedântins), is not reasonable. (Vijñâna Bhikṣu).—152.

Vṛitti.—What is gained by this? To this the author replies.

Attribution of contradictory properties does not take place.—152.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—"Evam," it being thus, that is, there being multiplicity of Puruṣas.

Bhâṣya.—The author concludes the consideration of the defects alleged against those who hold the theory of the Unity of the Self.

In this way, it is found to be not reasonable to introduce the simultaneous presence of contradictory properties in the form of birth, death, etc., in the case of the Self present everywhere by reason of its unity. Such is the meaning.

Or, there may be a stop after "ekatve," (so that the letters e, k, a, t, v, e, n, a, would make up two words "ekatve" and "na," instead of one "ekatvena"). The unity of the Self being admitted, would not the imputation of contradictory properties to the Self, "paritaḥ" or everywhere, present, *i. e.*, penetrating all upâdhis, be not entailed? On the contrary, co-existence of contradictory properties would by no means be avoidable. Such is the meaning.

Our opponents may urge that, when Puruṣa possesses no attribute at all, and when we also admit that all properties inhere in the upâdhis, how do we bring it about that on their theory, there is, in Puruṣa, a promiscuous presence of contradictory properties such as birth, death, bondage, release, etc.? We would reply that the properties mentioned, are admitted as belonging to Puruṣa by reason of their being of the forms of conjunction, disjunction, experience, and non-experience; it having been already declared that only properties which possess the form or nature of transformation, and none else, are denied in regard to Puruṣa.—152.

Imputation proves nothing.

अन्यधर्मत्वेऽपि नारोपात् तत्सिद्धिरेकत्वात् ॥११५३॥

अन्यधर्मत्वे Anya-dharmatve, being the property of another. अपि Api, even. न Na, not. आरोपात् Āropât, from imputation or superimposition. तत्सिद्धिः Tat-siddhiḥ,

establishment thereof, *i. e.*, of the distribution of birth, etc., as well as of pleasure, etc. एकत्वात् Ekatvât, from unity.

153. Even though the properties of other things be imputed to the Self, the imputation does not prove that it really possesses them, because of its being one and absolutely simple. (Aniruddha.)

Or, even though they be the properties of other things, the distribution of pleasure, etc., in regard to Puruṣa, cannot be established from the rule of imputation, in consequence of the unity of Puruṣa. (Vijñāna Bhikṣu.)--153.

Vṛtti.—It may be contended by the Vedāntin that the attribution of the property of a thing of quite a different nature, to another, is actually observed ; as, for example, the agency of Prakṛiti is attributed to Puruṣa who is different from Prakṛiti. To this the author replies.

The agency of Puruṣa is erroneous. The truth in the matter is that Puruṣa is not the agent, the imputation not being objectively true. Nor can the connection between the true and the not-true be real. Being free from all association or attachment, the Self can have no possible connection with birth, death, etc., in a true sense.—153.

Bhāṣya.—As there is a well regulated distribution of the properties of redness, blueness, etc., appearing in the crystals, although these properties are only superimposed upon them, likewise, in the case of Puruṣas also, there is, in the Sâstras, a well regulated distribution of the properties of Buddhi, *viz.*, pleasure, pain, etc., as well as also of the properties of the body, etc., *viz.*, Brāhmaṇahood, Kṣatriyahood, etc., although these properties are only imputed to them. As, for example, in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa.

यथैकस्मिन् घटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्वृत्ते ।

न च सर्वे प्रयुज्यन्ते एव जीवाः सुखादिभिः ॥

As, in the case of a single Ghaṭa-Âkāśa or Âkāśa confined within a water pot, which is covered with dust and smoke and the like, all these epithets are not applied ; so are the Jivas not possessed of Pleasure, etc.

And this distribution (of pleasure, etc.) also, just like the distribution of birth, etc., is not established on the theory of the Unity of the Self.

This the author now declares.

Although they are the properties of other things, *e. g.*, Buddhi, etc., still, the distribution mentioned above would not be established in the case

of Puruṣa, through the superimposition of the properties of pleasure, etc., upon him; because of the unity of Puruṣa (as supposed by the Vedāntin) who is the subject or substratum of the superimposition. Such is the meaning. In spite of the unity of Ākāśa, distribution of adventitious (coming from upādhis) properties takes place in it by means of the differences of the portions of Ākāśa (Ākāśas) determined by (being confined within) water pots, according to the difference of the water pots. The characters of being the Self, of being the Jīva, etc., do not, however, belong to what are determined and conditioned by means of upādhis or external investments; since, by the destruction of the Self, the Jīva, etc., which would necessarily follow, like the destruction of the Ghaṭa-Ākāśa, on the removal of the upādhi, there would be contradiction to the texts of the Veda which declare that the Jīva does not perish, etc. But, as it has been already stated, these characters belong to Pure Consciousness.

It is simply without understanding this non-establishment of the distribution of bondage, release, etc., which is too nice a subject for them to comprehend, that the moderns who style themselves as Vedāntins, say that the distribution of bondage and release is possible, even on the theory of the Unity of the Self, by means of the differences of upādhis. They too are silenced by the present aphorism.

Those, again, forming a section of them, who having seen this very non-establishment of the distribution of pleasure, bondage, etc., say that it is only of the reflections of Consciousness fallen on the upādhis, that bondage, etc., occur;—they are very greatly mistaken; because of the defect mentioned before (page 211), namely, that their theory does not stand the test of the alternatives of difference and non-difference, etc., and, further, because of the defect pointed out by the aphorism (I. 99, q. v.): “(Actual) superintendence is of the Antaḥ-karaṇa, because it is lighted up by Puruṣa; as is the case with iron.”

Moreover, in the Vedānta Sūtram, (S. B. H. Vol. V), the absolute unity of all the Selves is nowhere found declared. On the contrary, their difference has, in fact, been declared by the aphorisms, for example:

भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः ॥ १ । १ । २१ ॥

“The being above mentioned is other than Jīva. Because there is a declaration of its being separate from Jīva”.—Vedānta Sūtram, I. i. 21.

अधिकन्तु भेदनिर्देशात् ॥ २ । १ । २२ ॥

“But Brahman is greater than Jīva, because the scriptures declare His difference from the Jīva”.—*Ibid*, II. i. 22.

प्रशो नानाव्यपदेशात् ॥ २ । ३ । ४१ ॥

"The soul is a part, because the Lord is described as having manifold relations with the soul etc."—*Ibid*, II. iii. 41.

—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V, pages 42, 251, 381.

Hence it is established that the doctrines of Avachchheda or partial limitation, (namely, that the Jîva is an undisjoined portion of the one, all-pervading Brahman, cabined, cribbed, and confined by the upâdhi), of Pratibimba or reflection, (namely, that the Jîva is only a reflection of Brahman into the upâdhi), and the like, are nothing but perverse conclusions. There is this further reason also that, in regard to objects about which doubt has arisen and which have not been dealt with in one's own Sâstra, it is the conclusion of a sister Sâstra that should be accepted as the established tenet. All this has been demonstrated by us in our Commentary on the Brahma-Mîmâṃsâ (the Vedânta Sûtram).—153.

The Sâmkhya Theory is not in conflict with the Vedic declarations.

नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् ॥११५४॥

n Na, no. अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः Advaita-śruti-virodhaḥ, contradiction to the Vedic texts on non-duality. जातिपरत्वात् Jāti-paratvāt, being directed to the genus or class.

154.—There is no contradiction, (by the Sâmkhya Theory of the Multiplicity of Puruṣas), of the Vedic declarations of Non-duality (of Puruṣa), because the reference (in these declarations) is to the genus (of Puruṣa).—154.

Vritti.—But, this being so, the Vedântin may say, there would be contradiction of the Veda. For, says the Veda :

एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म ॥

Brahman is one only, without a second.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 1.

नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन,

मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ॥

There exists nothing diverse here. From death unto death he goes, who sees as if things were diverse here.—Kaṭha Upaniṣat, IV. 10, 11.

To this the author replies.

The sense is quite obvious.—154.

Bhâṣya.—But, then, the Vedântin may say, there being thus a multiplicity of Puruṣas, the declarations of the Veda and the Smṛiti which demonstrate the Unity of the Self, would not be established. Such declarations are, for example :

एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः ।

एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥

For, the mundane or creational Self, which is one and one only, is situated in every Bhûta or creature severally. Like the moon reflected in water, it is seen sometimes as one and sometimes as many.—Brahma-Bindu Upa., 12.

नित्यः सर्वगतो ह्यात्मा कूटस्थो दोषवर्जितः ।

एकः स भिद्यते शक्त्या मायया न स्वभावतः ॥

For, the Self is eternal, all—penetrating, immutable, blameless. Being one, it is diversified by means of Mâyâ which is its energy, and not from its own nature.

To this the author replies.

There is, however, no contradiction to the Vedic declarations on the Unity of the Self, because of their being directed to the genus, *i. e.*, because of the reference of the Vedic declarations on Non-duality being only to the genus (of Self) which consists of oneness of form in general, (in other words, of the general characteristic of being the Self), and not to its entirety, since there is no reason or necessity for reading such a reference in them. Such is the meaning.

And that the word “jāti” denotes oneness of form or uniformity, is obtained from the subsequent aphorisms.

If preference is given to (the meaning of) the word “jāti” as heard, (*i. e.* in the sense of genus), then, the aphorism should be explained just as corroborating or demonstrating the texts of the Veda on Non-duality, such as :

आत्मा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्

Verily, in the beginning, all this was a single Self.—Aitareya, I. i. 1.

सदैव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत् ।

एकमेवाद्वितीयम् ॥

In the beginning, O peaceful one, this was verily existent ; one and one only, without a second.—Chhândogya Upaniṣat, VI. ii. 1. S. B. H. Vol. III.

“Jāti-para-tvât” meaning, because (these texts of the Veda on Non-duality) are intended as negations of the duality that would be caused by the existence of something *heterogeneous* to the Self. Such is the meaning.

Of these, the import of the first interpretation (*i. e.* Non-duality of many Selves in the sense of their being non-different in form), is as follows : In the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, on the unity of the Self, the words one and the like are intended to denote oneness of form or uniformity, and the words difference and the like to denote difference characterised by difference in property. Because the meaning or sense of oneness of form is unavoidable in such passages as

एक एवात्मा मन्तव्यो जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तिषु ।

स्थानत्रयव्यतीतस्य पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥

The Self should be regarded as being one and one only in the states of waking, dreaming and sleeping. Who has passed beyond the three states, of him there is no re-birth.—Brahma-Bindu Upaniṣat, 11.

Otherwise, by means of the cognition of the mere unity of the Self even in all the three states, it is impossible that cessation of the fancy or assumption of the three states, declared by the phrase "which has passed beyond the three states," should result; while it is by means of the establishment of oneness of form or uniformity alone that it can be possible to elucidate the svarûpa or essential form of all the Selves by means of the discrimination and elimination of all upâdhis or external investments whatever. For, otherwise, it is not possible even for Brahmâ to demonstrate the svarûpa or essential form of the Self, as a particular entity possessing the distinction of freedom from properties, directly by means of words, since words can comprehend only the genus.

While, on the other hand, when the uniformity of the Self is established from Brahman down to a stalk, then, with a view to demonstrate the truth so taught, the disciple goes on discriminating till he arrives at the essential form of the Self devoid of all particular distinctions and within the comprehension of words, and, thereafter, becomes fulfilled by means of the cessation of abhimâna or self-assumption to its utmost end.

If, again, the declarations of Non-duality had reference to undividedness merely (of one entire self), then, the cessation of abhimâna would not be possible from them; because, as is the case with the various sounds produced in Âkâśa or Ether, so, in the undivided Self also, the production of Pleasure, Pain, and the absence thereof, and so forth, can be accounted for by means of the differences of determining conditions (which, in a manner, oppose undividedness and which keep up abhimâna as long as they remain).

And if one and the same text is said to refer to both undividedness and absence of difference in property, then, the text becomes ambiguous. And also the supposition of its reference to undividedness becomes fruitless, inasmuch as cessation of all abhimâna takes place from the cognition of the absence of difference in property alone.

Hence the declarations of Non-duality do not refer to undividedness (of one entire, all-pervading Self); further, because of their contradiction, (in that sense), by texts of the Veda and Smṛiti which comprehend multiplicity of the Self, and which are corroborated and strengthened by Reason. But their reference is simply to non-difference characterised as non-difference in property; since their import must be the same as that of the texts of the Veda and Smṛiti, teaching sameness or equality of Selves, and also because of the Vedânta Sûtra (III. ii. 33), viz.,

सामान्यात् तु ॥ ३ । २ । ३३ ।

"But (the word bliss is applied to human joy, merely) on account of generic resemblance (and not because the two blisses are of the similar nature)".—S. B. H. Vol. V. page 495.

Of these texts on the point of similarity of Selves, the Vedic texts are, for example,

यथोदकं शुद्धे शुद्धमासिक्त्वं तादृगेव भवति ।

एवं मुनेर्विज्ञानत आत्मा भवति गौतम ॥

As water sprinkled on a pure substance, becomes just as pure as that substance, likewise, O Gautama, becomes the Self of the Muni who knows the truth.—Kāṭha Upaniṣat, IV. 15.

निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ।

The stainless Self attains to supreme equality.—Muṇḍaka Upaniṣat, III. i. 3.

And the texts of the Smṛiti are, for example,

ज्योतिरात्मनि नान्यत्र सर्वभूतेषु तत्समम् ।

स्वयं च शक्यते द्रष्टुं सुसमाहितचेतसा ॥

यावानात्मनि बोधात्मा तावानात्मा परात्मनि ।

य एवं सततं वेद जनस्थोऽपि न मुह्यति ॥

Light is in the Self, and nowhere else. It is the same in all beings. And it can be seen, by itself, by one whose mind has been steadied well by means of meditation.

As great a Self in the form of knowledge is in one's own Self, so great is it in another's Self. He who knows this constantly, is not bewildered, even if he be in the midst of the multitude.

In the Vedic texts quoted above, since there is the declaration of equality constituted by, or rising out of, diversity (of individuals), even in the state of Release, it is established that, among Selves, there is also difference of essential form (svarūpa). And the reference to non-difference in the form of non-difference in property, (*i. e.*, absolute identity) is, in our opinion, to be observed of such sayings as "I am Viṣṇu", "I am Śiva", etc., but not also of sayings like "Thou art That", "I am Brahman", etc.; for, among such passages, the phrase, for instance, "Thou art That", as heard, expresses, in the theory of the Sāṃkhya, the sense of a passage like this that thou art Eternal and eternally Pure and eternally Released, since, in the theory of the Sāṃkhya, it is the Perfect Self existing at the time of Pralaya or Dissolution, that alone is the object denoted by the words "That" and the like.

But, if it is contended that it is the Puruṣa produced at the beginning of Creation and called Nārāyaṇa, that is the only object denoted by the word "That," then, let the reference of the sayings also, *e. g.*, "Thou art That," be to non-difference in property (from him).

It cannot be said that, since there is no need of it, therefore, the Vedic texts cannot possibly refer to difference or diversity; for, the establishment or explanation of Release itself is the need for such reference; for when Creation and Dissolution, by the form of ever flowing succession, never come to a termination, there could be no (meaning of) Release, if there were but one Self.

Now, don't say, please, that the diversity of Selves being thus known to the world, it cannot be that the Vedic texts should have reference to this matter; because (the fact is just the other way, that is), in the Veda, etc., has been made the negation of the unity of the Self, entailed in the popular mind, by inference from the example of Âkâśa, by reason of its being the simple and natural view of the Self, and because the difference between one's own Consciousness and that of another is not an object of perception (and therefore must be taught in, and learnt from, the Veda, etc.), and because the popular preception of the Self is in respect of the body, etc.

Diversity of Selves has, however, been condemned in such passages, as

य एतस्मिन्नुदरमन्तरं कुरुते ऽथ तस्य भयं भवति ।

He who creates a breach within this (Âkâśa), now, of him is the fear.—*Taittiriya Upaniṣat*, II. 7.

But it refers to the one or the other of difference in property and division, (i. e., to heterogeneity of Selves or to division of one and the same Self into different parts, and not to the multiplicity of Selves essentially alike one another, but different as distinct complete individuals, as held by the Sâmkhyas).

But, this being the case, what will be the fate of the Vedic texts which take the Selves as separations or reflections? If this be asked, we reply as under: As in the case of the solar sphere consisting of many Tejas or 'fires,' so, by making one mass, undivided and of the same quality in every part, of the sphere of the sun of Consciousness consisting of many Selves, it is innumerable divisions in innumerable upâdhis that alone is established, by the examples of the reflections, etc., by means of innumerable Puruṣas who, ray-like, form the parts, as it were, of the sphere, in order to teach that the otherness or separateness characterised or created by the divisions, is merely a creation or fabrication of speech; but not to teach the undividedness of one single Self, because there is more force, as they are supported by reason, in those other texts of the Veda which employ the example of parts (in relation to a whole

made up of them, in the case of the many Puruṣas forming a sphere of Consciousness) as in the following :

वायुर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो
रूप रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।

As the one Vayu (Air), penetrating into the world, became, in every form (of things) individually, their counterform—Kāṭha Upaniṣat, V. 10.

It is also recollected in the Smṛiti :

यस्य सर्वात्मकत्वेऽपि खण्डयते नैकपिण्डता ।

Of which, the character of forming one mass is not impaired, even though it is made up of all the Selves.

In the Brahma-Mīmāṃsā (i. e., Vedānta Sūtram), however, Non-duality has been declared also by way of non-division in the form of the laya or dissolution of all other Consciousness into the eternally manifested Consciousness of the Supreme Īśvara or Lord, by the aphorism (IV ii. 16) :

अविभागो वचनात् ॥ ४ । २ । १६ । ॥

“(The merging of the permanent atoms of Prāṇa and the rest, is by way of identity, for) there is no separation, as is stated by an authoritative text.”—Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V, page 717.

More on this point has been said by us in our Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtram. Such is the hint.

On the second interpretation of the aphorism, again, the import is as follows : At the time of Pralaya or Dissolution, all that is different in kind (Jāti, genus) from the Self, is, without exception, non-existent ; because of the non-existence in it of the character of an entity (such as what might be called a water pot or the like) and of the capability of being put to any use (such as bringing water in, etc.). Of Puruṣas, by reason of their being immutable, objectivity and use themselves are facts altogether unknown. Hence, as at the time of Creation, so, also, at the time of Dissolution, existence belongs to them. Hence, at that time, the Selves are free from the duality of Selves of a different kind from them. Similarly, at the time of creation also, since nothing else possesses transcendental or absolute existence in the form of immutability, and, consequently, the Selves are free from the duality of Selves of a different kind from them, the Vedic texts on Non-duality at the time of Creation are also explained. —154.

Multiplicity of Puruṣa further established.

विदितबन्धकारणस्य दृष्ट्याऽतद्रूपम् ॥ १ । १५५ ॥

विदितबन्धकारणस्य Vidita-bandha-kāraṇasya, of one to whom the cause of Bondage has become known (A). Of one in whom the cause of bondage is manifestly present (v). दृष्ट्या Dṛiṣṭyā, by seeing, in the sight. अतद्रूपम् A-tat-rūpam,

not being of the form thereof, *i. e.*, oneness or similarity of form. Aniruddha reads tat-rûpam, meaning, that form, instead of atat-rûpam.

155. One to whom the cause of Bondage (*i. e.*, Non-discrimination) has become known, attains to that form (*i. e.*, isolation), by seeing (the discrimination of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti).—Aniruddha.

Or, there is absence of oneness of form in the sight of only one in whom the cause of Bondage is manifest.—Vijñâna Bhikṣu—155.

Vṛitti.—But, the Vedântin may contend, even with the upholder of the theory of manifold Selves, the bondage and release of the same Self are quite contradictory. To this the author replies.

“Tat-rûpam,” the form of isolation, “dṛiṣṭyâ,” through knowledge of the discrimination (of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), is of him to whom the cause of Bondage, *i. e.*, non-realisation of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), has become known.—155.

Bhūṣya.—But, the Vedântin may contend, as in the case of the Unity of the Self, Uniformity also is contradicted by the perception of the Self as having diversity of form: how, then, can it be said “because the reference is to the genus” (*vide* preceding aphorism)? To this the author replies.

(There is) “a-tat-rûpam,” *i. e.*, diversity of form, in Puruṣas, only in the sight of one in whom the cause of Bondage, namely, Non-discrimination, is “viditam” or manifestly present. Such is the meaning. Hence, (the conclusion is), diversity of form is not established by erroneous seeing.—155.

Those who have eyes to see can see the Uniformity of the Self.

नान्धादृष्ट्या चक्षुष्मतामनुलम्भः ॥ १ । १५६ ॥

न Na, not. **आन्धादृष्ट्या** Andha-adriṣṭyâ, by reason of non-seeing by the blind. **चक्षुष्मताम्** Chakṣuṣmatâm, of those who have got eyes. **अनुपलम्भः** Anupalambhah, non-perception.

156. Because the blind do not see, (it does) not (follow that) those who have got eyes, also cannot perceive.—156.

Vṛitti.—Bondage, (you say), rejoins the Vedântin, is occasioned by the non-perception of the discrimination (between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), and is not real. And it is a maxim that non-perception comes to cease through perception. Such being the case, we see it to be reasonable

only in the theory of the Unity of the Self, and not in the theory of the Plurality of Selves. In regard to this the author says.

The blind do not see:—Is this any reason that even he who has eyesight, cannot also see? There are many arguments in favour of the upholders of the Plurality of Selves. Such is the meaning.—156.

Bhāṣya:—But still, may rejoin the Vedāntin, the Uniformity of Selves will be disproved from the non-perception thereof. So the author says.

Non-perception itself is not established; because of the seeing of Uniformity by the wise, although the ignorant fail to see it. Such is the meaning.—156.

Non-duality disproved by recorded cases of release.

वामदेवादिमुक्त नाद्वैतम् ॥ १ । १५७ ॥

वामदेवादि: Vāna-deva-ādīḥ, Vāmadeva, and others. *मुक्त*: Muktaḥ, released. न Na, not. *अद्वैतम्* A-dvaitam, Non-duality.

157. Vāmadeva, as well as others, has been released; (hence) Non-duality (is) not (a fact).—157.

Vṛitti.—The author declares that, for the following reason also, the Selves are many.

In the Purāṇas, etc., it is heard, “Vāmadeva has been released,” “Suka has been released”, etc. If the Self were one and one only, since on the release of one, there would be the release of all, the mention of diversity (as in the case of separate and successive releases) would be contradicted.—157.

Bhāṣya:—After showing that the Vedic texts on Non-duality are not established (in the sense attributed to them by the Vedāntin), the author brings forward other impediments to the theory of undivided Non-duality.

Vāmadeva and others exist (in the condition of) being released; still, at the present moment, bondage is proved by perception in ourselves. Hence, non-duality of an undivided or entire Self is not a fact. Such is the meaning. Further, non-duality of this form is in contradiction to hundreds of such sayings as:

स चापि जातिस्मरणात्तबोध तत्रैव जन्मन्यपवर्गमाप

And he too, having recovered knowledge about the Self, through recollection of previous births, attained to release in that very birth.

Such is the complement of the aphorism.

Nor should such bondage and release be regarded as being only of the upādhi or the external condition or investment of the Self, because of contradiction to the established tenets of the Veda and the Smṛiti, and because, when we see people make such prayers as "May I not suffer pain", it is quite clear that the release of Puruṣa alone constitutes the supreme purpose of Puruṣa, designated as Release.

And, as is the case with the son and the like, the removal of pain of the upādhi becomes an object of desire to Puruṣa, only mediately, being subservient to the chief end of Puruṣa.

And what is contended by the present-day Māyā-vādins, namely, that, through contradiction of the Vedic texts on Non-duality, the texts of the Veda on Bondage, Release, Creation, Dissolution, etc., are also contradicted: this too is an unfounded allegation. Because, when, at the very moment of the hearing (of absolute Non-duality as maintained by them) from the Veda, there must arise the certainty of the non-existence of the fruit or result also, called Release, their contention would entail the unauthoritativeness of the Veda, characterised by uselessness of the observance (as instructed therein) of the injunctions about Manana or reasoning, etc., subsequent to śravaṇa or hearing. And, further, since there would be contradiction to the (reality of) the Vedānta also which is included within the fabric of Creation, by means of the Vedic texts on Non-duality, doubt would again arise in respect of Non-duality also as learnt from the Vedānta; in the same way as, when there is contradiction in the waking state of the words uttered in the state of sleep, doubt, in turn, arises in respect of the import of the words uttered in that state, (i. e., of the contradiction itself).

Moreover, from the teaching,

मिथ्याबुद्धिर्नस्तिकता ॥

Belief in Unreality is Unbelief (Nāstikatā).—Amara-kośa, I. i. 4. 13.

it is seen that those who see dream-like unreality in Dharma, etc., are merely a sect of the Bauddhas, because by the word "Sāmvṛittika" or caused by Samvṛiti or Concealment, they recognise that the fabric of the world is the creation of A-vidyā or Nescience. Such is the hint.—157.

Release of Vāmadera is not relative, but absolute.

अनादावद्य यावदभावान्नविष्यदप्येवम् ॥ १ । १५८ ॥

अनादी Anāda, in the beginningless world (Aniruddha), time (Vijñāna Bhikṣu) अद्य Adya, to-day. यावत् Yāvat, uptil. अभावात् Abhāvāt, because of non-existence. भविष्यत् Bhaviṣyat, the future. अपि Api, also. एवम् Evam, similar.

158. If, in the world which has been coming down from eternity, void has not been the result uptil to-day, the future also will not be so. (Aniruddha.)

Or, in the time, continuing from eternity, if no release has taken place uptil to-day, no release will take place in the future also. (Vijñāna Bhikṣu).—158.

Vṛitti.—On the theory of the plurality of Selves, since the world (Samsāra) is coming down from eternity, and since, at one time or another, one or another is released, gradually, in this wise, on the release of all, the whole (world) would become a void, while, on the theory of the unity of the Self, (such a contingency cannot arise), as release takes place only on the passing away of the upādhi or adjunct (of which there is no end). (If this be the objection), so the author says.

In the world which has been from eternity, when, uptil to-day, void is not seen to have been the result, there is no proof that, in the future, release (of *all* would take place, and leave a universal void behind it).—158.

Bhāṣya. —But, the Vedāntin may rejoin, it should be believed that, in the case of Vāmadeva and others also, absolute or permanent release has not been produced. To this the author replies.

In time eternal, if, uptil to-day, release has not been produced (as you say) in the case of anybody whatever, the time to come also would be the same, *i. e.*, absolutely without release taking place in it, since the thorough cultivation of the means for the attainment of release will be the same in the future as it has been in the past. Such is the meaning.—158.

As it has been, so will it be.

इदानीमिव सर्वत्र नात्यन्तोच्छेदः ॥ १ । १५६ ॥

इदानीम् Idānīm, now. इव Iva, as, सर्वत्र Sarvatra, at all times. न Na, not. अत्यन्तोच्छेदः Atyanta-uchchhedah, absolute eradication or cutting short.

159. As now, so, for ever, (the course of transmigration will) not come to an end. (Aniruddha).

Or, (for, the inference is that), as now, so, for ever, there would be no final release. (Vijñāna Bhikṣu).—159.

Vṛitti.—The author states another solution of the case.

Because of the infinity of Selves, release will take place by degrees, and, at the same time, an end (of the course of the world will) also

not (be the consequence). As now, so "sarvatra", in time to come, also, release will take place; but, hence, absolute termination (of the course of transmigration) would not result, because of the eternality of its flow.

On the theory also, that release consists in the passing away of the upâdhi, there is the implication of universal voidness; hence the charge lies equally against it. Just as there would be an end of all things, on the successive release of manifold Selves, similarly the world would be a void in consequence of the destruction of all upâdhis on the exhaustion of all karma (which is the cause of the Self coming into contact with the upâdhi, i. e., body, etc.).

Now, (if the Vedântin says), there will not be a void, because the upâdhis are infinite in number, then, it is the same on the theory of the multiplicity of Selves also. Thus.

**अत एव हि विद्वत्सु मुच्यमानेषु संततम् ।
ब्रह्माण्डजीवलोकानामनन्तत्वादशून्यता ॥**

For this reason, therefore, while the knowing (Selves) get released, (the process of the world runs) incessant; voidness does not result, because of the infinity of the Cosmic System and of the worlds in which the Jivas experience the consequences of their karma.—159.

Bhâṣya.—The author shows the process (by which the above inference has been arrived at).

At no time will absolute removal of bondage be possible in the case of any Puruṣa whatever, as is the case with the present time, (according to the rejoinder of the Vedântin mentioned in I. 158),—such an inference would be possible. Such is the meaning.—159.

Puruṣas are ever uniform.

व्यावृत्तोभयरूपः ॥ १ । १६० ।

Vyāvṛttirūpah.—*Vyāvṛtta-ubhaya-rūpah*, that from which double, i. e., different (*Vijñāna Bhikṣu*), both, i. e., bound and released, (*Aniruddha*), forms are excluded.

160. Puruṣas are never multiform.—160.

Vṛtti.—But, is the Self (essentially) bound or is it essentially released? If it is (essentially) bound, then, since, the essence cannot slip away, non-release (is the consequence); for, if it slipped away, (the Self would be) non-eternal, (as loss of essence amounts to annihilation of the thing itself, *vide* aphorisms 7 and 8 above). If, (on the other hand, it is said to be essentially) released, then, useless are meditation and all the rest (enjoined as means for the attainment of release). To this the author replies.

It is not bound, nor is it released, but it is eternally released. While destruction of Ignorance is effected by means of meditation, etc., (which are, therefore, not useless).—160.

Bhāṣya :—The uniformity of Puruṣas, that has been ascertained to be the import of the Vedic texts establishing their “unity,”—does this uniformity arise at the moment of release, or does it exist at all times? There being room for this enquiry, the author declares.

And that Puruṣa is (“vyāvṛitta-ubhaya-rûpaḥ, i. e.,) one from whom difference of form has departed; because of the establishment of constant uniformity from the testimony of the Vêda, Smṛiti, and Reason. So is it said :—

बहुरूप इवाभाति मायया बहुरूपया ।

रममाणो गुणेष्वस्या ममाहमिति बध्यते ॥

By means of Mâyâ which shows a variety of forms, (Puruṣa) looks as if he were multiform. Revelling in its Guṇas, he is bound in such wise as “(This is) mine,” “I (do, feel, etc.),”

Further :

जगदाख्यमहास्वप्ने स्वप्नात् स्वप्नान्तरं व्रजत् ।

रूपं त्यजति नो शान्तं ब्रह्म शान्तत्ववृंहितम् ॥

In this long dream, designated the world, while passing on from dream to dream, the Peaceful Brahman which is the elaboration or expression of peacefulness, does not give up its own form. —160.

Character of witness is compatible with uniformity.

साक्षात्सम्बन्धात् साक्षित्वम् ॥ १ । १६१ ॥

साक्षात्सम्बन्धात् Sākṣāt-sambandhât, through immediate connection. For this, Aniruddha reads Akṣa-sambandhât, through connection with the Senses. साक्षित्वम् Sākṣitvam, the being the witness.

161. Puruṣa is the witness through connection with the Senses (Aniruddha), or, through immediate connection (Vijñāna Bhikṣu).—161.

Vṛitti.—It has been declared that it belongs to the Self to be the witness. But if it belongs to be the witness, even to one who has attained to discrimination (of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti), non-release would be the consequence. (If this be the doubt), so the author says.

“Akṣa” means the Senses. Through connection with that, Puruṣa is the witness. And where will be the connection with the Senses, when discrimination has been attained? (i. e., it will be nowhere).—161.

Bhāṣya.—But, since the character of being the witness is not permanent, how, then, can there be constant uniformity of Puruṣa? To this the author replies.

The character of being the witness, that has been asserted of Puruṣa, is through immediate connection merely, but not through transformation. Such is the meaning.

It is found that, by immediate connection, Puruṣa is the witness of Buddhi alone, because the derivation of the word "sākṣi" is साक्षाद्बुद्धिर्लक्षणा इ. e., as the name of one seeing immediately (Paṇini V. ii. 91.) And the character of seeing immediately means the character of seeing without intermediation. And immediate connection (in this sense) with a Puruṣa takes place only of the modification of the Buddhi pertaining to that Puruṣa. Hence, it is of Buddhi alone that Puruṣa is the sākṣi or witness, while of others he is merely the Draṣṭā or seer; such is the division, (i. e., distinction made) in the Śāstras.

And the connection which determines the production of cognition, is of the form of reflection only, which takes the place of the modification into the form of the objects cognised: but not, in the least, of the form of conjunction, as we have submitted more than once, because, in that case, the supposition would not be warranted by the facts of the case.

In the case of Viṣṇu, etc., on the other hand, the character of being the witness of all things, belongs to them in a secondary sense, because of the very non-existence (in their case) of the intermediation of the Senses.

Where the reading is "Akṣa-sambandhât sākṣitvam," "akṣa" there means Buddhi, as it is equally an instrument of knowledge (like the Senses), and "Akṣa-sambandhât" means, through connection of Buddhi in the form of reflection as declared before. Such is the meaning.—161.

Puruṣa is for ever released.

नित्यमुक्तत्वम् ॥ १ । १६१ ॥

नित्यमुक्तत्वम् Nitya-mukta-tvam, constant freedom.

162. It belongs to Puruṣa to be released for ever.—
162.

Vṛitti.—Constantly of what form is the Self? To this the author replies.

The meaning is quite plain.—162.

Bhāṣya.—For the purpose of establishing the absence of multiformity of Puruṣa, the author points out two other distinctions of Puruṣa, by the next two aphorisms.

It is, at all times, that freedom from bondage, called Pain, belongs to Puruṣa, since Pain, etc., are transformations of Buddhi. Such is the meaning. Puruṣa-artha or the supreme object of Puruṣa, on the other hand, is, as has been established before, the cessation of the experience of Pain, or, in other words, the cessation of Pain in the form of reflection.—162.

Puruṣa is indifferent.

औदासीन्यञ्चेति ॥ १ । १६३ ॥

औदासीन्यं Audāsīnyam, indifference. च Cha, and. इति Iti, finally.

163. And, finally, Indifference also (belongs to Puruṣa.)—163.

Vṛitti.—The meaning is quite plain.—163.

Bhāṣya:—"Audāsīnyam," (indifference), is inactivity or non-agency. And hereby the being free from desire, i. e., disinterestedness, and other distinctions also should be suggested, since there is the text of the Veda:

**कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा शुद्धाशुद्धा
धृतिरधृतिर्भौरित्येतत् सर्वं मन एव**

Desire, Volition, Curiosity, Faith, Unfaith, Retentiveness, Unretentiveness, Fear,—all this is verily Manas.—Bṛi. Āraṇ. Upa. I. v. 3.

The word "iti" marks the end of the establishment of the character of Puruṣa.—163.

Seeming agency of Puruṣa is due to influence of Buddhi.

उपरागात् कर्तृत्वं चित्सान्निध्याच्चित्सान्निध्यात् ॥१ । १६४॥

उपरागात् Uparāgāt, from affection or influence. कर्तृत्वं Kartr̥itvam, agency. चित्सान्निध्यात् Chit-sānnidhyāt, through proximity of consciousness.

164. (Seeming) agency (of Puruṣa) is from influence (of Prakṛiti), through proximity to Intelligence, through proximity to Intelligence.—164.

Vṛitti.—But, some one may say, we hear of the agency of the Self from the Scripture; how is this? To this the author replies.

"Agency" of the Self, i. e., the fancy or assumption of agency, is from the influence of Prakṛiti by means of her proximity to Intelligence.

The repetition of the expression "through proximity to Intelligence" is meant to indicate the completion of the Book, the same practice having been observed in the Veda.—164.

*Here ends the First Book, of Topics, in the Vṛitti on the
Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram of Kapila.*

Bhāṣya.—But, some one may ask, the mutual discrimination of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti being thus established by means of their dissimilarity in property, how can the declarations made in the Veda and the Smṛiti, namely, that Puruṣa is the agent, and also that Buddhi is the knower, be justified? To this the author replies.

Here the syntactical connection of the words is according to their appropriateness.

The agency that is attributed to Puruṣa, arises from the influence of Buddhi, and the intelligence that is attributed to Buddhi, arises from the proximity of Puruṣa: neither of them is real. Such is the meaning. As in the case of fire and iron, the attribution of their properties to each other mutually, arises from particular conjunction between them, (i. e., when an iron bar is heated to redness, it may be said that the iron burns, as well as that the fire is so much long and so much broad, etc.), and is, therefore, only accidental or caused by upādhis: or, as in the case of water and the sun, the imputation of their properties to each other mutually, arises from the conjunction of water and the sun, and is, therefore, only accidental; the very similar is the case with Puruṣa and Buddhi. Such is the import.

And this has been stated by the Kārikā also: viz.,

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तव्यं भवत्युदासीनः ॥ कारिका २२ ॥

Therefore, through conjunction with that (Puruṣa), the unintelligent Liṅgam (Buddhi, etc.) looks as if it were intelligent; and, although agency is of the Guṇas, the indifferent (Puruṣa) appears, in the same way, as if he were verily the agent.—Kārikā, Verse 22.

The repetition of the expression “through proximity to Intelligence” is for the purpose of indicating the close of the Book.—164.

The Avoidable, the Avoidance, the Cause of the Avoidable, and the Means of Avoidance,—the four principal objects of the Śāstra,—which form the four divisions of the System, have been successively discussed and elaborated in this Book.

And, because it gives an elaborate account of the contents of the condensed or abridged Sāṃkhya Sūtram (Kapila Sūtram), therefore, like the Yoga (Sūtram of Patañjali, which also is an exposition of the Sāṃkhya Thought, and is, on this account, similarly described), this Śāstra, is designated the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram.

*Here ends the First Book of Topics, in the Commentary, composed by
Vijñāna Āchārya, on the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram of Kapila.*

Book II. OF THE EVOLUTIONS OF PRAKRITI.

INTRODUCTION.

Vṛitti:—Now, after the ascertainment of the Topics, is made the composition of the Second Book for the purpose of the ascertainment of the products of the Pradhâna.

Bhâṣya:—The Topics of the Śâstra have been ascertained. Now, in order to prove that it belongs to Puruṣa not to undergo transformation, the author will, in the Second Book, explain, in very great detail, how the procession of Creation proceeds from Prakṛiti. Therein too the intrinsic nature of the products of Prakṛiti will be declared very fully, with a view to the very clear discrimination of Puruṣa from them also. It is for this reason that, in the verse :

विकारं प्रकृतिं चैव पुरुषं च सनातनम् ।
यो यथावद् विजानाति स वितृष्णो विमुच्यते ॥

Transformation as well as Prakṛiti and also Puruṣa the eternal,—whoso knoweth them as they are in themselves, he, thirsting no more, is released.—Mahâ-Bhârata, XII. 7879.

of the Mokṣa-Dharmâ Section of the Mahâbhârata, and in other places, it has been declared that *all* the three (things mentioned in the above verse) are objects which require to be known.

The Purpose of Creation.

विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा प्रधानस्य । २ । १ ।

विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं vimukta-mokṣa-artham, for the purpose of the release of the released. स्वार्थं sva-artham, for its own sake. वा vâ, or. प्रधानस्य pradhânasya, of Pradhâna or Prakṛiti.

1. Of Prakṛiti, (the agency or the becoming the procreatrix) is either for the release of the released or for her own sake.—165.

Vṛitti:—The Self is free by nature. Of the Pradhâna, the becoming the procreatrix of the world is for the purpose of the release of the Self from âbhimânika or assumed or imagined bondage.

In regard to creation which is painful, since Dispassion naturally grows towards it, Puruṣa at once strives to obtain release. And in regard

to creation which gives pleasure, since, it being tainted with painfulness, pleasure also is thrown on the side of pain, it is Dispassion only that ultimately is produced towards it.

This Dispassion is fourfold, being distinguished under the names of Yata-māna, Vyatireka, Ekendriya, and Vaśikāra.

Note :—These technical terms require explanation. "Dispassion, Vairāgya, is the extinction (or absence) of rāga, (lit.) colour, or passion, which, like dyes of various hues, tinctures the soul." The various stages of its unfoldment have been described as Yata-māna or Striving, Vyatireki or Discriminating, Ekendriya or Longing, and Vaśikāra or Supreme. Vāchaspati Miśra has explained them in his commentary on the Sāmkhya-Kārikā, Verse XXIII, and, in his gloss on Vyāsa's commentary on Patañjali's Yoga-Sūtram, I. 15. We give the following extract from the former :

रागादयः कषायाश्चित्तवर्तिनः, तैरिन्द्रियाणि यथास्वं विषयेषु प्रवर्त्यन्ते । तन्माञ्ज प्रवर्तिषत विषयेष्विन्द्रियाणीति तत्परिपाचनारम्भः प्रयत्नो यतमानसंज्ञा । परिपाचने चानुष्ठीयमाने केचित्कषायाः पक्वाः, पश्यन्ते च केचित् । तत्रैवं पूर्वापरीभावे सति पश्यमाणेभ्यः कषायेभ्यः पक्वानां व्यतिरेकेणावधारणं व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा । इन्द्रियप्रवृत्त्यसमर्थतया पक्वानामौत्सुक्यमात्रेण मनसि व्यवस्थापनमेकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा । औत्सुक्यमात्रस्यापि निवृत्तिरूपस्थितेष्वपि दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयेषु या संज्ञात्रयात् पराचीना सा वशीकारसंज्ञा । यामत्रभगवान् पतञ्जलिर्वर्णयांचकार—दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् ॥

Passion and the like, which act like dyes of different hues, reside in the Chitta or the Retentive Faculty. By them the Indriyas, the Powers of Cognition and Action, are employed on their respective objects. Now, the endeavour, i.e., the putting forth of energy, for the purpose of boiling down and dissolving them, with the desire that the Indriyas may not go out to the objects, is designated as Yata-māna. And when the boiling is once begun, some passions will become boiled, while others will be in the course of being boiled. In that stage, the relation of before and after thus coming into existence, the ascertainment of the boiled by means of their discrimination from those that are in the course of being boiled, is designated as Vyatireki. They being thus disabled to excite the Indriyas to activity, the persistence of the boiled passions in the mind in the form of mere longing, is designated as Ekendriya. The surcease of even the mere longing in regard to sensible and scriptural objects of enjoyment, even though they be near at hand, which, in its appearance, is subsequent to the first three stages, is designated as Vaśikāra: which the terrestrial divinity, Patañjali has described as

दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम् ॥ योगसूत्रम् । १ । १५ ॥

Dispassion, designated as Vaśikāra, is of him who has no thirst for sensible as well as scriptural objects.—Yoga-Sūtram, I. 15.

"The Avoidable," i.e., Pain not-yet-come, is of twenty-one varieties, viz., the Body, the six Indriyas or Senses, the six Objects, the six Buddhis, Pleasure, and Pain. Among them, the Body is a form of Pain, because it is the seat of Pain. The Senses, Objects, and Ideas (are so), because they stand in the relation of being instrumental to its production. Pleasure (is a form of Pain), because of its close association with Pain. Pain is the Avoidable *par excellence*, because it contains affliction, uneasiness, and anguish as its very essence.

That which accomplishes it, that is, its uncommon or specific cause, is A-vidyā, Triṣṇā, Dharma and A-dharma. A-vidyā consists in contrary cognition (*i.e.*, in knowing a thing to be different from what it really is). And the Saṃskāra or impression thereof has been declared, by those who know, to be the uncommon cause of Triṣṇā or thirst, etc.

And "the Avoidance of Pain" (aimed at in this Śāstra) consists in that cessation of the production of Pain, which is absolute or final.

The means thereof is the knowledge of the truth in respect of the Self, inasmuch as the cessation of A-vidyā or unreal Cognition takes place from it. Accordingly it has been declared :

आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः ।

श्रोतव्यः श्रुतिवाक्येभ्यो मन्तव्यश्चोपपत्तिभिः ॥

मत्वा च सततं ध्येय एते दर्शनहेतवः ।

तरति शोकमात्मवित् ॥

Lo! the Self verily requires to be seen, heard, thought, and contemplated.—Bṛihat-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 5.

(The Self) should be heard from the declarations in the Veda, thought by means of arguments, and, after being thought, should be constantly meditated. These are the ways of seeing.

The knower of the Self transcends grief.—Chhândogya-Upaniṣat, VII. i. 3.

It (*i.e.*, the Self) is twofold: Higher and Lower. Thus has it been declared :

द्वे ब्रह्मणी वेदितव्ये परं चापरमेव च ॥

Two Brahmanas have to be known: the Higher as well as the Lower.

The Higher Self is the Lord Mahesvara, possessed of the power of Real Cognition and Lordliness; not in the least touched by, or associated with, the virtues which cause transmigration; the All-knower, the Providence, as all creation proceeds from Him.

How is He to be known? Either through Anumāna or inference, or through Śama or tranquility of mind.

Note:—In the place of "Anumānât vâ Śamât vâ" (either through inference or through tranquility of mind), as read by Dr. Garbe, which we have adopted, the text of Paṇḍita Kâlîvara Vedântavāgîṣa, is "Anumānât vâ āgamât (through Revelation) vâ."

Thus, the subject of discussion, that is, the thing perceived, must have a cause, because it, being non-existent before, has come into existence, as is the case with a picture. This is inference. Thereafter of what is, (through inference), known in a general way, knowledge in particular is obtained by means of Yoga.

Of the lower (self), *i.e.*, the Jiva, the proof is from self-perception itself.

And the activity of Prakṛiti is for the purpose of the discriminative knowledge of these two, the Higher and the Lower Self. Herein she is declared to be altruistic.

And her selfishness consists in this that she keeps aloof from that Puruṣa to whom she has exhibited her form by means of discrimination.

(It may be asked), how activity can arise in Prakṛiti who (*ex hypothesi*) is non-intelligent? (To this our reply would be that) the activity of even non-intelligent things is seen, *e.g.* of trees, by way of producing fruits, etc.—1.

Bhāṣya :—The word “agency” is brought in from the last aphorism of the preceding book.

The Pradhâna becomes the maker of the world for the purpose of the release of Puruṣa who is by nature free from the bondage of pain, from pain in the form of reflection, or, in other words, for the purpose of release from pain which is connected with Puruṣa by the relation of a reflection.

Or, it is for her own sake, that is to say, for the purpose of her own release from pain which really belongs to her (*vide* Aphorism II. 7 *post*).

Although Bhoga or Experience (of Pleasure and Pain) is as much a purpose of Creation as Release, yet Release alone is mentioned (in this aphorism), inasmuch as it is the principal one.—1.

The Cause of Successive Creation.

विरक्तस्य तत्सिद्धेः ॥ २ । २ ॥

विरक्तस्य viraktasya, of the dispassionate. *तत्सिद्धेः* Tat-siddheḥ, because the accomplishment of this, *i.e.*, release, is.

2. (Successive Creation is necessary), because the accomplishment of Release is of him (only) who has become free from passion.—166.

Vṛitti :—Now, in regard to who are adhikârin or entitled to Release, the author declares.

So also says the Śruti :

पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति ॥

Having put forth activity out of desire for son, desire for wealth, and desire for better worlds, men thereafter live the life of mendicants.—Bṛihat-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, I II. v. 1.

शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तिष्ठुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति ॥

Being tranquil in mind, controlling the external Senses, withdrawing from the world, being ready to renunciate everything, and being steady in meditation, one sees the Self within oneself.—Bṛhat Āraṇyaka Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 23.—2.

Bhāṣya :—But, if Creation were for the purpose of Release, then, Release being possible by means of one Creation only, there would be, one may say, no Creation again and again. To this the author replies :

Release does not take place (for all) through creation once only. But the production of Release occurs in the case of him who has been intensely tormented by the various pains of birth, death, sickness, etc., repeated many times, and has, in consequence, Higher Dispassion produced in him by means of the knowledge of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti. Such is the meaning.—2.

Dispassion cannot grow in one creation.

न श्रवणमात्रात्तत्सिद्धिरनादिवासनाया बलवत्त्वात् ॥ २ । ३ ॥

n na, not. श्रवणमात्रात् śravana-mātrāt, from mere hearing. तत्सिद्धिः tat-siddhiḥ, growth of Dispassion. अनादिवासनायाः anādi-vāsanāyāḥ, of vāsanā which has been coming down from eternity. “Vāsanā” is the resultant impression of all the past experiences. It is that which inclines to re-birth. बलवत्त्वात् balavattvāt, on account of the forcibleness. For “Anādi-vāsanāyāḥ balavattvāt,” Aniruddha, Mahādeva and Nāgeśa read “Anādi-vāsanāpatutvāt,” which means the same thing.

3. It (Dispassion) does not arise from the mere *hearing* (i.e., learning about it from the Śāstras), because of the forcibleness of the eternal Vāsanā.—167.

Vṛitti :—If Release were to result through Dispassion immediately after the hearing, then, there would be, some one may say, the release of all immediately after they receive instructions from the Guru or preceptor, but such is not observed to be the case. To this the author replies :

Release does not take place immediately after the hearing. But, in the case of one whose eternal Vāsanā has become weak, Release appears quickly, and, in the case of others, it is late in appearance.—3.

Bhāṣya :—The author tells the reason why Dispassion does not grow by means of one creation only :

Even the *hearing* takes place by means of the merits acquired in many births. Even then the occurrence of Dispassion is not from the mere hearing, but through immediate cognition (sākṣātkāra). And immediate cognition does not take place at once, because of the false Vāsanā which has existed from eternity. But it takes place through steadiness in Yoga. And in Yoga there is an abundance of obstacles. (*Vide Yoga-Sūtram*

of Patañjali, Book II.) Hence, it is only after many births that Dispassion as well as Release take place, at rare intervals, in the case of a very few only.—3.

The Rule of Individuals.

बहुभृत्यवद्वा प्रत्येकम् ॥ २ । ४ ॥

बहुभृत्यवत् vahu-bhṛitya-vat, as is the case with many dependants (of one householder). वा वद्, or. प्रत्येकम् pratyekam, every one.

4. Or, as is the case with the many dependants (of a single householder), every individual (Puruṣa) (has his own lot, and hence the stream of creation flows on eternally.)—Aniruddha.

Or, as a single householder has many dependants under him, so every one of the Guṇas has innumerable Puruṣas to liberate, and hence the stream of creation, etc.—Vijñāna Bhikṣu.—168.

Vṛitti :—The author states another argument.

As a man may have many servants some of whom are released through faithful attendance, some share in his grace, while some are killed in consequence of their faults; so Prakṛiti is one, while Puruṣas are many. Among them, for those who have got clear knowledge of the discrimination of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, there is speedy release; for those who have risen up to the level of mere worship, it is gradual; and for others, there is none.—4.

Bhāṣya :—The author gives another reason in support of the theory of a stream of successive creations.

As, in the case of the householders, every one of them has to maintain a good many dependants in the persons of the wife, the son, and the like; likewise also, in the case of the Guṇas, Sattva and the rest, every one of them has to set free Puruṣas without number. Hence, even when a certain number of Puruṣas have obtained Release, the stream of creations must still continue for the purpose of securing Release to other Puruṣas, inasmuch as Puruṣas are infinite in number. Such is the meaning. Thus there is the Yoga-Sūtram :

कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् ॥ २ । २२ ॥

“Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved, it (the sensible world) is not destroyed, being common to others.”—*Vide* Yoga Aphorisms of Patañjali, II, 22, S. B. H. Vol. IV, page 138.—4.

Proof of the Theory of Adhyāsa or fictitious attribution (e.g., of bondage, release, creativeness, etc.) in regard to Puruṣa.

प्रकृतिवास्तवे च पुरुषस्याध्याससिद्धिः ॥ २ । ५ ॥

प्रकृतिवास्तवे prakṛiti-vāstave, the reality (of bondage, creativeness, etc.) in the case of Prakṛiti being established. च cha, and. पुरुषस्य puruṣasya, of Puruṣa. अध्याससिद्धिः adhyāsa-siddhiḥ, proof of adhyāsa or fictitious attribution.

5. And when (it is established that bondage, creativeness, etc.) really belong to Prakṛiti, proof (is thereby obtained) of their being fictitious attributions to Puruṣa.—169.

Uṛitti:—The Self, being kûṭastha or immutable, one may say, Bondage (real or fictitious) does not verily belong to it, (and, therefore, the question of Release does not arise, and consequently there is no scope for this Śāstra). In regard to this, the author says :

Release consists in the inactivity of Prakṛiti towards that Puruṣa to whom she has fully exhibited herself. She catches the reflection of, and also casts her shadow in, that Puruṣa towards whom she becomes active. The change thus appearing in Puruṣa is merely an adhyāsa or superimposition, and is in no sense real. So has it been said :

यद्यात्मा मलिनोऽस्वच्छो विकारी स्यात् स्वभावतः ।

न हि तस्य भवेन्मुक्तिर्जन्मान्तरादितैरपि ॥

Were the Self impure, untransparent, and changeful, by nature, Release would not accrue to it even by hundreds of births.—Īśvara-Gītā.—5.

Blaiṣya :—But how can it be asserted, it may be asked, that creativeness belongs to Prakṛiti alone? when the creativeness of Puruṣa also is proved from such Vedic texts as

एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः ॥

From this Self has Ākāśa been evolved.—Taittirīya-Upaniṣat, II. 1.

To this the author replies :

When, further, the reality of creativeness is established (*vide* II. 6 *post*) in the case of Prakṛiti, it follows that in the Vedas has been made only a fictitious attribution (adhyāsa) of creativeness to Puruṣa, for, upāsanā or worship is the primary object of the Vedas, and nothing else. That creativeness belongs to Prakṛiti in a real sense is proved by such other texts of the Veda as the one beginning with Ajām ekām, the Unborn One, (Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣat, IV. 5). Moreover, were the attributions of creativeness to Puruṣa, made in the Vedas, real, then these texts would contradict those other texts of the Veda which declare that Puruṣas are mere unchanging consciousnesses. Such is the meaning.

And this adhyâsa or attribution, in the form of transference of epithet, is, in fact, one of the current figures of speech amongst mankind. As, *e.g.*, victory and defeat, (really) present in the soldiers who make up the force of the king, are transferred or attributed to the king; in like manner, are creativeness, etc., (really) present in Prakṛiti, the Energy of Puruṣa, attributed to Puruṣas, the possessors of that Energy, on the strength of the maxim of the non-difference of energy and the possessor thereof. So has it been said in the Kûrma Purâṇa:

शक्तिशक्तिमतोर्भेदं पश्यन्ति परमार्थतः ।

अभेदं चानुपश्यन्ति योगिनस्तत्त्वचिन्तकाः ॥

The Yogins who contemplate the Tattvas (Prakṛiti, etc.), see the difference between the energy and the possessor thereof, and, again, they discern their ultimate non-difference.—Kûrma-Purâṇa, XII. 28.

“Bhedam,” “difference,” means anyonya-abhâvam or mutual non-existence (as, *e.g.*, in the case of the non-existence of the nature of the cow in the horse, and *vice versa*); “abhedam,” “non-difference,” means non-difference in the form of avibhâga or non-division. These are seen by the worshippers of Prakṛiti and the other Tattvas. Such is the meaning.

Examples of both these cases may be found in the following:—

अथात आदेशो नेति नेति ॥

Now, then, is the direction “It is not,” “It is not,” etc. Brihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, II. iii. 6.

आत्मैवेदं सर्वम् ॥

Verily all this is the Self.—Chhândogya-Upaniṣat, VII. xxv. 2.

Such is the import.—5.

The reality of Prakṛiti's creativeness is proved from the products.

कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेः ॥ २ । ६ ॥

कार्यतः kâryataḥ, from the products. तत्सिद्धेः tat-siddheḥ, because of the proof thereof.

6. Because it (the reality of Prakṛiti's creativeness) is proved from (the reality of) the products.—170.

Vṛitti:—The author adduces evidence to show that bondage really belongs to Prakṛiti, and not to Puruṣa.

From seeing the unbroken succession of Mahat and the rest, the products of Prakṛiti, there is proof of the bondage of Prakṛiti.—6.

Bhâṣya:—But how can it thus be taken for certain, rejoins our opponent, that creativeness is real even in the case of Prakṛiti, when we

also hear from the Vedas that creation is like a dream and so forth? In regard to this, the author says:

Because, the meaning is, whereas the reality of the products arises by means of their producing impressions and exhibiting acts, therefore, from the products themselves, there is establishment of the real creativeness of Prakṛiti, by means of dharmi-grāhaka-pramāṇa, i.e., the kind of proof which cognises the subject of inference as possessing a particular property (as, here, for instance, Prakṛiti as the seat of the power which created those products).

The texts of the Veda, on the other hand, which declare the resemblance of creation to a dream and the like, should be understood to bear merely on the aspect of (unreality or) non-existence of creation in the form of its non-eternality, or, on that aspect of it in which it is (fictitiously) attributed to Puruṣa; for, otherwise, there would be contradiction of the texts demonstrating (the reality of) creation. Moreover, the things which we call dreams, are not absolutely non-existent, inasmuch as they are transformations of Manas.—6.

Knowledge and Ignorance are the sole determinants of Release and Bondage.

चेतनोद्देशान्नियमः कण्टकमोक्षवत् ॥ २ । ७ ॥

चेतनोद्देशात् chetana-uddēśāt, with reference to one knowing. नियमः niyamah, the rule, why some escape Prakṛiti while others do not. कण्टकमोक्षवत् kaṇṭaka-mokṣa-vat, as in the case of the release of (or escape from) a thorn.

7. The rule is with reference to one knowing, as in the case of the release of a thorn.—171.

Vṛitti :—It might be objected that, since activity is of the very nature of Prakṛiti, she will cause activity in all Puruṣas without distinction; what, then, is the use of seeing the discrimination and non-discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa? In regard to this, the author says:

Just as, on seeing a thorn, some one warns another by saying, “Do not come by this way,” and does not warn all passers-by indiscriminately: so the rule is that, according to adhikāra or degree of excellence or stage of evolution, the activity of Prakṛiti takes place in regard to a particular conscious entity (i.e., Puruṣa), and not in regard to all.—7.

Bhāṣya :—Now, on the alternative view (*vide* II. 1 *ante*) that the activity of Prakṛiti is for her own benefit, she, it may be said, would be active with reference to the released Puruṣa also. To this the author replies:

By reason of its derivation from the root “chit” in the sense of full knowledge, “chetana” here means one who knows well. Just as one

and the same thorn is released only by one who is "chetana," i.e., knowing, that is to say, does not become a cause of pain to him alone, but certainly becomes so to others; so too the "rule," i.e., arrangement of things in the world, is that Prakṛiti is released by him only who is "chetana," i.e., knowing, and having all his objects fulfilled, that is to say, she does not become a cause of pain to him alone, but certainly becomes a cause of pain to others who are not knowing. Such is the meaning.

Hereby takes place Prakṛiti's own release, although she is in bondage by nature. And hence she does not become active with reference to the released Puruṣa.—7.

Vedāntin Mahādeva :—"Chetana" is one who knows, i.e., one who possesses immediate vision of viveka or the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. "Uddeśāt," with reference to him, i.e., towards him. "Niyamaḥ," i.e., (restraint, cessation, or) absence of the activity of Prakṛiti. As there is release (of the thorn from its own activity of causing pain) with reference to one who is aware of (the existence of) the thorn. For, it should be understood that the activity of Prakṛiti is for the purpose of her own release from the pain inhering in herself. And thus release is verily effected on her coming into contact with a Puruṣa possessing discriminative knowledge. Because Prakṛiti is of the form of pain in this sense and to this extent only that she is the efficient cause of the experience of pain, appertaining to Puruṣa, and consisting of the reflection of Buddhi which contains pain as its essence. And that (efficient causality) is certainly gone on the absence of the experience of pain for a Puruṣa who possesses discriminative knowledge. Owing to the absence of any particular purpose regarding herself, she does not become active towards the released Puruṣa, but does so towards the unreleased Puruṣa alone. Such is the idea.

The Theory of Adhyāsa further argued.

अन्ययोगेऽपि तत्सिद्धिर्नाञ्जस्येनायोदाहवत् ॥ २ । ८ ॥

अन्ययोगे anya-yoge, though there be conjunction with the other, i.e. Prakṛiti. अपि api, even. तत्सिद्धिः tat-siddhiḥ, proof of the existence thereof, i.e., of bondage (Aniruddha), of creativeness (Vijñāna Bhikṣu). न na, not. आञ्जस्येन āñjasyena, immediately. अयोदाहवत् ayo-dāha-vat, as is the case with the burning action of iron.

8. Even though there is conjunction with the other (i.e., Prakṛiti), this (bondage, creativeness, etc.) does not exist

(in Puruṣa) immediately, just as is the case with the burning action of iron.—172.

Vṛitti:—Bondage, it has been declared, does not belong to the Self. The author argues the point.

It is the characteristic of exciting to activity (or efficient causality) that makes for the bondage of Prakṛiti. Notwithstanding that there is conjunction of Prakṛiti (with Puruṣa), (it does not follow that the bondage of Puruṣa is real, but) that the abhimāna, conceit or misconception of bondage arises in Puruṣa by means of the falling of the shadow of Prakṛiti upon him.

“Na āñjasyena,” not really. (That is, even the conjunction of Puruṣa with Prakṛiti is not real, but only reflectional.)

“Ayo-dāha-vat:” as, where conjunction takes place with a piece of hot iron, it is felt as if the iron causes burning, while, in fact, the power to cause burning does not belong to iron, but comes, through conjunction, from fire alone.—8.

Bhāṣya:—Well, one may say, what has been stated, namely, that, in the case of Puruṣa, the creative character is merely a fictitiously attributed one,—that is not reasonable, for it is but proper that, by the conjunction of Prakṛiti, Puruṣa also should be transformed as Mahat, etc., because it is observed, that by the conjunction of earth, etc., transformation of wood, etc., similar to, or resembling, earth, etc., takes place. In regard to the position thus taken up, the author says:

Even though there is the conjunction of Prakṛiti, still it is not proved that creativeness belongs to Puruṣa “āñjasyena” or immediatly. An example of this is: “ayo-dahā-vat.” As the burning power does not directly belong to iron, but is merely fictitiously attributed to it, being borrowed from the fire conjoined with it; such is the meaning.

In the example just mentioned, however, transformation of both (the fire and iron) is admitted, it being proved by sense-perception; while in the instance in question, since the case is explained by the transformation of one only (*i.e.*, Prakṛiti), there would be cumbrousness in supposing the transformation of both; as, otherwise, transformation of the colour of the crystal would result from the conjunction of the China rose.—8.

The instrumental cause of Creation is Rāga, Passion or Desire

रागविरागयोर्योगः सृष्टिः ॥ २ । ६ ॥

रागविरागयोः rāga-virāgayoḥ, from passion and dispassion. योगः yogaḥ, concentration, Yoga. सृष्टिः sṛiṣṭiḥ, creation.

9. Creation (results) from Passion ; Release, from Dispassion.—173.

Vṛitti :—What, it may be asked, is the object of creation ? To this the author replies :

Bhoga or worldly experience proceeds from passion or desire ; Release, from dispassion. In reality or ultimately, however, nothing but dispassion results from passion or attachment also, through seeing the defects of the object of the senses in the course of Bhoga or experience.—9.

Bhāṣya :—It has already (*vide* II. 1 *ante*) been stated that the fruit of creation is Release. Now the author states the chief occasional or instrumental cause of creation.

When there is Passion, there is creation ; and when there is Dispassion, there is “yogaḥ,” i.e., the abiding of the Self in its own essence (svarūpa), that is to say, Release, or, in other words, the suppression of the modifications of the Chittam or the thinking principle (*vide* Yoga Aphorisms, I. 2). Such is the meaning. And thus it is proved, by the methods of agreement and difference, that Rāga or Passion is the cause of creation. This is the import. And, thus, the Veda also, after declaring the goals in the form of Brahmanhood, etc., attainable by the performance of the various Karmas or actions, declares :

इति तु कामयमानो योऽकामो न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति ॥

Thus, however, (fare) those who desire. Of him who is desireless, the Prāṇas or life-breaths do not go out (into other living forms).—Bṛihat-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 6.

Passion and Dispassion also are but properties of Prakṛiti.—9.

The order of creation.

महदादिक्रमेण पञ्चभूतानाम् ॥ २ । १० ॥

महदादिक्रमेण mahat-ādi-krameṇa, by the series of Mahat and the rest. पञ्चभूतानाम् pañcha-bhūtānām, of the five Bhūtas or gross elements.

10. The creation of the five Bhūtas is in the order of Mahat and the rest.—174.

Vṛitti :—The twenty-five Principles have been declared by the aphorism beginning with “Sattva, Rajas, Tamas” of the first book (*vide* I. 61, page 93). Now the author declares the order of their evolution along with all other details.

The word “creation” completes the sentence. The order will be stated in the sequel.—10.

Bhāṣya:—After this the author begins to describe the process of creation.

“Creation”—this follows from the preceding aphorism. Although from the texts of the Veda such as

एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः ॥

From this, Self, was evolved Ākāśa.—Taittirīya-Upaniṣat, II. 1.

it is heard that the creation of the five Bhūtas took place at the very beginning, still the creation of the five Bhūtas, just in the order of Mahat and the rest, is desired. Such is the meaning.

As in the Vedic texts on the creation of Fire, etc., the creation of Ākāśa and Air has to be supplied, or is pre-supposed, so too, in the Vedic texts quoted above, the creation of Mahat and the rest, previously to that of the five Bhūtas, has to be supplied. Such is the idea.

And in this matter, as in the case of the creation of the water-pot, the proof (of the aforesaid order of succession) consists in the inference that the creation of all the rest, other than the Antaḥ-karṇa or the Inner Sense, must have been preceded by the function or modification of the Antaḥ-karṇa. Moreover, the creation of Mahat and the rest, prior to the creation of the five Bhūtas, is known for certain by having regard to the order of their mention appearing in another Vedic text, viz.,

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ।

खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापश्च पृथ्वी विश्वस्य धारिणी ॥

From this (the Self) was produced Prāṇa ; Manas and all the Indriyas ; Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth, the supporter of the Universe.—Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣat, II. i. 3. and also by means of the other Vedic text beginning with

स प्राणमवृजत् प्राणच्छ्रद्धां खं वायुमित्यादि ॥

He created Prāṇa ; from Prāṇa, Śraddhā or Faith, Ether, Air, etc.—Praśna-Upaniṣat, VI. 4.

And Prāṇa is, as the author will later on (*vide* II. 31) declare, a particular modification of the Antaḥ-karṇa. Hence, in this text of the Veda, “Prāṇa” itself is the Principle of Mahat.

Likewise does the Vedānta-Sūtram also describe creation just in the order of Mahat and the rest. Thus

अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी क्रमेण तद्विकृतात् ॥

In the interval, Vijñāna and Manas,—in this order ; because of the inferential mark thereof.—Vedānta-Sūtram, II. iii. 14, S. B. H. Vol. V, page 345.

(“In the interval,” *i.e.*,) between the existent (Self) and Ether, should

be produced Buddhi and Manas,—in this order ; such is the meaning. Ahaṁkāra is included in Maṇas.—10.

*Note :—*Vide the Sacred Books of the Hindus, Vol. V, page 345. The full translation of the Vedānta-Sūtram in question from which Viññāna Bhikṣu has quoted the Pūrva-pakṣa only, as given there according to the Govinda Bhāṣyam, is as follows : "If it be objected that the organs of cognition and mind, occurring between Prāṇa and the elements, in the Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣat, are mentioned in their order of succession, owing to an inferential mark of this ; we say, no, because on account of non-difference." It will at once be seen from this that the Vedānta-Sūtrakāra reads a separate purpose altogether in the Muṇḍaka text (II, i, 3), also cited by Viññāna Bhikṣu in his support, and throws away the pūrva-pakṣa on which the latter apparently relies. It need not be feared, however, that there is, therefore, necessarily a conflict and contradiction of views between the two high authorities such as Vyāsa and Viññāna are. "The order of the origin of the various Tattvas held authoritative in this (Vedānta as also in the Sāmkhya) system is that which is laid down in the Scriptures like those of Subāla, etc., namely, Pradhāna, Mahat, Ahaṁkāra, Tan-mātras, Senses, and the Gross Elements beginning with Ether." The origination of all these Tattvas has been shown in the third Pāda of the second Adhyāya of the Vedānta-Sūtras, and the order of succession, as we find laid down in the Taittiriya-Upaniṣat and the rest, has also been discussed there, in order to show that there is no real conflict between these texts of the Subālas and the Taittiriya and others.

But it would appear that there is a real conflict between the teachings of the Sāmkhya and the Vedānta as to the immediate source of the origin of the Tattvas severally. For, according to the Sāmkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram, I, 61, etc., Mahat, etc., take their rise, the succeeding from the preceding one ; while, according to the Govinda-Bhāṣyam, "all the various Tattvas mentioned in the Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣat, beginning with Prāṇa and ending with earth, are taught as coming out directly from the Lord, . . . In fact, the word "Ētasmāt" of that text is to be read along with every one of these Prāṇa, Manas, etc. Thus, from Him is born Prāṇa, from Him is born Manas, from Him are born the Indriyas, etc." The idea seems to be, as elsewhere (under Vedānta-Sūtram, II, iii, 13) observed in the Govinda-Bhāṣyam, that "the Tattvas like the Pradhāna and the rest being insentient, cannot modify themselves into their succeeding Tattva, without the co-operation of an intelligent cause," namely Brahman. If this be so, then, there would be no real conflict, and the two theories can be easily reconciled.

The origination of Mahat, etc., is not for their own sake.

आत्मार्थत्वात् सृष्टेर्नैवामात्मार्थ आरम्भः ॥ २ । ११ ॥

आत्मार्थत्वात् ātmā-ārtha-tvāt, being for the sake of the Self. सृष्टेः sṛiṣṭeh, of creation. न na, not. एषाम् eṣām, of these, Mahat, etc. आत्मार्थे ātmā-ārthe, for the sake of themselves. आरम्भः ārambhaḥ, origination.

11. Since creation is for the benefit (i.e., deliverance) of the Self, the origination of these (i.e., Mahat, etc.) is not for their own sake.—175.

*Vṛitti :—*Is their origination for their own sake, or is it for the sake of another ? To this the author replies.

Since creation is for the sake of Puruṣa, the origination of these, viz., Mahat and the following, is not "âtmâ-arthē," for the sake of themselves.

Prakṛiti being eternal, creative activity, for a self-regarding object, is justified in her case. But, since Mahat, etc., perish by being dissolved into their cause, in their case, it is mere creation (without reference to any self-regarding object).—11.

Bhâṣya :—Of Prakṛiti alone, the creativeness is for the purpose of her release (*vide* II. 1 *supra*), she being eternal. But of Mahat, etc., the being the creators of their respective modifications, is not for their own release, they being non-eternal. This difference (between the creative character of Prakṛiti and that of her products), the author points out.

"Eṣâm," of Mahat, etc., the creative character "âtmâ-ârtha-tvât," being for the purpose of the release of Puruṣa, their "ârambhah," creative character, is not for their own sake, on account of their unfitness for release in consequence of their perishableness. Such is the meaning.

(But why is it asserted that their creative activity is for the benefit of Puruṣa instead of for that of Prakṛiti? This question the *Bhâṣya-kāra* next answers.)

And when the release of another must be the end, it is but proper that the release of Puruṣa should alone be the end in question and not that the release of Prakṛiti should be the end, inasmuch as she is "guṇa" or subservient to Puruṣa.—11.

Theory of Space and Time.

दिक्कालावाकाशादिभ्यः ॥ २ । १२ ॥

दिक्कालौ dik-kālau, space and time. आकाशादिभ्यः âkāśa-âdi-bhyaḥ, from Âkāśa, etc.

12. Space and Time come from Âkāśa and the Upâdhis.—176.

Vṛtti :—Space and Time are well-known entities. How is it, then, that they are not heard of in the enumeration (of the Tattvas, I. 61, p. 93)? To this the author replies.

It is Âkāśa itself that, according to the distinction of this and that Upâdhi or external condition, is denoted by the terms Space and Time. They are, therefore, included in Âkāśa.

The word "âdi" in the aphorism has come by sampâta or accident,

The use of the fifth case-ending in “ākāśa-ādi-bhyaḥ” is in the sense of the locative.—12.

Vedāntin Mahādeva :—By the word “ādi” the Upādhis are comprised. (*Vide* Bhāṣya below.)

Bhāṣya :—The author describes the creation of limited space and time.

Those space and time which are eternal, are of the form of the Prakṛiti or root-cause of Ākāśa, and are nothing but particular Guṇas or modifications of Prakṛiti. Hence, the universality of space and time is established. The universality of Ākāśa also, as alluded to by such Śrutis as

आकाशवत् सर्वगतश्च नित्यः ॥

Like Ākāśa, all-penetrating and eternal, is hereby explained.

But those space and time which are limited, are produced from Ākāśa through the conjunction of this or that Upādhi or limiting object. Such is the meaning ; as the word “ādi” comprises the Upādhis.

Although limited space and time are (in reality, not the products of Ākāśa, but) Ākāśa itself as particularised by this or that limiting object, still they have been stated here to be the effects of Ākāśa, similarly as, in the Vaiśeṣika System, the sense of hearing has been stated to be the effect of Ākāśa, following the custom admitting the thing particularised as a separate and additional entity.—12

Definition of Buddhi.

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः ॥ २ । १३ ॥

अध्यवसायः adhyavasāyah, judgment, ascertainment, determination of a thing in its true form. बुद्धिः buddhiḥ, Buddhi, understanding.

13. Buddhi is ascertainment.—177.

Vṛitti :—The author states the characteristic mark of Buddhi called Mahat.

“In this way only and in no other way,”—certainty or ascertainment in this form is “adhyavasāyah.”—13.

Bhāṣya :—Now the author exhibits the Tattvas alluded to by the phrase “in the order of Mahat and the rest” (in II. 10 above), one by one, with reference to their svarūpa or intrinsic form as well as with reference to their properties (dharma).

“Buddhiḥ,” this is a synonym of the Mahat Tattva. And “adhyavasāyah,” called ascertainment, is its general function. Such is the meaning.

The mention (of the function and the functionary) in the relation of non-difference (made in the aphorism in which adhyavasāya and buddhi stand in apposition to each other), is according to the maxim of the non-difference of the property and the thing of which it is the property.

And this Buddhi possesses "greatness" (and is called Mahat, Great), because, it should be understood, it pervades all effects whatever other than itself and because it is of great aiśvarya or power. On this point, says the Smṛiti :—

सविकारात् प्रधानात्तु महत्तत्त्वमजायत ।

महानिति यतः क्वातिर्लोकानां जायते सदा ॥

From the Pradhāna, undergoing modification, was produced the principle of Mahat ; wherefrom is always produced in the minds of men the illumination that "(it is) great."

There are, again, texts of the Veda and the Smṛiti such as

अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतदृग्वेदः ॥

Of this Great Being, is the breathing, this, the Rīg Veda.—Bṛihat-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣat II. iv. 10.

But in them the application of the term "Great" to Hiraṇya-garbha (the Golden-Egged Brahmā whose breathing the Rīg-Veda is), even though he is chetana or sentient, has been made only on account of his conceit (abhimāna) of, or of his identifying himself with, Buddhi ; in the same way as is made the application of the term "Earth" to the sentient entity (the deity presiding over earth) which has the mistaken belief (abhimāna) that it is earth. In the very same way also should be understood the application of the terms Ahaṃkāra, etc., to Rudra and others. And of one and all the deities without exception, commencing from the one possessing the abhimāna of (i.e., the belief of identity with) Prakṛiti and ending with those possessing the abhimāna of (i.e., the belief of identity with) the Bhūtas or Elements, the regular and constant Upādhis in the forms of their respective Buddhis, are nothing but parts of the Principle of Mahat itself.—13.

Products of Mahat.

तत्कार्यं धर्मादि ॥ २ । १४ ॥

तत्कार्यं tat-kāryam, its product. धर्मादि dharma-âdi, dharma or virtue, etc.

14. Virtue, etc., are its products.—178.

Vṛitti :—Wherein are Virtue, etc., included ? To this the author replies.

Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Power,—by their being the products of Mahat, is refuted the theory that they are the properties of the Self.

Since there is non-difference between effect and cause, the place of their inclusion (in Mahat) has hereby been shown.—14.

Bhāṣya :—The author states the other properties also of the Principle of Mahat.

Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Power also have Buddhi as their material cause, and do not have Ahaṁkāra, etc., as their material cause ; because Buddhi alone is the product of transcendental Sattva (*i.e.*, the purest form of Sattva, absolutely free from the admixture of Rajas and Tamas).—14.

How the same Mahat is modified into the form of Demerit, etc., also.

महदुपरागाद्विपरीतम् ॥ २ । १५ ॥

महत् mahat, Mahat. उपरागतं uparâgât, through adjacent tincture ; through the influence or interpenetration. विपरीतं viparitam, the reverse.

15. The (same) Mahat (gives rise to) the opposite (products) through the adjacent tincture (of Rajas and Tamas).—179.

Vṛitti :—The author states the (other) particular modifications of Buddhi.

These are Demerit, Ignorance, Passion, and Impotence. For, difference of products, according to difference of contributory causes, is seen. Just as the calamus seed (by itself) produces the calamus shoot, and, in co-operation with the conjunction of fire, produces the plantain stem, so does Mahat, in co-operation with Sattva, produce Virtue, etc., and, in co-operation with Tamas, produce Demerit, etc.—15.

Bhāṣya :—But, then, it may be asked, how can the predominance of Demerit in the parts of Buddhi inhering in man, beasts, etc., be accounted for ? To this the author replies.

The very same “Mahat,” the Principle of Mahat, through the tincture received from the adjacent Rajas and Tamas, becomes also “the reverse,” *i.e.*, small (the opposite of great), *i.e.*, endowed with the properties of Demerit, Ignorance, Passion, and Impotence. Such is the meaning.

Hereby is explained also the tradition current in the Veda and the Smṛiti that all Puruṣas are, without exception, Īśvaras or Lords ; inasmuch as it shows that the innate lordliness of their Upādhis (*i.e.*, of the Buddhic parts appertaining to them) suffers obscuration by Rajas and Tamas, (whereby they appear to be less and lower than Īśvaras).

But, then, it may be urged, for the purpose of the inherence of virtue, etc., Buddhi also must be eternal ; how, then, can it be a product (of

Prakṛiti, as declared before)? The author replies by saying that such is not the case; because, seeing that the residue or aroma of Karma, and the like resides in the Principle of Mahat in the seed-state, which is then only a particular modification of Sattva, still forming a part of Prakṛiti, we admit the production only of this seed of Mahat as a sprout during the causal state of knowledge. So that, just like Ākāśa, Buddhi is of the form of both the eternal and the non-eternal. And just as Ākāśa, in its causal state, is spoken of as Prakṛiti, and is not spoken of as Ākāśa, on account of the non-existence, in that state, of Sound which is the distinctive mark of Ākāśa, similarly also is Buddhi in the causal state spoken of only as Prakṛiti, and is not treated as Buddhi on account of the non-existence, in that state, of adhyavasāya or ascertainment, etc., which is the distinctive mark of Buddhi.—15.

Definition of Ahaṃkāra.

अभिमानोऽहंकारः ॥ २ । १६ ॥

अभिमानः abhimānaḥ, self-assumption, conceit. **अहंकारः** ahaṃ-kāraḥ, Ahaṃkāra, the I-maker.

16. Ahaṃkāra is self-conceit.—180.

Vṛitti:—The author states the definition of Ahaṃkāra, etc., which are the next in order.

“I am,”—such is abhimāna or self-consciousness.—16.

Bhāṣya:—Having defined the Principle of Mahat, the author defines its product, Ahaṃkāra.

“Ahaṃkāra” is that which makes the “I,” just as, for instance, “Kumbhakāra” jar-maker, is one who makes the jar. It is the substance called the Antaḥ-karāṇa, the Inner Sense. And this, inasmuch as a property and the thing of which it is the property are indivisible, has been spoken of as abhimāna or self-consciousness, in order to give the hint that self-consciousness is its uncommon or specific function or modification.

It is only in regard to an object which has previously been ascertained by Buddhi to be this or that, that the making of the “I” and the making of the “Mine” take place. Hence, by following the relation of effect and cause between the functions or modifications (*viz.*, abhimāna, self-consciousness, and adhyavasāya, ascertainment), the existence of the relation of effect and cause also between those of which they are the modifications, (*viz.*, Ahaṃkāra and Buddhi), is inferred;—this has been stated long before. It has also been stated long before that the Antaḥ-karāṇa is one and one only, and that, according to the three-fold distinction of mere

states, as in the case of the seed, the sprout, and the huge tree, etc., it falls under the relation of effect and cause. It is for this reason that Manas and Buddhi have been spoken of as synonymous terms in such passages of the Vâyu and the Matsya Purâṇa as

मनो महान् मतिर्ब्रह्मा पुरुषी ख्यातिरीश्वरः ॥

Manas, Mahat, Mati (Intelligence), Brahmâ, Pâr (the City), Buddhi, Khyâti (Illumination), Īśvara (are synonymous).—Vâyu-Purâṇa, IV. 25.—16.

Products of Ahaṁkāra.

एकादश पञ्चतन्मात्रं तत्कार्यम् ॥ २ । १७ ॥

एकादश ekādaśa, eleven. पञ्चतन्मात्रं pañcha-tan-mâtram, the five Tan-mâtras. तत्कार्यं tat-kâryam, its product.

17. The eleven (Indriyas) and the five Tan-mâtras are its products.—181.

Vṛitti :—The author states its product.

The eleven Indriyas, the five Tan-mâtras—these sixteen are its products.—17.

Bhûtsya :—The author mentions the product of Ahaṁkāra, which has arrived in order.

The eleven Indriyas as well as the five Tan-mâtras are the products of Ahaṁkāra. Such is the meaning.

“By this Indriya this Rûpa (Colour and Form), etc., should be enjoyed by me; it is this that is the means of accomplishing pleasure,”—it is from abhimâna or self-affirmation such as this, that, in the primary creations, were produced the Senses and their Objects; hence Ahaṁkāra is the hetu or the instrumental cause of the production of the Senses, etc.; inasmuch as it is seen in the world that only by persons having abhimâna for, *i.e.*, given to, enjoyment, there is, by means of their Râga, attachment, desire, or passion, the making of the materials of their enjoyment; and inasmuch, moreover, as it is recollected in the Mokṣa-Dharma Section of the Mahâ-Bhârata, by such passages as

रूपरागादभूषक्षुः ॥

From Râga or passion for Rûpa or Colour-cum-Form, was produced the Eye.—Mahâ-Bhârata, XII. 7758.

that only from the Râga or passion of Hiranya-Garbha (the Golden-Egged Brahmâ) was produced the samastî, collective or universal, Eye or the Sense of Vision. Such is the idea.

And from this the difference of the Sâmkhya teaching is this that, amongst the Bhûtas and the Indriyas, it is Manas of which Râga or passion

is the property, that is, according to it, first of all, produced from Ahaṁkāra ; inasmuch as the Tan-mātras, etc., are the effects of Rāga.— 17.

Origin of Manas

सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारात् ॥ २ । १८ ॥

सात्त्विकं sāttvikam, consisting of Sattva; sāttvic. एकादशकं ekādaśakam, the eleventh. प्रवर्तते pravartate, proceeds. वैकृतात् vaikṛitāt, from the vaikṛita (modification), i.e. Sāttvic (Ahaṁkāra). अहंकारात् ahaṁkārāt, from Ahaṁkāra.

18. The Sāttvic eleventh (Indriya, i.e., Manas) proceeds from the Vaikṛita Ahaṁkāra.—182.

Vṛitti :—But do the insentient and the illuminating both come from one and the same cause ? To this the author replies.

From Ahaṁkāra which is (vaikṛita) a modification of Mahat, proceed “ekādaśaka,” the eleven senses, “sāttvikam,” being attended with Sattva, and the Tan-mātras, being attended with Tamas.—18.

Bhāṣya :—Even in this (i.e., the manner of their evolution), the author points out a distinction.

“Ekādaśakam,” the completer of the eleven, (the eleventh, i.e.) Manas, is, amongst the sixteen-fold group, the “sāttvikam” (Sāttvic or Sattva-relating). Hence it is produced “vaikṛitāt ahaṁkārāt,” from the Sāttvic Ahaṁkāra. Such is the meaning.

From this it should also be understood that the ten (remaining) Indriyas are produced from the Rājasa Ahaṁkāra, and the Tan-mātras, from the Tāmasa Ahaṁkāra; as is ascertained from the Smṛitis themselves, such as :

वैकारिकस्तैजसश्च तामसश्चेत्यहं त्रिधा ।
अहन्तत्त्वाद्भिकुर्वाणान्मनो वैकारिकादभूत् ॥
वैकारिकाश्च ये देवा अर्थाभिव्यञ्जनं यतः ।
तैजसादिन्द्रियाण्येव ज्ञानकर्ममयानि च ॥
तामसो भूतसूक्ष्मादिर्यतः खं लिङ्गमात्मनः ।

Vaikārika, and Taijasa, and Tāmasa,—thus is Ahaṁkāra threefold. From the Vaikārika Aham-Principle, undergoing modification, was Manas; as also the Devas Vaikārika, from whom is the manifestation of Objects. And from the Taijasa (Ahaṁkāra) (sprang) the Indriyas themselves, constituted by Jñāna, Cognition, and Karma, Action. Tāmasa are the Bhūta-sūkṣmas or Subtile Elements (the Tan-mātras), etc., from which is Ākāśa, its own inferential mark.—Śrī-mad-Bhāgavatam, III. v. 29—31.

Hence verily, following the Purāṇa, etc., it has been stated in the Kārikā also :

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्तैजसादुभयम् ॥

The Sâttvic Eleventh proceeds from the Vaikṛita Ahaṁkāra ; the Tan-mâtra of the first of the Elements,—it is Tāmāsa : both (the Indriyas of Cognition and Action), from the Rājasa.—Sâmkhya-Kārikā, XXV.

“Taijasa” means Rājasa. “Both” denotes the Indriyas of Cognition and Action.

But, then, it may be asked, in the future aphorism (II. 21) beginning with Devatālayaśrutiḥ, the author will speak of the Devas (the presiding Deities) of the Indriyas ; why, then, by the Kārikā also, has it not been stated that the Devas are the products of the Sâttvic Ahaṁkāra ? In reply to this, we say : Of the Being possessing the Collective Eye, etc., as the body, it is the chetanā or sentiency of Sârya, etc., says the Śruti, that is the Deva of the Eye, etc. And from this it results that of the discrete or individual Indriyas, the Devas are the concrete or collective Indriyas. So that, intending to draw attention to the unity of the discrete and the concrete, the Devas have not, in this Sâstra (the Sâmkhya-Kārikā) been mentioned separately from the Indriyas. Hence the concrete Indriyas, containing, as they do, less Sattva than Manas, have been mentioned just as being the products of the Rājasa Ahaṁkāra ; while in the Smṛitis, they have been stated as being the products of the Sâttvic Ahaṁkāra on account of their containing greater Sattva as compared with the discrete Indriyas ; thus, it should be found, there is no contradiction.

Thus, from this threefoldness of Ahaṁkāra, should be understood the threefoldness of Mahat also, the cause thereof ; as there is the Smṛiti :

सात्त्विको राजसश्चैव तामसश्च त्रिधा महान् ।

Sâttvic, Rājasa, and Tāmāsa,—thus is Mahat threefold.—Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa, 45. 38.—18.

Of the Eleven Indriyas.

कर्मेन्द्रियबुद्धीन्द्रियैरान्तरमेकादशकम् ॥ २ । १६ ॥

कर्मेन्द्रियबुद्धीन्द्रियैः karma-indriya-buddhi-indriyaiḥ, together with the Indriya of Action and the Indriya of Cognition. आन्तरम् āntaram, the inner. एकादशकम् ekādaśakam, the eleventh.

19. Together with the Indriyas of Action and the Indriyas of Cognition, the Inner (Indriya, Manas) is the eleventh.—183.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions the threefold division of the Indriyas.

“Āntaram,” Manas, along with the five Indriyas of Action, viz., Speech, etc., and the five Indriyas of Cognition, viz., Smell, etc.,—these are the eleven Indriyas.—19.

Bhāṣya :—The author shows the eleven Indriyas.

The Indriyas of Action, namely the Organ of Speech, Hand, Foot, Anus, and the Genital, are five in number; and the Indriyas of Cognition, namely the Eye, the Ear, the Skin, the Nose, and the Tongue, are five in number; along with these ten, “*ântaram*,” *Manas*, is “*ekādaśakam*,” the elevenfold *Indriya*. Such is the meaning.

“*Indriyam*” is that which is the *karana* or instrument of *Indra*, the Lord of the Body. Thus, the characteristic mark of the *Indriya* is that, while it is a product of *Ahaṁkāra*, it is, at the same time, an instrument (of Action or Cognition).—19.

The Indriyas are not formed out of the Bhûtas or Elements.

आहंकारिकत्वश्रुतेर्न भौतिकानि ॥ २ । २० ॥

आहंकारिकत्वश्रुतेः *âhaṁkārika-tva-śruteḥ*, there being the *Śruti* that they are formed of *Ahaṁkāra*. न na, not. भौतिकानि *bhautikāni*, formed of the *Bhûtas*.

20. (The *Indriyas* are) not formed of the *Bhûtas*, as there is the *Śruti* that they are formed of *Ahaṁkāra*.—184.

Vṛitti:—With a view to refute the theory (held by the *Nyâya-Vaiśeṣikas*) that the *Indriyas* are formed of the *Bhûtas*, the author says:

In that theory there is contradiction of the *Veda*. Such is the meaning.—20.

Bhāṣya:—The author rejects the theory that the *Indriyas* are formed of the *Bhûtas* or Gross Elements. (Cf. *Kaṇāda-Sūtram*, VIII. ii. 5-6, S. B. H. Vol. vi, p. 285).

“The *Indriyas*,” such is the complement of the aphorism.

The *Śruti* which is the evidence for the theory that the *Indriyas* are formed of *Ahaṁkāra*, although it has been lost in course of time, can yet be inferred from the statement of the *Āchāryas* or renowned Teachers, as recorded in the *Smṛitis* of *Manu* and all the rest. The *Śruti* which can be immediately cited in evidence, is:

अहं बहु स्याम् इत्यादि ।

I will be many, etc.—*Chhândogya-Upaniṣat*, VI. ii. 3.

Well, it may be urged, there is Vedic evidence also for the theory that the *Indriyas* are formed of the *Bhûtas*; e.g.

अन्नमयं हि सौम्य मन इत्यादि ।

Verily, O Calm One, is *Manas* formed of food, etc.—*Chh. Upa.* VI. v. 4.

But such, we say, is not the case. Inasmuch as it is but proper and necessary that the material cause of the *Antah-karana* should bear resemblance to that which possesses the power to cause illumination (*i.e.*,

manifestation of objects), the Śruti that the Indriyas are formed of Ahaṁkāra, is alone the principal one (between this and the contrary Śruti). And, further, since the Bhûtas also are produced by the will (saṁkalpa) of Hiranya-Garbha (the Golden-Egged Brahmā), food itself is a product of Manas. The Śruti, on the other hand, that the Indriyas are formed of the Bhûtas, is of less authority, and speaks of the formation of the Indriyas in a figurative sense, pointing, as it does, to the mere manifestation (abhivyakti) (as contradistinguished from formation or creation) from out of the Bhûtas, of the discrete Manas, etc., which, until then, were lying only as associated with the Bhûtas (and had no separate, manifest existence of their own).—20.

A doubtful Śruti explained.

देवतालयश्रुतिर्नारम्भकस्य ॥ २ । २१ ॥

देवतालयश्रुतिः devatâ-laya-śrutih, the Śruti on the dissolution or absorption into the Devas. This is the reading of Vijñāna-Bhikṣu. Aniruddha reads देवतालयश्रुतेः devatâ-laya-śruteḥ, since there is the Śruti on the dissolution into the Devas. न na, not. आरम्भकस्य ārambhakasya, of the originator.

21. Since there is the Śruti declaring the dissolution (of the Indriyas) into the Devas, of the (supposed) originator (*i.e.*, the Bhûtas) is not (the causality).—Aniruddha.

The Śruti declaring the dissolution (of the Indriyas) into the Devas, does not (refer to the Devas as their) originator.—Vijñāna-Bhikṣu.—185.

Vṛtti :—The author gives a further reason.

Dissolution of the effect is in the cause ; this is established.

Dissolution into the Deva is heard from such texts as

आदित्यं वै चक्षुर्गच्छति

Verily the Eye goes (back) to Âditya.—Maitrî-Upaniṣat, VI. 6.

It follows, therefore, that the causality in question is not “ârambhakasya,” *i.e.*, of the Bhûta supposed to be the originator.—21.

Bhâṣya :—But, still, it may be argued, the ascertainment of their being formed of Ahaṁkāra is not possible ; because by means of the declaration, made in the Śrutis such as

अस्य पुरुषस्याग्निं वागप्येति वातं प्राणश्चक्षुरादित्यमित्यादि

Of this Puruṣa, the Speech returns to Agni, Prâṇa to Vâyu, the Eye to Âditya.—Bṛihat-Âraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, III. ii. 18.

of the dissolution of the Indriyas into the Devas, it is possible also to hold that the Devas are the material causes of the Indriyas ; inasmuch as it is in the cause only that the dissolution of the effect takes place.

Pondering over this doubt, the author says :

The Śruti that there is, regarding the dissolution into the Devas,—the same is not “ârambhakasya,” i.e., does not refer to the originator as its subject ; such is the meaning ; because we see the disappearance of a drop of water into what notwithstanding is not its originator, namely, the ground ; and also because we hear of the disappearance of the Self into the Bhûtas, notwithstanding that they are not its originators, from such Śrutis as

विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति

Vijñāna-Ghana itself (the Cloud of Pure Knowledge, i.e., the Self), after having sprung up from these Bhûtas, disappears into those very Bhûtas again.—Bṛihat-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, II. iv. 12.

Such is the import.—21.

The Indriyas are not eternal.

तदुत्पत्तिश्चुतेर्विनाशदर्शनाच्च ॥ २ । २२ ॥

तदुत्पत्तिश्चुतेः tat-utpatti-śruteḥ, there being the Śruti about their production. This is the reading of Vijñāna-Bhikṣu. Aniruddha reads tat-utpattiḥ śrūyate, we hear of their production. **विनाशदर्शनात्** vināśa-darśanāt, from seeing their destruction. च, and, also.

22. (The Indriyas are not eternal), because, in the Śruti, we hear of their production, and also because their destruction is seen.—186.

Vṛtti :—The Indriyas are eternal, such is the view of some. In order to reject this, the author says :

We hear of their production from Ahaṃkāra. And destruction of what is produced is also inevitable.—22.

Bhāṣya :—Manas, included amongst the Indriyas, is eternal, such is the opinion held by some. (Cf. Kaṇāda-Sūtram, III. ii. 2, S. B. H. Vol. vi, p. 126.) The author rejects it.

Of these, i.e., of every one of the Indriyas, there is production, as we learn from the Śrutis such as

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ॥

From Him are produced Prāṇa, Manas, and all the (other) Indriyas.—Mundaka-Upaniṣat, II. i. 3.

Moreover, by means of the fact that, in old age and like other conditions, Manas also, like the eye, and the rest, undergoes decay, etc., it is ascertained that there is also destruction of Manas. Such is the meaning. So also has it been said :—

दशकेन निवर्तन्ते मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ॥

Manas together with the ten,—that is, all the Indriyas come to cease.

The declarations (made in the Śruti and elsewhere) about the eternality of Manas, are, however, directed (not to Manas manifested as such, but) to the seed (of Manas) called Prakṛiti.—22.

The Indriyas are not the same as their physiological counterparts.

अतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रियं भ्रान्तानामधिष्ठाने ॥ २ । २३ ॥

अतीन्द्रियं ati-indriyaṃ, supersensuous. इन्द्रियं indriyaṃ, sense, Indriya. भ्रान्तानाम् bhrāntānām, of mistaken persons. अधिष्ठाने adhiṣṭhāne, in the site.

23. The Indriya is supersensuous; of mistaken persons, (the notion of the Indriya is) in respect of (its physiological) site.—187.

Vṛitti :—From seeing the difference of the powers belonging severally to the Eye, etc., it might be concluded that the Indriyas are sensuous. This the author prevents.

Of mistaken persons, the notion of the Indriya is in respect of its site, for instance, the eye-balls, etc. Were the notion not a mistaken one, then, hearing would not be possible for one whose ears have been cut off, while, on the other hand, apprehension of Rūpa (Colour-cum-Form) would be possible for one whose eyes are jaundiced.—23.

Bhāṣya :—The author repels the Nāstika or heretical opinion that the Indriya is, for example, just the sets of eye-balls.

The Indriya is, in all the cases, supersensuous, and not an object of sense-perception; it is, on the other hand, with mistaken persons only that the Indriya exists in the condition of identity with its site, for example, the eye-ball. Such is the meaning. The more correct reading, therefore, will be “adhiṣṭhānam,” (that the Indriya is the site, instead of that it is in the site).—23.

There is not one, but many, Indriyas.

शक्तिभेदेऽपि भेदसिद्धौ नैकत्वम् ॥ २ । २४ ॥

शक्तिभेदे śakti-bhede, in the case of a difference of powers. अपि api, even. भेदसिद्धौ bheda-siddhau, difference being established. न na, not. एकत्वम् ekatvam, oneness.

24. A difference being established, even if a difference of power (be admitted), there is not a oneness (of the Indriyas).—188.

Vritti:—The Indriya is only one in number; plurality attaches to it from a difference of Upādhis or extrinsic limitations;—in regard to this opinion, the author says:

Let there be a difference of Upādhis; still a difference of powers must be affirmed; and this difference is genuine; hence, plurality also is genuine.—24.

Bhāṣya:—The author rebuts the opinion that one single Indriya performs different functions through diversity of powers.

Even by the admission of a difference of powers of one single Indriya, a difference of Indriyas is established, inasmuch as the powers also possess the character of the Indriyas; hence there is not a oneness of the Indriya. Such is the meaning.—24.

Rules of Thought must not be allowed to stand against the Evidence of the Senses.

न कल्पनाविरोधः प्रमाणदृष्टस्य ॥ २ । २५ ॥

n na, not. कल्पनाविरोधः kalpanā-virodhaḥ, contradiction to thought. प्रमाणदृष्टस्य pramāṇa-dṛṣṭasya, of that which is “seen” or known or ascertained by means of evidence.

25. There can be no contradiction to thought, of that which is established by evidence.—189.

Vritti:—Lest it be said that the case being explained by a oneness only (of the Indriyas), the supposition of (their) plurality is redundant; so the author says:

(The meaning) is clear.—25.

Bhāṣya:—But, then, it may be urged, in the supposition of the production of diverse Indriyas from one and the same Ahaṁkāra, there is a contradiction of the Rules of Thought (Nyāya). To this the author replies.

This is simple.—25.

Definition of Manas.

उभयात्मकं मनः ॥ २ । २६ ॥

उभयात्मकं ubhaya—ātmakam—possessing the character of both. मनः manas, Manas. Aniruddha reads a “cha” between “ubhaya-ātmakam” and “manas.”

26. Manas (partakes) of the character of both (Cognition and Action).—190.

Vṛitti:—The author states the definition of Manas :

Manas possesses the character of the Indriya of Cognition and the character of the Indriya of Action, because its operation is in both directions, according to site.—26.

Bhāṣya:—The author declares that of Manas, the one leading Indriya, the other ten are the different powers.

Manas possesses the character of the Indriyas of Cognition and Action. Such is the meaning.—26.

Vedāntin Mahādeva.—Inasmuch as, without the application of Manas, the Indriyas are incapable of performing their respective offices, Manas itself is, therefore, designated as the Indriya of Cognition and as the Indriya of Action.

Diversity of Manas explained.

गुणपरिणामभेदान्नानात्वमवस्थावत् ॥ २ । २७ ॥

गुणपरिणामभेदात् guṇa-pariṇāma-bhedāt, owing to a difference of the transformations of the Guṇas, Sattva, etc. नानात्वम् nānātvam, diversity. अवस्थावत् avasthā-vat, like conditions.

27. The diversity (of Manas) is owing to the difference of the transformations of the Guṇas ; as is the case with the (diverse) conditions (of one single man).—191.

Vṛitti:—But how can more than one Indriyas come from one and the same Ahaṃkāra ? To this the author replies :

By reason of the differences of the transformations of the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., acting in co-operation with Dharma, Merit, and A-dharma, Demerit, (there is the production of) more than one ; “Avasthā-vat :” as, of one single body, are caused infancy, youth, and old age.—27.

Bhāṣya:—“Of the character of both” (*vide* II. 26 above),—of this phrase the author himself explains the meaning :

Just as one self-same man puts on a variety of characters according to the influence of association: being, through association with his beloved, a lover ; through association with one indifferent to the world, dispassionate ; and through association with some other, something else ; so Manas also, through association with the Eye, etc., becomes manifold, by being particularised (or specifically differentiated) with the function of seeing, etc., by reason of its becoming one with the Eye, etc. The cause

of this diverse modification is "Guna, etc.," that is, that the Guṇas, Sattva, etc., are capable of various transformations. Such is the meaning.

And this is inferred from the incapability of the Eye, etc., to perform their functions without the conjunction of Manas,—a fact established by such Śrutis as

अन्यत्रमना अभूवं नाश्रोषम्

I was with my Manas diverted elsewhere ; I did not hear.—Bṛihat-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, I. v. 3.—27.

What are the Objects of the Indriyas.

रूपादिरसमलान्त उभयोः ॥ २ । २८ ॥

रूपादिरसमलान्तः rūpa-ādi-rasa-mala-antaḥ, beginning with Colour and ending with the dirt of the juices. उभयोः ubhayoḥ, of both.

28. Of both, (the object is) that beginning with Colour and ending with the dirt of the juices.—192.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions the object of both the Indriyas.

"Ubhayoḥ," of the Indriya of Cognition and the Indriya of Action.

The objects of the Indriya of Cognition are Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, and Sound. The objects of the Indriya of Action are Speech, Prehension, Movement, Pleasurable Excitement, and the dirt of the juices.

"Rasa-mala" is the name of a particular kind of dirt. The number of objects ends with it.—28.

Bhāṣya :—The author mentions the object of the Indriyas of Cognition and of Action.

The dirt of the juices of food is the ordure, etc.

Thus, the ten objects of both, namely, the Indriyas of Cognition and of Action, are (respectively) Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Sound, the Speakable, the Prehensible, the Approachable, the Excitable, and the Excretable.

"The Excitable" which is the object of the Genitals, is something within the Genitals.—28.

Puruṣa is different from the Indriya.

द्रष्टृत्वाद्यात्मनः करणत्वमिन्द्रियाणाम् ॥ २ । २९ ॥

द्रष्टृत्वादिः draṣṭṛi-tva-ādi, the being the seer, etc. आत्मनः ātmanah, of the Self. करणत्वम् karaṇa-tvam, the being the instrument. इन्द्रियाणाम् indriyāṇām, of the Indriyas.

29. The being the seer, etc., is of the Self ; the being the instrument is of the Indriyas.—193.

Vṛitti:—The author points out the characteristic difference between the Self and the Indriya.

This is clear.—29.

Bhāṣya:—Of what Indra (Saṃghāta-Īśvara, Embodied Consciousness, *vide* II. 19, Bhāṣya), by what service, these are termed the Indriyas, Instruments,—both these things the author declares.

The pentad beginning with the being the seer, the pentad beginning with the being the speaker, and the being the thinker are “ātmanah,” of Puruṣa; while, in the operations of seeing, etc., the instrumentality is of the Indriyas. Such is the meaning.

But, it may be urged, when the being the seer, the being the hearer, etc., may sometimes develop into anubhava or immediate cognition, it is just possible that they should belong to Puruṣa, notwithstanding that he is unchanging; but the being the speaker, etc., is merely an act (which is nothing but a change); how can it be possible in the case of the Immutable (Puruṣa)? We reply that such is not the case; because here the meaning of the terms the being the seer, etc., is nothing more than this that it belongs to Puruṣa to cause the performance of the functions of seeing, etc., (by the Indriyas), by his mere proximity (to them); as is the case with the loadstone. For, as an emperor, even without himself actively operating, becomes a warrior through his instrument, the army, inasmuch as, by his orders simply, he incites them into action; so Puruṣa, though immutable, through the instruments of the Eye, and all the rest, becomes the seer, the speaker, the thinker, and such like, inasmuch as he incites them to action simply by his mere proximity (to them) which is called “Samyoga” or Conjunction; as is the case with the loadstone (which moves the iron by mere proximity to it, without actively exerting any force itself).

And here “kartṛitva,” agency, (in “to cause the performance of the functions of seeing, etc.” above) consists in being that which sets in motion (kāraṇa-chakra) the wheel of all that helps towards the accomplishment of the action; and “karaṇatva,” instrumentality, in the possession of the operation which is the cause of the action, or in being the most efficient means of accomplishing it; as is the case with the axe, etc.

The agency in seeing, etc., which is prohibited in the Śāstras in the case of Puruṣa,—that consists in the possession of action favourable to those acts (*i.e.*, seeing, etc.), or in the possession of those acts themselves. So has it been said:

अत आत्मनि कर्तृत्वमकर्तृत्वं च संस्थितम् ।
निरिच्छत्वादकर्ताऽसौ कर्ता सन्निधिमाश्रितः ॥

Hence agency as well as non-agency is established in the Self: being free from desire, it is a non-agent; (it is) an agent through mere proximity.

For the very same reason, since the power to set in motion the "kâraka-chakra" or all that helps towards the accomplishment of an action, is of the svarûpa or intrinsic form of the Self, the being the seer, the being the speaker, etc., eternally belongs to the Self,—this is heard from such Śrutis as

न द्रष्टुर्हृद्वे विपरिलोपो विद्यते न वक्तुर्वक्त्रेविपरिलोपो विद्यते ॥

Of the Seer, there is no absolute loss of vision; of the Speaker, there is no absolute loss of speech, etc.—Bṛihat-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV. iii, 23, 26.

But, it may be urged, in the division of Pramāṇa (*vide* I. 87 *ante*), instrumentality has been mentioned only of the functions or modifications of sense-perception, etc.; how is it, then, that the same is here predicated of the Indriya? To this we reply that such is not the case; because here instrumentality is ascribed to the Indriyas only in respect of the modifications that, in the form of vision, etc., take place in Buddhi through the gateways of the Eye, etc.; while there the instrumentality of the functions (of sense-perception, etc.) has been declared in respect of the result (lit. fruit) called Bodha or Knowledge, appertaining to Puruṣa.—29.

The Internal Indriyas distinguished.

त्रयाणां स्वालक्षण्यम् ॥ २ । ३० ॥

त्रयाणां trayāṇām, of the three Internal Indriyas. स्वालक्षण्यम् svālakṣaṇyam, possession of distinctive characteristics of their own.

30. The three (Internal Indriyas) have their own function as their distinguishing characteristics.—194.

Vṛitti:—The author points out the difference in character of the three Internal Indriyas mutually.

Of Mahat, Ahaṁkāra, and Manas, there is "svālakṣaṇyam," individual or specific characteristic: of Mahat, there is adhyavasāya or ascertainment; of Ahaṁkāra, abhimāna or self-consciousness; of Manas, saṁkalpa or deliberation.—30.

Bhāṣya:—Now the author mentions the distinctive functions of the three Internal Indriyas.

"Trayāṇām," of Mahat, Ahaṁkāra, and Manas, there is "svālakṣaṇyam," that is, the condition or state of being 'svālakṣaṇa' which is a compound word with the middle term elided, meaning things of which the respective definitions are their uncommon or distinguishing functions. Such is the meaning.

In the popular view also the mark of a *great* man is the possession of *adhyavasâya* or certain knowledge and other higher qualities ; of a *conceited* man, the *attribution* to himself of the qualities which do not exist in him ; and of (a strong) *mind*, the *resolution*, " This must be."

And so it follows that the modification of *Buddhi* is *adhyavasâya* or ascertainment ; that of *Ahaṁkāra* is *abhinâna* or self-conceit ; that of *Manas*, is *saṁkalpa* or deliberation and *vikalpa* or doubt. *Samkalpa* is the will to do, as follows from the teaching :

संकल्पः कर्म मानसम् ॥

Samkalpa is an action of *Manas*.—*Amara-kośa*, I. i. 4. 11.

And *Vikalpa* is doubt, or the so-called particular kind of error mentioned in the *Yoga-Darśana* (*vide* *Yoga-Aphorisms* of Patañjali, I. 6, S. B. H. Vol. IV, page 21), but not the cognition of a thing as possessing a particular property, because that is a function or modification of *Buddhi*. —30.

The Resemblance amongst the Internal Indriyas.

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २ । ३१ ॥

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः *sāmānya-karaṇa-vṛttih*, the common modification of the Internal Instruments. *प्राणाद्याः* *prāṇa-ādyāḥ*, *Prāṇa* and the rest. *वायवः* *vāyavaḥ*, airs, *Vāyus*. *पञ्च* *pañcha*, five.

31. The five beginning with *Prāṇa*, (familiarly known as) *Airs*, are the common modifications of the (three Internal) Instruments.—195.

Vṛitti:—The author points out the similarity in character of these (Internal *Indriyas*).

The five "Airs" beginning with *Prāṇa*, are supported by the three (Internal) Instruments.—31.

Bhâṣya :—The author mentions the common modification also of the three (Internal Instruments).

The five in the form of *Prāṇa*, etc., which, from their air-like movements, are familiarly known as *airs*,—these are "*sāmānya*," common, "*vṛitti*" kind of transformation, "*karaṇasya*," of the three Internal Instruments. Such is the meaning.

Accordingly, has this been declared by the *Kārikâ* :

स्वालक्ष्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥

Of the three, the modifications are their respective characteristics ; these are uncommon ; the common modification of the (Internal) Instruments is the five, beginning with Prāṇa, known as the Aṛs.—Sāṃkhya-Kārika, XXIX.

Some think that Prāṇa, etc., are nothing but particular kinds of Air, and that they are made to operate (as they do) by the modification of the Internal Instrument in the form of volition, the source of vitality, and so they say that, in the present aphorism, there is the statement of their non-difference in the form that Prāṇa, etc., are the modifications of the (Internal) Instrument. But it is not so ; for, by the Vedānta Aphorism :

वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेशात् ॥

(The chief Prāṇa is) neither air, nor any function of air, because the text enunciates it separately (from air) — Vedānta-Sūtram, II. iv. 9, S. B. H. Vol. V, page 401.

the characteristic of being air and the characteristic of being a transformation of air have expressly been denied to Prāṇa, and it is but proper that the present aphorism also should have the same import as the one in question of the Vedānta-Sūtram. Moreover, since the property of Manas, e.g. cupidity, etc., becomes the cause of disturbance in Prāṇa, it must needs be that they have a common substratum.

The Śrutis, however, in which there is separate enunciation of Air and Prāṇa, are, for instance :

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणे मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ।

खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापश्च पृथ्वी विश्वस्य धारिणी ॥

From Him is produced Prāṇa ; Manas and all the Indriyas ; Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth, the supporter of the universe.—Mund. Upa., II. i. 3.

(But, it may be asked, when Prāṇa, etc., are thus a modification of the Internal Instrument, how is it that they have not been counted among the component parts of the Liṅga-Śarīra or Subtle Body? To this the Commentator next replies.)

It is for this reason that, notwithstanding the non-enumeration of the Prāṇas within the Liṅga-Śarīra (*vide* III. 9 *post*), there is no defect, because Buddhi itself, by reason of its power of action, takes the names of Sūtra-âtmâ, Prāṇa, etc.

(But, again, when Prāṇa is a modification of the Internal Instrument what is the justification for speaking of it as air? To this the Commentator now replies.)

Although it is a modification of the Internal Instrument, still the use of the term, air, is accounted for by the fact of its having peculiar movements like those of air, and also of its being presided over by the Deva, Vāyu.—31.

The modifications of the Indriyas are simultaneous as well as successive.

क्रमशोऽक्रमशश्चेन्द्रियवृत्तिः ॥ २ । ३२ ॥

क्रमशः kramaśaḥ, successive. अक्रमशः a-kramaśaḥ, not successive. च cha, and, also. इन्द्रियवृत्तिः indriya-vṛttiliḥ modification of the Indriyas.

32. The modifications of the Indriyas (take place) successively as well as simultaneously.—196.

Vṛtti :—The author mentions the modifications of the Indriyas.

“Kramaśas cha,” and successively : after seeing a thief in dim light, a man first judges of the thing by the help of the Indriyas, then with the help of the mind forms the judgment, “It is a thief,” next, by means of Ahaṁkāra, becomes self-conscious, reflecting “He steals money,” and then, with the help of Buddhi, makes certain in the form of “I will catch the thief.”

“A-kramaśas cha,” and also simultaneously : after seeing a tiger at night under the flash of a lightning, a man instantly runs away. In this case there is the simultaneous modification of all the four (*viz.*, Indriyas, Manas, Ahaṁkāra, and Buddhi). Although it being impossible for the modifications to arise all at one and the same moment, here also their appearance is really successive, still it has been stated to be not-successive on account of their non-manifestation as successive, according to the maxim of utpala-sāta-patra-vyatibheda or the piercing through of one hundred petals of the water-lily, (in which case the petals are, in fact, pierced successively, one after another, but the whole thing seems to take place in a single moment of time).—32.

Bhāṣya : —It is not a fixed rule with us, as it is with the Vaiśeṣikas (*vide* Kaṇāda-Sûtram, III. ii. 3, S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 126), that the modifications of the Indriyas take place only successively, and not simultaneously. This the author declares :

This is easy to understand.

Inasmuch as promiscuity of classes is not a fault in our view, given the required collocation of materials, there is nothing of an obstruction to the production of modifications at one and the same time by more than one Indriyas. Such is the idea.

The division of the modifications of the Indriyas have also been explained by the Kârikâ :

**शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।
वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥**

In respect of Sound, and the rest, the modification of the five (Indriyas of Cognition) is desired to the *ālochana* or simple awareness or observation of particular kinds. Of the five (Indriyas of Action, the modifications are) speech, prehension, movement, excretion and excitation.—Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XXVIII.

“*Ālochana*” also has been explained by the ancient teachers, thus :

अस्ति ह्यालोचनं ज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम् ।

परं पुनस्तथा वस्तुधर्मैर्जस्यद्विभक्तम् ॥

For, first, there arises “*ālochana*,” that is, *nirvikalpaka* or objectless cognition; afterwards, again, it is made discrete by means of the properties of the object as well as by means of its class, etc.—Sāṃkhya-Tattva Kaumudī on Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XXVII.

And “*Param*,” the subsequent cognition, again, which is *savikalpaka* or discrete “*vastu-dharmaih*” or by reason of the properties of the thing as also “*jāti-ādi-bhiḥ*” or by reason of the class, etc., is “*tathā*,” called by the name “*ālochana*.” Such is the meaning.

So that, it is obtained that sensuous cognition in the form of *nirvikalpaka* or indiscrete and *savikalpaka* or discrete, is, in both of its forms, designated by the name of “*ālochana*.”

According to some, however, the above verse means that *nirvikalpaka* cognition alone is *ālochana* and is the product of the Indriya, while *savikalpaka* cognition is the product of Manas only. But such is not the meaning of the verse; because, in the Commentary on Yoga, it has been established by the revered Vyāsa that *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* or the cognition of a thing as possessing a particular character is also a product of the Indriyas; and, further, because there is nothing of an obstruction to the cognition, by the Indriyas, of a thing as possessing a particular character.

The same authority (cf. *Aniruddha* also) explains the meaning of the aphorism also in this way: The modification of these, beginning with the external Indriyas and ending with *Buddhi*, ordinarily takes place by succession; but occasionally, for instance, at the moment of seeing a tiger and the like, on account of special fear, modification takes place simultaneously in all the Instruments (*Vide* II, 38), like the flash of a streak of lightning; such is the meaning. This too is incorrect; because in the aphorism there is mention of the successive and simultaneous appearance of the modifications of the Indriyas only; there is not the remotest allusion to the modification of *Buddhi* and *Ahaṃkāra*. Moreover, since a divergent opinion is held by our opponent only in respect to the simultaneity of the modifications of the several Indriyas, it is but proper that the aphorism should be directed only to the establishment of such simultaneity, with a view to repel the atomicity of Manas (*vide* *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtram*, S. B. H. Vol. VI, page 230), but not that it should be directed to make search for the tooth of a crow.—32.

Note.—*Aniruddha*, however, accepts the *Vaiśeṣika* theory of the atomicity of Manas, *Vide* *Vpitti* on III, 14.

Number and Character of the Modifications.

वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः ॥ २ । ३३ ॥

वृत्तयः vṛttayah, modifications. पञ्चतय्यः pañchatayyah, fivefold. क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः klistâ-a-klistâh, painful and non-painful.

33. The modifications are fivefold, and are painful and non-painful (cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 5).—197.

Vṛtti :—How many are the modifications? To remove this curiosity, the author says :

(The fivefold modifications are) Pramâṇa, Viparyaya, Vikalpa, Nidrâ, and Smṛiti. Sense-perception, Inference, and Word, are the Pramâṇas or Proofs, *i.e.*, Sources of Knowledge. (*Vide* Yoga Aphorisms, I. 6, and 7, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 14). Viparyaya is unreal cognition, resting on a form not possessed by that which is its object (*vide* Yoga Aphorisms, I. 8, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 18). Vikalpa is cognition swinging between both the alternatives (cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 9, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 20). Nidrâ (Sleep) is cognition supporting on Tamas (cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 10, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 22). Smṛiti (Memory or Reminiscence) is cognition of the past. (Cf. Yoga Aphorisms, I. 11, S. B. H., Vol. IV, p. 24).

“Klistâh” means attended with pain, that is, constituted by Rajas and Tamas; “A-klistâh” means having the painful in it burnt up, that is, constituted by Sattva.—33.

Bhâṣya :—Lumping together the modifications of Buddhi, the author, in the first place, exhibits them, with the object of showing that they are the cause of Saṃsâra or worldly existence.

Whether they be painful or non-painful, the modifications are “pañchatayyah,” of five kinds only, and not more. Such is the meaning. “Klistâh,” that is, pain-giving, are the worldly modifications; “a-klistâh,” that is, the opposite thereof, are the modifications taking place at the time of Yoga.

The fivefoldness of the modifications has been declared by the (Yoga) Aphorism of Patañjali :

प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः ॥

Pramâṇa, Viparyaya, Vikalpa, Nidrâ, and Smṛiti (are the modifications).—Yoga-Sûtram, I. 6.

Amongst these, the modification called Pramâṇa has also been similarly described in this (Sâmkhya-Sâstra, *vide* I. 87 *ante*). But Viparyaya, in our view, consists only in the non-apprehension of viveka

or the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, because we reject the theory of anyathā-khyāti, that is, that a thing can be seen in a light different from its own. Vikalpa, again, is cognition such as "The head of Rāhu" (when Rāhu is all head), "The consciousness of Puruṣa" (when Puruṣa is nothing but consciousness), even at the time of the observation of the peculiarity. And Nidrā is the modification of Buddhi taking place during the state of dreamless sleep. And Smṛiti is cognition produced from Saṃskāra or previous impressions. All this has been aphorised in the System of Patañjali.—33.

The svarūpa of Puruṣa indicated.

तन्निवृत्तावुपशान्तोपरागः स्वस्थः ॥ २ । ३४ ॥

तन्निवृत्ती tat-nivṛttau, on the cessation of these (modifications). उपशान्तोपरागः upaśānta-uparāgaḥ, having the tincture subsided. स्वस्थः sva-sthaḥ, self-seated.

34. On the cessation of these (modifications), as the colour reflected (on him by them) disappears, (Puruṣa remains) self-seated.—198.

Vṛitti :—The author says that, on the cessation of the modifications, there results Release.

On the cessation of the modifications, Ignorance, Egoity, Desire, Aversion, and Love of Life (*vide* Yoga Aphorisms, II. 3, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 91) having been exhausted, (Puruṣa) "sva-sthaḥ," recovers his svarūpa or intrinsic form.—34.

Bhīṣya :—These modifications of Buddhi that have just been mentioned—it is entirely due to them as Upādhis, and not to himself, that Puruṣa seems to have a form other than his own; and on the cessation of these, Puruṣa becomes fixed in his svarūpa. From this side (of the question) also the author makes us acquainted with the svarūpa of Puruṣa.

In the state of repose of these modifications, their reflections having subsided, Puruṣa becomes self-seated, just as he is, at other times also, in the state of aloneness. So also say the three Yoga Aphorisms :

योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥

तदा द्रष्टुः स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम् ॥

वृत्तिसारूप्यमितरत्र ॥

Yoga is the suppression of the modifications of the Chitta.

Then is the resting of the on-looker in his own form.

Elsewhere there is identity of form with the modifications.—Yoga-Aphorisms of Patañjali, I. 2, 3, 4, S. B. H. Vol. iv, pp. 5, 9, 10.

And the being self-seated, in the case of Puruṣa, denotes nothing else than the cessation of the reflection of the modifications of his Upâdhi (i.e., Buddhi).

A similar condition of Puruṣa has been shown by means of an illustration, in the Yoga-Vâsiṣṭha-Râmâyanaṃ :

अनात्ताखिलशैलादिप्रतिबिम्बे हि यादृशी ।

स्यादर्पणे दर्पणता केवलात्मस्वरूपिणी ॥

अहं त्वं जगदित्यादौ प्रशान्ते दृश्यसम्भ्रमे ।

स्यात्तादृशी केवलता स्थिते द्रष्टव्यविक्षणे ॥

For, in a mirror which has not received the reflections of the hills and hundred other objects, the single nature that there is, of being a mirror, consisting of its own intrinsic form alone, the same aloneness there will be in the on-looker, when he stands not seeing, the panorama of scenes showing the "I," the "You," and the "World," etc., having gone down.—34.

Above illustrated.

कुसुमवच्च मणिः ॥ २ । ३५ ॥

कुसुमवत् kusuma-vat, like the flower. च cha, and. मणिः manih, the jewel.

35. And as (is the case with) the jewel, in relation to the flower.—199.

Vritti :—The author gives an illustration.

As redness appears in the crystal (which is naturally of a white colour), through its association with a China-rose flower, and, after its removal, the crystal stands by its own intrinsic form ; so does he also.—35.

Bhâṣya :—The author elucidates this by an illustration.

The word "cha" denotes the cause ; so that the meaning is that as the jewel is *by means of* the flower.

As the crystal, by reason of the China-rose flower, becomes red, i.e., not standing by itself, and, on the removal thereof, becomes red-less, i.e., standing by itself ; similarly does Puruṣa. So has it been stated in the Kârma-Purâṇa :

यथा संलक्ष्यते रक्तः केवलः स्फटिको जनैः ।

रञ्जकाद्युपधानेन तद्वत् परम पुरुषः ॥

As the pure crystal is seen by men to be red by reason of something which makes it look red, lying near about it, so is the case with the Great Puruṣa.—Kârma-Purâṇa, II. ii, 28.—35,

What moves the Indriyas to operate.

पुरुषार्थं करणोद्भवोऽप्यदृष्टोल्लासात् ॥ २ । ३६ ॥

पुरुषार्थं puruṣa-artham, for the accomplishment of the object of Puruṣa.
करणोद्भवः karaṇa-udbhavaḥ, awakening or activity of the Instruments. अपि api,
also. अदृष्टोल्लासात् adṛiṣṭa-ullāśāt, from the development of Adṛiṣṭam, the unseen
Merit and Demerit.

36. The Instruments also rise into activity, for the sake of Puruṣa, from the development of Adṛiṣṭam.—200.

Vṛitti :—Lest it be thought that, the Instruments being on a par with one another, they will always have similarity of forms ; so the author says :

There can be no such similarity, on account of the difference of the development and non-development of the Instruments into activity. And this difference comes from the development of Adṛiṣṭam which is the stronger factor in the case.—36.

Bhāṣya :—But, it may be asked, by whose effort or volition the aggregate of the Instruments come into operation, when Puruṣa is immutable, and when (the intervention of) Īśvara is denied ? To this the author replies :

Like the activity of Prakṛiti, “ karaṇa-udbhavaḥ,” the activity of the Instruments, which also is for the sake of Puruṣa, proceeds only from the manifestation of the Adṛiṣṭam of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.

And Adṛiṣṭam is (really) of the Upādhi itself (of Puruṣa) (*vide* II. 46, *Bhāṣya*).—36.

Above illustrated.

धेनुवद्वत्साय ॥ २ । ३७ ॥

धेनुवत् dhenu-vat, like cow. वत्साय vatsāya, for the sake of the calf.

37. As does the cow for the calf.—201.

Vṛitti :—The author gives an illustration.

As, although cows resemble one another in being cows, the milch one nourishes the calf.—37.

Bhāṣya :—The author gives an illustration of spontaneous activity for another's sake.

As the cow, for the sake of the calf, quite spontaneously distils milk, and awaits no other effort, in the very same way do the Instruments come

into operation quite spontaneously for the sake of Puruṣa, their lord. Such is the meaning. And it is also seen that, from deep sleep, Buddhi quite spontaneously wakes up.

The very same thing has been stated by the Kārikā also:

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकृतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम् ॥

(The instruments) go into their respective modifications, occasioned by mutual sympathy; the purpose of Puruṣa is the only cause (of it); by none is an Instrument moved to action.—Sāmkhya-Kārikā, XXXI.—37.

The number of the Instruments.

करणं त्रयोदशविधमवान्तरभेदात् ॥ २ । ३८ ॥

करणं *karanaṃ*, Instrument. त्रयोदशविधम् *trayodaśa-vidham*, thirteen-fold. अवान्तरभेदात् *avāntara-bhedât*, through subsidiary division :

38. The Instrument is of thirteen kinds, according to subsidiary differences.—202.

Vritti :—Through external and internal division, how many are the Instruments? To this the author replies :

The internal (Instruments) are Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra, and Manas; the external ones are the ten Indriyas.—38.

Bhāṣya :—There being room for the enquiry as to how many the Instruments are, with the external and the internal ones combined; the author says :

The three internal Instruments and the ten external Instruments, being combined, are thirteen. The word “vidham,” kinds, has been used in order to show that amongst these (thirteen), again, there is an infinity through the difference of individuals. The expression “according to subsidiary differences” has been used with this in mind that Buddhi alone is the principal Instrument; the meaning being that the Instruments of the one single Instrument called Buddhi, are more than one.—38.

Why the Indriyas are called Instruments.

इन्द्रियेषु साधकतमत्वगुणयोगात् कुठारवत् ॥ २ । ३९ ॥

इन्द्रियेषु *indriyeṣu*, in the Indriyas. साधकतमत्वगुणयोगात् *sādhakatama-tva-guṇa-yogât*, from conjunction of the quality of the most efficient means of accomplishing the object of Puruṣa. कुठारवत् *kuṭhāra-vat*, like an axe.

39. (There are thirteen kinds of Instruments), because, in the Indriyas (excepting Buddhi), there is conjunction of

the quality of the most efficient Instrument (*viz.*, Buddhi); as in the case of the axe.—203.

Vṛitti :—How does instrumentality belong to the Indriyas? To this the author replies :

As instrumentality arises in the axe, it being the most efficient means of accomplishing the act ; so also in the case of the Indriyas.—39.

Bhâṣya :—But Buddhi itself, because it makes over objects to Puruṣa, is the principal Instrument, while the instrumentality of the others is due to their possessing the quality of the former ; what, then, it may be asked, is that quality (here required?) 'There being room for such an enquiry, the author says :

In the Indriyas, there exists, mediately, the quality of the Instrument, Buddhi, in the form of being the most efficient means of accomplishing the purpose of Puruṣa ; hence thirteen kinds of Instruments are made out ; such is the connection with the preceding aphorism.

“As in the case of the axe :” As, although the principal instrumentality, in the act of cutting, is of the blow alone, since it cuts off our non-connection with the fruit or result, yet instrumentality belongs to the axe also, through its conjunction with the quality of being an excellent means ; similarly. Such is the meaning.

Bearing in mind the oneness of the internal Instruments, it is not declared here that instrumentality in a secondary sense belongs to Ahaṃ-kâra.—39.

Pre-eminence of Buddhi illustrated.

द्वयोः प्रधानं मनो लोकवद्भृत्यवर्गेषु ॥ २ । ४० ॥

द्वयोः : dvayoh, of the two. *प्रधानं* pradhânam, principal. *मनः* manah, Manas. *लोकवत्* loka-vat, as some one person (Vijñâna), as in the world (Aniruddha). *भृत्यवर्गेषु* bhṛitya-varge-ṣu, among a troop of servants.

40. Of the two, the principal is Manas, as is some one person, among a troop of servants.—204.

Vṛitti :—The author describes the action of the thirteen Instruments.

“Dvayoh,” of the Indriyas of Cognition and the Indriyas of Action, the principal is Manas, because the activity of the others proceeds only from its superintendence over them ; as, in the world, is the master among the servants.—40.

Bhāṣya :—Specifying how the case stands in regard to the relation of the secondary and the principal, the author says :

“Dvayoḥ,” among the external and the internal, “manas,” Buddhi alone is “pradhānam,” the principal, in other words, the immediate Instrument, because it is that which makes over the object to Puruṣa. Just as, among a host of servants, some one person alone becomes the prime minister of the king, while the others are, as his subordinates, the governors of villages, and the like ; similarly. Such is the meaning.

Here the word “manas” does not denote the third internal Instrument (*vide* II. 30) ; because it is impossible for anything other than Buddhi to be, as will later on (*vide* II. 42) be declared, the receptacle of all the numerous Saṃskāras or past impressions, or, even if it were possible, because, (in that case), the supposition or conception of Buddhi would be futile.—40.

Why Buddhi is the principal.

अव्यभिचारात् ॥ २ । ४१ ॥

अव्यभिचारात् a-vyabhichārāt, from not wandering away.

41. (Buddhi is the principal), because it never wanders away.—205.

Vṛitti :—The author gives the reason for the above.

This is clear.—41.

Bhāṣya :—The author gives, in three aphorisms, reasons why Buddhi is principal.

Because it pervades all the Instruments, or because it never fails to produce the fruit (in the shape of knowledge).—41.

A second reason.

तथाऽशेषसंस्काराधारत्वात् ॥ २ । ४२ ॥

तथा tathā, so too. अशेषसंस्काराधारत्वात् aśeṣa-saṃskāra-ādhāra-tvāt, from being the depository or receptacle of infinite saṃskāras or past impressions.

42. So, too, because it is the receptacle of infinite Saṃskāras.—206.

Vṛitti :—The author gives another reason.

Because there are seen to survive the saṃskāras, receipts or impressions of even lost Indriyas.—42.

Bhāṣya :—It belongs to Buddhi alone to be the receptacle of all the saṃskāras, and not to the Eye, etc., nor to Ahaṃkāra, nor to Manas, inasmuch as the recollection, by the blind, the deaf, etc., of objects previously seen, heard, etc., cannot otherwise be explained or be possible. Moreover, it is seen that, even after the dissolution of Ahaṃkāra and Manas by means of Tattva-Jñāna or Knowledge of Truth, there remains recollection. Hence, by reason also of its being the depository of infinite saṃskāras, Buddhi alone possesses pre-eminence over all. Such is the meaning.—42.

A third reason.

स्मृत्याऽनुमानाच्च ॥ २ । ४३ ॥

स्मृत्या smṛityā, by memory, reminiscence, or recollection. अनुमानात् anumānāt, from inference. च cha, and, also.

43. And also because (there is) inference (of its pre-eminence) by means of reminiscence.—207.

Vṛitti :—The author shows the reasoning.

From seeing that recollection takes place even in the absence of the Indriya, Manas is inferred.—43.

Bhāṣya :— Also because, "Smṛityā," by means of the modification in the form of chintana or thinking, there is inference of the pre-eminence (of Buddhi). Such is the meaning. For, the modification of the chintā or thinking, called dhyāna or contemplation, is the noblest of all the modifications; and, by being the seat thereof, Buddhi itself, otherwise named chitta or the thinking principle, is nobler than the Indriyas possessing modifications other than this. Such is the meaning.—43.

Recollection is not spontaneous to Puruṣa.

सम्भवेन्न स्वतः ॥ २ । ४४ ॥

सम्भवेत् sambhavet, is possible. न na, not. स्वतः svataḥ, from Puruṣa.

44. (Recollection) cannot come from Puruṣa.—208.

Vṛitti :—Lest it be thought that Saṃskāra has its receptacle in the Self; so the author says :

"Svataḥ," from the Self, it cannot be possible, owing to the fact that the Self is immutable and has no direct relation to the Guṇas.—44.

Bhāṣya :—But, it may be said, let the modification called thinking or contemplation belong to Puruṣa himself. To this the author replies :

“Svataḥ,” of Puruṣa, recollection cannot be possible, on account of his being immutable. Such is the meaning.

Or, the aphorism can be explained in the following manner :

Well, then, it may be objected, let Buddhi alone be the Indriya, and do away with the subsidiary Indriyas. Apprehending this, the author says : Sambhavet na svataḥ ; the meaning being that, without the intervention of the Eye, etc., the instrumentality of Buddhi in all its operations, cannot arise spontaneously, since, in that case, it would happen that the blind, etc., also would see Colour, etc.—44.

Relativity of the Condition of Principal and Secondary.

आपेक्षिको गुणप्रधानभावः क्रियाविशेषात् ॥ २ । ४५ ॥

आपेक्षिकः âpekṣikah, relative, mutually respective. गुणप्रधानभावः guṇa-pradhâna-bhâvah, the relation or condition of secondary and principal. क्रियाविशेषात् kriyâ-visēṣât, owing to distinction of function.

45. The condition of secondary and principal is relative to the distinction of function.—209.

Vṛitti:—But when they are all equally instruments, to what cause, it may be asked, is due the condition of their being secondary and principal? To this the author replies :

This is clear.—45.

Bhâṣya:—But, then, it may be asked, Buddhi alone thus being the principal, how has it been declared before (*vide* II. 26) that Manas partakes of the character of both (the Indriya of Cognition and the Indriya of Action)? To this the author replies.

The condition of being secondary and principal among the Instruments is relative towards (the performance of) particular acts. *E.g.*, in the operations of the Eye, etc., Manas is principal ; in the operation of Manas, again, Ahaṁkāra is principal ; and in the operation of Ahaṁkāra, Buddhi is principal.—45.

Why one particular Buddhi, and not another, acts for the benefit of one particular Puruṣa, and not another.

तत्कर्माजितत्वात्तदर्थमभिचेष्टा लोकवत् ॥ २ । ४६ ॥

तत्कर्माजितत्वात् tat-karma-arjitatvât, having been acquired or purchased by the Karma or deeds of that (particular Puruṣa). तदर्थम् tat-artham, for his purpose. अभिचेष्टा abhicēṣṭâ, activity towards another. लोकवत् loka-vat, as in the world.

46. The other-regarding activity (of one particular

Buddhi), for the benefit of one particular Puruṣa, is due to its having been purchased by the Karma of that particular Puruṣa ;—just as in the world.—210.

Vṛitti :—When there is the absence of any adjustment of aim, why does not, it may be asked, a different one act or energise for the sake of another ? To this the author replies :

Having been acquired by the Karma of Puruṣa as reflected in Buddhi, the other-regarding activity of Buddhi, etc., is for the benefit of Puruṣa ; as, in the world, a servant does the work of the person by whom he has been purchased.—46.

Bhāṣya :—Well, it may be asked, what is the cause of the arrangement that of this Puruṣa is this Buddhi alone the Instrument, and not another ? To this the author replies :

Because the Instrument is originated from the Karma of a particular Puruṣa, “*abhiccheṣṭā*,” all its operations are for the sake of that Puruṣa, just as in the world. Such is the meaning. Just as, in the world, whatever axe, etc., has been acquired, by the act of buying, etc., by whatever man,—the operation (of that axe, etc.) such as cutting, etc., is only for the sake of that man ; such is the meaning. Hence is the specific distribution of the Instruments. Such is the idea.

(But how can it be said : “Karma of Puruṣa,” when Puruṣa is incapable of action ? This point is next considered in the *Bhāṣya*.)

Although, by reason of his being immobile or immutable, there is no Karma in Puruṣa, still, inasmuch as it, being the means of *bhoga* or experience, is related to Puruṣa as its owner, therefore Karma is said to belong to Puruṣa, in the same way, for example, as victory, etc. (really achieved by the army, is said to belong) to the king (because he is the owner of the army.)

But what is there to determine the particular adjustment of Karma itself to particular Puruṣas ? To this we reply that it is nothing but other Karmas similarly related. In saying this we do not commit the fault of *anavasthā* or nothing-to-stand-upon (*i.e.*, non-finality), because Karma is without beginning.

What, on the other hand, some one (*Aniruddha*, *vide* *Vṛitti*), not possessing discrimination, says, namely that Karma is of Puruṣa reflected in Buddhi ; that is not so ; because, the very same relation (of Karma to Puruṣa), as has been mentioned by us, having been mentioned in the Commentary on Yoga, no other relationship is creditable ; and also because, by reason of the fact that a reflection is not a *Vastu* or independent

objective existence, Karma, and the like are impossible for it, for ; otherwise, on the admission of Karma and the experience thereof as appertaining to the reflection, the supposition or conception of Puruṣa, admitted by him also to be the substance casting reflection into Buddhi, would, as has already been established by us, be futile.—46.

The topic of the pre-eminence of Buddhi concluded.

समानकर्मयोगे बुद्धेः प्राधान्यं लोकवल्लोकवत् ॥ २ । ४७ ॥

समानकर्मयोगे samâna-karma-yoge, performance of like acts notwithstanding. बुद्धेः buddheḥ, of Buddhi. प्राधान्यं prâdhânyam, principalship. लोकवत् loka-vat, as in the world.

47. Although they perform like offices, principalship belongs to Buddhi, just as in the world, just as in the world.—211.

Vṛitti:—The author declares that everywhere principalship belongs to Buddhi.

Just as in the world, the governor of the state is superior to the governor of the village, and superior to him, again, is the king, so, because Manas operates for the sake of Buddhi, Buddhi is the principal of all ; “samânak-arma-yoge,” although all of them perform acts equally for the purpose of Puruṣa.

The repetition of the expression “just as in the world” is to indicate the close of the book.—47.

Here ends the Second Book, of the Evolutions of Prakṛiti, in the Vṛitti on the Sâmkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram of Kapila.

Bhâṣya :—In order to bring out prominently the principalship of Buddhi, the author concludes :

Although, the function of all the Instruments is, just the same, in being for the purpose of Puruṣa, still principalship belongs to Buddhi alone, just as in the world. For, in the world, as pre-eminence belongs to the primeminister alone among the governors of villages and the rest, even although there is no particular distinction in their being (workers) for the benefit of the king ; similarly. Such is the meaning.

Hence is it that in all Sâstras, Buddhi alone is celebrated as Mahat or the Great One.

The repetition (*viz.* “just as in the world,” “just as in the world”) marks the end of the Book.—47.

The components of the Liṅga-Deha, the subtle body, which are seventeen in number,—these subtle products of Prakṛiti have been examined in this Book.

Note.—The components of the Liṅga-Deha are “Mahat-ādi sūkṣma-paryantam” (Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XL. g. v.) : Mahat, Ahaṃkāra, Manas, the five Indriyas of Cognition, the five Indriyas of Action, and the five Tan-mātras, which would be eighteen in number. Vijñāna-Bhikṣu follows Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram, III. 9, which reduces the number to seventeen, by taking Buddhi and Ahaṃkāra as one.

Here ends the Second Book, of the Evolutions of Prakṛiti, in the Commentary composed by Vijñāna Āchārya, on the Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram of Kapila.



BOOK III. OF DISPASSION.

INTRODUCTION.

Vṛitti :—Now, after the ascertainment of the Evolutions of Prakṛiti, is made the beginning of the Third Book, for the purpose of discussing Vairāgya or Dispassion.

Bhāṣya :—From here forward the gross products of Prakṛiti, *viz.*, the Mahā-Bhūtas or Great Elements and the duad of bodies, are to be described, and after this, the going into the various wombs, and the like; with the object of evoking that lower dispassion which is the motive to the performance of acts which are the means of knowledge; and, thereafter, with a view to higher dispassion, all the means of knowledge are to be told. So the Third Book commences :

Origin of the Gross Elements.

अविशेषाद्विशेषारम्भः ॥ ३ । १ ॥

अविशेषात् a-viśeṣāt, from the indefinite homogeneity. विशेषारम्भः viśeṣa-ārambhaḥ, origination of the definite heterogeneity.

1. From the indefinite homogeneity (there is) the origination of the definite heterogeneity.—212.

Vṛitti :—“ A-viśeṣāt ” from the subtle elements, there is the origination “ viśeṣasya ”, of the Great Elements.—1.

Bhāṣya :—In which do not exist the distinctions in the form of calmness, fierceness, dulness, and the like,—such is “ a-viśeṣa ” (indiscernible or indistinguishable), the subtle (parts) of the Elements, called the five Tanmātras or mere somethings or the measures thereof; from them there is the origination of the gross Great Elements, which are “ viśeṣas ” (discernible or distinguishable), inasmuch as they possess the distinctions in the form of the calm and the like. Such is the meaning. For it is only in the Gross Elements that the character of having pleasure, etc., as their essence, in the form of the calm and the like, is manifested by the degrees of more and less, and not in the Subtle Elements, because their manifestation in the mind of the Yogins (where alone, if anywhere, they are ever manifested) is only by the one single form of the calm.—1.

Origin of the Body.

तस्माच्छरीरस्य ॥ ३ । २ ॥

tasmât, therefrom. *शरीरस्य* śarīrasya, of the body.

2. Therefrom, of the Body.—213.

Vṛitti:—One grows dispassionate to the body through a consideration of its being composed of the flesh and the like.—2.

Bhāṣya:—Thus, then, commencing from the first book, up to this place, having described the production of the twenty-three principles, the author declares therefrom the production of the duad of bodies.

"Tasmât," from the twenty-three principles, is the origination of the pair of bodies, gross and subtle. Such is the meaning.—2.

Origin of Samsāra.

तद्बीजात् संसृतिः ॥ ३ । ३ ॥

tat-bijāt tat-vijāt, from the seed thereof. *संसृतिः* saṃsṛitiḥ, transmigratory or worldly existence ; Samsāra.

3. From the seed thereof, is Samsāra.—214.

Vṛitti:—Production has been shown ; wherefrom is disappearance ? To this the author replies :

From the cause thereof, *i.e.*, of the origination of the Elements, namely Dharma and A-dharma, is going out, *i.e.*, disappearance or destruction.—3.

Bhāṣya:—Now the author proves that Samsāra or worldly existence (of Puruṣa) cannot be accounted for otherwise than by means of the twenty-three principles.

From the seed, *i.e.*, the subtle causes in the form of the twenty-three principles, of it, *i.e.* the body, takes place "saṃsṛiti," *i.e.*, the going and coming, of Puruṣa, inasmuch as spontaneous going, etc., is impossible for the immutable on account of his universality. Such is the meaning. For, (only) Puruṣa, residing in the twenty-three principles, by means of that Upādhi or investment alone, moves from body to body, for the purpose of experiencing the Karmas previously done ; because, by such Smṛitis as

मानसं मनसैवायमुपभुङ्क्ते शुभाशुभम् ।

वाचा वाचा कृतं कर्म कायेनैव तु कायिकम् ॥

Verily with the Manas, does Puruṣa experience the Karma, good and bad, done with the Manas ; with the Speech, the Karma done with the Speech ; and with the body only, the Karma done with the body.—Manu-Saṃhitā, XII, 8.

it has been established that experience in other lives takes place quite naturally, by means of the materials consisting of the Karmanas performed in the previous lives. For this very reason, the Brahma-Sūtram concludes :

सम्यक्त्व इति

“(In order to obtain another body, the soul goes) accompanied (by permanent atoms ; as appears from the question and answer in the Chhândogya text.)—Vedānta-Sūtram, III. i. 1 ; S. B. R. Vol. v., page 426.—8.

Limit of Saṃsāra.

आ विवेकाच्च प्रवर्तनमविशेषाणाम् ॥ ३ । ४ ॥

आ विवेकात् & vivekāt, till Viveka or discriminative knowledge. च cha, and. प्रवर्तनम् pravartanam, activity, operation. अविशेषाणाम् a-viśeṣāṇām, of the Indistinguishables or Indiscernibles ; of the A-viśeṣas, Tan-mâtras (Aniruddha) ; of Puruṣas (Vijñāna).

4. And till there is Viveka, there is the operation of the Indiscernibles.—215.

Vritti :—Lest it might be thought that, since the originators of the Gross Elements are existences, there would be origination at all times, and, that, consequently, there would be no Release ; so the author says :

Till the development of the Knowledge of the distinction between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, the characteristic of being of the nature of originators belongs to the Tan-mâtras and the Bhûtas.—4.

Bhâṣya :—The author states the limit of Saṃsāra.

Of all Puruṣas whatever, devoid of the distinction of being an Īśvara, not being an Īśvara, and the like, “Pravartanam,” saṃsāra or transmigratory existence, is inevitable or necessary, till only the appearance of Viveka, and after the appearance of Viveka, it is not. Such is the meaning.—4.

The reason for the above.

उपभोगादितरस्य ॥ ३ । ५ ॥

उपभोगात् upabhogāt, on account of the experience. इतरस्य itarasya, of the other, viz., who has not Viveka.

5. On account of the experience of the other.—216.

Vritti :—When the characteristic of being the originators is in respect to one not possessing Viveka or Discrimination, this characteristic of being the originators will persist, one may say, even at the time of Mahâ Pralaya or the Great Dissolution ;—this is what the author denies.

After (the undergoing of) experience by one not possessing Viveka or Discrimination, his body does not exist during Mahâ Pralaya, and, consequently, how can there be experience in that state? Hence in respect to him, the Subtle Elements do not possess the characteristic of being the originators.—5.

Vedāntin Mahâdeva :—“Itarsya,” of the one not possessing Viveka, “upabhogât,” after the completion of Experience, there being the destruction of the previous Karma causing Experience, Pralaya takes place. Hence in the absence of Experience, for what purpose will there be a Body? Such is the import.

Bhâṣya :—The author states the reason of this :

Because of the inevitableness of the experience of the fruits of his own karma, “itarasya,” only in the case of the one not possessing Viveka or Discrimination. Such is the meaning.—5.

Puruṣa is ever free from experience.

सम्प्रति परिमुक्तो द्वाभ्याम् ॥ ३ । ६ ॥

सम्प्रति samprati, now ; during Pralaya or Dissolution (Aniruddha) ; at the time of creation (Mahâdeva) ; at the time of transmigration (Vijñâna). *परिमुक्तः pari-muktaḥ*, entirely free (Vijñâna) ; bound (Mahâdeva). Aniruddha reads “*pariṣvaktaḥ*” meaning overpowered, enveloped, instead of “*parimuktaḥ*.” *द्वाभ्याम् dvâbhyâm*, by the pair (Aniruddha and Mahâdeva) ; from the pairs of contraries (Vijñâna).

6. Now (Puruṣa is) entirely free from the pairs.—217.

Vṛitti :—But when, as a general rule, they cease to be the originators during Mahâ Pralaya, from what particular cause, again, they become the originators in regard to one not possessing Viveka? To this the author replies :

(“*Dvâbhyâm*,” *i.e.*) by Dharma, Merit, and A-dharma, Demerit. Embracing going and coming, the Self remains bound, even in Pralaya, in as far as it drags behind it the load of Dharma and A-dharma ; hence is origination over again in respect to it. Not so in the state of Release.—6.

Vedāntin Mahâdeva :—At the time of creation, again, how do they come to possess the characteristic of being the originators? In reply to this, the author says :

“*Samprati*,” at the time of creation. “*Dvâbhyâm*,” by Dharma and A-dharma. “*Pari-muktaḥ*,” that is, bound ; because the root *mucḥ* (from which, joined to the prefix *pari*, the word, *parimukta*, is derived). joined to the prefix *pari* also, as when joined to the prefix *â*, conveys the sense of

binding. When Dharma and A-dharma, lying dormant in Pralaya, are, at the time of creation, about to bear fruits, the body is originated. In the state of Release, on the other hand, there is verily the destruction of Dharma and A-dharma. Such is the import.

Bhāṣya :— The author states that, even while there is a Body, at the time of transmigrating, there is no experience.

“Samprati,” at the time of transmigration, Puruṣa becomes entirely freed, “Dvābhyām,” from the pairs of contraries such as cold and hot, pleasure and pain, etc. Such is the meaning.

So has it been stated by the Kārikā.

(पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादि सूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।)

संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥

[(Puruṣa, residing in) the Liṅga-Sarīra the one primordially produced, unconnected continuant, composed of the principles beginning with Mahat and ending with the Subtle Elements], transmigrates, free from Experience, and tinged with the Bhāvas or Dispositions (of Dharma and A-dharma, and the like. — Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XL.

“Bhāvas” are Dharma and A-dharma, Vāsanā or Desire or Inclination, and the like.—6.

The Gross and the Subtle Body distinguished.

मातापितृजं स्थूलं प्रायश इतरन्न तथा ॥ ३ । ७ ॥

मातापितृजं mātā-pitṛi-jaṃ, produced from father and mother. स्थूलं sthūlam, gross body. प्रायशः prāyaśaḥ, for the most part, usually. इतरत् itarat, the other, i.e., the subtle body. न na, not. तथा tathā, so.

7. The Gross (Body) is the one usually produced from the father and mother; the other is the one not so produced.—218.

Vṛitti :—But, the Self being eternally free,* how is it said to be dependent, for its release, on the destruction of Dharma and A-dharma? To this the author replies :

“Prāyaśaḥ,” usually : because so is it seen to be the case. “Itarat,” the Subtle Body, is not so, because of the difficulty of its conception.—7.

Bhāṣya :—Hereafter the author proceeds to describe the dual of bodies with reference to their specific nature.

* We adopt the reading of Paṇḍita Kālivara Vedāntavāgīśa's edition of 1808 Saka Era Calcutta. Dr. Garbe's reading, viz., Nityatve tu mukteḥ katham pāratantryam,—the Self being eternal, how there can be dependence of Release upon something else,—does not seem to be quite satisfactory.

The Gross (Body) is the one produced from the father and mother, "Prāyaśah," for the most part, because there is recollection (recorded in the Smṛitis) also of a Gross Body not born of a womb. (cf. Vaiśeṣika-Sūtram, IV. ii. 5-10, S. B. H. Vol. VI, pages 159-162). And "itarat," the Subtle Body, "na tathā," is not one produced from the father and mother, because of its having been produced at the beginning of creation. Such is the meaning.

So has it been stated by the Kārikā :

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादि सूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ॥
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥

The Liṅga or Mergent Body, the one primordially produced, unconnected, continuant, composed of the Principles beginning with Mahat and ending with the Subtle (Elements), transmigrates, free from Experience, tinged with the Bhāvas or Dispositions.—Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, XL.

"Niyatam," "continuant," means eternal, lasting for a period of two parārdhas,* that is, secondarily or relatively eternal; because of the redundancy in the supposition of the production of a Liṅga Body for every Gross Body. Its destruction at the time of Pralaya is, however, admitted, following the authoritative declarations of the Veda and Smṛiti.

Mention of the absence of Experience at the time of transmigrating has been made (in the above Kārikā), intending to lay down the general proposition. Occasionally, however, through entrance into an aërial body, Experience takes place even at the time of transmigrating. Herefrom are explained the declarations about the Experience of pain on the way to the Judgment Seat of Yama, the Controller.—7.

The Subtle, and not the Gross, Body causes Experience to Puruṣa.

पूर्वोत्पत्तेस्तत्कार्यत्वं भोगादेकस्य नेतरस्य ॥ ३ । ८ ॥

पूर्वोत्पत्तेः pūrva-utpatteh, of that of which the production is primordial. तत्कार्यत्वं tat-kārya-tvam, the characteristic of having that, i.e., experience, as the

* A Parārdha stands, in mathematics, for the number, lakṣa-lakṣa-koṭi, that is, for 1,00,00,00,00,00,00,000. But here it has a different meaning. For, from the text :

निजेन तस्य मानेन चायुर्वर्षशतं स्मृतम् ।
तत्पराख्यं तदर्थं च परार्धमभिधीयते ॥

And His (i.e., of Brahmā) life-time is recollected to be one hundred years by His own measure. That is called (पर) Para; and the half of it is designated as Parārdha (Para-half). -- Kūrma-Purāṇa, Ch. V.

it appears that the life-time of Brahmā makes the measure of two Parārdhas. This is the period of one Great Cycle of Creation and Dissolution, throughout which the Liṅga-Śarīra persists.

Now, the one hundred years of Brahmā is equal to 31,10,40,00,00,00,000 human years. A, Parārdha, therefore, indicates 15,55,20,00,00,00,000 human years,

effect. भोगत् bhogât, owing to experience. एकस्य ekasya, of the one. न na, not. इतरस्य itarasya, of the other, i.e., the Gross Body.

8. To that of which the production is primordial, it belongs to have this (pleasure and pain) as its effect, because the experience of pleasure and pain is of the one, and not of the other.—219.

Vṛitti:—Between the two Bodies, to which does Bhoga or Experience belong? To this the author replies.

“Pârva-utpatteh,” of the Subtle Body; “ekasya,” of this, being the Experience, and not “itarasya,” of the Gross (Body); is the characteristic of having that, Experience, as its effect. Experience, in a secondary sense, belongs to the Gross Body, because of the non-observation of experience in a dead body.—8.

Bhâṣya:—Among the Bodies, Gross and Subtle, due to which as the Upâdhi or the external investment, is the conjunction of Puruṣa with the pairs (of contraries)? This the author ascertains.

Of which the production is “pûrvam,” at the beginning of creation, i.e., the Subtle Body, of this alone is “tat-kârya-tvaṃ,” the characteristic of having pleasure and pain as its effects. Why? Because the experience called pleasure and pain, belongs, “ekasya,” only to the Subtle Body, but not “itarasya,” to the Gross Body, because all are agreed that pleasure, pain, and the like do not exist in a dead body. Such is the meaning.—8.

Constitution of the Subtle Body.

सप्तदशैकं लिङ्गम् ॥ ३ । ६ ॥

सप्तदश sapta-daśa, seventeen. एक ekam, and one (Aniruddha); made into, combined as, one (Vijñâna). लिङ्गम् liṅgam, mergent, Liṅga; Subtle.

9. The seventeen, as one, are the Subtle Body.—220.

Vṛitti:—By means of how many principles is the origination of the Subtle Body? To this the author replies:

Seventeen and one more, that is, eighteen; by these, the Subtle Body is produced. (They are) Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, and Manas, the five Subtle Elements, and the ten Indriyas.—9.

Bhâṣya:—The author describes the svarûpa or the intrinsic form of the Subtle Body mentioned above.

The Subtle Body, again, by being the container and the contained, is two-fold. Among them, the seventeen, combining together, are the

Liṅga-Sarīra, and that, at the beginning of creation, is, in the form of an aggregate, but one. Such is the meaning.

The seventeen are the eleven Indriyas, the five Tan-mātras, and Buddhi. Ahaṁkāra is really included in Buddhi.

Because of the proof to be mentioned under the third following aphorism (III. 12), it is these seventeen only that should be understood to be the Liṅgam; and the present aphorism should not be construed so as to make their number eighteen, by taking "saptadaśaikam" to mean seventeen and one more (as has been done by Aniruddha); also because, since the distinction of individuals is the subject of demonstration by the next aphorism (III. 10), it is thereby ascertained that, in the present aphorism, the significance of the word, Eka, is to declare the oneness of the Liṅgam; and because, moreover, that the Liṅga-Sarīra is made up of seventeen elements only has been established in such passages of the Mokṣa-Dharma Section of the Mahābhārata, etc., as

कर्मात्मा पुरुषो योऽसौ बन्धमोक्षैः प्रयुज्यते ।

स सप्तदशकेनापि राशिना युज्यते च सः ॥

He who is the Karma-ātmā Puruṣa, that is, Puruṣa enveloped by Karma,—the same is predicated of with Bondage and Release; he is also attended by the seventeen-membered mass.—Mahābhārata, XII. 13755b-13756a.

Seventeen parts or members exists in it,—such is what has been called "the seventeen-membered mass." Such is the meaning. By the use of the word "rāṣi," mass, has this been excluded that, like the Gross Body, the Liṅga-Deha is a system containing distinct organs; because, (when we have got such a system in the shape of the Gross Body), there would be redundancy in the supposition or postulation of another substance under the form of a system containing distinct organs. And, in the case of the Gross Body, the supposition that it is a system containing distinct organs, is made in conformity with the sense-perception (of the several parts) as one, two, etc.

And with the idea that in this, the Liṅga-Deha, it is Buddhi that is principal, Experience was stated before (*vide* III. 8) to be of the Liṅga-Deha.

Prāṇa, again, is a kind of modification of the Antaḥ-karāṇa or Internal Instrument itself (*vide* II. 31). Hence, in the Liṅga-Deha, there is inclusion of the pentad of Prāṇa also.

That this seventeen-membered thing is a Body, the author will himself declare by the aphorism: Liṅga-Sarīra-nimittaka iti Sanandana-āchāryaḥ (VI. 69). Hence, that it is the House of Experience,—this only

is the principal or primary definition of a Body ; while, by reason of being its container, the other (*i.e.*, the Gross) is, as will, later on (*vide* III. 11), become clear, treated as a Body. It is of this that the definition has been made in the aphorism of Nyāya :

वेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाभ्यः शरीरम् ॥

"Body is the site of gesture, senses, and sentiments."—Nyāya-Sūtram, I. i. 11, S. B. H. Vol. viii, page 5.—9.

How from one single Liṅgam, manifold Individuals arise.

व्यक्तिभेदः कर्मविशेषात् ॥ ३ । १० ॥

व्यक्तिभेदः vyakti-bhedah, distinction of individuals. **कर्मविशेषात्** karma-viśeṣāt, from distinction of Karma.

10. Differenciation of Individuals (proceeds) from distinction of Karma.—221.

Vṛitti :—The Subtle Body being alike in all cases, how can, it may be asked, the production take place therefrom of the vastly dissimilar bodies, *e.g.*, of the honey-bee and of the elephant ? To this the author replies :

This is clear.—10.

Bhāṣya :—But, then, if the Liṅga-Sarīra be one, then, how could there be experiences of different characters according to difference of individuals ? In regard to this the author says :

Even although, at the beginning of creation, the Liṅga exists as one and one only, in the form of the Upādhi or external investment of Hiraṇya-Garbhā or the Golden-Egged Brahmā, yet afterwards takes place "vyakti-bhedah," manifold division into parts by the forms of individuals ; just as at present there is of the one single Liṅga-Deha of the father, a manifold division into parts in the forms of the Liṅga-Deha of a son, a daughter, and so on.

He states the cause of this : "karma-viśeṣāt ;" meaning, owing to the karma, the cause of experience, of other Jīvas or Incarnate Puruṣas.

From the mention here of "viśeṣa," distinction, that is, distinctive peculiarity, of Karma, it is obtained that the saṁaṣṭi-sṛiṣṭi or collective creation of the Jīvas takes place by reason of the common Karmas of the Jīvas.

And this differenciation of Individuals has also been declared in the Smṛitis of Manu and others. For example, in Manu's work, after the

description of the production of the six Indriyas of the samaṣṭi-puruṣa or Collective Puruṣa, we find :

तेषां त्वयवान् सूक्ष्मान् षण्णामप्यमितौजसाम् ।

सन्निवेश्यात्ममात्रासु सर्वभूतानि निर्ममे ॥

Engrafting the subtle parts of those six, again, of immeasurable energy, into portions of the Self, He made all the beings.--Manu, I. 16.

The word “ṣaṇṇām,” of the six, is indicative of the entire Liṅga-Śarīra. “Ātma-mātrāsu,” into portions of consciousness ; conjoining. Such is the meaning.

Similarly, there is, again, in the same Śāstra, another passage, *viz.*,

तच्छरीरसमुत्पन्नैः कार्यैस्तैः करणैः सह ।

क्षेत्रज्ञाः समजायन्त गात्रेभ्यस्तस्य धीमतः ॥

From the Body of that Intelligent Being, were born the Kṣetra-jūas (the Knowers of the Fields, that is, the Incarnate Puruṣas), by means of the effects produced from His Body, together with those Instruments.—10.

Why the Gross Organism is called a Body.

तदधिष्ठानाश्रये देहे तद्वादात् तद्वादः ॥ ३ । ११ ॥

तदधिष्ठानाश्रये tat-adhiṣṭhāna-āśraye, in respect of the tabernacle of the abiding thereof, *i.e.*, of the Liṅga-Śarīra. देहे dehe, in respect of the Gross Body. तद्वादात् tat-vādāt, from the predication thereof, *i.e.*, of the term Body (Vijñāna), Self (Aniruddha). तद्वादः tat-vādah, the predication thereof.

11. From its being predicated of it, it is predicated of the (Gross) Body which is the tabernacle of the abode thereof.—222.

Vṛitti :—If the Self be the other, how does, then, the abhimāna or self-conceit arise in respect to the Body, that this is “I”? To this the author replies :

From the attribution of the term Self to the Body, the tabernacle of the abiding of the Self, on account of Experience taking place in it, there arises the application of the abhimāna or self-conceit, *viz.*, that this is “I,” to the Body.—11.

Bhāṣya :—But, then, since the characteristic of being a Body would thus belong to the Liṅga alone by reason of its being the House of Experience, why is the Gross (Organism) regarded as though it were a Body? To this the author replies :

To the receptacle of the pentad of Bhūtas or Elements presently to be mentioned, which are the adhiṣṭhāna, *i.e.*, vehicle, of that, *i.e.*, the

Līṅgam, that is, to the (Gross) Body consisting of six sheaths,* “tat-vādaḥ,” the application of the term Body, “tat-vādāt,” is due to the application of the term Body to “tat,” i.e., to what is denoted by the word adhiṣṭhāna, i.e., vehicle (of the Līṅgam, viz., the pentad of Elements presently to be mentioned). Such is the meaning.

It comes to this, therefore, that, through relation to the Līṅgam, the vehicle thereof is treated as a Body, and that, through its being the receptacle of that vehicle, the Gross also is treated as a Body.

Adhiṣṭhāna-Śarīra, again, the author will declare (*vide* III. 12), is constituted by subtler forms of the five Elements. So, then, the three-foldness of the Body is established.

What, on the other hand, we hear from the Śāstras, such as :

आतिषाहिक एकोऽस्ति देहाज्यस्याधिभौतिकः ।

सर्वासां भूतजातीनां ब्रह्मणस्त्वेक एव किम् ॥

Of the whole hosts of beings, there is the one Body, the Âti-vāhika, the Vehicular, while the other is the Âdhi-Bhautika, the Gross-Elemental; but how is it that only one Body belongs to Brahmā?

namely, that there are only two kinds of Body,—that statement is intended to show the oneness of the Līṅga-Śarīra and the Adhiṣṭhāna-Śarīra, by reason of their constantly accompanying each other, and also by reason of their alike being subtle.—11.

Proof of the Adhiṣṭhāna or Vehicular Body.

न स्वातन्त्र्यात् तद्वदे छायावच्चित्रवच्च ॥ ३ । १२ ॥

* na, not. स्वातन्त्र्यात् svātnatryāt, by the rule of its own nature; of itself; independently. तत् tat, that, the Adhiṣṭhāna-Body. ऋते rite, without. छायावत् chhâyâ-vat, like a shadow. चित्रवत् chitra-vat, like a picture. च cha, and.

12. (The Līṅga-Śarīra stands) not, by itself, without it (the Adhiṣṭhāna Śarīra), just like a shadow and like a picture.—223.

Vṛitti :—On this point, the author gives an illustration.

Did the intuition, viz., “This is I,” take place in reference to the Body, irrespectively of the Self, then, the intuition, viz., “This is I,” would arise in respect of a dead Body; and such is not the case. Just as

* Six Sheaths: *vide* Tattva-Kaumudī on Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XXIX, where Vāchaspati Miśra comments : “(Bodies) produced from father and mother” are the six-sheathed (ones). Therein, from the mother (are produced) the hair, blood, and flesh; while from the father, the vein, bone, and marrow :—these are the Six Sheaths.

a shadow does not stand without something to obstruct light, a picture without a wall, so is the case here also.—12.

Bhāṣya :—But what proof there is of the existence of another Body as the adhiṣṭhāna, seat or vehicle of the Liṅga-Śarīra, other than the one of six sheaths? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says :

That Liṅga-Śarīra, “tat pite,” without adhiṣṭhāna or something to stand upon, *i.e.*, independently, does not exist ; just as a shadow or a picture does not stand without a support. Such is the meaning. So that, the existence is established of another Body to serve as the vehicle of the Liṅga-Deha for the purpose of its going to another world, after leaving the Gross Body. Such is the import.

And its svarūpa or intrinsic form has been described in the Kārikā :

**सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥**

The Subtle (Bodies), (Bodies) produced from father and mother, together with the Great Elements, will be the Viśeṣas (Distinguishables, or Discernibles, *vide* III. 1 *ante*) ; amongst them, the Subtle (Bodies) are continuant, or, in a sense, eternal (*vide* Bhāṣya under III. 7) ; (Bodies) produced from father and mother cease (to entangle after death).—Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XXIX.

In this verse, the product of the Tan-mātras (*i.e.*, the adhiṣṭhāna-Śarīra, and not the Liṅga-Śarīra) is (the designate of the word) “Subtle,” by comparison with the Body produced from father and mother. (But in this view of the matter the doubt may arise whether the above Kārikā really says that it is this Tānmātric Adhiṣṭhāna-Śarīra that is co-existent with the Liṅga-Śarīra. Vijñāna proceeds to remove such a doubt.)

The same aggregate of Elements that has been declared to endure as long as the Liṅga lasts,—the very same is the Body which is the adhiṣṭhāna of the Liṅga. This is obtained from another Kārikā, *viz.*,

**चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थायवादिभ्यो विना यथा छाया ।
तद्वद्विना विशेषे न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥**

As a painting stands not without a support, nor a shadow without a stake, etc., so neither does the Liṅga stand supportless, without the Viśeṣas.—Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XLI.

“Viśeṣa” in the above Kārikā means the Gross Elements which may be called subtle, (*i.e.*, the subtler forms of the Gross Elements), that is to say, a sub-species, a subordinate variety, of the Gross.

By reason of the knowledge in this Kārikā of the difference of the Gross Elements denominated as subtle from the Liṅga-Śarīra, it cannot be the sense of the Kārikā, cited before (*vide* under III. 7), beginning with

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसकं नियतं महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।

(The Body), primordially produced, unconnected, continuant, beginning with Mahat, ending with the Subtle (Elements).

that the characteristic of being the Liṅga belongs to the Principles ending with the Subtle (Elements), but that, that which is the Liṅga in the form of Mahat, etc., transmigrates, extending up to its own receptacle, the Subtle (form of the Gross Elements), that is, (the meaning is), along with them.

Well, if this be so, how can it be ascertained, it may be asked, how many the Padārthas or Nameables are which go to form the Liṅga? To this we reply that it can be ascertained from passages in the Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇam, etc., such as :

वासना भूतसूक्ष्मं च कर्मविद्ये तथैव च ।
दशेन्द्रियं मनो बुद्धिरेतल्लिङ्गं विदुषु धाः ॥

Vāsanā or Desire, the Tan-mātras, and so also Karma and Knowledge, the ten Indriyas, Manas, Buddhi,—these the wise know to be the Liṅga.

In this verse, by reason of the intention that by the very establishment of the Liṅga-Śarīra, the eight Cities (of Puruṣa) should also be explained, there has been made separate mention or introduction of even the properties of Buddhi, viz., Desire, Karma, and Knowledge. And “the Subtle of the Elements” here denotes the Tan-mātras. The ten Indriyas, further, according to their division into the Indriyas of Cognition and the Indriyas of Action, make up two Cities. Such is the idea.

Note.—That is to say, in the above verse, have been declared both the components of the Liṅga-Śarīra and the eight Cities of Puruṣa. Thus, the former are Buddhi, Manas, the ten Indriyas, and the five Tan-mātras; while the latter are Buddhi, Manas, the Indriya of Cognition, the Indriya of Action, Desire, Karma, Knowledge, and the Tan-mātras.

The Māyā-vādins, on the other hand, interpolate the pentad of Prāṇa, and the rest, in the place of the Tan-mātras of the Liṅga-Śarīra, and imagine the eight Cities in a different way. But this is unworthy of credit.—12.

An objection considered.

मूर्तत्वेऽपि न संघातयोगात् तरणिवत् ॥ ३ । १३ ॥

mūrtatve, though it is mūrta, i.e., possessing a definite shape of its own, or corporate, or ponderable. अपि api, even. न na, not. संघातयोगात् saṅghāta-yogāt, on account of association with a mass or body. तरणिवत् tarapi-vat, like the sun.

13. Even though (the Liṅga-Śarīra) is a corporate or ponderable substance, (it does not stand independently), on account of (the necessity of) association with a mass, as in the case of the sun.—224.

Vṛtti :—Lest it be imagined that the Subtle Body itself will be the Self; so the author says :

Being a mass, it is corporate ; being corporate, it is for the sake of another (*Vide* I. 140). "Tarāṇi-vat," just as, notwithstanding that it causes illumination, on account of its being corporate or ponderable, the sun cannot be the Self.—13.

Bhāṣya :—But since it is a ponderable substance, let the *Linga*, it might be said, have *Ākāśa* itself as its (not inseparable) substratum, without association with it, as is the case with Air, and the rest ; useless is the supposition of its association elsewhere. In regard to this the author says :

Even though it is a ponderable substance, it cannot stand independently, by being free from association ; because of the inference of its, just as of the sun's, association with masses by reason of its being of the form of light or that which illuminates. Such is the meaning.

All *Tejas* or Lights, such as the sun and the rest, are seen as standing only by association with earthy substances. The *Linga*, again, is constituted by *Sattva* which is Light ; hence it must be associated with the *Bhūtas* or Gross Elements.—13.

Size of the Linga-Śarira is atomic.

अणुपरिमाणं तत् कृतिश्रुतेः ॥ ३ । १४ ॥

अणुपरिमाणं anu-parimāṇam, of the measure of an atom. तत् tat, that, the *Linga-Śarira* (*Vijñāna*) ; *Manas* (*Aniruddha*). कृतिश्रुतेः kṛiti-śruteḥ, because of the *Śruti* about its acting. *Aniruddha* reads "tat" and "kṛiti-śruteḥ" as one word.

14. It is of atomic size, because of the *Śruti* that it acts.—225.

Vṛitti :—If it be thought that *Manas* will be the Self ; so the author says :

Manas is of the size of an atom, because, we see, there is a *Śruti* that it acts. The characteristic of being an *Indriya* does not belong to that which is all-pervading and without an *Upādhi* or external investment ; (but *Manas* is an *Indriya*) ; hence an *Upādhi* or external investment must be affirmed of it. (What is then the *Upādhi* of *Manas*?) If a fixed and permanent organ only were to be its *Upādhi*, as is the cavity of the ear in the case of Hearing, then its function would be confined to that much only, and would not extend elsewhere, as is the case with Hearing. And, therefore, it should be affirmed that the Body as such is the *Upādhi* of *Manas*. So that it being obtained that the function or modification of *Manas* takes place under the local limitations imposed upon it by the Body, there arises, by reason of the intuitions such as "There is pain in my head,"

"There is pleasure in my body,"* the (apparent) contradiction of its being (all-pervading and) not-all-pervading.

From the simultaneous non-production of cognitions also, they (*e.g.*, the Vaiśeṣikas, cf. Kaṇāda-Sūtram, VII. i. 23, S. B. II. Vol. VI, page 230) infer the atomic magnitude of Manas. The reasoning for this inference has been shown in detail in another place.—14.

Bhāṣya :—The author determines the magnitude of the Liṅga.

"Tat," the Liṅga, "anu-parimāṇam," that is, finite or limited, but not absolutely an atom merely, because its being made up of parts has already (by III. 9) been declared. Wherefore (is it finite)? "Kṛiti-śruteḥ," because we hear of its acting, that is to say, because from Śrutis such as :

विज्ञानं यद् तनुते कर्माणि तनुतेऽपि च ॥

The Liṅga propagates Sacrifice, and propagates Karmas also.—Taittiriya-Upaniṣat, II. 5.

we hear that all Karmas belong to the Liṅga which is called there Vijñāna, because of its having Buddhi, called Vijñāna, as principal (among its components). Where there is all-pervadingness, action cannot be possible, (for action is motion). The reading "tat-gati-śruteḥ," meaning, from the hearing of its motion, however, is more in accordance with the sense desired. And the Śruti on the movement of the Liṅga-Śarira is :

तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणोऽनुक्रामति प्राणमनुक्रामन्तं सविज्ञानो भवति सविज्ञानमेवावक्रामति

Following it going out, Prāṇa goes out; following Prāṇa going after, (it) becomes attended with Buddhi (Saviñjāna); (it) comes down just as attended with Buddhi.—Bṛihat-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 2.

"Saviñjānaḥ:" is born verily being attended with Buddhi, and migrates also in such a manner as to be attended with Buddhi. Such is the meaning.—14.

*Body : We have adopted the reading of Paṇḍita Kālivara Vedānta-Vāgīśa. Dr. Garbe reads Pāde, meaning, in the leg, instead of Dehe, meaning, in the body. Dr. Garbe's reading, of course, falls in a line with the theory of the atomic size of Manas based on the localisation of its functions in different parts of the Body; but it does not help us, at the same time, to understand the force or import of the phrase "A-vyāpya-vṛittitva-pratiti-virodha," meaning, contradiction to the intuition of Manas being of not-all-pervading function; for, instead of contradiction, there is only confirmation, of such intuition, by the intuition, *viz.*, "There is pleasure in my leg." Aniruddha, on the other hand, clearly mentions a contradiction, among the different modifications or functions of Manas, such as, for example, "There is pain in my head" (which is local), and "There is pleasure in my body" (which is all-pervading, and as such is in contradiction to the not-all-pervading character of the function of Manas),—a contradiction which, as he would say, but unfortunately has not said, (and Dr. Garbe very well knows that Aniruddha has left many things unsaid, *vide* his preface to The Sāmkhya-Sūtra-Vṛitti), can be explained and reconciled by the atomic magnitude, implying and including swift movement also, of Manas, which the aphorism puts forward as an argument against the theory of Manas being the Self which is all-pervading.

Another proof of the finiteness of the Liṅga-Śarīra.

तदन्नमयत्वश्रुतेश्च ॥ ३ । १५ ॥

तदन्नमयत्वश्रुतेः tat-anna-maya-tva-śruteh, from the Śruti about its being formed of food. च cha, and.

15. And because there is the Śruti declaring that it is formed of food.—226.

Vṛitti :—The author gives a further reasoning.

There is Śruti that that, i.e., Manas, is formed of food. And by means of its being constituted by food, has been shown its Saumyatva. And Saumyatva consists in being of the form of the Moon. And neither is the Self the Moon.

And the Śruti in question is :

अन्नं वै प्राणाः

The food verily is the Prāṇas.

Prāṇa, again, should be known to be formed of the Moon. The Moon is produced from Manas. Therefore, Manas is atomic, and not (Ātmā, the Self which is) all-pervading.—15.

Bhāṣya :—The author states another argument for the finiteness of the Liṅga-Śarīra.

There being the Śruti that it, i.e., the Liṅga, is, partially, formed of food, all-pervadingness cannot possibly belong to it; because if it were all-pervading, it would thereby be eternal. Such is the meaning.

And that Śruti is :

अन्नमयं हि सौम्य मन आपोमयः प्राणस्तेजोमयी वागित्यादि ।

Verily, O Calm One, is Manas constituted by food, Prāṇa constituted by Water, the Voice constituted by Fire, etc.—Chhândogya-Upaniṣat, VI. v. 4.

Although Manas and the rest are not formed of the Elements, still it should be understood that they are considered as being constituted by food and the rest, because they are nourished with their homogeneous particles lying associated with, or attached to, food and the rest.—15.

Cause of Migration of the Liṅga-Śarīra.

पुरुषार्थं संसृतिर्लिङ्गानां सूपकारवद्राजः ॥ ३ । १६ ॥

पुरुषार्थं puruṣa-artham, for the sake of Puruṣa. **संसृतिः** saṁsṛitiḥ, migration. **लिङ्गानां** liṅgānām, of the Liṅgas. **सूपकारवत्** sūpa-kāra-vat, like the cook. **राजः** rājāḥ, of the king.

16. Of the Liṅgas, the migration is for the sake of Puruṣa ; just as is that of the king's cook.—227.

Vṛitti :—Of Mahat and the rest, the activity is for the sake of Puruṣa ; but, it may be asked, for what purpose is their migration ? To this the author replies :

As is the case with activity, so is it with migration. In migration also there is the pain of death ;—so thinking, one gets dispassionate.

“Sūpa-kāra-vat :” that is, the activity (of the cook) is only for the sake of another (i.e., the king).—16.

Bhāṣya :—Wherefore, it may be asked, is the migration, i.e., the going from one body to another, of the Liṅgas, when they are insentient ? The author removes this curiosity.

Just as the movement of the king's cooks among the kitchens is for the sake of the king, so is the migration of the Liṅga-Sarīras for the sake of Puruṣa. Such is the meaning.—16

Origin of the Gross Body.

पाञ्चभौतिको देहः ॥ ३ । १७ ॥

पाञ्चभौतिकः pāñcha-bhautikah, formed of the five Elements. देहः dehaḥ, Body.

17. The (Gross) Body is formed of the five Elements.—228.

Vṛitti :—There being differences of opinion as to the composition of the Gross Body, the author first states his side.

This is clear.—17.

Bhāṣya :—The Liṅga-Sarīra has been considered in reference to all its details ; now the author similarly considers the Gross Body also.

The (Gross) Body is the transformation of the five Elements combined together. Such is the meaning.—17.

A Different Opinion stated.

चातुर्भौतिकमित्येके ॥ ३ । १८ ॥

चातुर्भौतिकम् chātur-bhautikam, formed of four Elements. इति iti, thus. एके eke, some. For “eke,” Aniruddha reads “anye,” meaning, others.

18. Some say that the Gross Body is formed of four Elements.—229.

Vṛitti :—What is the difference of opinion ? This the author mentions.

By the giving up of Ākāśa, the Body is formed of the other four Elements ;—thus think others.—18.

Bhāṣya :—The author states another opinion.

This view is held, intending to imply that Ākāśa is not an originator (of anything).—18.

Another Opinion stated.

एकभौतिकमित्यपरे ॥ ३ । १६ ॥

एकभौतिकम् *eka-bhautikam*, formed of one Element. इति *iti*, thus. अपरे *aparo*, others.

19. Others say that the Gross Body is formed of one Element.—230.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions another opinion.

Of Earth (alone) is the Body.—19.

Bhāṣya :—The Body is of Earth only, while the other Elements are mere sustainers. Such is the import. (Cf. *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtram*, IV. ii. 2-3, S. B. H. Vol. VI, pages 157-158.)

Or, the meaning of “*eka-bhautikam*” is, formed of one or other of the Elements. By reason of the predominance of the particles of Earth in the Body of Man, etc., and by reason of the predominance of *Tejas*, etc., in the worlds of the Sun, etc., Bodies are said to be of Earth, of *Tejas*, etc., just as it is the case with gold, etc.;—it is this very theory that the author will take up as an established tenet in the fifth book (*vide* V. 102 and 110).—19.

Chaitanya or Consciousness is not a natural product of the Body.

न सांसिद्धिकं चैतन्यं प्रत्येकादृष्टेः ॥ ३ । २० ॥

न *na*, not. सांसिद्धिकं *sāṃsiddhikam*, innate ; natural product ; necessary result of the organisation of the Body. चैतन्यं *chaitanyam*, *Chaitanya* ; Consciousness ; Sentieney ; Intelligence. प्रत्येकादृष्टेः *prati-eka-a-dṛṣṭeḥ*, owing to not being seen in each apart.

20. *Chaitanya* is not a natural product (of the Elements), because it is not seen in each separately.—231.

Vṛitti :—The author repels the Theory of the *Chaitanya* of the Body.

Because, after the Elements have been separated from one another, Consciousness is not found, therefore, Consciousness is not natural to

them. For the same reason also, it need not be apprehended that they will give rise to Consciousness, when combined together (*vide* III. 22 *post*). For, animals, each possessing strength enough to subdue smaller animals, subdue the elephant also, when united together ; but not so the Elements. Hence there is no (natural) Consciousness in the Body.—20.

Bhāṣya :—The author mentions what is proved by the fact of the Body being formed of the Elements.

The Elements having been separated from one another, since Consciousness is not found in them, therefore Consciousness is not natural to the Body formed of the Elements, but is due to Upādhi or external influence. Such is the meaning.—20.

Theory of Consciousness Innate in the Body further refuted.

प्रपञ्चमरणाद्यभावश्च ॥ ३ । २१ ॥

प्रपञ्चमरणाद्यभावः prapañcha-marāṇa-ādi-abhāvaḥ, non-existence or non-occurrence of death, etc., of anything in the world. Aniruddha reads Prapañchatva-ādi-abhāvaḥ, meaning, the absence of the character of being a production. cha, and.

21. (Were Consciousness innate in the Body), there would, further, not be the death, etc., of anything in the world.—232.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions another defect in the theory that Consciousness is innate in the Body.

Were Consciousness a property of the Body, there would be non-existence of the being a prapañcha or an elaboration or phenomenon, that is, of death, because of the eternality of that which is chetana, i.e., has Consciousness as its property.

Now, if it is asserted that even of the conscious Body there would be death, then, we rejoin that the same is Release.—21.

Bhāṣya :—The author mentions another impediment to the theory of Consciousness being innate in the Body.

Were Consciousness to be natural to the Body, then there would not be the death, dreamless sleep, and the like of anything whatever in the whole of creation. Such is the meaning. For, death, dreamless sleep, and the like constitute the non-consciousness of the Body ; and these would not be possible, if Consciousness were natural to it, because the nature of a thing remains as long as the thing endures (*cf.* I. 8).—21.

An objection to III. 20 disposed of.

मदशक्तिवच्चेत् प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टे सांहृत्ये तदुद्भवः ॥ ३ । २२ ॥

मदशक्तिवत् mada-śakti-vat, like the power of something intoxicating. चेत् chet, if it is said. प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टे pratyeka-paridṛṣṭe, being closely seen in each. (क्षिप्त्यात् saukṣmyāt, from subtilty or minuteness.—Aniruddha) सांहृत्ये sāṅgrhatye, on being united together. तदुद्भवः tat-udbhavaḥ, development or manifestation thereof.

22. If it is said that (the production of Consciousness in the elemental Body) is like (that of) the power in an intoxicating mixture ; (we reply that, in the mixture in question), there is the development thereof (*i.e.*, of the power to intoxicate), on the combination (of the several ingredients) in each of which it is seen, by close observation, to exist (in a subtle or minute form).—233.

Vṛitti.—The author points out yet another defect in the above theory.

Just as the power of physical vigour is found in every man in a minute form ; but, on their combination, owing to the development of vast strength, men carry even the hugest block of stone. But neither is, in the Elements severally, subtle Consciousness seen ; whereby, on combination, Consciousness would appear in the Body.

In the aphorism, *viz.*, “Chaitanya is not a natural result of the organisation of the Body” (III. 20), the thing denied has been shown from the negative point of view (*i.e.*, from the side of how it cannot be), and in this aphorism, from the positive point of view *i.e.*, from the side of how it could have been); hence there has been no useless repetition.—22.

Bhāṣya.—Apprehending an objection to what has been stated, *viz.*, “because it is not seen in each separately” (III. 20), the author removes it.

Well, it may be objected, as the power to cause intoxication, although it may not be present in a manifested form in each of the several ingredients, yet is present in the mixture compounded of them ; similarly will it be with Consciousness also. We reply, no. The development thereof, (*i.e.*, of the power to intoxicate), on the combination (of the ingredients), would be possible, were it found to exist, in a subtle form, in each of them. In the case under consideration, on the other hand, the characteristic of being observed in each does not exist. Therefore, in the

illustration, the power to cause intoxication being proved, by the Śâstras and the like, to exist, in a subtle form in each of the ingredients, it follows that, in the state of their combination, there takes place only a manifestation of the power to cause intoxication ; while in the case illustrated, by no kind of evidence whatever has Consciousness been proved to exist in a subtle form in each of the Elements severally. Such is the meaning.

But, by means of the observation of Consciousness in the collected whole (i.e., the Body), should be inferred, may rejoin our objector, the existence of a subtle power of Consciousness in each separate Element. No, we reply ; because, by reason of the redundancy or cumbrousness entailed in the supposition of manifold powers of consciousness existing in the manifold Elements, it is proper, for the sake of simplicity, to make the supposition of one and only one entity having the svarûpa or essential form of eternal Consciousness.

Well, then, may still contend our objector, as the effect such as the (greater) magnitude, usefulness for carrying water in it, etc., although such effect is absent in its constituent parts, is yet seen in the case of the water-pot and the like ; even so will there be Consciousness in the Body. We reply that it cannot be so ; because, since the particular attributes belonging to the Elements, are produced from the attributes of their homogeneous causes, the appearance of Consciousness in the Body is impossible, when there is no Consciousness in those causes (i.e., the Tan-mâtras which are produced from the Insentient Prakṛiti).—22.

Why the Liṅga-Sarîra takes a Gross Body : the cause of Release.

ज्ञानान्मुक्तिः ॥ ३ । २३ ॥

ज्ञानात् jñânât, from knowledge. मुक्तिः muktiḥ, release.

23. Through Knowledge (comes) Release.—234.

Vṛitti :—It has been described above how Dispassion and the like serve, through one another, to be the means of Release. The author (now) mentions the direct means of Release.

This is obvious.—23.

Bhâṣya :—It has been stated that the migration of the Liṅgas is for the sake of Puruṣa (III. 16). In reference to that, the author shows, by (the next) two aphorisms, what objects of Puruṣa are accomplished, by what operations, from the birth of the Liṅgas which, namely, is their going into Gross Bodies.

By means of birth, due to the transmigration of the Liṅga, takes place (or, rather, is made possible) viveka-sâkṣâtkâra or the immediate

cognition of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa ; and thence, the object of Puruṣa in the form of Release.

And Knowledge, etc., have been technically termed as Pratyaya-sarga or emanations of Buddhi in the Kārikā :

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ॥

This is Pratyaya-sarga, called Viparyaya or Fallacy or Mistake or Doubt, A-śakti or Incapacity, Tuṣṭi or Complacency, and Siddhi or Perfection. Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XLVI.

Viparyaya and the rest will be explained hereafter.

And, in this Śāstra (Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sūtram), it is the very same Emanation of Buddhi that is described, along with its purpose, by a number of aphorisms (*vide* below). Such is the distinction. —23.

Cause of Bondage.

बन्धो विपर्ययात् ॥ ३ । २४ ॥

: bandhaḥ, Bondage. विपर्ययात् viparyayāt, from Viparyaya or the reverse of knowledge, that is to say, error or doubt.

24. Bondage is from Mistake. —235.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions what happens in the absence of knowledge.

(" Viparyayāt " means), from ignorance (ajñāna).—24.

Bhāṣya :—Through transmigration of the Liṅga, caused by Mistake, takes place the object of Puruṣa, in the form of Bondage, containing pleasure and pain as its essence. Such is the meaning. —24.

Knowledge is the sole and independent cause of Release.

नियतकारणत्वान्न समुच्चयविकल्पौ ॥ ३ । २५ ॥

नियतकारणत्वात् niyata-kāraṇa-tvāt, from the being the precise or determinate cause. न. na, no. समुच्चयविकल्पौ samuchchaya-vikalpau, co-operation and alternation.

25. Since (Knowledge) is the precise cause, there is no contributiveness, nor alternativeness. —236.

Vṛitti :—Release does not, it might be thought, come from knowledge alone, because Karma also is a means of Release ; as, for instance, the Śruti says :

तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारमेते पूर्वप्रज्ञा च ॥

In pursuit of it (Release), Vidyā, Knowledge, and Karma, Action, are undertaken. Previous Knowledge also (is a means of attaining it). —Bṛihat-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣat, IV. iv. 2.

In regard to this the author says :

The cause is the determinate only : viz, from Knowledge, Release : from Action, Experience. Where, too, contribution of unselfish (akâma) karma is heard, there, too, it is for the sake of knowledge (and not of Release immediately); hence there is no co-operation (really). Neither is there such alternation as that Release takes place sometimes from knowledge and sometimes from action. The Śruti also says the same thing. Thus,

**वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् ।
तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥**

I know Him, the Great Puruṣa, of the colour of the Sun, (standing) beyond Tamas or Darkness. By knowing Him alone, one passes over Death. No other path there exists for going.—Śvetâśvatara-Upaniṣat, III. 8.—25.

Bhâṣya :—Release and Bondage have been stated to be caused by Knowledge and Action. Among them, the author first discusses the subject of Release from Knowledge.

Although we hear

**यिद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोमयं सहं ।
(अविद्याया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्यायाऽमृतमश्नुते ॥)**

Knowledge and Action,—who knows both of them together, (he, passing Death by the help of Action, enjoys immortality by the help of Knowledge).—Īśa-Upaniṣat, XI.

yet, since Knowledge is established in the world as being the determinate and sufficient cause for the termination of non-discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, there is neither co-operation nor alternation, with Knowledge, of Action, called (in the above Śruti) A-vidyâ, towards the production of Release. Such is the meaning.

It follows also from the Śrutis such as :

तमेव विदित्वातिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥

By knowing Him alone, one passes over Death ; no other path there exists for going.—Śvetâśvatara-Upaniṣat, III. 8.

न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेऽमृतत्वमानशुः ।

Neither by Action, nor by progeny, nor by wealth, (but) by renunciation, some attained immortality.—Mahânārāyaṇa Upaniṣat, X. 5.

that Karma or Action is not the direct cause of Release.

The performance of Action, in co-operation with Knowledge, has been admitted into the Śrutis under the relation of principal (Knowledge) and subsidiary (Action), and the like.*—25.

* Dr. Garbe's reading of this sentence is somewhat different. It is as follows : Samuchchaya-anuṣṭhâna-śrutis tu aṅga-aṅgi-bhâva-âdi-bhir api upapadyate ; meaning, the Śruti on the institution (of Knowledge and Action) in co-operation, is, on the other hand,

An Illustration of the above.

स्वप्नजागराभ्यामिव मायिकामायिकाभ्यां नोभयोर्मुक्तिः

पुरुषस्य ॥ ३ । २६ ॥

स्वप्नजागराभ्यां svapna-jāgara-ābhyām, by sleep and the waking state. इव iva, like. मायिकामायिकाभ्यां māyika-a-māyika-ābhyām, by illusory and not-illusory. न na, not. उभयोः ubhayoh, from both, knowledge and action. मुक्तिः muktih, release. पुरुषस्य puruṣasya, of Puruṣa.

26. Just as (the same object is not fulfilled) through sleep and the waking state, (whether in co-operation or in alternation), (which are respectively) illusory and not-illusory, similarly the Release of Puruṣa (does) not (come) from both (Knowledge and Action).—237.

Vṛitti:—The author points out one more defect in the above theory.

Dream is illusory; the waking state is not-illusory. Action is comparable to dream; Knowledge is comparable to the waking state. Now, co-operation is of things belonging to the same time. But dream and the waking state cannot be referred to the same time. Hence there is no co-operation of Knowledge and Action.—26.

Bhāṣya:—On the absence of their co-operation or alternation, the author states an illustration : सत्यमेव जयते

Just as the accomplishment of one and the same end of Puruṣa cannot be possible by means of the mutually contributive operation of what are designated by the terms, dream, and, the waking state, respectively illusory and not-illusory; in like manner also Release of Puruṣa cannot properly come from the joint performance of both Action and Knowledge which are respectively illusory and not-illusory. Such is the meaning.

explained also by their being related as, for instance, principal and subsidiary. But the reading of Mr. F. E. Hall, which we have adopted, seems to be preferable. For, in the first place, the word "also" in Dr. Garbe's reading is obviously out of place, having no reference anywhere else in the other portion of the Bhāṣya. Secondly, the reading of Mr. F. E. Hall makes out a case of abhyupagama-vāda, i.e., of admission of, or concession to, a popular belief; which seems to be the natural view of the case in question, by making the sense to be that the Śruti on the institution (of Knowledge and Action) in co-operation is a concession to the popular belief that Action which, in fact, becomes a means of Release mediately through the production of Knowledge by means of purification of the Chitta or the thinking principle, is itself a direct means of Release,—a belief which is due to the failure of the common people to catch the nice distinction of mediateness and immediateness.

And illusoriness consists in being unreal, that is to say, unstable; and this characteristic exists in an object seen in a dream. What is designated as the waking state is, by comparison with dream, certainly real; the unreality that is sometimes predicated of it, consists in its unstableness only by comparison with the immutable Puruṣa; and it is that which is the doer of such acts as bathing, etc., whereby it is distinguished from dream. In like manner, Action also, not being durable, and also being the product of Prakṛiti, is illusory. The Self, on the other hand, being stable, and not being a product, is not-illusory. Hence it is unreasonable that they, i.e., Action and Knowledge, being undertaken, would yield similar fruits; hence dissimilar effect alone is consistent.—26.

An objection considered: Our Conception of the Object of Worship is faulty.

इतरस्यापि नात्यन्तिकम् ॥ ३ । २७ ॥

इतरस्य itarasya, of the other; of dream (Aniruddha); of the other Self which is the object of Worship (Vijñāna). अपि api, also. न na, not. आत्यन्तिकम् ātyantikam, absolute.

27. Of the other also, (the not-illusoriness is) not absolute.—238.

Vṛitti :—It might be said that, both being alike intuitions, like the intuition of dream, the intuition of the waking state also may be unreal. In regard to this the author says :

Even the intuition of dream is not absolutely unreal, like a flower in the air. Neither is there unreality in one's own Self also; otherwise, "This is a dream,"—this itself would not be possible. Neither can there be dream of an object absolutely unseen, but, on the contrary, of an object seen in the waking state.—27.

Bhāṣya :—Well, even if this be so, it may be urged, there may still be association and alternativeness of the Knowledge of the Tattvas or Principles discriminatively, with the knowledge called the Worship of the Self, since there can be no illusoriness in the Object of Worship. In reference to this, the author says :

"Itarasya api," of the Object of Worship; "na ātyantikam," (not absolute) not illusoriness, because superimposed ideas also enter into (our conception of) the Self which is the Object of Worship. Such is the meaning.—27.

Wherein the Conception of the Object of Worship is faulty.

संकल्पितेऽप्येवम् ॥ ३ । २८ ॥

संकल्पिते-saṃkalpīte, in the part conceived or imagined by Manas (Vijñāna); in the case of objects which are the mental creations of the Yogins (Aniruddha). अपि api, also. एवम् evam, the same.

28. Similarly, moreover, what is conceived by Manas is (not absolutely unreal,—Aniruddha; not absolutely real,—Vijñāna).—239.

Vṛitti :—(It has been stated that “neither can there be dream of an object absolutely unseen.” If this be so, then, one may say), since there are no visible causes at work here, there would be no^{*} production of objects, in the case of the Yogins, by the force of the mere mental conception of those objects, (which, however, is contrary to fact). To this the author replies :

Production through the mental conception of men like ourselves and others, does not take place. But that is no reason why it should not take place in the case of the Siddhas or Perfected Ones also, who are endowed with the power born of Yoga. Hence, (their mental creations are) not unreal.—28.

Bhāṣya :—The author states in which part of the act of Worship, the unreality lies.

“(Manas) saṃkalpīte,” in the part containing the object to be meditated upon, “evam api,” there is unreality also. Such is the meaning.

* We have adopted the reading of Pandita Kālivara Vedānta-vāgīśa. Dr. Garbe's reading is “sarva-asiddhiḥ,” meaning, non-production of all things, instead of “sarva-siddhiḥ,” meaning, production of all things. Now, the matter stands thus : The doubt set at rest in the previous aphorism (III. 27), was whether, like the intuition of dream, the intuition of the waking state also was not unreal. It was there pointed out that the objects seen in a dream were not absolutely unreal, inasmuch as they had their prototypes in the objects seen in the waking state. The doubt that is, therefore, next raised in the present aphorism, is as to whether, “driṣṭa-kāraṇa-abhavāt,” on account of the non-existence (in mental creation) of causes seen in the waking state, “saṃkalpa-mātrēna,” by the mere mental conception, “Yoginām,” of the Yogins, (there does) “na,” not, (take place), “sarva-siddhiḥ,” the production of all things. “Atra,” in regard to this pūrva-pakṣa, “āha,” (the author) says (as in the aphorism, III. 28). It would clearly appear from this that the reading, non-production of all things, for the reading, production of all things, is altogether beside the mark, unless, of course, the sentence is read with a tone of interrogativeness, in which case the two negatives, not, and non-production, would imply the affirmative required by the context.

For, in the Object of Worship as declared, for instance, by such Śrutis as :

सर्वं सत्त्विदं ब्रह्म

All this verily is Brahman.—Chhândogya-Upaniṣat, III. XIV. 1.

unreality certainly belongs to the part consisting of the "All," i.e., the web of the world.—28.

Fruit of Worship.

भावनोपचयाच्छुद्धस्य सर्वं प्रकृतिवत् ॥ ३ । २६ ॥

भावनोपचयात् bhâvana-upachayât, through the accumulation or accession of meditation or thought. शुद्धस्य śuddhasya, of the pure or sinless. सर्वं sarvaṃ, accomplishment of all things. प्रकृतिवत् Prakṛiti-vat, as in the case of prakṛiti.

29. Through accession of meditation, all (power) comes to the pure, as in the case of Prakṛiti.—240.

Vṛitti :—The author continues the same subject.

As Mahat and the rest are, in the production of their effects, dependent upon those that precede them ; while, in the case of Prakṛiti, there is, in the production of the effects, dependence upon nothing else whatever ; so, even though there is no cause previously known, yet, for the Yogins, through accession of meditation, all is achieved.—29.

Bhâṣya :—What, then, is the fruit of Worship ? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says :

"Śuddhasya," of Puruṣa rendered sinless by the performance of Worship called Bhâvanâ or spiritual re-formation, just as of Prakṛiti, there is all power. Such is the meaning. Just as Prakṛiti causes creation, preservation, and destruction ; so does the Sattva of the Buddhi of the Worshipper also cause creation and the like.—29.

The Means of Knowledge. (1) Dhyâna or Meditation.

रागोपहृतिर्ध्यानम् ॥ ३ । ३० ॥

रागोपहृतिः rāga-upahatih, removal of (adventitious) "redness" (Vijñāna), cessation of the action of Rajas. ध्यानं dhyānam, meditation ; dhyâna.

30. Cessation of Râga, is Dhyâna.—241.

Vṛitti :—The author says that Dhyâna is for the sake of Bhâvanâ or spiritual re-formation.

"Râgât," that is, from the Guṇa called Rajas, comes restlessness ; the cessation thereof, that is, steadiness, is Dhyâna.—30.

Bhāṣya :—It is settled that Knowledge alone is the means for the accomplishment of Release. Now the author mentions the means towards the accomplishment of Knowledge.

Dhyāna is the cause of the removal of that taint of the Chitta caused by the external objects, which is an obstruction to Knowledge. Such is the meaning. The mention of the effect (cessation of taint) and of the cause thereof (Dhyāna), by way of identity, has been made by a process of transference, because it is impossible that the cessation of taint should itself be Dhyāna.

Here, by the word Dhyāna, should be comprehended all the three, (means) mentioned in the Yoga-Śāstra, viz., Dhāranā, Concentration, Dhyāna, Meditation, and Samādhi, Contemplation, because we hear in the Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali that every one of the eight Aṅgas or limbs of Yoga is a cause of the immediate intuition of Viveka or Discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa. And, of these (three), the subsidiary differences should be looked for in that work also. (*Vide* S. B. H. Vol. IV.) The remaining five Aṅgas or limbs, the author will himself explain.—30.

How consummation of Dhyāna is reached.

वृत्तिनिरोधात् तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३१ ॥

vṛttinirodhāt tat-siddhiḥ, through inhibition of modifications. *तत्सिद्धिः* tat-siddhiḥ, the production or perfection thereof.

31. Through inhibition of modification, is the production or perfection thereof.—242.

Vṛtti :—How does the production of Dhyāna take place? To this the author replies :

The modifications are the five, viz., Pramāṇa, and the rest. (*Vide* II. 33 and Yoga-Sūtram, I. 6). Through the restraint of these, is “*tat-siddhiḥ*,” that is, the accomplishment of Dhyāna.—31.

Bhāṣya :—Only by means of the perfection of Dhyāna, can there be the production of Knowledge, and not by means of its mere commencement. Intending to show this, the author mentions the distinguishing mark of the perfection of Dhyāna.

By means of the Cognitive (Samprajñāta*) Yoga, in the form of the

* Samprajñāta Yoga : The two primary divisions of Yoga have been distinguished by Vyāsa in his Commentary on Yoga-Sūtram, I. 1, as follows :

योगः समाधिः । स च सार्वभौमश्चित्तस्य धर्मे । क्षिप्तं मूढं विक्षिप्तमेकाग्रं निरुद्ध-
मिति चित्तभूमयः । तत्र विक्षिप्ते चेतसि विक्षोपोपसर्जनीभूतः समाधिर्न योगपक्षे वर्तते ।

inhibition of modifications other than the object of meditation, (takes place) "tat-siddhiḥ," that is, the consummation of Dhyāna in the form of conferment of the fruit called Knowledge. Such is the meaning. Hence what the author wishes to teach is that the course of Dhyāna should be followed only up to that point.

It is only when there is restraint of the other modifications, that, on account of the passing away of the obstruction, called the movement of the mind into other objects, there takes place the immediate intuition of the object of meditation. And as it effects this, Yoga also should be understood to be a cause of Knowledge, just like Dhyāna and the other Aṅgas or limbs of Yoga; because we know that this is so from texts of the Śruti and Smṛiti such as :

अभ्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं मत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति ॥

Having known the Deva by the acquirement of Yoga relating to the Embodied Self, the wise abandon joy and grief.—Kāṭha-Upaniṣat, 11. 12.—81.

Practices conducive to Dhyāna.

धारणासनस्वकर्मणा तत्सिद्धिः ॥ ३ । ३२ ॥

धारणासनस्वकर्मणा dhāraṇā-āsana-svakarmaṇā, by means of Dhāraṇā, retention, Āsana, posture, and Sva-karma, one's own Karma or duty. तत्सिद्धिः tat-siddhiḥ, the accomplishment thereof, i.e., of Dhyāna.

32. By means of Dhāraṇā, Āsana, and Sva-karma, is the accomplishment of Dhyāna.—243.

यस्यैकाम्रे चेतसि सद्भूतमर्थं प्रद्योतयति क्षिणोति च क्लेशान्कर्मबन्धनानि रुधयति निरोधमभिमुखं करोति स संप्रज्ञातो योग इत्याख्यायते । स च वितर्कानुगतौ विचारानुगत आनन्दानुगतौऽस्मितानुगत इत्युपरिष्ठाञ्जिवेदयिष्यामः । सर्ववृत्तिनिरोधे त्वसंप्रज्ञातः समाधिः ॥

Yoga is Samādhi or Contemplation. And it is a dharma or property of the Chitta or the thinking principle, penetrating all its planes. The planes of the Chitta are : the Kṣipta or unsteady, the Mūḍha or dull, the Vikṣipta or steady-and-unsteady, the Ekāgra or one-pointed, and the Niruddha or restrained. Among these, in the steady-and-unsteady Chitta, the Samādhi or occasional contemplative mood, which but serves to support the character of steadiness-in-unsteadiness, does not lie within the category of Yoga. What, on the other hand, in the one-pointed Chitta, directly illuminates the whole essence of the object as existing by itself, takes away the power of the Afflictions, loosens the bonds of Karma, and brings Restraint within the aim,—that is called Samprajñāta Yoga or cognitive contemplation. And this, we will afterwards submit, follows Vitarka or doubt, Vichāra or deliberation, Ānanda or bliss, and Asmitā or egoity (lit. I-am-ness). But when there takes place the restraint or suppression of all the modifications (of the Chitta), the Samādhi is (called) A-samprajñāta or non-(i.e., ultra)-cognitive.

Vṛitti:—How is the restraint thereof (i.e., of the modifications) effected? To this the author replies :

Dhāraṇā is the holding the Chitta in a particular part such as the navel. Āsana, that is, Posture, is such as the Svastika,* etc. (*Vide* S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 170). Hereby Yama, Restraint; Niyama, Observances; Prāṇa-āyāma, Prolongation of Breath; and Pratyāhara, Abstraction are implied. Sva-karma is the performance of acts prescribed for one's own caste. From these, results the accomplishment of the restraint of the modifications.—32.

Bhāṣya :—The author mentions the various means of Dhyāna also.

Dhyāna is effected by means of the triad beginning with Dhāraṇā, which will be presently described. Such is the meaning.—32.

Dhāraṇā described.

निरोधश्चर्दिविधारणाभ्याम् ॥ ३ । ३३ ॥

निरपेक्षः nirodhaḥ, restraint of Prāṇa, Prāṇa-āyāma (Vijñāna); restraint of modifications (Aniruddha). चर्दिविधारणाभ्याम् chhardi-vidhāraṇa-ābhyām, by means of expiration and retention of breath.

33. Restraint (of Prāṇa), by means of expiration and retention of breath, (is Dhāraṇā).—Vijñāna.

Restraint (of the modifications is effected also) by means of expiration and retention of breath.—Aniruddha.—244.

Vṛitti :—The author mentions another means of restraint.

"Chhardi" means expiration, the breathing out. "Vidhāraṇa" means the retention of breath. The term "Chhardi-vidhāraṇa-ābhyām" is illustrative. Pūraka or inhalation or the breathing in, should also be understood.—33.

Note :—In Dr. Garbe's edition, Aniruddha transposes this and the next aphorism.

Bhāṣya :—By means of a triad of aphorisms, the author characterises, in order, the triad beginning with Dhāraṇā.

"Of Prāṇa," this is obtained by means of its notoriety in this context, because it is Prāṇa-āyāma that has been explained by the Commentator in the Yoga aphorism, viz.,

प्रच्छर्दनविधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य ॥

* "The Svastika is that in which the left foot is placed, a little downward inclined, between the right thigh and shank, and the right foot is placed, in a similar position, between the left thigh and shank."

Or, by means of expiration and retention of Prāṇa (breath). (steadiness of the mind is to be effected).—Yoga-Sūtram, I. 34, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 60.

"Chhardhi," again, is throwing out, that is to say, the expulsion of the retained (air). Hereby both inspiration and expiration are obtained. And "vidhāraṇā" is retention of breath. So that, the meaning is that what is the "Nirodhaḥ," that is, the bringing under control or regulation, of Prāṇa or the life-breath, by means of inspiration, expiration, and retention,—the same is what is called Dhāraṇā.

(But, it may be asked, if the aphorism was intended to be a characterisation of Dhāraṇā, why has not the word Dhāraṇā been specifically mentioned in it? And, further, when there is no such mention, why should it be taken to refer to Dhāraṇā only and not, at the same time, to Āsana and Sva-karma also? In order to remove any such curiosity, the Commentator proceeds.)

Āsana and Sva-karma will afterwards be the subject of characterisation, being referred to by their own words; hence, Dhāraṇā alone is left; because, from this very reason, Dhāraṇā is gathered as being the subject of characterisation in the present aphorism, the term Dhāraṇā has not been incorporated in it.

The Dhāraṇā of the Chitta, that is, the holding the mind in a particular locality, has, on the other hand, already been stated to be comprehended, like Samādhi or Contemplation, by the very word Dhyāna (in III. 30 q. v.)—33.

N.B.—In this aphorism, Vijnāna takes "Dhāraṇā" to be another word for "Prāṇa-āyāma."

Āsana described.

स्थिरसुखमासनम् ॥ ३ । ३४ ॥

स्थिरसुखम् sthira-sukham, steady and easeful. आसनम् āsanam, posture.

34. What is steady and easeful,—that is Āsana.—245.

Vṛitti:—Among diverse Āsanās, the author states the Āsana approved by himself.

Whereby steadiness as well as ease will be obtained, that Āsana should be undertaken.—34.

Bhāṣya:—The author characterises Āsana which comes next in order. Which, being steady, at the same time, is a promoter of ease, such as, e.g., the Śvastika, etc., that is Āsana. Such is the meaning.—34.

Note:—Compare Yoga-Sūtram, II. 46, S. B. H. Vol. IV, p. 189 and also Śīva Saṃhitā, III. 84-97, S. B. H. Vol. XV, part I, pages 37-40.

Svakarma described.

स्वकर्म स्वाश्रमविहितकर्मानुष्ठानम् ॥ ३ । ३५ ॥

स्वकर्मे *sva-karma*, one's own duty. स्वाश्रमविहितकर्मानुष्ठानम् *sva-āśrama-vihita-karma-anuṣṭhānam*, performance of acts prescribed for one's own *Āśrama* or stage of life.

35. *Sva-karma* is the performance of acts prescribed for one's own Stage of Life.—246.

Vṛitti:—What that *Sva-karma* is? To this the author replies.

This is clear.—35.

Bhāṣya:—The author characterises *Sva-karma*.

This is easy.

Here, by the word *Karma*, there is apprehension of *Yama*, Restraints, and *Niyama*, Observances. *Pratyāhāra*, Abstraction, in the form of having the *Indriyas* under subjugation, since it is commonly prescribed for all the Stages of Life, should also be included within *Karma*. So that we obtain here (in the *Sāṃkhya-Sāstra*) also the eight *Āṅgas* or limbs of *Yoga* mentioned in the aphorism of *Patañjali* as being the means of accomplishing Knowledge. That aphorism, namely, is :

यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि ॥

Yama, Rostraint ; *Niyama*, Observance ; *Āsana*, Posture ; *Prāṇāyāma*, Regulation of Breath ; *Pratyāhāra*, Abstraction ; *Dhāraṇā*, Concentration ; *Dhyāna*, Meditation ; and *Samādhi*, Contemplation ; are the eight *Āṅgas*.—II, 29, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 154.

And the *svarūpa* or essential form of these should be looked for in that *Sāstra* itself.—35.

Other Means of Dhyāna.

वैराग्यादभ्यासाच्च ॥ ३ । ३६ ॥

वैराग्यात् *vairāgyāt*, from Dispassion. अभ्यासात् *abhyāsāt*, from constant practice or habituation. च *cha*, and.

36. And also through Dispassion and constant practice (is *Dhyāna* produced).—247.

Vṛitti:—The author states other means of the inhibition of modifications.

“*Vairāgyāt* ;” i.e., from the two kinds of Dispassion ; namely, from the lower, that is, from the sense (of satisfaction) that “this is enough,” and from the higher, that is, from the mere clearness of Knowledge.

“AbhyAsāt,” that is, from meditation over and over again. The word “cha” is in the sense of collection or co-operation (of the two means).—36.

Bhāṣya:—For the principal Adhikārins or Initiates, there is no need of, or dependence upon, the external Aṅgas, viz., the pentad of Yama and the rest. In their case, Knowledge as well as Yoga are accomplished from Samyama alone, i.e. from complete self-control in the form of the triad merely of Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna, and Samādhi. This is the conclusion established in the System of Patañjali. In the case of Jaḍa Bharata, and others, such is also seen to have been the case. Hence, in accordance to those facts, the Āchārya (Kapila) also says :

Through the mere practice alone in the form of meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge and its means Yoga also take place in the case of the best Adhikārins. Such is the meaning. So has it been said in the Garuḍa-Purāṇa also :

आसनस्थानविधयो न योगस्य प्रसाधकाः ।

विलम्बजननाः सर्वे विस्ताराः परिकीर्तिताः ॥

शिशुपालः सिद्धिमाप स्मरणाभ्यासगौरवात् ।

The rules about posture and place are not the instruments of Yoga. All these details have been said to be causes of delay. Śiśupāla attained success or perfection through the accession of the constant practice of Smaraṇa or remembrance (of the Lord).

Or, here Dispassion and the practice of Dhyāna have been stated as being the causes of Dhyāna itself, and the word, cha, has been used for the purpose of adding Dhāraṇā to them.

Thus, then, is explained that Release comes through Knowledge.—36.

Nature of Viparyaya described.

विपर्ययभेदाः पञ्च ॥ ३ । ३७ ॥

विपर्ययभेदाः viparyaya-bhedāḥ, the divisions of Viparyaya or Mistake. पञ्च pañcha, five.

37. The divisions of Mistake are five.—248.

Vṛitti:—The author states the subsidiary differences of the modifications.

“A-vidyā,” Unreal Cognition ; “Asmitā” (Egoity), Self-Conceit (abhimāna); “Rāga,” Desire ; “Dveṣa,” Anger ; “Abhiniveśa,” Fear ; —these are the cognitions called Viparyaya or Mistake ; and so, by them, have been indicated the cognitions of which they are the objects.—37.

Bhāṣya :—After this, will be explained Viparyaya stated to be the cause of Bondage by the aphorism, “Bondage is from Mistake” (III. 24). At the opening of this discussion, the author mentions the svarūpa or essential nature of Viparyaya.

A-vidyā, Asmitā, Rāga, Dveṣa, and Abhiniveśa,—these five, mentioned in the Yoga, (*vide* Yoga-Sūtram, II. 3, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 91 q. v.), are the subsidiary divisions of Viparyaya or Mistake, which is the cause of Bondage. Such is the meaning. There is no harm even in the non-inclusion hereby of the mistakes in the form of the cognition of silverness in respect of a mother-of-pearl shell, and the like.

Amongst the above, A-vidyā, Unreal Cognition, consists, as has been declared in the Yoga (*vide* Yoga-Sūtram, II. 5, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 95), in the manifestation or illumination of the non-eternal, the impure, the painful, and the Not-Self, as the eternal, the pure, the pleasurable, and the Self. Similarly, Asmitā also is the intuition of the identity of the Self and the Not-Self; that is, it is of this form, namely, that there is no Self other than the Body, etc. A-vidyā, on the other hand, is not of this form; because, even when the Self is of both the forms of the Body and the not-Body, the idea of the “I” in respect of the Body can be accounted for. Rāga and Dveṣa, again, are too well-known. And Abhiniveśa is the fear of death and the like. Rāga and the rest, being the effects of Mistake, are called Mistakes. —37.

The cause of Mistake is Incapacity.

अशक्तिरष्टाविंशतिधा तु ॥ ३ । ३८ ॥

अशक्तिः aśaktiḥ, incapacity. अष्टाविंशतिधा aṣṭāvimśati-dhā, of twenty-eight kinds. तु tu, as is well-known.

38. Incapacity, as is well-known, is of twenty-eight kinds.—249.

Vṛitti :—The author states Incapacity.—38.

Bhāṣya :—Having stated the essential nature of Mistake, the author states the essential nature of Incapacity also which is the cause of it.

This is easy.

This too has been explained by the Kārikā :

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरहिष्टा ।

सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात् तुष्टिसिद्धौनाम् ॥

Injuries of the eleven Indriyas, together with injuries of Buddhi, are pronounced to be Incapacity. The injuries of Buddhi are seventeen, through inversion of Complacencies and Perfections.—Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, XI.IX.

The eleven Incapacities of the eleven Indriyas are :

वाधिर्यं कुष्ठितान्धत्वं जडताजिघ्रता तथा ।

मूकता कौण्यपङ्गुत्वे क्लेश्योदावर्तमुग्धताः ॥

Deafness, Leprosy, Blindness, Paralysis of the Tongue, Loss of Smell, and Dumbness, Contraction of the Hand, Lameness, Impotence, Constipation and Dulness.

And of Buddhi itself there are seventeen Incapacities. For example, as there are nine (Incapacities of Buddhi itself in the form of the) counteractives of the nine Complacencies presently to be mentioned, so there are eight (other Incapacities of Buddhi itself in the form of the) counteractives of the eight Perfections presently to be mentioned. And, by combining, these, coming from within itself and from others, form the twenty-eight Incapacities of Buddhi. Such is the meaning.

The word "Tu" has been used to declare their special notoriety.—38.

Note.— "Tu" is not read by Aniruddha. Vedāntin Mahādeva reads it.

Complacency is ninefold.

तुष्टिर्नवधा ॥ ३ । ३६ ॥

तुष्टिः tuṣṭih, Complacency. **नवधा** nava-dhā, of nine kinds.

39. Complacency is of nine kinds.—250.

Vṛtti :—The author mentions Tuṣṭi or Complacency.—39.

Bhāṣya :—By a couple of aphorisms, the author mentions those two, Complacency and Perfection, on the prevention or impairment of which arise the two kinds of Incapacities of Buddhi.

The author will himself explain their ninefoldness (*vide* III. 43).—39.

Perfection is eightfold

सिद्धिरष्टधा ॥ ३ । ४० ॥

सिद्धिः siddhiḥ, perfection **अष्टधा** aṣṭa-dhā, of eight kinds.

40. Perfection is of eight kinds.—251.

Vṛtti :—The author mentions Siddhi or Perfection.—40.

Bhāṣya :—This too the author will himself explain (*vide* III. 44).—40.

Further sub-division of Mistake.

अवान्तरभेदाः पूर्ववत् ॥ ३ । ४१ ॥

अवान्तरभेदाः avāntara-bhedāḥ, minor differences. **पूर्ववत्** pūrva-vat, as of old.

41. The minor divisions of Mistake are as of old.—252.

Vṛtti :—The author mentions the differences of Mistake, among the our (*viz.*, Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection).

“Pûrva-vat:” mentioned by the ancient teachers; that is, the divisions of Mistake are sixty-two in number.

A-Vidyâ, viz., the idea of the Self in respect of Prakṛiti, Mahat, Ahaṁkāra, and the five Kaṇ-mâtras, which is technically called Tamas,—is, since its objects are eight, of eight kinds.

The Devas, verily, look, through self-conceit, upon Animâ or Attenuation and the rest (of the eight kinds of lordliness, viz., Laghimâ or Lightness; Mahimâ or Magnification; Garimâ or Heaviness; Prâpti or Attainment of all objects; Prâkâmya or Unrestrained Desire; Îśitva or Supremacy; and Vasitva or Commanding Position), as their permanent belongings; this is Asmitâ; and it, which is technically called Moha, is, since its objects are eight, of eight kinds.

In respect of the five Kaṇ-mâtras, viz., Sound and the rest, divided or characterised as heavenly and not-heavenly, Râga or Desire, which is technically called Mahâmoha, is, since its objects are ten, of ten kinds.

The ten, viz., Sound and the rest, are accompanied by the superimposition of the eight “powers,” viz., Animâ and the rest, and these are met in opposition by another; wherefrom arises Dveṣa, technically called Tâmisra, which is, since its objects are eighteen, of eighteen kinds.

The Devas, verily, while enjoying them (viz., the ten of Sound, etc., and the eight “powers”), are met in opposition by the Asuras; wherefrom arises Abhiniveśa or fear, technically called Andha-Tâmisra, which is since its objects are eighteen, of eighteen kinds.

Thus there are sixty-two (minor varieties of the five kinds of Mistake mentioned before).—41.

Vedāntin Mahâdeva :—(Dveṣa :) The ten beginning with Sound, and the eight beginning with Animâ,—these, by coming into collision with one another, become irritable; they, then, come to be the objects of Dveṣa or Aversion, technically called Tâmisra, which is, since its objects are eighteen, of eighteen kinds.

Bhâṣya :—Since there is room for an enquiry into the particulars or distinctions of Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection, mentioned above, there proceed, in order, a quaternion of aphorisms.

The subsidiary divisions of Mistake which generally has been stated (III. 37) to be five, should be taken distinctively to be “pûrva-vat,” that is, the same as have been stated by the ancient teachers; for fear of prolixity, they are not mentioned (in the aphorism). Such is the meaning.

And the same, A-vidyâ and the rest, have been explained by me also

in a general way, as being only five. But, in respect of their peculiarities, they are of sixty-two varieties. So has it been stated in the Kārikā :

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च दशविधो महामोहः ॥

तामिन्नोऽष्टादशधा तथा भवत्यन्धतामिन्नः ॥

The distinctions of Tamas (A-vidyā) are eightfold, as also of Moha (Asmitā) : Mahāmoha (Rāga) is tenfold ; Tāmīśra (Dveṣa) is eighteenfold, so also is Andha-Tāmīśra, (Abhiniveśa).—Sāmkhya-Kārikā, XLVIII.

Of this, the meaning is as follows :

In respect of the eight Prakritis, viz., the Avyakta (Unmanifested), Mahat, Ahaṁkāra, and the five Tan-mātrās, that is, in respect of the not-Self, the idea of the Self, that is, A-vidyā, technically called Tamas, is eightfold. By reason of the non-difference of the effect and the cause, there is inclusion herein also of the idea of the Self in respect of the mere Vikritis or Transformations.

Similarly, as there is eightfoldness of A-vidyā according to the distinction of its objects, so there is eightfoldness of Asmitā, technically called Moha, which has the same number of objects.

Because sensible objects, viz., Sound and the rest, are, being divided as heavenly and not-heavenly, ten in number, Rāga, technically called Mahā-moha, of which they are the objects, is tenfold.

What are the eight objects of A-vidyā and Asmitā, and what are the ten objects of Rāga, in respect of the eighteen counter-actives of these arises eighteenfold Dveṣa, technically called Tāmīśra.

Similarly, from seeing the destruction, etc., of the above eighteen, arises eighteenfold Abhiniveśa, fear, technically called Andha-Tāmīśra.

Of these, again, the designations, Tamas and the rest, are because they are the causes of Tamas and the rest.—41.

Further sub-division of Incapacity.

एवमितरस्याः ॥ ३ । ४२ ।

एवम् *evam*, similarly. इतरस्याः *itarasyāḥ*, of the other, i.e., Incapacity.

42. Similarly, (there are further sub-divisions) of the other.—253.

Vṛitti :— The author states the distinctions of Incapacity.

“ Itarasyāḥ ” that is, of Incapacity, there is similar manifoldness, i.e., twenty-eight-foldness.

Thus, there are injuries of the eleven Indriyas ; viz.,

बाधिर्यं कुष्ठितान्धत्वं जडताजिघ्रता तथा ।

मूकताकौण्ड्यपङ्क्तुत्वक्कैव्योदावर्तमुग्धताः ॥

Deafness, Leprosy, Blindness, Rigidity of the Tongue, Loss of Smell, and Dumbness, Contraction of the Hand, Lameness, Impotence, Constipation and Dulness.

Having these as objects, there are eleven (Incapacities) of Buddhi.

Complacencies are nine, and Perfections, eight ; by the inversion thereof there are seventeen (other Incapacities) of Buddhi.

Thus there are twenty-eight (Incapacities of Buddhi).—42.

Bhāṣya :—“Evam ” that is, just according to the statement of the ancient teachers, of Incapacity also, the minor divisions should be understood distinctively to be twenty-eight in number. Such is the meaning.

“Incapacity, as is well-known, is of twenty-eight kinds ” (III. 38)—in this very aphorism has been explained by me the twenty-eight-foldness of Incapacity.—42.

Divisions of Complacency explained.

आध्यात्मिकादिभेदान्नवधा तुष्टिः ॥ ३ । ४३ ॥

आध्यात्मिकादिभेदात् âdhyâtmika-âdi-bhedât, through the distinction of the âdhyâtmika or internal and the like. नवधा nava-dhâ, ninefold. तुष्टिः tuṣṭiḥ, complacency.

43. Through the distinction of the internal and the like, Complacency is ninefold.—254.

Vṛtti :—The author states the distinctions of Complacency.

Those that are active under the idea of the Self in respect of the Not-Self, are “âdhyâtmika;” there are four of them. From the word, âdi, come the external five.

If Release comes through the seeing the discrimination of Prakṛiti (from Puruṣa), then, she alone is to be worshipped ; what is the need of the Self?—this is one kind of Complacency, deriving its name (Complacency) from its reference to Prakṛiti ; it is called Ambhas.

Even through the Knowledge of the Discrimination, Release cannot come directly, because it has never been seen to be the case, but it will come through the observance of a vow ;—such is the second kind of Complacency, deriving its name from its reference to the Upâdâna or the means and materials employed ; it is called Salila.

Even through a vow, Release cannot come directly, but it comes through time ;—such is the third kind of Complacency, deriving its name from its reference to time ; it is called Ogha.

Even through the influence of time, Release cannot come in all cases but it does, through luck alone ;—such is the Complacency, deriving its name from its reference to luck ; it is called *Vṛiṣṭi*.

These Complacencies are “*âdhyâtmika*,” that is, with reference to the Self.

The (other) five, because they arise from, or relate to, abstinence from external objects, are called external.

In abstinence, in view of the pain or trouble of acquiring objects, there is one kind of Complacency, which is called *Pâra*.

In abstinence, in view of the pain or trouble of preserving objects of enjoyment, there is a second kind of Complacency, which is called *Supâra*.

In abstinence, in view of the pain arising from the thought of waste, there is a third kind of Complacency, which is called *Pâra-pâra*.

In abstinence, in view of the pain arising from the thought of the defects in enjoyment, there is a fourth kind of Complacency, which is called *An-uttama-ambhas*.

In abstinence, in view of the pain arising from the thought that the enjoyment cannot be complete without killing animals, there is a fifth Complacency, which is called *Uttama-ambhas*.

Thus is Complacency ninefold. —43.

Vedântin Mahâdeva :—Complacencies are two fold : *âdhyâtmika* and *bâhya*. Among them, the *Âdhyâtmikas*, that is, those that proceed by referring to the Self, as differentiated from *Prakṛiti*, are four in number, having the names of *Prakṛiti*, *Upâdâna*, *Kâla*, and *Bhâgya*. Among them, *Prakṛiti Tuṣṭi* is, for example : When the Self, as differentiated from *Prakṛiti*, has been known, in that stage, from the instruction of some one, such as, “Immediate intuition of the discrimination between *Prakṛiti* and *Puruṣa* is verily a transformation of *Prakṛiti*, and this *Prakṛiti* herself will produce ; to this end, useless is the practice of *Dhyâna* by you ; therefore, remain just where you are,” there is Complacency of the disciple ; it is this that is called *Ambhas*. *Upâdâna Tuṣṭi* is, for example : “Even though the manifestation of discrimination be a product of *Prakṛiti*, it does not result from *Prakṛiti* only, because there is no distinction in the relation of mere *Prakṛiti* to all beings. But that manifestation has renunciation of the world for its cause. Therefore, you should resort to renunciation ; enough of your practice of *Dhyâna*,”—from such instruction, there is Complacency ; and it is called *Salila*. *Kâla Tuṣṭi* is, for example : “Renunciation does not then and there give Release, but, by abiding time.

Therefore, success will come to you through time ; you need not be agitated about it,"—from such instruction there is Complacency called Ogha. Bhāgya Tuṣṭi is, for example : "Even through time, Release does not come to all, but, on the contrary, to some, through luck alone. Hence it was that, even in their boyhood, the sons of Madālasā attained Release, by means of the acquisition of the manifestation of discrimination, through the mere instruction only of their mother. Therefore, luck is the sole cause and nothing else,"—from such instruction there is Complacency called Vpīṣṭi

The external five take place on the abstinence from the objects of enjoyment, just as in the case of one who, through abhimāna or self-conceit, regards the Not-Self, *viz.* Prakṛiti, Mahat, Ahaṃkāra, etc., as the Self. For, thus there are five kinds of abstinence having their origin in the seeing the defects in the acquisition, preservation, waste, enjoyment, and killing, in respect of all the five objects, *viz.*, Sound and the rest. And in them there are five Complacencies. One is the Complacency found in abstinence, by means of Knowledge, by one who enquires into the manifold pains or troubles in the acquisition of the objects of enjoyment, such as a garland, sandal paste, woman, etc. A second is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who thinks that there is great trouble in the preservation of even the acquired riches and the like which are liable to be lost through the cupidity of the king and the like. A third is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who thinks of waste, in this way, namely, that even what is acquired and preserved with great effort, will waste away in the course of enjoyment. A fourth is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who thinks of the defect in enjoyment itself, namely, that on the unattaining of their objects, desires cause pain to the desirer,—desires which increase through habitual enjoyment, according to the saying :

न जातु कामः कामानामुपभोगेन शम्यति ।

हविषा कृष्णवर्मेव भूय एवाभिवर्धते ॥

Never does Desire cease through the enjoyment of the objects desired. Like fire, by means of clarified butter, it most assuredly increases—Manu-Saṃhitā.

A fifth is the Complacency found in abstinence from objects by one who sees the defect of killing, namely, that there is no enjoyment without killing or causing pain to other beings. And these Complacencies are respectively called Pāra, Supāra, Pāra-pāra, An-uttama-ambhas, and Ambhas.

These are the nine Complacencies.

Bhāṣya : —This aphorism has been explained by the Kārikā, namely :

आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभोग्याख्याः ।

बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च नव तुष्टयोऽभिहिताः ॥

The nine Complacencies are propounded : the four internal ones called after Prakṛiti, Upādāna, Kāla, and Bhāgya ; the external five, through abstinence from objects.—Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, L.

The meaning of this is as follows :

“Ādhyātmikāḥ,” that is, which exist or take place by relating to Ātmā or the Embodied State (Samghāta) of one who possesses the Complacencies. These Complacencies are four in number.

Among them, the Complacency which is called after Prakṛiti is, for example : All transformation whatsoever, up to the direct vision of the difference between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, is of Prakṛiti alone ; and it is Prakṛiti that produces that direct vision ; whereas I am immutable and all-full ;—from such contemplation of the Self, there arises contentment or satisfaction ; this Complacency is called Ambhas.

Thereafter, the Complacency that arises by means of the upādāna or material cause in the shape of retirement from the world, the same, named after Upādāna, is called Salila.

Thereafter, the Complacency that arises by means of the performance of Samādhi or spiritual contemplation for a long time in the state of retirement,—that Complacency, named after or relative to Kāla, is called Ogha.

Thereafter, the Complacency that arises on the accomplishment of the Samādhi known as the Cloud of Virtue (*vide* Yoga-Sūtram, IV. 29), —that, named after Bhāgya, is called Vṛṣṭi.

These are the four Ādhyātmika Complacencies.

The five external Complacencies are produced from abstinence from the five external objects of enjoyment beginning with Sound, caused or occasioned by the defects involved in acquisition, preservation, waste, enjoyment, killing, etc. And these Complacencies have respectively been given the technical names of Pāra, Supāra, Pāra-pāra, An-uttama-ambhas, and Uttama-ambhas.

Some one (cf. Vedāntin Mahādeva), on the other hand, has explained this Kārikā in a different manner. It is thus : That is called after Prakṛiti, which is the Complacency found in the abandonment of Dhyāna, etc., in some such view as that the direct vision of Discrimination is nothing but a transformation of Prakṛiti, and that, therefore, there is no need of the practice of Dhyāna. That is called after Upādāna, which is the Complacency

consisting in the attitude of mind, namely, that by the extraneous means of retirement alone there will be Release, and that, therefore, there is no need of Dhyâna, etc. That is called after Kâla, which is the Complacency consisting in the attitude of mind, namely, that even of one who has done renunciation, Release will take place by means of time alone, and that, therefore, there is no need of anxiety. That is called after Bhāgya, which is the Complacency found in some such misleading argument as that Release will take place by means of luck alone, and not by the help of the means laid down in the Śāstras on Release. Such is the meaning. But it is not so; because, since the non-existences of the Complacencies expounded by him, would be favourable to knowledge, it is improper or not right to give them the technical name of Incapacity (*vide* III. 38 and 42).—43.

Divisions of Perfection explained.

उहादिभिः सिद्धिः ॥ ३ । ४४ ॥

उहादिभिः ūha-ādi-bhiḥ, by means of reasoning and the rest. **सिद्धिः** siddhiḥ, perfection. (**अष्टधा** aṣṭ-dhā, eightfold.—Aniruddha only.)

44. By means of *reasoning* and the rest, Perfection (is of eight kinds).—255.

Vṛtti :—The author states the distinctions of Perfection.

“Chah,” argumentation, thinking (manana),—this is one Perfection, called Tāra. Verbal Cognition is the second Perfection, called Sūtāra. Study is the third Perfection, called Tāra-tāra. Acquisition of or companionship of the Guru or spiritual teacher, Brahmachārins or student celebrates, and the like, is the fourth Perfection, called Ramyaka. External and internal purity is the fifth perfection, called Sadā-muditā. Prevention of pain ādhyātmika or attendant upon the embodied state of the Self, is the sixth Perfection, called Pramodā. Prevention of pain adhibhautika or caused by the Elements and the elemental creations, is the seventh Perfection, called Muditā. Prevention of pain ādhidaivika or caused by the Devas and like other Beings, is the eighth Perfection, called Modamānā. Thus they are eightfold.

Principally, Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection,—these are the four varieties (of modifications of Buddhi). Through minor distinctions, there are fifty (of them).—44.

Vedāntin Mahādeva :—****And they—the eight Perfections—are Ūha, Śabda, Adhyayana, the three Preventions, Companionship of Friends,

and Dâna. Now, intending to show that the order of things is stronger than the traditional or scriptural order of their mention, they are being explained in a different order.

Among them, the first Perfection is what is called Adhyayana; that is, the receiving, according to prescribed rules, from the mouth of the teacher, of the inner sense of the letters of the vidyâs or truths about the adhyâtma or the Incarnate Self; this is called Târa. The second Perfection is Śabda or Sound; that is, cognition of the sense or object produced by it; this is called Sutâra. The third is Ūha, reasoning, that is, the examination of the meaning of the Âgama or Veda by means of arguments not conflicting with the Âgama; it is what they say is Manana or thinking; this is called Târa-târa. Companionship of friends is the fourth. One pays no respect even to the object examined by arguments, so long as one has not discussed it with the Guru, his disciples, and other student celebrities; hence companionship of friends is necessary. This is called Ramyaka. The fifth Perfection is Dâna, and dâna is the purity of the Knowledge of the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, because the word, Dâna, is derived from the root, *daip*, meaning purification. As Patañjali has said, *viz.*,

विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा हानोपायः ॥

Undisturbed manifestation of Viveka, is the means of avoidance.—Yoga-Sûtram, II. 28, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 147.

“A-viplava” means purity, and this consists in the existence of the immediate intuition of discrimination, in the shape of a transparent stream, by means of the avoidance of doubt and mistake together with desire. But this cannot be possible except through the maturity of abhyâsa or constant practice, for a long time, without interruption, and, with ardour. Hence, by the act called Dâna, that, abhyâsa, also is included. This is called Sadâ-muditâ.

And these five are secondary Perfections, because they are the means; while the principal Perfections, principal, because they are the fruits, are prevention of Âdhyâtmika pain, prevention of Âdhibhautika pain, and prevention of Âdhidaivika pain, of which the names are respectively Pramodâ, Muditâ, and Modamânâ.

Thus, the divisions of Mistake are five, Incapacity is twenty-eight-fold, Complacency is ninefold, and Perfection is eightfold;—these are the fifty Padârthas or Nameables or Predicables.

Bhâṣya :—By the divisions of Ūha and the rest, Perfection is eight-fold. Such is the meaning.

This aphorism too has been explained by the Kārikā ; viz.,

ऊहःशब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघाताख्यः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।

दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥

Argumentation, Word, Study, the triad of Prevention of Pain, Acquisition of Friends, Charity or Purity, are the eight Perfections. The three mentioned before Perfection (viz., Mistake, Incapacity, and Complacency) are the goads (to Ignorance and Suffering).—Sāṃkhya-kārikā, LI.

The meaning of this is as follows :—

Here the three preventions of pain are the principal perfections, because they are the counter-opposites of the threefold pains, Ādhyāt-mika and the rest ; while the others, because they are the means towards their accomplishment, are secondary Perfections.

Amongst these, Ūha is, for example, the finding out, or the guessing at, the truth, for oneself, through the force of the abhyāsa or practice done in a previous state of existence (in other words, the instinctive guess at the truth), even without the help of instructions and the like. While Word is, for example, the knowledge that is produced from hearing the reading of another or from reading the Sāstras for oneself. And Study is, for example, the Knowledge derived from the study of the Sāstra as a student sitting at the feet of a teacher. Acquisition of Friends is, for example, the Acquisition of Knowledge from a person so exceedingly compassionate as to have come to one's house for the purpose of imparting Knowledge. And Charity is, for example, the acquisition of Knowledge (from another) through satisfaction caused (to him) by the gift of money and the like.

And, amongst these, the first threefold, viz., of the form of Instinct, Word, and Study, are the "aṅkuṣa," that is, the attractors, of the principal Perfections. This has been said with a view to show that Acquisition of Friends and Charity are inferior means as compared with the triad beginning with Instinct. Some one, however, explains (the passage as meaning) that, of these eight Perfections, "aṅkuṣa," that is, the curb or impeder, is the first threefold, viz., of the form of Mistake, Incapacity, and Complacency, inasmuch as these cause obstruction (to the attainment of Perfection). But this explanation is not a correct one ; for, since the characteristic of the non-existence of Complacency to be the contradictory of Perfection, is obtained through its being an Incapacity like deafness and the rest, it is impossible that both Complacency and Non-complacency should be the contradictory of Perfection.—44.

Note.—The some one alluded to by Vījñāna is no other than Gaudapada, the famous Commentator of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā.

The other so-called Perfections are not real.

नेतरादितरहानेन विना ॥ ३ । ४५ ॥

na, not. इतरात् itarât, from the other, i.e., austerity and the like (Vijñâna), Incapacity and Complacency (Aniruddha). इतरहानेन itar-hânena, by the abandonment or removal of the other, i.e., Mistake (Vijñâna), Mistake and Incapacity (Aniruddha). विना vinâ, without.

45. (There can be) no (Perfection), without the removal of the one by the other.—Aniruddha.

(There can be) no (real Perfection), through any other (means), without the removal of the other (i.e., Mistake, which those other means fail to effect). Vijñâna.—256.

Vṛitti:—The author states that Perfection comes through the abandonment of the preceding by means of the succeeding (among Mistake, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection).

There is no Perfection without "itarâ-hânena," the removal of Mistake, "itarât," through Incapacity. Similarly, there is no Perfection without the removal of Incapacity through Complacency. Similarly, without the removal thereof.—45.

Vedântin Mahâdeva:—The author says that Mistake, Incapacity and Complacency are to be avoided.

Without the avoidance of the others, viz., Mistake, Incapacity and Complacency; "itarât," through the other, viz., non-avoidance (i.e., employment of the other prescribed means herein laid down); Perfections do not result,—such is the complement of the aphorism; because those are obstacles in the path of Perfection,—such is the import.

Bhâṣya:—But, pray, why is it said that Perfections are attained by means only of Instinct and the rest, when it is established in all the Sâstras that the eight Perfections beginning with Añimâ, are obtained by means also of the force of Mantras, austerity, contemplation, and the like? In regard to this the author says:

"Itarât," that is, through the means different from the pentad beginning with Instinct, that is to say, through austerity, etc., does not result *real* Perfection. Why? "Itara-hânena vinâ;" because that Perfection results even without the removal of the "other," namely, Mistake; therefore, not being an antagonist to samsâra or worldly existence, that is merely a semblance of Perfection, and not a real Perfection. Such is the meaning.

So has it been stated by the Yoga aphorism ; viz.,

ते समाधायुपसर्गा व्युत्थाने सिद्धयः ॥

They are obstacles in the state of Contemplation, and Perfections during (the stage of) worldly activity.—Yoga-Sŭtram, III. 36, S. B. H. Vol. iv, p. 236.

Thus, then, beginning with this that, through Knowledge comes Release, (III. 23) (and ending with the present aphorism), has been mentioned, in detail, the pratyaya-sarga, that is, the intuitional creation, having the form of the Guṇa or subsidiary states of Buddhi, including its effect, viz., Bondage, together with the purpose of Puruṣa in the form of Release.

And these two creations, that is, of the form of Buddhi and of its subsidiary states or modifications, are, by the form of continuous succession, the causes of one another, just like the seed and the sprout. So there is also the Kārikā :

न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिवृत्तिः ।

लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥

Without Bhāvas or dispositions, there would be no Liṅga ; without Liṅga, there would be no surcease of Bhāvas ; wherefrom a twofold creation proceeds ; the one called after the Liṅga, the other called after the Bhāvas.—Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, LII.

“ Bhāva ” is Buddhi, having the form of Vāsanā or tendency, of which the Guṇas or subsidiary modifications are Knowledge and the rest. “ Liṅga ” is the Principle of Mahat, that is, Buddhi.

The samaṣṭi or collective creation as well as the pratyaya or intuitional creation are completed.--45.

Individual or Specific Creations divided.

दैवादिप्रभेदा ॥ ३ । ४६ ॥

दैवादिप्रभेदा daiva-ādi-prabhedā, of which the fixed or marked divisions are the Daiva or Divine and the rest.

46. (Vyāṣṭi or Specific Creation is that) of which the marked divisions are the Divine and the rest.—257.

Vṛitti:—If there be Creation, there would be Dispassion. How many, then, are the divisions of Creation ? To this the author replies.

From the word ādi, six divisions are obtained. Thus, they are :

दैवादौ षड्विधश्च स्यात् संसारः कर्मसंभवः ।

सुरोऽसुरो नरः प्रेतो नारकस्तिर्यकस्तथा ॥

And among the Divine and the other Creations, there would be a sixfold saṃsāra or worldly existence, arising from Karma ; viz., as a god, a demon, a man, a departed spirit, a denizen of hell, as well as a grovelling creature.

The immovables are included among the denizens of hell.—46.

Bhāṣya :—Now the *vyāṣṭi* or specific or individual creation, which was briefly mentioned as “ Division into Individuals is through distinctions of Karma ” (III. 10), is shown in detail.

Such as that of which the “ *prabhedā* ” or sub-divisions are the *Daiva* or Divine and the rest ; is Creation,—such is the complement of the aphorism.

So has it been explained by the *Kārikā* :

अष्ट विकल्पो दैवस्तैर्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।

मानुष्यश्चैकविधः समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥

The *Daiva* is of eight kinds ; and the Grovelling Species is of five kinds ; and the Human is of a single kind ;—this, briefly, is the *Bhautika Sarga* or the creation of beings or elemental creation.—*Sāmkhya-Kārikā*, LIII.

The eightfold *Daiva Sarga* is the *Brāhma*, *Prajāpatya*, *Aindra*, *Paitra*, *Gāndharva*, *Yākṣa*, *Rākṣasa*, and *Paśācha*. The fivefold Grovelling Species are the beasts, domestic animals, birds, reptiles, and immovables. The human creation is of a single kind. “ *Bhautika*,” that is, the creation or emanation of the *Bhūtas* or the individual beings from the side of the *Virāt*. Such is the meaning.—46.

Note : - *Virāt* is, as explained in the *Vedānta-Sāra*, the Consciousness superimposed upon, that is to say, the Conscious Being presiding over, the Gross Bodies collectively :

(स्थूलशरीरसमष्ट्युपहितं चैतन्यम् ॥)

Bhautika Sarga also is for the sake of Puruṣa.

आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तं तत्कृते सृष्टिरा विवेकात् ॥ ३ । ४७ ॥

आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तं ā-brahmastamba-paryantam, from *Brahmā* down to a stock. *तत्कृते tat-kṛite*, for the sake of him, i.e., *Puruṣa*. *सृष्टिः sṛiṣṭih*, creation. *आ विवेकात् āvivekāṭ*, till there be Discrimination.

47. From *Brahmā* down to a stock, the creation is for the sake of *Puruṣa*, till there be Discrimination (between *Prakṛiti* and *Puruṣa*).—258.

Vṛitti :—Since activity is the very nature of *Prakṛiti*, there would be creation at every moment, and, consequently, no Release. In regard to this, the author says :

“ *Tat-kṛite*,” for the sake of *Puruṣa*, that is to say, for the purpose of Release, is creation. “ Till there be Discrimination,” that is, because the essential nature of a thing does not depart from it, this (to create) is the habit of *Prakṛiti* so long as Discrimination does not arise.—47.

Vedāntin Mahādera:—It is the nature of Prakṛiti to energise only till there be Discrimination.

Bhāṣya:—The author says that the subsidiary creation, just mentioned, is also for the sake of Puruṣa.

Vyaṣṭi or individual creation, beginning with the Four-Faced (Brahmā) and ending with the immovables, is also, just like the collective creation of Virāt or Mahat, for the sake of Puruṣa, that is to say, till there be manifestation of the Discrimination (between Prakṛiti and Puruṣa) to the several Puruṣas concerned or affected. Such is the meaning.—47.

The Higher World described.

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशाला ॥ ३ । ४८ ॥

ऊर्ध्वं ūrdhvaṃ, aloft, above. सत्त्वविशाला sattva-viśālā, abundant in Sattva.

48. Aloft, (it is) abundant in Sattva.—259.

Vṛitti:—In which region, how is Creation made? To this the author replies.

(“ Ūrdhvaṃ,” i.e.) in the Deva-Loka or the World of the Devas.—48.

Bhāṣya:—The author mentions the divisions in Individual Creation also, in the following three aphorisms.

“ Ūrdhvaṃ,” that is, above the world of the earth, the creation has a prevalence of Sattva in it. Such is the meaning.—48.

The Lower World described.

तमोविशाला मूलतः ॥ ३ । ४९ ॥

तमोविशाला tamas-viśālā, abundant in Tamas. मूलतः mūla-taḥ, towards the foot.

49. Towards the foot, (it is) abundant in Tamas.—260.

Vṛitti:—The author describes the creation in the world of the Nāgas. (Mūlataḥ,” i.e.) in the Pātāla.—49.

Bhāṣya:—“ Mūlataḥ,” i.e., below the world of the earth. Such is the meaning.—49.

The Middle World described.

मध्ये रजोविशाला ॥ ३ । ५० ॥

मध्ये madhye, in the middle. रजोविशाला rajas-viśālā, abundant in Rajas.

50. In the middle, (it is) abundant in Rajas.—261.

Vṛitti:—The author describes the creation in the world of the mortals.

“ Viśālā ” means, developed or predominant.—50.

Bhāṣya :—“Madhye,” that is, in the world of the earth. Such is the meaning.—50.

Note :—Compare *Kārikā* :

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।
मध्ये रजोविशालो ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तम् ॥

Above, the creation is abundant in Sattva ; below, it is abundant in Tamas ; and, in the middle, it is abundant in Rajas ;—(such is the creation) from Brahmā down to a stock. —*Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*, LIV.

Cause of the differences of the above creations.

कर्मवैचित्र्यात्प्रधानचेष्टा गर्भदासवत् ॥ ३ । ५१ ॥

कर्मवैचित्र्यात् karma-vaichitryāt, through diversity of Karma. प्रधानचेष्टा pradhāna-cheṣṭā, operation or behaviour of Prakṛiti. गर्भदासवत् garbha-dāsa-vat, just like a born slave.

51. Through diversity of Karma, is the (diverse) operation of Prakṛiti, just like a born slave.—262.

Vṛitti :—But, then, it may be asked, when her own several Guṇas or subsidiary states do consort with one another, how does diversity appear in the creation of Prakṛiti? To this the author replies.

Just as a born slave, if he is skilful or smart enough, performs a variety of works, for the sake of his master, so does Prakṛiti produce diverse creation, for the sake of Puruṣa, through diversity of Karma, that is, through getting diverse works to do according to the different lots of individual Puruṣas.—51.

Bhāṣya :—But, then, for what reason, are there, from one single Prakṛiti, creations diversified as being abundant in Sattva, etc.? There being room for such an enquiry, the author says :

It is only by reason of a diversity of Karma, that there is the operation of Prakṛiti, as aforesaid, in the form of a variety of products. An illustration of this diversity (is afforded by the example :) “just like a born slave :” Just as of a person who is a slave from the embryo state upwards, there is, through smartness or maturity of the vāsana or instinctive tendency to serve, a variety of operation, that is, service, in the interests of his master ; similarly. Such is the meaning.—51.

The Higher Worlds cannot be the Summum Bonum.

आवृत्तिस्तत्ताप्युत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगाद्वयः ॥ ३ । ५२ ॥

आवृत्तिः āvṛtitiḥ, reversion, return. तत्र tatra, in the going to the higher regions. अपि api, even. उत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगात् uttara-uttara-yoni-yogāt, on account of connection with successive lower births. वयः beyah. ~~to be avoided or skimped~~.